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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the nature of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) as a governance organisation in the context of international 
regime theory. It examines the hypothesis that ICANN represents a new type of 
hybrid political entity, one that both challenges established concepts in IR theory, and 
that may be representative of emerging trends in other areas of global issue 
management.  
The concept of international regimes, initially defined in the early 1980s by Stephen 
Krasner, has become one of the key elements of contemporary International Relations 
theory. Despite ongoing debates between proponents of various theoretical paradigms 
over some key questions, such as how and why regimes form and are sustained, the 
basic concept of the international regime has remained fairly clearly defined. ICANN, 
however, has been widely interpreted as a new approach to global governance in an 
emerging issue-area, one based upon ‘multistakeholder’ decisionmaking involving a 
range of interested actor types, as opposed to the traditional model of a predominantly 
state-based ‘inter-national’ organisation. This dissertation seeks to examine the extent 
to which concepts drawn from existing regime theories remain useful as analytical 
tools for interpreting the types of emerging global governance arrangements 
represented by the ICANN system.  
The dissertation begins with a review of ICANN’s history and organisational 
structure, followed by a literature review exploring some competing interpretations of 
ICANN. It then utilises three case studies of the ICANN policy development process 
in action, in an effort to explore how ICANN policy is made in practice and which 
types of actors and interests appear to have most influence within the regime. The 
analysis reveals certain commercial interests, together with governments, to be the 
predominant actors within the ICANN system. Subsequent chapters draw upon these 
findings to explore how ontological models drawn from various paradigms on regime 
theory, including realist, neoliberal institutionalist, neo-Marxist and social 
constructivist approaches, might be applied to the ICANN regime. The study 
demonstrates that concepts drawn from each of these paradigms, and particularly 
 vi 
neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism, are readily applicable to the 
ICANN case. The dissertation concludes that ICANN can be usefully interpreted as a 
regime using a definition based on Krasner’s, albeit of a modified type better 
described as a ‘global governance’ rather than an ‘inter-national’ regime. Finally, it 
attempts to evaluate the extent to which lessons from the ICANN case may be 
applicable to emerging trends in other issue-areas of international politics. 
 vii 
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Glossary of terms 
 
A-label - The A-label is what is transmitted in the DNS protocol and is the ASCII-
compatible (ACE) form of an IDNA string; for example "xn--11b5bs1di". 
 
ACE - ASCII Compatible Encoding. ACE is a system for translating non-Latin 
character sets into ASCII equivalents, encoding Unicode so that each character can be 
transmitted using only the letters a-z, 0-9 and hyphens. It is used to allow non-Latin 
character sets to be represented in IDN domain names without having to redesign the 
underlying DNS technology.  
 
ALAC – ICANN’s At-Large Advisory Committee. The role of the ALAC is to 
consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the 
interests of individual Internet users. It consists of ten members selected by Regional 
At-Large Organisations (RALOs) and five members selected by the Nominating 
Committee. 
 
ARPA - Advanced Research Projects Agency. A technical research agency of the 
United States Department of Defense. Also known as DARPA (Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency). 
 
ARPANET – Advanced Research Projects Agency Network. The first wide-area 
packet-switching network, initially created in 1969 and funded by the US Department 
of Defense. ARPANET formed the core network of what later became the Internet.  
 
ASCII - American Standard Code for Information Interchange. ASCII is a commonly 
used numerical code for computers and other devices that work with text. Computers 
can only store and process data as numbers, so a method is required of assigning a 
numerical value to each character of text. An ASCII code is the numerical 
representation of a character such as 'a' or '@'.  ASCII only supports characters from 
the Latin script.  
 
ASO – ICANN’s Address Supporting Organisation. The Address Supporting 
Organisation (ASO) is made up of representatives of the RIRs, and deals with policy 
issues relating to the operation, assignment, and management of IP addresses. 
 
At-Large Constituency - the former ICANN organisation responsible for co-
ordinating the global At-Large user community and coordinating global elections for 
one-third of ICANN directors. Disbanded 2002, partly replaced by the ALAC.   
 
Backbone – Historically, the central link connecting the various networks making up 
the Internet. Today superseded by multiple Internet Exchange (IX) points that allow 
major ISPs to exchange data directly.     
 
BC –  Alternative term for the CBUC.  
 
CBUC - Commercial & Business Users Constituency. One of the GNSO 
Constituencies, representing commercial and business users. 
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CCNSO – ICANN’s Country Code Names Supporting Organisation. The ccNSO 
deals with policy relating to country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), and is made 
up of representatives of the ccTLD registries. 
 
ccTLD - Country Code Top Level Domain. Two letter domains, such as .uk (United 
Kingdom), .de (Germany) and .jp (Japan) (for example), are called country code top 
level domains (ccTLDs) and correspond to a country, territory, or other geographic 
location. The rules and policies for registering domain names in the ccTLDs vary 
significantly and some ccTLD registries limit use of the ccTLD to citizens of the 
corresponding country. 
 
Device – In a networking context, a computer or other piece of equipment capable of 
sending and receiving data on the network. Also known as a node or host. 
 
Domain Name - A name that identifies a computer or computers on the Internet. 
These names appear as a component of a Web site's URL, e.g. www.microsoft.com, 
and are also used for other purposes in the Domain Name System (DNS), for example 
following the @ sign in an email address. Domain names are organised as a hierarchy, 
beginning with Top Level Domains, such as .com or .org, under which are second-
level domains (SLDs) such as microsoft.com, third level domains (such as 
support.microsoft.com) and so on.  
 
DNS - Domain Name System. DNS is a user-friendly system that allows users to find 
their way around the Internet. Every computer on the Internet has a unique numerical 
address – essentially similar in concept a telephone number – known as an IP (Internet 
Protocol) address. However, IP addresses are cumbersome and difficult to remember. 
The DNS makes using the Internet easier by allowing a familiar string of letters (the 
‘domain name’) to be used instead of the arcane IP address. DNS is organised as a 
distributed database, based around a hierarchical system of interlinked servers. At the 
top of the hierarchy lie the thirteen ‘root’ servers.    
 
DNSO – Domain  Name Supporting Organisation. A former ICANN Supporting 
Organisation with responsibility for policy pertaining to Top-Level Domains (TLDs). 
Split into the GNSO and ccNSO in 2002. 
 
GNSO – ICANN’s Generic Names Supporting Organisation. The GNSO deals with 
policy relating to generic top-level domains (gTLDs), and is made up of 
representatives from a number of stakeholder ‘Constituencies’, including: the 
Business and Commercial Users Constituency; the Non-Commercial Users 
Constituency; the gTLD Registries Constituency; the Registrars Constituency; the 
Intellectual Property Constituency; and the ISPs Constituency. 
 
gTLD - Generic Top Level Domain. Most TLDs with three or more characters are 
referred to as "generic" TLDs, or "gTLDs". They can be subdivided into two types, 
"sponsored" TLDs (sTLDs) and "unsponsored” TLDs. Generally speaking, an 
unsponsored TLD operates under policies established directly through the ICANN 
process, while a sponsored TLD is a specialised TLD intended for use by a particular 
community. The TLD sponsor represents that community and may set criteria for 
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registration. For example, .museum is sponsored by the International Council of 
Museums and restricts registrations to recognised museum institutions.   
 
GAC – ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee. The GAC is made up of 
representatives of national governments, and is intended to provide advice on the 
activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters 
where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and 
international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues. 
 
Host – a computer or device connected to the Internet. Also known as a node. 
IAB – Internet Architecture Board. The IAB is the steering committee of the IETF, 
and is responsible for defining the overall architecture of the Internet, providing 
guidance and broad direction to the IETF. The IAB also serves as the technology 
advisory group to the Internet Society, and oversees a number of critical activities in 
support of the Internet.  
IANA – Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. The original IANA was ICANN’s 
predecessor as the organisation responsible for top-level management of the Internet’s 
naming and numbering systems. The present IANA is a department of ICANN. The 
“IANA function” refers to the core task of global coordination of the DNS root, IP 
addressing, and other Internet protocol resources. IANA manages the DNS Root 
Zone; coordinates the global IP and AS number space, and allocates these to Regional 
Internet Registries; and acts as the central repository for protocol name and number 
registries, used in many Internet protocols. 
 
ICANN – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Formally 
organised as a non-profit corporation under Californian law, ICANN is responsible 
for development of policy pertaining to the management and use of the Internet’s core 
IP addressing and domain name systems. It draws its authority to manage these 
systems from a contract with the US Department of Commerce, which claims legal 
ownership of the root.   
 
IDNs -Internationalised Domain Names. IDNs are domain names represented by 
language characters other than the standard ASCII character set. These domain names 
may contain characters with diacritical marks (required by many European languages) 
or characters from non-Latin scripts such as Arabic, Cyrillic or Chinese. 
 
IDNA - Internationalised Domain Names in Applications. IDNA is a protocol that 
makes it possible for applications to handle domain names with non-ASCII 
characters. IDNA converts domain names with non-ASCII characters to ASCII labels 
that the DNS can handle.  
 
IDN A Label -  The A-label is what is transmitted in the DNS protocol and this is the 
ASCII-compatible (ACE) form of an IDN A string. For example "xn-1lq90i". 
 
IDN U Label - The U-label is what should be displayed to the user and is the 
representation of the IDN in Unicode. For example "北京" ("Beijing" in Chinese). 
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IESG – Internet Engineering Steering Group. The IESG is responsible for technical 
management of IETF activities and the Internet standards process. As part of the 
ISOC, it administers the process according to the rules and procedures which have 
been ratified by the ISOC Trustees. The IESG is directly responsible for the actions 
associated with entry into and movement along the Internet "standards track," 
including final approval of specifications as Internet Standards. 
IETF –  Internet Engineering Task Force.  The IETF is the main Internet standards 
body, and operates under ISOC. It is a large open international community of network 
designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the 
Internet architecture and the operation of the Internet. The actual technical work of the 
IETF is done in its working groups, which are organized by topic into several areas 
(e.g., routing, transport, security, etc.). 
 
Internet Exchange (IX) point – A physical connection between the networks of two 
major ISPs, allowing direct data transfer between them. The use of these points is 
usually governed by peering agreements between the two parties. 
 
IPC - Intellectual Property Constituency. One of the GNSO Constituencies, 
representing intellectual property interests. 
 
ISP – Internet Service Provider. An entity, usually a private company, that provides 
connections to the Internet.   
 
ISPCP - Internet Service & Connection Providers Constituency. One of the GNSO 
Constituencies, representing ISPs. 
 
ISO - International Organisation for Standardisation. An international standard-
setting body composed of representatives from various national standards 
organisations, which  promulgates worldwide proprietary, industrial, and commercial 
standards. It has produced various standards relevant to the domain names field, 
including a list of ‘countries’ (ISO-3166-1) upon which assignment of country-code 
top-level domains is based.  
 
ISOC – Internet Society. ISOC is a professional membership organisation of Internet 
experts that comments on policies and practices and oversees a number of other 
boards and task forces dealing with network policy issues, including the IAB, IETF 
and IESG. 
 
ITU – International Telecommunications Union. The UN agency dealing with 
international telecommunications regulation.  
 
IP address - An IP address is a unique numeric identifier assigned to each computer 
or device connected to the Internet. Its function is to facilitate communication by 
distinguishing that particular computer from any other on the network, and is 
somewhat analogous to a postal address for conventional mail, or to a telephone 
number on a conventional voice telecommunications system; it allows data to be 
forwarded to or requested from that particular device. Under the IPv4 system utilised 
since 1983, an IP address consists of a 32-bit binary number, e.g. 
11000000101010000000101000001010. However, on a computer-human interface, 
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the address is usually expressed in ‘dotted decimal’ format for ease of interpretation, 
for example 192.168.10.10.   
 
Label – in the domain name context, a label is one element of a URL. For example, 
the URL www.microsoft.com contains the labels www, microsoft and com.  
 
LDH - Letter Digit Hyphen. The hostname convention used by domain names before 
internationalisation. This meant that domain names could only practically contain the 
letters a-z, digits 0-9 and the hyphen "-". The term "LDH code points" refers to this 
subset. With the introduction of IDNs this rule is no longer relevant for all domain 
names. The LD````H-label strictly refers to an all-ASCII label that obeys the 
"hostname" (LDH) conventions and that is not an IDN; for example "icann" in the 
domain name "icann.org". 
 
NCUC - Non-Commercial Users Constituency. One of the GNSO Constituencies, 
representing non-commercial users. 
 
Node - a computer or device connected to the Internet. Also known as a host. 
 
NomCom – ICANN Nominating Committee. The NomCom appoints members to 
various ICANN bodies, including a proportion of the Board.  
 
NSF – US National Science Foundation. In 1986 NSF created the NSFNet, a new 
‘backbone’ linking the various networks that make up the Internet together. NSF also 
implemented the ‘No commerce’ rule, prohibiting use of the backbone (and therefore 
effectively the Internet) for purposes ‘not in support of Research and Education’). 
This rule was dropped in 1991.  
 
NSI – Network Solutions Inc. A private company, NSI was contracted to provide 
registration services across all gTLDs between 1993 and 1998, and also held a 
contract from the United States government to directly administer the DNS root zone 
file. Following ICANN’s creation, NSI’s monopoly over name registration came to an 
end. ICANN policy prohibited vertical integration of registries and registrars, and NSI 
was forced to separate its registry and registrar operations into separate businesses. 
However, NSI continued to hold the contract for administration of the root zone, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Commerce that required NSI to co-
operate with policy decisions made by ICANN. NSI was subsequently taken over by 
VeriSign in 2000; however, in 2003 VeriSign sold the registrar arm of the business, 
which continues to operate under the Network Solutions brand.  
 
PCP - Public Comments Period. 
 
PDP - Policy Development Process. 
 
Protocol – In computer networking, a set of rules and formats governing 
communications on a network. For two devices on a network to be able to exchange 
data, they must be using the same protocols – effectively, ‘speaking the same 
language’.   
 
 xiii 
PSO – Protocol Supporting Organisation. A former ICANN Supporting Organisation, 
disbanded in 2002. The PSO’s function was to advise the ICANN Board with respect 
to matters relating to the assignment of parameters for Internet protocols. It was partly 
succeeded by the SSAC and RSSAC. 
 
Punycode - Punycode is the ASCII-compatible encoding algorithm described in 
Internet standard RFC3492. It is the method for encoding IDNs into sequences of 
ASCII characters in order for the Domain Name System (DNS) to understand and 
manage the names. 
  
RALOs – Regional At-Large Organisations. These are regional groupings of the 
ICANN At-Large community that host discussions at a regional level. They are 
intended to gather grass-roots input on the views of the global Internet-using 
community, to be forwarded on to the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). Each 
RALO appoints two members of the ALAC (for a total of ten members out of fifteen).  
The RALOs are open for membership to interested individuals and organisations in 
the relevant region. Each RALO has a regional Chair and a Secretariat. In addition to 
their annual General Assemblies, the regions hold monthly teleconferences to develop 
a regional view on current policy issues and to provide input for the At-Large policy 
process. There are five such RALOs – the African Regional At-Large Organisation 
(AFRALO); the Asian, Australasian and Pacific Islands Regional At-Large 
Organisation (APRALO); the European Regional At-Large Organisation (EURALO); 
the Latin American and Caribbean Islands Regional  At-Large Organisation 
(LACRALO); and the North-American Regional At-Large Organisation (NARALO). 
  
 
Registrar – Registrars act as ‘middlemen’ between the registries and the end-user. 
Domain names ending with .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, .org, 
and .pro can be registered through many different companies (known as "registrars") 
that compete with one another. The registrar keeps records of the contact information 
and submits the technical information to the registry. Registrar services in the ccTLDs 
are decided by the ccTLD manager and ccTLD registrars are not accredited by 
ICANN. Some ICANN-accredited registrars provide registration services in the 
ccTLDs in addition to registering names in .biz, .com, .info, .name, .net and .org, 
however, ICANN does not specifically accredit registrars to provide ccTLD 
registration services. 
 
RC-Registrar Constituency. One of the GNSO Constituencies, representing registrars  
 
Registry - A registry is the authoritative, master database of all domain names 
registered in each Top Level Domain. However, the term is also commonly used to 
refer to the registry operator, the entity that manages this database. The registry 
operator keeps the master database and also generates the "zone file" which allows 
computers to route Internet traffic to and from top-level domains anywhere in the 
world. Domain name registrants do not interact directly with the registry operator, 
instead registrars act as ‘middlemen’ between registrants and registries.  
 
RyC - Registry Constituency One of the GNSO Constituencies, representing gTLD 
registries. 
 
 xiv 
RFC - Request for Comment. The main method for documenting an Internet standard. 
These are numbered sequentially, beginning with RFC 1 in April 1969. Initially, any 
researcher working on the ARPANET could write an RFC, and, if enough people 
agreed and used the idea, the design became a standard. The RFC system continues to 
this day under the IETF, though it has become more formalised over the years. 
 
RIR – Regional Internet Registry. ICANN allocates large blocks of addresses to 
organisations known as Regional Internet Registries (not to be confused with TLD 
registries). There are five such RIRs, made up of representatives from various 
interested parties, such as Internet service providers (ISPs), telecommunication 
organisations, educational institutions, governments, regulatory agencies, and large 
corporations. RIRs allocate smaller blocks of IP addresses to ISPs and other large 
organisations, which then in turn allocate individual IP addresses to end-users. 
 
Root – the top level of the DNS namespace hierarchy. All domain names on the 
Internet can be regarded as ending in a full stop character, e.g. 
"www.microsoft.com.". This final dot is generally implied rather than explicit, as 
modern DNS software does not actually require that the final dot be included when 
attempting to translate a domain name to an IP address. The empty string (blank 
space) after the final dot is called the root domain, and all other domains (e.g. .com, 
.org, .net, etc.) are contained within the root domain.   
 
Root server - A root nameserver is a DNS server that answers requests for the root 
namespace domain, and redirects requests for a particular top-level domain to that 
TLD's nameservers. Although any local implementation of DNS can implement its 
own private root nameservers, the term "root nameserver" is generally used to refer to 
the thirteen nameservers that implement the root namespace domain for the Internet's 
official global implementation of the Domain Name System. The most authoritative 
of these servers, to which the others defer is, known as the ‘A’ root server.   
 
RSSAC – ICANN’s Root Server System Advisory Committee.  The RSSAC is a 
technical body that provides advice with regards to the technical operation of the root 
servers, to guide policymaking and help to ensure ICANN’s commitment to 
preserving the stability of the DNS is fulfilled. 
 
SSAC – ICANN’s Stability and Security Advisory Committee. The SSAC is a 
technical body that provides advice with regards to the technical operation of the 
domain name system with emphasis on security and stability matters, to guide 
policymaking and help to ensure that ICANN’s commitment to preserving the 
stability of the DNS is fulfilled. 
 
sTLD - Sponsored Top Level Domain. These are a special category of restricted 
gTLDs, e.g. .museum, which are operated by a Sponsor (sponsoring organisation), 
e.g. the International Council of Museums operates the .museum TLD. The sponsored 
TLD has a Charter, which defines the purpose for which the sponsored TLD has been 
created and will be operated. The Sponsor is responsible for developing policies on 
the delegated topics so that the TLD is operated for the benefit of a defined group of 
stakeholders, known as the Sponsored TLD Community, that are most directly 
interested in the operation of the TLD. The Sponsor also is responsible for selecting 
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the registry operator and to varying degrees for establishing the roles played by 
registrars and their relationship with the registry operator.  
 
String – A sequence of characters. In the domain name context, used to refer to 
domain name labels, e.g. org and com. 
 
Supporting Organisation –  ICANN sub-groups that deal with specific areas of 
ICANN policymaking. There are currently three such Supporting Organisations, the 
Address Supporting Organisation (ASO), the Generic Names Supporting Organisation 
(GNSO), and the Country-Code Supporting Organisation (CCNSO). Previously 
existing Supporting Organisations included the Protocol Supporting Organisation 
(PSO) and the Domain Name Supporting Organisation (DNSO).  
 
TCP/IP - Transmission control protocol / Internet protocol. The Internet’s main 
protocol suite since 1983.  
 
Unicode – a commonly used encoding standard that supports a much wider range of 
characters than ASCII. Like ASCII, it assigns a unique numerical code to each 
character. Unicode supports a wide variety of languages and scripts, and continues to 
be expanded. The Unicode standard contains tables that list the code points for each 
local character identified. These tables continue to expand as more characters are 
digitalised. 
 
Unicode Consortium - A not-for-profit organisation founded to develop, extend and 
promote use of the Unicode standard.  
 
URL – Uniform Resource Locator. The URL is the full address of a resource (such as 
a Web page) on the Internet, including protocol labels and domain name, e.g. 
http://www.hud.ac.uk  
 
WHOIS – A database of registration details and contact information for domain name 
registrants. Current ICANN policy is that such details must be fully disclosed and 
made publically available for registrants in the gTLD namespaces. WHOIS policy for 
ccTLDs is left to the national ccTLD registries. A ‘strong’ or ‘thick’ WHOIS model 
refers to a requirement for detailed data to be provided and made available, while a 
‘thin’ WHOIS model would require less personal information.    
 
WIPO – The World Intellectual Property Organisation. The UN agency dealing with 
international regulation of intellectual property protection.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Overview and rationale for project    
 
This dissertation will explore the nature of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a governance organisation in the context of 
international regime theory. 
 
ICANN is a non-profit corporation created in 1998 to assume control of the Internet’s 
core naming and addressing systems, a function previously performed by an agency of 
the United States government. Originally claimed to be a private sector, apolitical 
technical agency, ICANN deals with an issue area that in practice has become 
increasingly politicised over the last decade and a half. This dissertation examines the 
hypothesis that ICANN represents a new type of hybrid political entity, one that both 
challenges established concepts in international regime theory, and that may be 
representative of emerging trends in other areas of global issue management. The 
project investigates how the ICANN case can be related to broader patterns in global 
governance, and probes the adequacy of international regime theories as an analytical 
tool for understanding both the ICANN system, and, by extension, similar emerging 
developments in other areas of global governance.  
 
The notion of international ‘regimes’ is one of the key concepts in contemporary 
International Relations theory. An international regime is a set of arrangements that 
governs behaviour pertaining to a given issue-area in international politics, and 
consists of a set of principles, norms and rules, usually together with some kind of 
decision-making procedures. Regimes may be formalised institutions based around 
international treaties and managed by formal international organisations, or they may 
simply consist of informal arrangements and ‘rules of the game’. They exist in almost 
every area of international activity, and govern matters as diverse as nuclear arms 
control, food assistance, international trade, whaling, banking, human rights, drug 
trafficking, shipping and air traffic regulation, environmental protection and radio 
frequency allocation, to list but a few examples. Regime theory, a subset of 
 2 
International Relations theory, has developed over the last few decades as a 
framework for analysis of these phenomena, and has become a key plank in our 
understanding of patterns in global governance. The issue of Internet governance, 
however, represents a new area in global politics that may test the veracity of existing 
regime theories.    
 
The study of international regimes has become well established since Stephen Krasner 
first defined the term in 1983.1  There are ongoing debates between adherents of 
various paradigms on regime theory on some key questions, such as how and why 
regimes form and are sustained, but despite this, the basic concept of the international 
regime remains fairly clearly defined. Regimes display recognisable characteristics, 
based around the existence of identifiable principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking 
procedures. Although they may well incorporate private actors, they usually do so 
within an overarching framework agreed between sovereign states. Regimes in related 
issue-areas often have similar characteristics. For example, regimes in the areas of 
transportation and communications, such as shipping, postal, air traffic and 
‘conventional’ telecommunications (primarily telegraph / telephone / broadcasting) 
show strong similarities, including sets of similar norms related to jurisdictional rights 
and obligations, damage control problems, technical and procedural barriers, and 
prices and market shares.2  
 
Despite existing in an apparently similar issue-area to these regimes, however, 
ICANN is a significantly different animal. ICANN is, at the time of writing, a more or 
less unique organisation. Its purpose is to provide co-ordination and top-level 
management of the global IP addressing and Domain Name Systems (DNS), a set of 
naming and addressing resources essential for the functioning of the Internet. Created 
in 1998, ICANN was intended to be a new approach to governance in a brand new 
global issue-area, based not on interstate treaties and intergovernmental 
decisionmaking, but instead on multistakeholder representation of the major actors 
and interest groups involved in the issue-area, including meaningful direct 
representation of the global Internet-using public. Its decisionmaking processes would 
be based on facilitating and identifying ‘bottom up’ consensus among these groups.  
                                                 
1 Krasner, S. D. (1983). ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables.’ 
International Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 2-22. P2.  
2 See Zacher, M.W. and Sutton, B.A. (1996). Governing Global Networks: International regimes for 
Transportation and Communications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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However, looking at the ICANN of today, it is clear that the model has changed 
significantly. Governments, originally intended to have a very limited advisory role 
only, seem to have become much more influential in policymaking. Meanwhile, the 
emphasis on direct representation of the global Internet-using public appears to have 
been very much reduced; for example, mechanisms for direct election of a third of 
ICANN’s Board of Directors have been removed. From the original vision of a wholly 
private organisation with elements of direct democracy, ICANN appears to have 
morphed into a public-private governance organisation dominated by governments 
and powerful commercial interests.  
 
This dissertation investigates these issues in more depth. It attempts to gain more 
insight into ICANN’s internal dynamics and a fuller understanding of how ICANN 
policy is made in practice. It investigates how far the original ideals of 
multistakeholderism and ‘consensus-based’ decisionmaking have survived, and 
attempts to explain why changes in the organisational model have occurred. It 
ultimately explores the question of just how far ICANN has, in reality, turned out to 
be different from more conventional approaches to international issue management. 
This question is initially explored via empirical investigation of the ICANN 
policymaking process in action. Later stages of the investigation use evidence 
gathered from the empirical stage to analyse ICANN in the context of international 
regime theories, asking whether ICANN really is fundamentally different to previous 
approaches to global issue-management as described by the concept of the 
international regime, or whether it can in fact be understood as a regime and 
interpreted through the lenses of regime theory. The penultimate chapter also explores 
whether one paradigm on regime theory in particular, social constructivism, can help 
to explain the shift away from ICANN’s original organisational design.  
 
Finding answers to these questions matters, for two reasons. Firstly, Internet 
governance is a major issue-area in its own right, because of the Internet’s economic, 
political and social importance in modern-day global politics. ICANN’s work impacts 
upon matters such as questions of state sovereignty and jurisdiction, economics, 
virtual property rights and the distribution of some critical resources. A fuller 
understanding of the regime is therefore a matter of considerable import in its own 
right. Secondly, ICANN provides a useful case study to explore just how far 
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conventional approaches to governance are being challenged in the contemporary 
global arena. Numerous scholars have identified a shift away from a world dominated 
by state actors, towards one in which states are one actor type among several; a world 
where governments must form working partnerships with other types of actors in a 
hybrid public-private governance model.  Such developments pose a challenge to the 
Westphalian state model that has traditionally dominated both the academic field of 
International Relations and actual diplomatic practice. The state-centric nature of the 
conventional international regime concept has meant that its applicability to non-state 
governance arrangements has been dismissed by scholars such as Susan Strange.3 
However, others, such as A. Claire Cutler, argue there is no reason why Krasner’s 
definition of international regimes cannot be applied to private or semi-private 
governance arrangements.4 The ICANN case therefore offers an opportunity to 
explore these questions further. There is a need to develop an understanding of the 
extent to which, and in what ways, the global institutions of the future will differ from 
conventional models of international organisation. While the ICANN model is fairly 
unusual so far, it may prove to be an early example of a new type of institution that 
will become increasingly important as the 21st century goes on, and therefore could 
have major implications for the study of International Relations.  
 
Thus, there are two dimensions to the theoretical part of the project. It explores the 
question of whether regime theory can help us to understand ICANN, but also 
ultimately asks whether ICANN holds any lessons for regime theory. Is the regime 
concept defunct when dealing with a new type of governance organisation like 
ICANN, or can ICANN be fundamentally understood as a regime? There is also a 
need to consider just how far the ICANN model is likely to be representative of wider 
trends in global governance; whether ICANN is a ‘one off’, or a prototype for other 
global institutions of the future.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Strange, S. (1997). ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis.’ The Politics of Global 
Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. P. F. Diehl. London, Lynne 
Rienner: 41-55. P52. 
4 Cutler, A. C. (2007). ‘Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation.’ The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance. R. B. Hall and T. J. Biersteker. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 24-41. P27.  
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Introduction to the issue-area: Critical Internet resources and the role of ICANN 
 
Introduction to IP addressing and DNS 
 
In order for networked computers to communicate, there must be some means of 
distinguishing each individual computer or device from any other on the network. On 
the Internet, this requirement is fulfilled at a basic technical level by IP (Internet 
Protocol) addresses, unique numeric identifiers assigned to each computer or device. 
Their function is somewhat analogous to a postal address for conventional mail, or to 
a telephone number on a conventional voice telephone system; the use of a unique 
identifier allows data to be forwarded to or requested from that particular device. 
Under the IPv4 system utilised since 1983, an IP address consists of a 32-bit binary 
number, e.g. 11000000101010000000101000001010. However, on a computer-
human interface, the address is usually expressed in ‘dotted decimal’ format for ease 
of interpretation, for example 192.168.10.10.   
  
Although IP addresses are adequate to provide basic functionality, they are 
cumbersome and difficult for humans to remember. In response to this, a second level 
addressing system, utilising names instead of numbers, was created; the Domain 
Name System (DNS), familiar to all Internet users today. The system exists entirely 
for human convenience, as computers can communicate perfectly well using IP 
addresses alone. For example, the BBC’s Web server uses the IP address 
212.58.244.71. Typing http://212.58.244.71 into a Web browser would access the 
front page of the BBC website.5 However, typing http://www.bbc.co.uk is much more 
user-friendly. Additionally, IP addresses are subject to change for numerous reasons. 
Some addresses are dynamically assigned and change on a regular basis, and 
sometimes whole blocks of addresses can switch around due to changes within 
organisations or reassignment to new entities.  Advertising a given server based on a 
domain name avoids the problems associated with IP address change.  
At a technical level, DNS works by mapping IP addresses to domain names.  
However, there are literally millions of servers on the Internet, each with different IP 
address and domain name details, and these change on a daily basis. A dynamic, 
constantly updated and publicly accessible resolution database of domain names and 
                                                 
5 IP address accurate at time of writing, January 2011 
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IP addresses is therefore required. Furthermore, this system must be capable of 
accommodating extremely heavy traffic, as many billions of DNS requests are made 
every day. For these reasons, it would be a practical impossibility to centralise all 
DNS information in a single location; a single integrated database would be too 
cumbersome and unable to handle the sheer volume of traffic. Instead, DNS is 
organised as a distributed database system, based around a hierarchical structure of 
interlinked nameservers. At the top of the naming hierarchy lies the ‘root’, a set of 
thirteen servers storing the IP addresses for the nameservers that handle the top-level 
domains (TLDs), such as .uk, .com, .org, and so on. The TLD nameservers are 
‘authoritative’ for each top-level domain namespace (that is, the DNS file held on 
these servers is deemed to be the ‘official’, current version for that namespace, to 
which other nameservers defer). The root servers store the IP addresses of the TLD 
nameservers, but do not need to store information below that level. 
Under each TLD are second-level domains (SLDs), which include namespaces such 
as .co.uk or microsoft.com. Second-level domains have their own authoritative 
nameservers (one server may be authoritative for many second-level domains) to 
which queries for name resolution in that namespace are forwarded. The TLD 
nameserver keeps track of the database of second-level names under each TLD and 
the IP address of the SLD nameserver dealing with that namespace, but does not need 
to keep track of information below that level.  
A large company such as Microsoft has numerous third–level domain names under its 
microsoft.com SLD (such as support.microsoft.com and technet.microsoft.com). 
Microsoft therefore maintains its own DNS servers for microsoft.com, to which all 
queries for name resolution under that namespace are redirected. The same is true for 
country-specific SLDs, such as .co.uk, which have their own authoritative 
nameservers; below these sit nameservers authoritative for third-level namespaces 
such as bbc.co.uk, and so on.  
When a client computer is presented with a domain name such as virtual.hud.ac.uk, it 
will attempt to contact a DNS server to discover the IP address associated with that 
name. It will initially contact its local DNS server (for a home computer, this will 
usually be a server belonging to the ISP) for name resolution of virtual.hud.ac.uk. The 
local DNS server may or may not have the relevant data cached (i.e., stored for 
immediate retrieval) to be able to resolve the query itself. If the DNS server does not 
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have an entry for virtual.hud.ac.uk, it is capable of redirecting the request to another 
DNS server. If necessary, it will ‘go back to root’; that is, it will query the root servers 
in order to locate a nameserver authoritative for the .uk namespace. The .uk 
nameserver will then forward the request to a nameserver for the .ac.uk second-level 
namespace; this server will be aware of the address of the University of 
Huddersfield’s nameserver (which deals with the hud.ac.uk namespace) and will 
forward the request to that server, which will then make the final name resolution and 
forward the correct IP address for virtual.hud.ac.uk back to the client’s local DNS 
server, which will then return it to the client.    
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Figure 1.1: Domain name resolution 
 
This is a slightly simplified account of how DNS works, but in essence this is the 
basic principle. It will be seen, therefore, that control and efficient management of the 
root and the top-level domain namespaces is essential for the DNS system to function 
correctly. This is the role of ICANN. 
 
Role of ICANN  
 
Because the Internet developed haphazardly without collective international 
regulation, and because of the way it developed from ARPANET, a US government 
funded network, the US Department of Defense assumed unilateral control over 
important aspects of the Internet’s core structure, particularly assignment of domain 
names and addresses (this oversight authority was later transferred to the Department 
of Commerce in recognition of the Internet’s changing nature). As the funding source 
for ARPANET, the US government became the de facto owner of the DNS and IP 
addressing systems, but actual management of these systems was left in the hands of a 
small technical community. Following the opening up of the Internet to commerce, its 
exponential growth in the 1990s placed strains on the somewhat ad hoc system for 
managing the core naming and numbering resources. ICANN was created in 1998 to 
take over top-level management of these systems from the Internet Assigned Numbers 
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Authority (IANA), a small technical organisation that had operated under DoC 
authority.  
 
ICANN was initially established as an ostensibly ‘private’, ‘multistakeholder’ 
organisation. Despite assurances that ICANN would become fully independent of US 
governmental control, however, the US government has never entirely relinquished its 
authority over the Internet’s core systems or its claim to legal ownership of the root. 
ICANN is formally a non-profit corporation incorporated under California law, and 
holds a contract from the US Department of Commerce (DoC) to manage DNS and IP 
addressing arrangements. In formal legal terms, therefore, ICANN is theoretically 
answerable to the US government for fulfilment of this contract. At least in theory, the 
DoC could choose to withdraw the contract and allocate it to another agency. There is 
also another contractural element to US governmental oversight of the DNS, namely a 
co-operative agreement with a private company named VeriSign, which controls the 
DNS root zone file at an operational level. The agreement ensures that ICANN policy 
is actually implemented at the root level, but it does also potentially give the DoC the 
option to veto any changes to the root.6   
 
ICANN is made up of a number of bodies representing various ‘stakeholders’ in the 
domain name and IP addressing industry. It sits at the head of a hierarchy of 
organisations, to which day-to-day management of various aspects of the naming and 
numbering systems are delegated. Each TLD created in the DNS root is managed by 
an organisation known as a ‘registry’. Registries do not normally sell second-level 
domain names directly to the consumer; this is the role of ‘registrars’, third-party 
organisations (usually private companies) acting as middlemen between the registries 
and end-users. TLDs, while identical from a technical perspective, are divided into 
four types in terms of management and intended use. Generic top-level domains 
(gTLDs), such as .com, .biz, .net or .org, are managed by registries (mostly for-profit 
companies) under contract with ICANN, for example VeriSign is the registry for 
.com. gTLD registries are required to sign formal Registry Agreements agreeing to 
abide by ICANN policies. Country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), such as .uk, .fr 
                                                 
6 United States Department of Commerce: National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (2010). Domain Names: Management of Internet Names and Addresses. Cooperative 
Agreement Between the Department of Commerce and VeriSign (Network Solutions). Last amended 
July 6 2010. Retrieved 27 September 2011, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/nsi.htm  
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or .jp are usually managed by a public or private registry operator in the relevant 
country, for example Nominet is the registry for .uk. Unlike gTLD registries, ccTLD 
registries are not required to sign mandatory Registry Agreements, though the 
majority have entered into formalised agreements with ICANN on a voluntary basis. 
Also, unlike gTLD registries, ccTLD registries are not obliged to provide mandatory 
financial contributions to ICANN, though they are encouraged to do so voluntarily. A 
special restricted category of gTLDs, sponsored top-level domains (sTLDs) are 
managed by the relevant sponsoring organisation, for example .museum is managed 
by the International Council of Museums. Finally, certain domains are reserved for the 
use of US public authorities, such as .mil, .gov and .edu.   
 
With regards to IP address allocation, ICANN allocates large blocks of addresses to 
organisations known as Regional Internet Registries (RIRs, not to be confused with 
domain name registries). There are five such RIRs, made up of representatives from 
various interested parties, such as Internet service providers (ISPs), 
telecommunications organisations, educational institutions, governments, regulatory 
agencies, and large corporations. RIRs allocate smaller blocks of IP addresses to ISPs 
and other large organisations, which then in turn allocate individual IP addresses to 
end-users.  
  
ICANN also has a close relationship with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
IP addressing and DNS technology are not static; they are modified and updated over 
time. ICANN recognises the IETF as the authoritative body for defining Internet 
standards. The relationship is a two-way one; while ICANN is tasked with 
implementing IETF standards, ICANN also asks the IETF to produce specific 
standards that ICANN identifies as being required. The ICANN-IETF relationship is 
formalised via a Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations.7 
There is also a permanent Liaison assigned by the IETF to ICANN. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 IETF-ICANN (2000). Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority. Signed on 1 March 2000. Retrieved 5 August 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/ietf-icann-mou-01mar00.htm  
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Figure 1.2: Internet naming & numbering resource governance - structure 
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ICANN – internal organisational structure 
 
Figure 1.3: ICANN organisational structure  
 
 
Source: ICANN (2009). Retrieved 16 September 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/about/ 
ICANN’s organisational structure is set out in its key ‘constitutional’ document, the 
ICANN Bylaws.8 Its chief decision-making body is its Board of Directors, which has 
final authority in all areas of ICANN decision-making, and sole authority to exercise 
the powers of ICANN, control its property and direct its business and affairs (or to 
delegate these powers as it sees fit).9 It can also modify the Bylaws.10 The Board 
consists of sixteen voting members (Directors), including: eight members selected by 
the Nominating Committee; six members selected by the Supporting Organisations 
(two each); one member selected by the At-Large Community; and the President of 
                                                 
8 ICANN (2011). Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As amended 24 
June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm  
9 ICANN (2011). Article II, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As 
amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm  
10 Ibid 
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ICANN.11 The Bylaws go to considerable lengths to ensure international 
representation on the Board12, which currently represents twelve nationalities.13 No 
official of a national government or IGO may serve as a Director.14  
The three Supporting Organisations (SOs) are intended to represent the major 
stakeholders in the industry, and play a major role in development of policy proposals 
to be passed to the Board for approval. The Address Supporting Organisation (ASO) 
is made up-of-representatives-of-the-RIRs, and deals with policy issues relating to the 
operation, assignment, and management of Internet addresses.15 The Country Code 
Names Supporting-Organisation (CCNSO) deals with policy relating to ccTLDs, and 
is made-up-of-representatives-of-the ccTLD registries.16 The Generic Names 
Supporting Organisation (GNSO) deals-with-policy-relating-to gTLDs, and-is-made-
up-of representatives from a number of stakeholder ‘Constituencies’, including: the 
Business and Commercial Users Constituency; the Non-Commercial Users 
Constituency; the gTLD Registries Constituency; the Registrars Constituency; the 
Intellectual Property Constituency; and the ISPs Constituency.17  
In addition, there are a number of advisory committees, including the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC); the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC); the Root 
Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC); and the Stability and Security 
Committee (SSAC). The GAC is made up of representatives of national governments, 
and is-intended to ‘provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to 
concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction 
between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where 
                                                 
11ICANN (2011). Article IV, Section 1, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
12 ICANN (2011). Article IV, Sections 2, 3 and 5, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm  
13ICANN (2011). “Board Representation by Nationality.” Retrieved 26 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/maps/board.htm  
14 ICANN (2011). Article IV, Section 4, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm  
15 ICANN (2011). Article VIII, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As 
amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
16 ICANN (2011). Article IX, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As 
amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
17 ICANN (2011). Article X, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As 
amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
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they may-affect public-policy issues.’18 The role of-the ALAC is ‘to consider and 
provide advice-on the activities of ICANN, insofar as-they relate to the interests of 
individual Internet users.’ It consists of ten members selected by Regional At-Large 
Organisations (RALOs) and-five members-selected by the Nominating Committee.19 
The RSSAC and SSAC are technical-bodies that-provide advice-with regards to the 
technical operation-of the domain name-system to-guide policymaking-and help-to 
ensure ICANN’s commitment-to preserving-the stability-of the DNS is fulfilled.20   
The IETF Liaison is intended to co-ordinate ICANN’s activities with that 
organisation. The Technical-Liaison-Group is intended to ‘connect the Board with 
appropriate sources-of-technical advice on specific matters pertinent to ICANN's 
activities’ and is made-up-of-representatives from four further Internet standards 
bodies: the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); the 
International-Telecommunication Union's Telecommunication Standardisation Sector 
(ITU-T); the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C); and the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB).21 
The Nominating Committee (NomCom) is responsible for the selection of eight 
ICANN Directors as well as members of some other ICANN bodies. Its voting 
membership-is-made up of five delegates-selected by-the ALAC; seven delegates 
selected from the GNSO-Constituencies; one delegate-selected by-the CCNSO; one 
delegate selected-by-the ASO; one delegate-selected by-the IETF; and one delegate 
selected by-the Technical Liaison Group.22  
 
 
                                                 
18 ICANN (2011). Section 1, Article XI, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
19 ICANN (2011). Section 4, Article XI, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
20 ICANN (2011). Sections 2 and 3, Article XI, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
21 ICANN (2011). Section 2, Article XI-A, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (As amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
22ICANN (2011). Article VII, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As 
amended 24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
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Economic and political significance of DNS 
 
With commercialisation-and the rapid growth in-the Internet’s scale and reach in the 
1990s, businesses and other entities came to-appreciate-the-importance-of the Internet 
as an online public face and as-a tool-for-marketing-and-trading. As a result, domain 
names came to be regarded as an important economic resource, as identifiers and 
brand names for an organisation’s presence online. As attractive domain names began 
to become scarce, particularly-in-the popular .com namespace, disputes-over names 
became-increasingly common, and pressure-mounted for-the creation of new TLDs to 
alleviate this bottleneck. From a technical perspective, new TLDs were easy to 
implement, but were opposed-by-intellectual-property rights holders who already 
faced mounting-problems with ‘cybersquatters’ (speculators who registered domain 
names corresponding to trademarks and-held them for profit). From-the early 1990s 
trademark owners pressed for a-solution to-the cybersquatting issue.23  
 
With the number of names being registered-rising rapidly, the provision of registration 
services was outsourced-to a private-sector contractor, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI). 
Whereas-registrations had previously been-free, NSI was given the authority to charge 
a $50 annual registration fee for each domain name. The fee, and NSI’s monopoly, led 
to growing discontent from many registrants.24 These pressures led to a plan by the 
Internet Society and-the IANA to create a new organisation under the ITU to take 
over top-level-management of the DNS and IP addressing systems.25  
 
However, as will be explained in more depth in Chapter 2, the US government 
blocked this plan by refusing to hand over control of the root, instead putting forward 
its own proposals to ‘privatise’ management of the DNS.26 The broad outlines of this 
policy were set out in 1998 by the Department of Commerce in a Green Paper27. 
                                                 
23 Abel, S.M. (1999). “Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier.” Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 5(1): 91-140. PP93-98. 
24 Weinberg, J. (2000). "ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy." Duke Law Journal 50(1): 187-260. 
PP200-201. 
25 IAHC (1997). Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Committee: “Recommendations for  
Administration and Management of gTLDs.” February 4, 1997. Retrieved March 25, 2010, from 
http://www.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html.  
26 Clinton, W. J. (1997). The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 1 1997. Memorandum 
for the heads of executive departments and agencies. Subject: Electronic Commerce. Retrieved 25 July 
2009, from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-nec-ec.htm  
27 NTIA (1998). “A proposal to improve technical management of Internet names and addresses.” 
Discussion draft, 30 January 1998. (‘Green Paper’) Retrieved 25 July, 2007, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm#N_1_  
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Meanwhile, other-governmental authorities, notably the European Union, had begun 
to express understandable concern about the United States' control of a critical 
element of a global communication and commercial resource, upon which they 
foresaw their economies and-societies-becoming-ever-more dependent.28 Moreover, 
control over ccTLDs, being associated with their respective national territories, began 
to be viewed as an aspect of state sovereignty by some scholars and governments.29 30  
 
The Green Paper was followed by a White Paper31, which left the specifics of the new 
organisation to the ‘private sector’ to self-organise. This resulted in a series of 
initiatives and discussions involving the main private stakeholders in the industry 
about how to form a suitable organisation, a process that eventually led to the creation 
of ICANN. ICANN was subsequently recognised by the Department of Commerce 
and was awarded a contract to manage the DNS and IP addressing systems. Despite 
the unilateral actions of the US government in initiating the ‘privatisation’ approach, 
certain concessions were made to other governmental actors regarding the final shape 
of the ICANN regime, including the creation of an intergovernmental ‘advisory’ body 
at the behest of the EU,32 the inclusion of a significant number of non-Americans on 
the Board,33 and, it has been claimed, the ‘vetting’ of the initial Board by the EU and 
the Australian governments.34 
 
                                                 
28 See, for instance, European Union (1997). Bonn Ministerial Declaration on the role of global 
networks for the information society (8 July 1997). Retrieved 25 July, 2009, from 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/policy/isf/documents/declarations/Bonn-Ministerial-Declaration.htm  
and  
Council of the European Union (1998). Internet Governance: Reply of the European Community and 
its Member States to the US Green Paper. (16 March 1998). Retrieved 25 July, 2009, from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000815093245/http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/policy/govreply.html  
29 Mueller, M. L. (2002). Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. P243. 
30 Hagen, G. R. and K. G. von Arx (2002). "Sovereign Domains: A Declaration of Independence of 
ccTLDs from Foreign Control." Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 9(1). Online journal. 
Retrieved 29 September 2008, from http://jolt.richmond.edu/v9i1/article4.pdf  PP5-13. 
31 United States Department of Commerce (1998). National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration Statement of Policy: “Management of Internet Names and Addresses.” ('White Paper'). 
5th June 2007. Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02. Retrieved 5 October 2008, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm  
32 Leib, V. (2002). "ICANN – EU can’t: Internet governance and Europe’s role in the formation of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers." Telematics and Informatics 19(2): 159-171. 
P168. 
33 Ibid, PP168-170. 
34 Mueller, M. (1999). "ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of ‘self-
regulation’." Info, the Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information 
and Media, 1(6):497-520. P507. 
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Political controversy over governance of the Internet’s core systems continued after 
ICANN’s foundation and was expressed in particular during the World Summit on the 
Information Society (2003 and 2005).35 Various governments and other actors have 
expressed a desire to see ICANN replaced with an alternative, possibly an 
intergovernmental body, but any possibility of such a move has so far been blocked 
both by US intransigence and by lack of agreement among ICANN’s critics about the 
form an alternative should take.36 Meanwhile, as will be shown in Chapters 4-6, an 
array of actors, both private and governmental, continue to compete within the 
ICANN regime on an ongoing basis for influence over its policy decisions, as they 
attempt to advance their often conflicting interests.    
 
In summary, by the late 1990s, as a consequence of commercialisation and the rapid 
increase in the Internet’s importance from a research network into a critical 
communications infrastructure, what had once been primarily technical issues became 
political, legal, and economic problems that attracted high-level official attention. 
Whereas management of the naming and addressing systems was previously based on 
principles of rough consensus among a relatively-small technical community, finding 
consensus was always likely to be much more-difficult with so many diverse interests 
at stake. The politics of DNS was born.   
 
Relevance of international regime theory   
 
As the organisation set up to-manage DNS, an issue-area that involves competing 
political and economic interests, ICANN is inevitably-more than a-mere technical co-
ordinator. It is a global governance-institution that produces public policy, yet in 
many respects it is unconventional in nature. ICANN was not set up in the context of 
any international treaty or intergovernmental convention. It is neither a conventional 
interstate organisation nor a wholly nongovernmental organisation, but incorporates 
both governmental and private sector actors in its organisational structure. ICANN’s 
unusual features raise questions about-the extent to which the organisation represents 
a new model for issue management at the global level and a departure from 
conventional approaches to global governance.  
                                                 
35 See Mathiason, J. (2009). Internet Governance: The new frontier of global institutions. New York, 
Routledge. PP 97-125. 
36 Ibid, PP123-124. 
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The international regime concept appears to be an appropriate tool for exploring some 
of these questions, since it offers a yardstick or baseline against which ICANN can be 
compared. By comparing ICANN to pre-existing models of global governance 
described by the international regime concept, it should be possible to explore the 
extent to which ICANN differs from those models and thus the extent to which it 
represents a fundamentally new approach to global governance.  
 
Regime theory is, however, not a single unified body of theory. Though the actual 
concept of the international regime is fairly well defined, there are competing views 
on some key questions, such as how and why regimes come into being and are 
sustained. These tie in to broader debates between proponents of various paradigms in 
International Relations theory.  
  
Rationalist theories encompass both realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches. 
Both of these begin from some similar ontological assumptions. They stress the 
importance of state actors and state power as a basis for the international system 
structure, and assume conditions of anarchy in the international system; that is, a 
situation in which there is no overall authority above and beyond that of individual 
sovereign states. However, whereas realists believe that these conditions lead 
inevitably to competition and conflict between state actors, with any co-operation 
being short-term and tactical, neoliberal institutionalists argue that, because of mutual 
interdependence, there is an incentive for actors to build long-term co-operative 
arrangements. Realists such as Charles Kindleberger37, Robert Gilpin38, Stephen 
Krasner39 and Daniel Drezner40 have tended to explain successful international 
regimes in terms of the imposition of order, either by a single hegemonic state or by a 
small group of great-power states acting in concert. In this model, the stability of the 
regime is dependent upon the persistence of the existing distribution of power in the 
                                                 
37See Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The World in Depression: 1929-1939. Berkeley, University of 
California Press. 
and 
Kindleberger, C. P. (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, 
Public Goods and Free Rides." International Studies Quarterly 25(2): 242-254. 
38 See Gilpin, R. (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
39 Webb, M. C. and S. D. Krasner (1989). "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment." 
Review of International Studies 15(2): 183–98. PP183-184.  
40 Drezner, D. W. (2007). All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. PP3-14. 
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international system. If the hegemon’s relative capabilities decline, the regime will 
collapse.41 Neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, by contrast, assert that 
mutual recognition among actors of the rationality of co-operation leads to the 
establishment of understandings between them, a process of ‘convergence of 
expectations’, which can then become crystallised into full-blown international 
regimes.42 
 
Neo-Marxist type approaches, put forward by scholars such as Robert Cox43 and 
Vincent Mosco44, emphasise the economic and social forces of capitalism as the 
starting point for understanding of global political economy and as the ultimate basis 
for international regimes and institutions. Such approaches view the current world 
order as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Under this 
system, resources are stripped of their ‘intrinsic’ value and turned into commodities in 
a market that dictates their exchange value. Neo-Marxist approaches focus on the 
organisation of production, exchange and property, and how governance relates to 
those broader economic relations and structures. They focus on a view of power as 
economic exploitation and see the role of both market economy states and 
international institutions as being to entrench and serve the interests of the dominant 
capitalist world system. This system produces an international order better described 
as a world political economy, which includes both formal governance arrangements 
and non-state organisations, and is supported by a prevailing set of ideas.45 
 
Constructivist approaches challenge the core assumptions of both rationalist and neo-
Marxist paradigms on IR, arguing that what is assumed to be ‘real’ in the political 
world is in fact socially constructed. There are various strands of constructivism, 
ranging from out-and-out postmodernist and poststructuralist perspectives to the more 
moderate ‘thin’ or ‘social’ constructivist approaches of scholars like Alexander 
                                                 
41 Young, O. R. (1983). ‘‘Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes.’’ International 
Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 93-114. P116. 
42 Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. PP53-54. 
43 See Cox, R. W. (1981). "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory." Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10(2): 126-155. 
44See Mosco, V. (1996). The Political Economy of Communication. London, Sage Publications. 
PP146-147. 
45 See, for example, Cox, R. with T. J. Sinclair (1996). Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
and  
Mosco, V. (1996). The Political Economy of Communication. London, Sage Publications. 
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Wendt46 and David Dessler.47 Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how structure in 
the global system is created and sustained by ongoing processes of social practice and 
interaction. Actors’ behaviour within the system is the result of identities and 
interests; these are not the inevitable product of material forces, but are grounded in 
socially constructed ideas.  
 
These debates can be linked to some of the competing perspectives on ICANN’s 
nature that will be explored in Chapter 3. For example, the view that ICANN is a 
regime created and controlled by states, as postulated by writers such as Daniel 
Drezner48, has much in common with traditional ‘rationalist’ perspectives on 
international regime theory. ‘Liberal democratic’ interpretations of ICANN, 
advocated by scholars such as Jonathan Weinberg49, Kathleen Fuller50 and Jonathan 
G. S. Koppell51, echo liberal perspectives on IR, which revolve around concepts such 
as pluralism, diplomacy, interdependence, co-operation, representation and 
legitimacy. Perspectives emphasising the role of corporate actors in ICANN, as 
advanced by writers like Hans Klein52 and Geoff Huston53, find echoes in alternative 
branches of IR theory, including neo-Marxist type approaches, that stress the logic of 
the global capitalist system as the ultimate basis for international regimes and 
institutions. Constructivist perspectives on IR can also be usefully applied to the 
ICANN case, since many of the issues surrounding Internet governance reflect 
conceptualisations that have emerged over the last two decades. The domain name 
space, while in reality being no more than a series of files held on linked computers, is 
conceptualised as something much more. It is a roadmap to the virtual world; it is the 
key to online identity; and thus, for corporate actors, it is an economic resource of 
                                                 
46See Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
47 See Dessler, D. (1989). "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organisation 
43(3): 441-473.  
48 Drezner, D. W. (2007). All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. PP113-117. 
49 Weinberg, J. (2000). "ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy." Duke Law Journal 50(1): 187-260. 
50 Fuller, K. E. (2001). "ICANN: The debate over governing the Internet." Duke Law and Technology 
Review 2(1). Online journal. Retrieved 12 February 2010, from 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0002.html PP2-42. 
51 Koppell, J. G. (2005). "Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple 
Accountabilities Disorder”." Public Administration Review 65(1): 94-108. 
52 Klein, H. (2005). ‘ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of Law. A policy analysis prepared for The 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).' Tunis. 16-18 November 2005. Retrieved 10 
January 2010, from http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ICANN-Reform-Establishing-the-Rule-of-
Law.pdf P4. 
53 Huston, G. (2005). "ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Governance." The Internet Protocol 
Journal 8(1): 19-24. 
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enormous value. For governments, the identifiers used to represent country-code top-
level domains have become seen as extensions of national sovereignty. All of these 
views of the namespace rest ultimately on socially constructed values. Thus, a 
constructivist approach can also provide valuable insights into the politics of Internet 
resource governance.   
 
Questions around ICANN’s hybrid public / private nature also tie in to wider debates 
concerning emerging governance models in an era of globalisation, and the extent to 
which these challenge the statist basis of international organisation. For example, 
some scholars, such as Dan Schiller, identify a ‘takeover’ by the corporate-led market 
system of key social functions previously the domain of the nation-state.54 On the 
other hand, other writers, such as Drezner, are sceptical of claims that the traditional 
Westphalian state system is being eclipsed by the forces of globalised capitalism.55 
ICANN, as an organisation featuring ongoing competition between governmental and 
corporate actors for control of policymaking, seems to sit at the heart of this debate.  
 
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, findings from the empirical phase of 
the research support the application of concepts drawn from more than one paradigm 
on regime theory to the ICANN case. ICANN is a multifaceted regime, aspects of 
which could be justifiably interpreted from the perspectives of hegemonic stability 
theory, neoliberal intuitionalist co-operative models, or capitalist / neo-Marxian 
perspectives. However, as will be shown, an analysis based on social constructivism 
can be utilised to draw these various interpretations of the regime together to produce 
a broader overall understanding, as well as to explain the process by which ICANN 
has evolved as an organisation over time.     
 
Aims of the project   
 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the overall aim of the project is to 
understand ICANN’s nature as a governance organisation, how it relates to broader 
patterns in global governance, and the extent to which it represents a fundamentally 
new approach to global issue-management.  
                                                 
54 Schiller, D. (1999). Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA, 
MIT Press. P205. 
55 Drezner, D. W. (2007). All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. P3. 
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These questions can be divided into a number of interrelated objectives:    
 
1) To explore the extent to which ICANN has changed as an organisation 
compared to the model set out in 1998, and to explain why such change has 
occurred;  
2) To explore ICANN’s internal dynamics and how it makes policy in practice, 
and to explore whether the ‘consensus based decisionmaking’ ideal is adhered 
to in reality; 
3) To understand the extent to which ICANN diverges from conventional models 
of issue-management at the global level as described by various paradigms on 
regime theory; 
4) To explore what lessons ICANN can offer about the continuing applicability 
of the international regime concept, and whether and in what ways regime 
theory may need to be modified to deal with emerging new models of global 
governance as exemplified by the ICANN case.   
 
Methodology and sources 
 
Although the underlying questions have theoretical import, it was necessary to gain a 
detailed working understanding of ICANN before any comparison with the models 
offered by regime theories could be made. This involved an in-depth study of the 
organisation, beginning by looking at its origins and history, and moving on to 
examine how various scholars have previously interpreted the organisation. This was 
followed by an in-depth empirical study of the ICANN policymaking process in 
action, in an attempt to gain insight into the roles played by various actors, the relative 
amount of influence each held, and the power relationships between them. The results 
of these investigations formed the basis for an understanding of the organisation that 
then informed subsequent efforts to compare ICANN to the governance models 
offered by regime theories.    
 
The first part of the thesis begins to explore Objective 1 by looking at the regime’s 
history, including the circumstances and events that lead to its creation, the details of 
the initial organisational model, and ICANN’s subsequent development over the next 
dozen years. Sources for this stage of the investigation included pre-existing histories 
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of the Internet, particularly those written by the Internet pioneers themselves, such as 
Vint Cerf56 and Barry Leiner.57 Other accounts of the Internet’s history were also 
utilised, including works by scholars such as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu,58 John 
Mathiason59 Wolfgang Kleinwaechter,60 Richard T. Griffiths,61 and Milton Mueller.62 
Where relevant, contemporary media reports from reputable sources, such as the 
BBC, were also utilised. The intention was to use a range of sources to gain a 
comprehensive picture and also to safeguard against the possibility of any one source 
giving a biased interpretation of events.   
 
In addition, a wealth of primary source material was readily available. These sources 
included first-hand documentation of the events, for example the US 
Government’s Green and White Papers of 1998, which laid the groundwork for 
the formation of ICANN. Other primary source documents provided first-hand 
evidence of the attitudes, goals and motivations of key actors and interest 
groups, for example the EU’s statements of policy, national governmental 
proposals to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) or the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation’s 1999 Report on the Internet Domain 
Name Process.  
 
The next section of the dissertation turns to existing scholarly perspectives on ICANN 
in relevant academic literature. It reflects an attempt to categorise some of the 
extensive literature on ICANN into a number of groupings, including ‘technical 
caretaker’ models, ‘liberal democratic’ perspectives, corporatist perspectives, statist / 
intergovernmental approaches and ‘public-private partnership’ models. These 
competing perspectives on the sort of governance system ICANN represents reflect 
                                                 
56 Cerf, V. (2010). “A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks.” Internet Society. Retrieved 
28 July, 2010, from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.shtml  
57 Leiner, B. M., V. G. Cerf, et al (2010). "A Brief History of the Internet." Internet Society. Retrieved 
29 July 2010, from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml  
58 Goldsmith, J. L. and T. Wu (2006). Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World. New 
York, Oxford University Press.  
59 Mathiason, J. (2009). Internet Governance: The new frontier of global institutions. New York, 
Routledge. 
60 Kleinwatcher, W. (2007). ‘The History of Internet Governance’ in Möller, C. and A. Amouroux. 
(2007). "Governing the Internet: Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region." Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  Retrieved 29 July, 2007, from 
http://www.osce.org/publications/rfm/2007/07/25667_918_en.pdf  PP41-66. 
61 Griffiths, R.T. (2010). “History of the Internet.” Lieden, Lieden University, 2010. Retrieved 24 
August, 2010, from http://www.leidenuniv.nl/letteren/internethistory/index.php3-c=5.htm  
62 Mueller, M. L. (2002). Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
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some of the ontological questions about ICANN’s nature that were explored by this 
project.  
 
Chapters 4-6 document how Objectives 1 and 2 were further addressed by examining 
three in-depth case studies of major ICANN policy development areas. The aim of 
this was to explore in depth how ICANN policy is created, and to identify which 
actors and interests wield the greatest influence over policymaking in practice, in an 
effort to gain insight into the organisation’s internal dynamics and how far it lives up 
to the original principles set out in 1998. As shown in later chapters, the results of 
these investigations subsequently formed the basis of efforts to evaluate the various 
aforementioned scholarly perspectives on the nature of the regime. For example, 
evidence of strong governmental influence over policymaking would have helped to 
support a statist / intergovernmental interpretation of ICANN, while evidence that 
corporate actors dominate policymaking would have supported interpretations of 
ICANN as an essentially private, commercial regime. Evidence of collaboration and / 
or compromise between governmental and private actors in policy creation would 
have lent weight to the ‘public private partnership’ interpretation of the organisation. 
The ‘liberal democratic’ model would have been given support by evidence of real 
influence over policymaking by the ‘public at-large’, via channels such as the public 
comments process and the ICANN At-Large organisation.  
 
The case studies chosen for this purpose included New gTLDs policy, 
Internationalised Domain Names and the Uniform Domain-Name Disputes Resolution 
Policy. These particular policy areas were chosen, firstly because they represent some 
of the most important policy issues dealt with by ICANN during its first dozen years, 
and secondly because each highlights the role of different actors within the ICANN 
regime.  
 
Some of the issues addressed in this phase included: 
 
• To what extent is ICANN a public policymaker as opposed to a technical co-
ordinator? 
• To what extent is ICANN a globalised nonstate actor divorced from the 
Westphalian state system? To what extent do states shape policy?  
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• To what extent is ICANN policymaking based on 'bottom-up consensus'? 
Does the 'multistakeholder' model stand up to scrutiny?  
• How far is ICANN policy influenced by input from the global Internet-using 
community? 
• To what extent is ICANN policymaking captured by a set of major corporate 
interests?  
• To what extent are ICANN norms now settled and stable, and to what extent 
do they continue to be challenged?  
 
Each case study took the form of a step-by-step investigation into each stage of the 
policy development process, examining the work of the various policy development 
committees and attempting to evaluate the relative influence of various actors and 
interest groups in producing the specific policy outcomes resulting from their work.  
 
The majority of the data for these investigations was drawn from primary source 
documents pertaining to ICANN’s activities, such as minutes of meetings, committee 
reports and finalised policy statements. There were no major problems with source 
survival and availability; the relevant documentary sources are in the public domain 
and are readily available, mostly from ICANN’s own website. Indeed, such a vast 
amount of source material was available that the main difficulty lay in sifting, sorting 
and identifying the most relevant documents for the purposes of the investigation.    
 
Despite the large volume of documentary evidence available, however, there were 
certain gaps in the record; for example, there are no minutes of meetings for the GAC 
or of certain relevant GNSO committees. Moreover, there are clearly certain potential 
limitations with such documentary sources; for example, there is no guarantee that 
minutes of meetings will capture everything that was discussed, while reports could 
arguably be deliberately written to present ICANN activities in a more positive light 
to the public.  
 
In an effort to overcome these limitations, as well as fill in some of the gaps in the 
documentary record, some relevant individuals were contacted where appropriate and 
asked to give interviews by telephone and / or email. These included current and past 
members of some of the ICANN policymaking committees under scrutiny, as well as 
a number of GAC representatives. Although not all individuals contacted responded, a 
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significant number did so and were mostly open and willing to discuss the issues. 
Where possible, several members of each committee were contacted to provide 
corroboration. While the written record was sufficient to provide most of the required 
data, the information from these contacts helped to fill in certain gaps and answer 
certain specific questions, and also assisted in interpretation of the written record. 
Such interviews were carried out on a largely unstructured basis and took the form of 
telephone or email conversations between the author and the respondents. It was 
recognised that face-to-face interviews might possibly have yielded more information 
in some respects, but this approach would have been difficult to carry out due to the 
constraints of physical distance and finance; almost all of the respondents were based 
outside the UK, and many outside Europe.  
 
An example of such an email conversation is included in Appendix 1.3. Records of 
other email conversations are available on request. In order to meet ethics 
requirements, each of the interview respondents was given the option to have their 
names remain confidential; however, none requested this. A sample of the initial 
interview request email is included in Appendix 1.1. A list of persons contacted is 
included in Appendix 1.2.  
  
Another avenue of investigation involved study of the role of Public Comments 
Periods (PCPs). If the ‘liberal democratic’ or indeed ‘broad multistakeholder’ models 
fit reality, public comments would be expected to have some significant impact on 
policy development. This was explored by examining the comments from PCPs, all of 
which are archived by ICANN, and identifying some themes and proposals, 
particularly any that seem to have broad support across a significant proportion of 
commentators. These were then compared to the output of the policy formulation 
committees in an effort to determine whether input from public commentators tends to 
get incorporated into actual policy recommendations. The ICANN personnel who 
were contacted were also asked directly to comment on how public comments were 
taken into account.  
 
With regards to the third case study chapter which focused on ICANN’s Uniform 
Domain-Name Disputes Resolution Policy, the question of whether the policy appears 
to disproportionately favour a particular set of interests (namely trademark holders) 
was relevant. This question was explored by examining the details of a sample of 250 
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case histories of arbitration decisions made under the UDRP, looking for evidence of 
bias, inconsistency and deviation from the rules. The case histories were selected at 
random from the online databases of three of the four ICANN dispute resolution 
providers and cover the period 2000-2009.  
 
Further details of specific methodology for the empirical phase of the study will be 
made clear in the case study chapters (Chapters 4-6).  
 
Following the case study chapters, the scholarly analyses of ICANN were revisited 
and evaluated in light of the evidence from the case studies, in an effort to produce 
some final responses to objectives 1 and 2.  
 
The next phase of the dissertation then moves to the theoretical level in order to 
explore objectives 3 and 4. The extent to which ICANN diverges from conventional 
models of issue-management was explored by comparing the evidence gained in the 
earlier phases of the investigation to models of global governance offered by 
international regime theories. The first step in this process was to examine the extent 
to which ICANN can be interpreted as an international regime using Krasner’s 
definition. The patterns of interaction between participants in the ICANN system, as 
revealed by the policy case studies, were utilised in an effort to evaluate the extent to 
which ICANN resembles the regime concept described by Krasner and others. This 
was followed by an attempt to define the ICANN regime in terms of its principles, 
norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures.  
 
ICANN was then compared to the models offered by various paradigms on regime 
theory, in an attempt to evaluate the extent to which these models fitted the ICANN 
case. For example, if the policy case studies had produced evidence that ICANN 
policymaking was dominated by states, this would have provided the basis for a statist 
/ realist interpretation of the organisation, while evidence that ICANN was dominated 
by commercial actors would have lent weight to a neo-Marxist interpretation. In the 
event, the evidence from the case studies demonstrated that ICANN policy is the 
outcome of interactions between a set of governmental and nongovernmental actors, 
all of whom compete to advance their specific interests but also have a mutual interest 
in maintaining the interconnectivity of the Internet and the stability of its core 
systems. Furthermore, the case studies demonstrated that interactions of the key 
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regime participants have caused the regime framework to become modified over time. 
As is explained in Chapter 8, this evidence favoured the application of neoliberal 
institutionalist models of regime theory as a starting point for understanding ICANN, 
but modified by the application of concepts taken from social constructivism and 
particularly structuration theory.     
 
The answers to these questions were ultimately used to help determine how the 
ICANN model might fit into a broader understanding of global governance in the 
early twenty-first century. The final part of the dissertation explores whether lessons 
from the ICANN case study can inform our understanding of regime theory, and the 
extent to which the regime concept remains a useful conceptual tool for interpreting 
new emerging approaches to global governance as represented by ICANN.  
 
In addition to the sources listed, technical reference material pertaining to Internet 
infrastructure was utilised where required.  
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Chapter 2 
A brief history of ICANN 
 
Overview 
 
In order to fully understand the ICANN regime, it is necessary to examine the 
background to its creation, as well as the ways in which it has evolved since 1998. 
This chapter will examine that historical background, exploring the actors and forces 
that brought ICANN into being and influenced its continued development. 
 
History of the Internet – summary  
 
The Internet was ultimately built upon pre-existing electronic communications 
networks, the telephone and telegraph systems, that originated in the nineteenth 
century. In the 1960s, the feasibility of utilising these systems as a means of data 
transfer between electronic digital computers began to be explored.   
 
Early experiments in computer networking began in the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
included military projects such as the US SAGE air defence system, commissioned in 
the late 1950s.63  In 1964, Paul Baran, a researcher at RAND (a US governmental 
think-tank), produced the concept of a wide area network of computers with multiple 
redundant connections between them. The main purpose was to be a military 
communications network with a high degree of survivability in the event of a nuclear 
attack.64 The Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) subsequently 
took up this concept. 
 
In 1965, Larry Roberts and Thomas Merrill connected a computer at MIT to one in 
California via a standard telephone line, thus proving the feasibility of creating wide 
area computer networks using the existing telecommunications system.65 In 1967 
                                                 
63 Forrester, J.W., and Everett, R.R. (1990). "The Whirlwind computer project."  IEEE Transactions on 
Aerospace and Electronic Systems 26(5):903-910. P903, 906  
64 RAND (2010). “Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet.” Retrieved 29 July, 2010, from 
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65 Leiner, B. M., V. G. Cerf, et al. (2010). "A Brief History of the Internet. " Internet Society. Retrieved 
29 July 2010, from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.  
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Roberts published a plan for a wide-area network to be known as ARPANET. After 
its publication, he discovered that similar work had been proceeding at RAND and 
also at the British National Physical Laboratory, and from 1967 onwards there was an 
exchange of ideas between these three communities of researchers.66 In 1968, the first 
prototype packet-switching network was tested by the NPL. The following year, 
ARPA funded a larger-scale experiment resulting in the foundation of the ARPANET, 
which initially linked four mainframe computers (known as ‘nodes’ or ‘hosts’) around 
the United States.67  
 
Over the next few years, more computers were added to the ARPANET, including 
nodes in Hawaii, Norway and London. In December 1970, the Network Working 
Group (NWG), a semi-formal grouping of researchers working under Steve Crocker, 
finished the initial ARPANET host-to-host protocol, called the Network Control 
Protocol (NCP). This was implemented during the period 1971-1972, and made 
possible the development of the first network applications such as email. The first 
email send and receive software was developed in 1972 by Roberts and Ray 
Tomlinson at Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. (BBN, a private sector technology 
research company), and email went on to become the ‘killer application’ of the 
ARPANET over the next decade.68  
 
Instead of authority-based decisionmaking, early network standard creation relied on a 
process that ARPANET researchers termed ‘rough consensus and running code.’ This 
was based around a format for distributing memoranda on network methods, 
behaviours and innovations, known as Requests for Comments (RFCs). RFCs were 
numbered sequentially, beginning with RFC 1 in April 1969. Initially, any researcher 
working on the ARPANET could write an RFC, and, if enough people agreed and 
used the idea, the design became a standard. The RFC system continues today under 
the IETF, and still forms the main method for documenting Internet standards, 
although it has become more formalised over the years.69   
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Other wide-area networks, initially unconnected to the ARPANET, began to appear in 
various geographical locations, including academic networks between mainframes at 
universities in the USA, Europe, Canada, Hong Kong and Australia. These networks 
were initially mostly incompatible with each other.70 In 1973, ARPA initiated a 
programme called the ‘internetting project’, to develop communication protocols that 
would allow data transfer across dissimilar networks.71  It eventually produced a 
protocol suite known as TCP/IP, named after the two initial protocols to be developed, 
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol.72 TCP/IP became the standard 
protocol suite on the ARPANET in 1983, allowing other networks, such as the UK’s 
JANET, to be connected to the ARPANET. By the mid-1980s, the term ‘Internet’ 
began to come into widespread use to describe the resultant interconnected network. 
Advancing technology and the growing popularity of desktop computers and LANS in 
the 1980s allowed the nascent Internet to flourish.73 By 1984, over one thousand 
computers were connected to the Internet, rising to ten thousand a mere three years 
later.74 
 
In 1983, the US military portion of the network was separated off to form the 
MILNET, leaving ARPANET as a pure research network75 (though the US 
Department of Defense continued to hold oversight authority over its naming and 
numbering systems). In 1986, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) initiated 
the development of the NSFNET, a new ‘backbone’ linking the various networks 
together. NSF elected to support ARPA's existing organisational infrastructure, 
hierarchically arranged under the Internet Activities Board (IAB), a descendant of the 
Network Working Group. NSF also implemented an ‘Acceptable Use Policy’ which 
prohibited backbone usage for purposes ‘not in support of Research and Education’; 
i.e., commercial traffic was not permitted.76  
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In 1989, the number of connected computers exceeded 100,000.77 The following year, 
the ARPANET name was dropped and the term ‘Internet’ officially adopted as the 
term for the unified global network.78 In the same year, Tim Berners-Lee at CERN 
developed HTML and the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), allowing the creation 
of the first Web pages.79 In the 1990s, the World Wide Web would go on to become 
the new ‘killer application’, underpinning the Internet’s explosive growth in 
popularity. 80 Another development of enormous significance was the dropping in 
1991 of the non-commercial rule, opening up the network to business traffic and thus 
to commercial investment.81 Private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) appeared and 
opened up the Internet to home and small business users for the first time. New 
‘peering’ arrangements were agreed for direct data transfer between ISPs via new 
Internet exchange (IX) points. These are physical connections allowing ISPs to 
exchange Internet traffic between their networks directly, thus eliminating the need 
for a third-party ‘backbone’.82  
 
In 1992, the Internet Activities Board was reorganised into the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Research Task 
Force (IRTF) and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). These bodies 
would operate under the auspices of the Internet Society (ISOC), a new not-for profit 
corporation based in Geneva.83 This represented a formalisation of some previously 
quite ad-hoc structures and procedures. 
 
The decade following commercialisation saw an explosive growth in the number of 
computers and users on the Internet, reaching 60 million computers by 2000.84 
Growth continued to accelerate beyond 2000, particularly in regions where uptake had 
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previously been low. In the 1990s, most Internet users were concentrated in Europe 
and North America, but increasingly since 2000 the Internet’s greatest growth has 
been in developing states.85  
 
Within a matter of years, the Internet had become established as a critical 
communications and commercial infrastructure. As a consequence, governance of the 
network, previously more or less ignored by governments, became a matter of 
considerable political significance. 
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Figure 2.1 Internet Host Count 1994-2010 
 
 
Source: Internet Systems Consortium (2010). “Domain Survey, Host Count.” Retrieved 14 March 
2010, from http://www.isc.org/solutions/survey 
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Table 2.1 Internet Users Count 1995-2009 
 
Date Number of users worldwide 
December 1995 16 million 
December 1996 36 million 
December 1997 70 million 
December 1998 147 million 
December 1999 248 million 
December 2000 359 million 
April 2002 558 million 
March 2003 608 million 
December 2003 719 million 
December 2004 817 million 
December 2005 1018 million 
December 2006 1093 million 
December 2007 1319 million 
December 2008 1574 million 
December 2009 1802 million 
 
Source: internetworldstats.com (2010). “Internet Growth Statistics.” Retrieved 30 March 2010, from 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm  
History of naming and numbering systems governance 
Early years 
Administration of the DNS root from its inception in 1984 until the late 1990s was the 
responsibility of Jon Postel and a small team of assistants at the University of 
Southern California. The decision to add any new top-level domains, including 
country code top-level domain names, was entirely at Postel’s discretion, as was the 
decision as to which entities would be assigned responsibility for management of a 
ccTLD.86 In defining the ccTLDs, Postel used an existing list (ISO 3166) of 243 
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‘countries’ and territories recognised by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) as a guide.87 He explained this decision in RFC 1591, asserting 
that his team was ‘not in the business of deciding what is and what is not a country’, 
whereas the ISO had a procedure for determining ‘which entities should be and should 
not be on that list’.88 Postel sought to ensure that there was substantial backing for a 
ccTLD applicant from ‘significantly interested parties’ who should agree that the 
applicant was the appropriate party to manage the ccTLD.89 Registration services for 
the gTLDs were handled by the Network Information Center at Stanford Research 
Institute, while registrations under the ccTLDs were the responsibility of the ccTLD 
managers. Stanford’s NIC also administered the root nameservers and IP number 
assignments under a US Department of Defense contract.90  
 
The Bush (senior) administration oversaw a somewhat more formal 
institutionalisation of these arrangements. A 1989 contract between the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency and Postel’s Information Science Institute at the 
University of Southern California established the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) to manage the naming and numbering systems at top level. 
However, the IANA remained a compact organisation consisting of Postel and his 
small team. 91  
 
In the early 1990s, responsibility for funding of registration services passed from the 
Department of Defense to the National Science Foundation (NSF).92 In 1993 NSF 
outsourced the provision of registration services to a private-sector contractor, 
Network Solutions Inc. (NSI). In 1995, NSI and NSF agreed that NSF would no 
longer fund registrations; instead, NSI would charge a $50 annual registration fee for 
each registrant. Previously, registration had been free, and the fee led to growing 
discontent from domain name registrants.93 The commercialisation of domain name 
registration, and particularly the monopolistic nature of NSI’s contract, was also 
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resented by many in the technical community.94 There was further discontent over 
NSI’s policy of suspending domain names on receipt of a complaint from a trademark 
owner, regardless of whether the trademark owner had been shown to have a superior 
legal claim to the domain name. 95 
 
IAHC and the gTLD-MoU  
 
While NSI now held the contract for domain name registrations, management of the 
core systems, and associated ‘policy’ authority (such as the power to add TLDs) 
remained mainly in the hands of Postel’s IANA.96 Postel, like others in the technical 
community, was dissatisfied with the NSI monopoly on registrations, and in May 
1996 he persuaded ISOC to set up a collaborative panel to produce recommendations 
for reform of the core systems management arrangements.97 The panel, known as the 
International Ad-Hoc Committee (IAHC), comprised representatives from the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), the International Trademark Association (INTA), ISOC, the 
IANA, and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).98  The IAHC’s Final Report 
(February 1997) put forward a conception of the DNS as a ‘public resource’ to be 
governed in accordance with the interests of stakeholders and the public.99 It proposed 
the creation of seven new gTLDs and replacement of the NSI monopoly with a 
competitive market for registration services, based around separation of the top-level 
registry database operation from the ‘retail’ function of registering names for end 
customers. The latter function would be undertaken by private, competing registrars 
sharing access to the same TLDs. The registry itself would be operated by a not-for-
profit monopoly, co-owned by the registrars, to be known as the Council of 
Registrars, or CORE.100  
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Details of this proposal were set out in an agreement entitled the ‘Generic Top-Level 
Domain Memorandum of Understanding’ (gTLD-MoU) 101, initially signed by the 
IANA and ISOC, and then offered for signature by other interested parties in the 
Internet community.102 The gTLD-MoU also proposed to establish a Policy Oversight 
Committee (POC) composed of the six groups that had participated in the IAHC, as 
the highest decision-making authority over domain names.103 The POC would take 
advice from a Policy Advisory Board (PAB) that any signatory to the gTLD-MoU 
could join.104  
 
The ITU, an agency of the UN, acted as official depository of the agreement, giving it 
a certain international credibility, and a formal signing ceremony was held in Geneva 
on May 1 1997.105 266 entities ultimately signed the document.106  However, the 
IAHC’s attempt to assume control of the Internet’s core systems stood on shaky legal 
ground.107 108 No governments were invited to the Geneva signing ceremony.109 In 
particular, the absence of agreement from the US government, which still claimed 
legal authority over the DNS and IP addressing systems, was a crucial weakness. The 
assumption seemed to be that the US government would freely hand over control of 
the naming and numbering systems without any objection. This assumption proved to 
be in error.  
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Following the signing ceremony, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote to 
ITU Secretary-General Pekka Tarjanne, accusing him of exceeding his mandate by 
signing the gTLD-MoU without any formal consultations with ITU member states, 
including the US government.110 A few weeks later, Ira Magaziner, the Clinton 
Administration’s Internet policy advisor, put together an inter-agency working group 
including representatives from the Commerce Department, the Federal 
Communication Commission, and the Justice and State Departments.111 This group 
rejected the authority of the gTLD-MoU.112 The Clinton administration appears to 
have been unconvinced that the proposed arrangements would guarantee the same 
stability as that offered by US oversight, and also feared they might lead to ITU 
‘overregulation’.113 114  
 
The European Commission likewise expressed dissatisfaction with the gTLD-MoU, 
which, it argued, had engaged insufficient participation, allowed insufficient time for 
consultation, and proposed a licensing mechanism for registrars that did not meet the 
Commission's requirements for transparency.115  There was also opposition from other 
significant actors, including NSI116; the European RIR (RIPE);117 some of the ccTLD 
registries118; and various other organisations. Many policy analysts and user groups 
criticised the gTLD-MoU as a sellout to trademark interests; conversely, many 
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trademark interests were still unhappy with the proposed creation of additional TLDs 
and criticised INTA for its participation.119  
 
Faced with these pressures, the US government went on to formally intervene, setting 
in motion an alternative reform process that led ultimately to the formation of 
ICANN.  
 
US Government intervention 
 
On July 1 1997, President Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to support 
efforts towards the creation of a new governance system for the DNS, to be run on 
private, competitive self-regulatory lines and incorporating a mechanism for 
resolution of conflicts between domain name usage and trademark law on a global 
basis.120 On July 2, the DoC issued a request for public comments on ‘issues relating 
to the overall framework of the DNS system, the creation of new top-level domains, 
policies for registrars, and trademark issues.’121  
 
The emphasis on 'private' governance of the DNS reflected the Clinton 
administration's commitment to competition and deregulation in the 
telecommunications sector. This was reflected in a White House statement of policy 
entitled ‘A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce’, which emphasised that, 
despite governmental financing for the initial development of the Internet, its 
expansion had been driven primarily by the private sector. For electronic commerce to 
flourish, the ‘private sector must continue to lead’, and the network should operate as 
a ‘market driven arena’. 122   
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On 30th January, the DoC published a conceptual Green Paper123, which proposed to 
create a ‘new, private, non-commercial corporation’ (‘NewCo’) to take over 
governance of the Internet’s naming and numbering systems. ‘NewCo’ would be 
guided by four core principles: stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, 
and representation124, and would take over operational responsibility for the naming 
and numbering systems by a target date of October 1998. The DoC would initially 
continue to participate in policy oversight for a period to ensure stability, but would 
withdraw from this role no later than September 30, 2000.125 126 
A draft governance structure was outlined for the new corporation.127 Note 2.1 The 
Green Paper also proposed separation of the registry and registrar functions, the 
creation of five new gTLDs128, and a system whereby disputes over domain names 
would be submitted to the jurisdiction of specified courts. The introduction of a 
streamlined disputes resolution mechanism as an alternative to litigation was also 
mooted, but no detailed proposals were offered.129 Finally, the Green Paper also 
indicated that NSI’s monopoly would end on September 30, 1997.130   
Over 500 distinct comments on the Green Paper were received from individuals, 
organisations and governments.131 Some groups supported the main thrust of the 
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proposals, including the IAB.132 Others were less satisfied. Proposals to refer domain 
name disputes to US courts, though widely supported by US trademark holders, were 
protested by trademark holders and domain name registrants outside the United States, 
who characterised this as an inappropriate attempt to impose U.S. trademark law as 
the law of the Internet.133 The International Trademark Association (INTA) felt that 
the proposals did not adequately protect trademark interests, and expressed a need for 
a uniform dispute resolution policy.134 Postel himself was dissatisfied with the 
detailed proposals on how new gTLDs, registrars and registries would be established, 
and the restriction to only five new gTLDs.135  
 
The European Council’s response to the Green Paper emphasised the global nature of 
the Internet and called on the US government to refer decisions on the future 
governance of the core systems to ‘an appropriate internationally constituted and 
representative body’.136 Magaziner replied to this criticism, arguing that the purpose 
of the proposals was to improve the ‘technical management’ of the DNS only and that 
the Green Paper did not propose a ‘monolithic Internet Governance system’. 
However, he proposed that the composition of a ‘NewCo’ board of directors should be 
balanced and representative of the functional and geographic diversity of the 
Internet.137  
 
On 3 June 1998, the DoC released a White Paper, ‘Management of Internet Names 
and Addresses’.138 Like the Green Paper, it took as its basis the principles of 
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‘competition, stability, private, bottom-up coordination, and representation’ and 
proposed that management of the naming and numbering systems be transferred to a 
private, not for profit corporation (‘NewCo’).  However, unlike the Green Paper, the 
White Paper did not include any specifications for ‘NewCo’, instead calling for a 
suitable corporation to be self-organised by the ‘private sector’.139 It set a timescale of 
four months for the private sector to form a suitable corporation that commanded 
‘consensus’ among stakeholders.140 The DoC would then recognise this corporation 
and transfer to it the IANA functions. The White Paper also called upon the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to ‘initiate a process to: develop 
recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name 
disputes involving “cyberpiracy”; to recommend a process for protecting famous 
trademarks; and to evaluate the effects of adding new gTLDs and related dispute 
resolution procedures on trademark and intellectual property holders.’141 
 
Milton Mueller identifies some confusion in the US government’s position, 
characterising the White Paper as ‘an improvised response to political pressures 
pulling in various directions.’ On one side, he asserts, corporate lobbyists pressed for 
governmental involvement to ensure ‘stability’ and to create a trademark protection 
system. However, the DoC also faced pressure from ISOC to leave control in the 
hands of the ‘Internet community’, as well as pressure from European and Australian 
governments for more formal, international and governmental involvement. Mueller 
feels that ‘industry self-regulation’ was merely a public label for a process that could 
be more accurately described as the US government brokering a ‘behind-the-scenes 
deal’ among what it perceived as the major players, both private and governmental.142 
 
In its formal response to the proposals, the European Commission found that the 
White Paper did, to a large extent, respond to the comments and criticisms of the 
Green Paper made by the EU and other entities. It noted that the White Paper had 
recognised the need to move away from a US-centric approach and towards a 
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multilateral basis for Internet core systems management. However, it expressed 
continued reservations about the new corporation being set up under US law.143    
 
Formation of ICANN 
 
Following the release of the White Paper, a number of groups began to hold 
discussions regarding formation of the ‘NewCo’. The most important of these became 
the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), an ‘ad hoc coalition of 
professional, trade and educational associations representing a diversity of Internet 
stakeholder groups, including ISPs, content developers, trademark holders, 
networkers, intergovernmental groups, policy experts, end-users and others.’144  The 
IFWP was backed by numerous large corporations, including NSI. It held a series of 
seminars and workshops including meetings in Virginia, Geneva, Singapore and 
Buenos Aires. Ultimately, the IFWP did not succeed in producing a fully articulated 
plan for the ‘NewCo’, but nonetheless acted as a catalyst that moved the process 
forward.145 At the same time, Postel and the IANA initiated a global online 
discussion, which took the form of emails from individuals, governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions worldwide.146  
 
In September 1998, the IFWP tried to bring IANA, NSI and various other groups 
together to work out a formal constitution for the new corporation. This meeting was 
known as the Boston Working Group; however, IANA declined to participate in it. 147 
Instead, using input from the online discussions, Postel and the IANA put together a 
series of drafts of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for a ‘NewCo’, to be 
named the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.148  The most 
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important of these was released on September 17 with the endorsement of NSI and 
was known as the ‘IANA / NSI draft’.149 Postel sent these drafts on October 2 to the 
DoC.150  
 
On October 16, 1998, Jon Postel unexpectedly died. However, the IANA / NSI draft, 
following a final round of revisions, was ultimately accepted by the DoC as the basis 
for ‘NewCo’.151 On November 25, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, which had been incorporated under California law on September 18, was 
formally recognised by the DoC as the ‘NewCo’ described in the White Paper.152 
 
ICANN was formally incorporated as a non-profit corporation under the California 
Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law.153 Two contracts were signed between 
ICANN and the DoC: the IANA contract, which gave ICANN control of the co-
ordination of domain names, IP addresses and related protocol parameters154; and the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which set out ICANN’s specific 
responsibilities and targets. The MoU was specified to be for a two-year transition 
period only, after which, under the condition that ICANN fulfilled its functions, all 
remaining responsibilities were to be transferred and ICANN was to become fully 
independent.155   
 
Mueller explains the DoC’s acceptance of the IANA / NSI draft as the result of a lack 
of clear consensus emerging out of the IFWP.156 He is critical of the way the process 
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was managed, arguing that the ‘Internet’s constitutional convention’ had been 
‘reduced to two government contractors negotiating in secret.’157 Despite the White 
Paper’s public call for the private sector to self-organise, he argues, the process that 
unfolded ‘reflected a behind-the-scenes agreement that IANA-ISOC and their 
corporate allies would be the ones in control of the new organisation and that a 
specific program acceptable to the trademark lobby, the US Commerce Department 
and the Europeans would be executed.’158  
 
ICANN initial structure 
 
Figure 2.2: ICANN initial structure  
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, ICANN’s initial organisational structure was 
considerably different from that of the present day.  
 
Following the corporation’s formal establishment, the Supporting Organisations 
essentially organised themselves. The PSO was set up by the IETF technical 
community159 and the ASO by the Regional Internet Registries.160 The initial seven 
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DNSO constituencies were granted provisional recognition by the Board, and met in 
Berlin in May 1999 to establish a Names Council and set up an internal structure.161 
 
The initial, ‘interim’ Board was made up of nine members unilaterally selected by 
Postel and the IANA. This list of members was, however, ‘vetted’ by Ira Magaziner 
and also, it has been claimed, by the EU and the Australian government.162 A tenth 
Board member was added in the position of President and CEO of ICANN.163 Under 
the Bylaws, the interim Board was to be succeeded by a full Board composed of 
nineteen members chosen from the Supporting Organisations, and a further nine 
intended to represent ‘the public at large’, chosen by some form of online election.164 
The interim Board was geographically quite balanced, with four members from the 
US, three from Europe and two from Asia.Note 2.2 
 
The Membership Advisory Committee (MAC) was set up to develop a structure for 
the At-Large constituency and produce criteria for At-Large Membership and the 
rights and obligations of members.166  
  
ICANN in operation: 1998-2002 
 
Although NSI had initially helped to bring ICANN into being, NSI and ICANN were 
soon at loggerheads over ICANN’s proposal to implement a ‘Shared Registry 
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Service’. This would involve a division of Network Solutions into two entities, a 
registry and a registrar, and accreditation of a number of new registrars to compete 
with the latter. NSI resisted this proposal.167 In October 1998, NSI had signed a new 
co-operative agreement with the DoC, under which NSI continued to control the 
actual root zone file at an operational level; this specified that NSI must enter into a 
contract with ‘NewCo’ to provide the services that they had previously provided to 
the US government.168 However, NSI simply refused to recognise ICANN as being 
the ‘NewCo’ described in the Cooperative Agreement.169 Nonetheless, ICANN 
pushed forward with its plans, and in April 1999 selected 34 competitors for NSI in 
registration of domain names. Following its failure to secure Congressional support 
for its stance170 171, NSI elected to come to an agreement. On November 4, NSI 
recognised ICANN's authority in return for continued control over the WHOIS 
directory for at least four years, and ICANN’s recognition of NSI as an accredited 
registrar. The agreements provided that NSI would have to separate its registry and 
registrar operations. NSI continued to act as registry for .com. net and .org, but agreed 
to allow competing firms to register names in those TLDs for a ‘wholesale’ price of 
$6 a year. Competing registrars were to pay NSI an annual $10,000 fee for access to 
WHOIS. NSI also agreed to pay ICANN $1.25m to cover the following year's fees. A 
few weeks later, the DoC also accepted these revised agreements.172 In May 2001, 
ICANN entered into a revised agreement with VeriSign (which had bought out NSI), 
under which VeriSign would relinquish control of the .org TLD in 2002 and .net in 
2005, but would retain control of .com (by far the largest and most lucrative TLD) 
until at least 2007.173  
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ICANN’s initial years of operation saw further important policy initiatives, including 
implementation of a Uniform Domain Name Disputes Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
based on the WIPO report commissioned by the US Government (see Chapter 6). It 
also introduced seven new gTLDs (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, following a series of 
studies174, the Board approved a mechanism for direct election of one-third of 
Directors by the global ‘At-Large’ user community in March 2000.175 Note 2.3 The 
election was duly held in October 2000 and five ‘At-Large’ Directors were elected.176 
Reform process 2002-03  
 
Despite the target set by the White Paper, US governmental oversight did not come to 
an end in October 2000, as ICANN was judged not to have met the criteria specified 
in the MoU.177 The accession of the Bush administration in 2001 was also significant; 
some scholars, such as Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, identify a greater unwillingness on 
the part of the Bush government to relinquish US oversight of the core Internet 
systems.178  
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Various scholars have argued that ICANN was in disarray by 2002. Susan Crawford, 
David Post and David P Johnson argue that the principle of consensus based 
decisionmaking was not working. They identify two reasons for this; firstly an alleged 
failure of the ICANN Board and staff to publicly exert leadership in calling for the 
creation of consensus policies and running the process; and secondly, deep 
factionalism in the DNSO.179 However, they did not believe that the consensus 
principle should be abandoned; rather, they argued that ICANN should ‘more 
effectively implement the consensus theory’ through stronger Board and staff 
leadership.180   
 
George Christou and Seamus Simpson identify, over ICANN’s first three years, an 
ongoing contestation of several key procedures and associated norms with regard to 
issues such as representativeness, the process of creating new generic TLDs and 
ICANN’s relationship with national country code TLD administrators.181 
Kleinwaechter identifies a tension among national governments over the 
appropriateness of public functions being performed by a private corporation as being 
one of the key pressures for reform of ICANN.182 He believes the major turning point 
came in 2001, when the original ideals of private governance and broad representation 
were superseded by other priorities after the burst of the .com bubble and the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001. As a consequence, Kleinwaechter asserts, the broader 
political and economic environment for Internet governance changed dramatically. 
Security and stability of the Internet became the first priority; and as a consequence, 
he argues, ICANN turned from a project on ‘cyberdemocracy’ into an instrument for 
‘cybersecurity’.183  
 
Against this backdrop, ICANN underwent a reform process. This was internally 
initiated by the publication, in February 2002, of a President's Report authored by 
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Lynn and entitled  ‘ICANN: The Case for Reform’.184 Lynn acknowledged there were 
problems with ICANN’s organisation, which he described as being ‘overburdened 
with process’. He was unequivocal that ‘ICANN needs reform: deep, meaningful, 
structural reform’ and proposed to replace its ‘unstable institutional foundations’ with 
‘an effective public-private partnership, rooted in the private sector but with the active 
backing and participation of national governments’, a major departure from the 
original conception of ICANN as a wholly private, non-governmental organisation. 
Lynn went on to propose a reduction in the size of the Board, an increase in its 
authority, and an end to direct Board elections in favour of a greater role for 
governmental representatives.185 Kleinwaechter interprets Lynn’s report as a response 
both to the ‘obvious deficiencies’ in the management structure but also to the new 
security challenges. He believes Lynn’s proposal for a new public-private partnership 
was aimed at avoiding two extremes; an intergovernmental takeover, or a totally 
independent ICANN governed by providers and users of services.186  
 
The GAC welcomed this new approach, stating that ‘a private-sector/public-sector 
partnership will be essential to ICANN's future success.’187 The move towards a 
public-private model was also in accordance with the direction favoured by the EU.188 
The US government remained officially silent during the reform process. However, 
Congressional hearings were held to look into ‘long-standing complaints about 
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ICANN's lack of accountability, stability and security’,189 at which DoC officials 
made statements. These acknowledged the desirability of ICANN reform, but also 
stated the department’s continuing support for private sector management of the DNS, 
with an effective advisory role for governments, rather than having ICANN’s 
functions performed by an intergovernmental body, such as the ITU. 190  
 
Following Lynn’s report, the Board established a Committee on Restructuring, 
subsequently renamed the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform (ERC),191 
consisting of three members (all Directors)192 Note 2.4 and tasked with making 
recommendations to the Board on possible changes to the structure of ICANN, taking 
into account input from ‘the community’.193 The ERC’s report, ‘A Blueprint for 
Reform’, was published in June 2002. It proposed to reduce the Board to fifteen 
voting members; eight selected by the Nominating Committee, two from each 
Supporting Organisation, and the President. At-Large elections would be abandoned. 
Additionally, there would be five non-voting Liaisons, from the GAC, IAB / IETF, 
RSSAC, and SSAC. The DNSO would be split into a Generic Names Supporting 
Organisation (GNSO) and a Country Code Names Supporting Organisation 
(CCNSO). The PSO was to be abolished. No changes were recommended for the 
ASO. 194 The GAC would remain an advisory committee and would appoint a non-
voting liaison to the Board, as well as one delegate to the Nominating Committee, and 
non-voting liaisons to each of the SO Councils and to the RSSAC, the TAC, and the 
SAC.195 
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On 2nd October, the ERC proposed new Bylaws, based mostly on the Blueprint for 
Reform.196 These were posted for public comment from 2nd October and discussed at 
the Public Forum at the ICANN meeting at Shanghai on 30 October. Following minor 
modifications,197 on 31st October, the Board adopted the proposed Bylaws with one 
dissenting vote.198 
 
As previously proposed, the PSO was abolished, partly succeeded by the Technical 
Liaison Group. The DNSO was split into the GNSO and CCNSO. The ASO was 
retained, but conducted internal reforms; the RIRs formed their own coordination 
body, the Number Resource Organisation (NRO), the members of which became the 
new ASO Address Council via a 2004 agreement between ICANN and the NRO.199 
An At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) was formed to represent the interests of 
end-users. It was to some degree a successor to the old At-Large Constituency, but 
with considerably less power; it appointed no Directors and was to be merely an 
advisory body, though it was given the power to select five voting delegates to the 
Nominating Committee, together with one non-voting liaison to the Board. The 
scrapping of At-Large elections had already been approved by the Board at Accra, 
Ghana, on 14 March 2002.200 The GAC’s role was enhanced, arguably further than 
had been envisaged in the Blueprint. The Board was now obliged to notify the GAC 
of any proposal raising public policy issues and was required to take GAC 
recommendations ‘duly . . . into account, both in the formulation and adoption of 
policies.’ If the Board rejected a GAC recommendation, it must state its reasons in 
writing.201 The GAC was to appoint a non-voting liaison to the Board together with 
one delegate to the Nominating Committee, and was given the option to designate a 
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non-voting liaison to each of the SO Councils and Advisory Committees. In addition, 
staffing of ICANN increased significantly,202 as did its level of expenditure.203  
Overall, most analysts agree that the reforms brought a significant shift in ICANN’s 
nature, moving away from the original ideals of direct user representation and towards 
the ‘public-private’ model promoted by Lynn and the EU. These changes were 
criticised by some analysts, such as Michael Froomkin, who argued that the scrapping 
of direct At-Large elections tipped the balance of power towards certain governments 
and certain business interests and away from public participation.204 Kleinwaechter 
focused on the enhanced role taken on by governments, contending that the GAC had 
now acquired ‘something akin to veto power’ as a result of the new rule obliging the 
Board to supply reasons in writing if it should elect to reject GAC advice.205 
ICANN since 2002 
In September 2003, ICANN again clashed with VeriSign (NSI’s successor) over the 
latter’s introduction of a service called SiteFinder, under which users accessing any 
unregistered domains under the .com and .net TLDs (for example, as the result of a 
typo) would be redirected to a VeriSign web portal advertising VeriSign products. 
ICANN issued a formal demand to VeriSign that SiteFinder be suspended, stating that 
VeriSign had exceeded the terms of its contract.206 VeriSign complied, but later filed a 
lawsuit claiming that ICANN had overstepped its authority over the SiteFinder affair, 
and including an antitrust component.207  This continued until October 2005, when 
VeriSign agreed to drop the legal action as part of a settlement which would see 
VeriSign’s contract to run .com extended until 2012, and an agreement that SiteFinder 
would not be reinstated without ICANN approval. 208 In February 2006, the Board 
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approved this settlement via a majority vote (9 to 5 in favour, one abstention), and 
allowed VeriSign to raise  registration fees by up to 7% per annum.209 This dispute 
demonstrated that some aspects of the regime were still in a state of flux; there was an 
ongoing lack of certainty about just how far ICANN’s authority over the registries 
extended, with ICANN seeking to impose centralised control and at least some 
registries, particularly VeriSign, seeking to resist what they saw as ICANN exceeding 
its authority (or at least to extract significant concessions in return for compliance).  
In a similar way, ICANN has moved in recent years to extend its control over the 
registrars. In 2007, following a legal dispute with registrar RegisterFly over the 
ICANN’s right to terminate RegisterFly’s accreditation210 Note 2.5, ICANN stated its 
intention to reform the registrar accreditation process.211 A new RAA was created, 
though this did not come into effect until May 2009 and would only apply to registrars 
accredited (or re-accredited) after that date.212 ICANN also began to demonstrate a 
new willingness to enforce contracts with registrars.213 The result was a considerably 
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enhanced policy enforcement regime over the registrar market and thus a 
strengthening of another aspect of ICANN’s authority.  
On September 29, 2006, ICANN signed a new agreement with the DoC, termed the 
Joint Project Agreement (JPA).214 The JPA effectively extended the previous MoU for 
a further three years, with some minor amendments.215 Three years later, on expiry of 
the JPA in September 2009, ICANN and Commerce signed an ‘Affirmation of 
Commitments’ replacing the former agreement.216 Unlike the JPA / MoU, however, 
this agreement was intended to be permanent and was not set to expire after a fixed 
period. It removed the requirement that ICANN would report to Commerce, and 
explicitly stated that ICANN was a private entity not under the control of any one 
authority. Under the agreement, ICANN affirmed its commitments to: (a) maintain the 
capacity and ability to coordinate the Internet DNS at the overall level and to work for 
the maintenance of a single, interoperable Internet; (b) remain a not for profit 
corporation, headquartered in the USA with offices around the world to meet the 
needs of a global community; and (c) to operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector 
led organisation with input from the public, ‘for whose benefit ICANN shall in all 
events act.’217  ICANN was committed to organise a review of its execution of the 
above commitments at least once every three years, with the first review concluding 
no later than December 31, 2010. The review was to be performed, not by the DoC as 
in the past, but by a team including the Chair of the GAC, the Chair of the Board of 
ICANN, a DoC representative, representatives of ICANN Advisory Committees and 
Supporting Organisations, and independent experts. The precise composition of the 
review team was to be be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with 
GAC members) and the Chair of the Board of ICANN. Recommendations from the 
reviews were to be be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The 
Board was committed to take action within six months of receipt of the 
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recommendations.218 In addition, oversight panels including GAC representatives 
were to be set up to conduct regular reviews of ICANN’s work in three other areas: 
WHOIS policy, competition among gTLDs, and the security of the network.219  
The Affirmation was widely seen as freeing ICANN from US governmental 
oversight,220 although it should be remembered that the US government still retains 
ultimate control of the DNS root and ICANN continues to derive its authority to 
manage the core systems from the IANA contract, which remains unaltered. 
Furthermore, the DoC retains a permanent seat on the AoC review panel. 
Notwithstanding, it is clear that the replacement of the JPA with the AoC represents 
an important loosening of US governmental oversight. It is interesting that this change 
of policy followed the election of the Obama administration, although the Obama 
team had made no previous statements regarding ICANN either prior to or after the 
election. ICANN independence had, of course, previously been promised under the 
Clinton administration, but had failed to materialise during the eight years of the Bush 
government.  
The GAC’s oversight role seems to be significantly extended, which might be seen as 
moving ICANN a step closer to an intergovernmental oversight model. ICANN’s own 
commentary on the agreement noted that the GAC’s role was ‘reaffirmed’ and that the 
GAC is a key participant in selecting the membership of the review teams.221 
However, ICANN also asserts that the AoC places oversight power mainly with the 
hands of the ‘ICANN community’, constituting ‘recognition that the multi-stakeholder 
model is robust enough to review itself’.222  
Mueller sees the Affirmation as eliminating at a stroke some of the key objections to 
ICANN from powers such as the EU. He argues that, by elevating the GAC in status, 
the Affirmation has been used to provide a ‘soft internationalisation’ without tying 
ICANN to the United Nations or other type of intergovernmental agreement; the 
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result, he asserts, is to solidify international acceptance of ICANN as a privatised 
governance entity.223 
ICANN, WSIS and the IGF  
 
ICANN came under important international scrutiny at the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005. WSIS, jointly organised by the UN 
and ITU, was seen as an experiment in holding a ‘tripartite’ international conference, 
with representation for governments, business and civil society, as opposed to the 
traditional, purely intergovernmental, model. Mathiason sees WSIS as the formal 
emergence of the international political dimension of Internet governance.224  
 
WSIS was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in January 2002.225 The first phase 
of the summit (WSIS I) was held in Geneva in December 2003. It adopted a 
Declaration of Principles on which the ‘Information Society’ should be built226; 
however, it failed to produce any meaningful agreement on substantive issues of 
Internet governance, including the future of DNS. The Geneva summit also produced 
a Plan of Action, which requested the UN Secretary-General to set up a working 
group on Internet governance (WGIG)227, to include representatives from all three 
stakeholder groups (governments, the private sector and civil society) and detailed to: 
develop a working definition of Internet governance; identify public policy issues 
relevant to Internet governance; develop a common understanding of the respective 
roles and responsibilities of governments and existing international organisations as 
well as the private sector and civil society; and prepare a report on the results of this 
activity to be presented at the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005. The WGIG 
was duly established, consisting of some forty members and chaired by Nitin Desai 
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(Special Adviser to the Secretary-General).228 It worked over the next eighteen 
months and presented its Final Report in July 2005.229  
 
As with WSIS I, WSIS II was preceded by a series of preparatory conferences known 
as ‘PrepComs’, at which several major governments indicated a desire to see the 
ICANN regime replaced by some other arrangement, such as an intergovernmental 
body. The Chinese delegation at Prepcom 2 (February 2005) advocated that the 
WGIG should examine and undertake research into establishing a single multinational 
organisation to control various aspects of Internet governance, including DNS.230 
Brazilian delegates advocated reform of naming and numbering systems governance, 
on the grounds that current arrangements excluded national governments and civil 
society. The Indian delegation also spoke of the need for reform of DNS governance 
arrangements, as did the Columbian representatives, together with the NGO caucus. 
Chinese representatives also criticised the IP address allocation system, which they 
saw as inherently unfair, based on a 'first come, first served' principle that, they felt, 
had led to a scarcity before many developing nations had the chance to request 
addresses, resulting in an effective bottleneck to development. 231  
 
Prior to the main Summit, Argentina put forward proposals to reform ICANN to 
reinforce the role of governments with regard to ‘relevant internet public policy 
issues’ and also to continue its ‘internationalisation’.232 A similar stance was taken by 
Russia233 and in the African common position paper submitted by Ghana.234 The EU 
proposed that ICANN be removed from US oversight and a new ‘co-operation model’ 
put in place, based on a regular meeting of states and including a new arbitration and 
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dispute resolution system.235 236 Iran and Pakistan proposed an ‘Intergovernmental 
Council for Global Public Policy and Oversight’, a UN body that would oversee 
ICANN. It would include an advisory role for the private sector and 
intergovernmental agencies.237 238 The Arab Group echoed the Chinese position in 
proposing the establishment of a world council on the Internet.239   
 
The US, however, made plain that it had no intention of countenancing alternative 
arrangements for DNS governance. A few months before the summit, the US assistant 
commerce secretary, Michael Gallagher, stated that the US would ‘maintain its 
historic role in authorising changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone 
file’.240 He justified this in terms of the need to ensure stability and security of the 
system. This announcement was met with support from Australia241 but was criticised 
by other states, including Japan242 and the EU.243   
 
The WGIG Report (July 2005) suggested four possible models for future governance 
of Internet naming and numbering resources:  
• Model 1): Creation of a UN body named the Global Internet Council, which 
would replace the GAC and take over oversight of ICANN. Governments 
would play the leading role in the GIC, with the private sector and civil society 
in an advisory capacity. The GIC would also have a wider role in governance 
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of other Internet-related public policy issues, such as such as spam, privacy, 
cybersecurity and cybercrime.  
• Model 2): No changes apart from strengthening of ICANN’S GAC.  
• Model 3): Creation of an International Internet Council outside the UN system, 
which would take over oversight of ICANN and possibly replace the GAC. 
Governments would take a leading role in the IIG, with the private sector and 
civil society in an advisory role.    
• Model 4): Creation of three new bodies: a World Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers, overseen by governments, to take over 
ICANN’s functions; a Global Internet Governance Forum to facilitate 
discussion and co-ordinate policy between governments, businesses and the 
public; and a government-led Global Internet Policy Council to co-ordinate 
work on Internet-related public policy issues.244 
The US government effectively rejected all four options, arguing against any shift in 
the regulatory approach towards governmental, top-down control, and stating that the 
United States continued to support ‘private sector led technical coordination and 
management’ of the naming and addressing systems in the form of ICANN. It did, 
however, recognise that ‘governments have legitimate public policy and sovereignty 
concerns with respect to the management of their country code top level domains’.245  
 
The main summit (WSIS II) took place from 16-18 November 2005 in Tunis, Tunisia.  
174 state entities (including the EU) were represented, together with 92 IGOs, 606 
NGOs and civil society organisations, 226 business entities and 642 media 
organisations.246  None of the issues pertaining to US control of the root or political 
oversight of ICANN were effectively resolved. Two official agreements were 
produced, the ‘Tunis Commitment’247 and the ‘Tunis Agenda for the Information 
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Society’.248 Neither addressed the issue of DNS and IP addressing oversight in 
specific terms. There were, however, a number of clauses that referred to the need for 
a multilateral approach to Internet governance issues.Note 2_6 
 
The main-outcome-of-the Summit was the creation of an Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF) to continue discussions. 249 Like WSIS, the IGF is a multistakeholder body 
comprised of representatives of governments, business and civil society. Its 
Secretariat, established in March 2006, was effectively a continuation of the WSIS 
Secretariat, retaining the same staff.250 In May 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan established an-Advisory-Group to assist-in convening the IGF, chaired by 
Nitin Desai and including 47 members from governments, the private sector and civil 
society.251  The Advisory Group, now known as the Multistakeholder Advisory Group 
(MAG), continues to exist and meets three times annually, between meetings of the 
IGF.252 Its status is that of a UN advisory committee.253  
 
The main IGF meets annually. Initially-it was to meet for a period of five years; 
however in May 2010 the UN Secretary-General recommended that this be 
extended.254 There have so far been-six meetings: Athens, Greece (2006), Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil (2007), Hyderabad, India (2008), Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt (2009), 
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Vilnius, Lithuania (2010) and Nairobi (2011).255 IGF meetings are based around 
workshops, forums and meetings of-the ‘Dynamic Coalitions’ (effectively, working 
groups tasked to examine a specific issue). All of these activities are open to 
participants from governments, business and civil society. There are also a number of 
Main Sessions, which discuss issues from an agenda prepared in advance by the 
MAG.256  
 
The IGF has so far produced little to address the issue of naming and numbering 
resource governance. The topic of Critical Internet Resources was discussed in Main 
Sessions at Rio de Janeiro,257 Hyderbad,258 259 Sharm el Sheikh260, Lithuania,261 and 
Nairobi262 but these discussions have produced little consensus with regards to future 
oversight arrangements. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter 2 
 
In summary, ICANN began as an attempt by the Clinton administration to ‘privatise’ 
governance of the Internet’s core systems. The new organisation was to be run on 
‘multistakeholder’ lines, incorporating representatives of both the private sector and 
civil society, with an ‘advisory’ role only for governments. It was to be essentially a 
globalised non-governmental governance organisation, based on principles of free-
market competition but also representation of, and accountability to, a global Internet-
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using public. Though the United States would retain an oversight role for a ‘transition’ 
period, ICANN was to be released into full independence within two years.  
 
Since that time, the regime has undergone some major changes, particularly in the 
2002-03 reforms. The emphasis on representation of and accountability to the global 
Internet-using public has been severely curtailed, particularly with the scrapping of 
the ‘At Large’ election system for Directors. At the same time there has been 
increased emphasis on the role of governments through the GAC, which has seen its 
effective powers markedly increased. In other ways, there has been a more subtle and 
gradual evolution of the regime. These have included the extension of ICANN’s 
effective authority over both registries and registrars, which did not come without 
significant resistance, including the contests with NSI / VeriSign, and the RegisterFly 
affair and its consequences.  
 
Throughout the years of the Bush administration, there was a marked unwillingness 
on the part of the US government to give up its oversight role, as evidenced by the 
repeated renewal of the MoU / JPA. The Obama administration, however, has moved 
ICANN closer to full independence, with the termination of the JPA and its 
replacement with the AoC. Nonetheless, the US still has not completely removed 
itself from the oversight role. Not only do DoC officials continue to play a (reduced, 
but still significant) role in the AoC review committees, but the US still claims 
ultimate legal ownership of the root. In the final analysis, therefore, ICANN continues 
to draw its legal authority to govern the Internet’s core systems from its contract with 
the DoC.  
 
An effective intergovernmental challenge to this state of affairs has so far failed to 
emerge. The UN and ITU have repeatedly attempted, without success, to impose their 
authority on the issue-area. The first attempt, in the form of the gTLD-MoU, failed 
because the US government refused to co-operate. Subsequent reform proposals 
emerged during the UN / ITU sponsored WSIS process, but also failed to gain 
traction, partly because of US intransigence and partly because of a failure to reach 
consensus. A subsequent UN initiative, the IGF, has also so far failed to produce any 
significant challenge to the standing ICANN arrangements.   
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Nonetheless, despite the failure of the formal intergovernmental system in the shape 
of the UN to impose itself on this issue-area, the change in the GAC’s role has been 
interpreted by scholars such as Kleinwaechter as a significant shift towards an 
intergovernmental approach. 263 However, other scholars, such as Geoff Huston, 
continue to see the organisation as being largely dominated by nongovernmental 
actors, particularly from the domain name supply side.264  The next chapter will look 
in more depth at these competing interpretations of the ICANN regime.    
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Chapter 3 
Competing perspectives on ICANN: a literature review 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter-will review some of the pertinent academic literature on ICANN. A 
considerable volume of material has been written about the organisation, from a range 
of perspectives.  
 
A considerable proportion-of the literature appears-to assume that ICANN is a 
‘private’ nongovernmental industry self-regulatory body. This is certainly how the 
organisation was envisaged when initially created-under the Clinton administration, 
and ICANN’s core documents still maintain this-claim. The concept-of ICANN as an 
essentially nongovernmental agency wielding ‘private’ regulatory authority is 
consistent with a phenomenon identified by-numerous IR scholars (see Chapter 8) of 
nonstate governance-mechanisms arising to-fill regulatory gaps, brought about by the 
diminishment of state-power to regulate-in a globalised world.  
 
The notion that the Internet’s core systems-are outside-the control of traditional-public 
authorities often leads to the view that ICANN is effectively a public authority-in its 
own right, perhaps even possessing a type of ‘sovereignty’ of its own. Such-views 
often result in concerns regarding the-extent to which the-organisation meets ‘liberal 
democratic’ standards of legitimacy. Writers-such as Jonathan Weinberg, 265 Kathleen 
Fuller266 and Jonathan Koppell267 tend to-emphasise concerns regarding ICANN’s 
legitimacy, accountability, and mechanisms for-representation. Attempts to address 
such concerns are-also ultimately the basis-for the ‘multistakeholder’ model of 
governance. Proponents of multistakeholderism, such as John Mathiason,268 argue that 
ICANN can be legitimised-on the basis of fair-representation for all affected interests 
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within the ICANN structure. However, these writers also often tend to see 
multistakeholderism-as an-ideal-that is not-necessarily well implemented in the 
current ICANN system. They-tend to see the solution-as reform of ICANN rather than 
abandonment of the multistakeholder model. 
 
Some other analysts, such as Daniel Drezner, 269 take a more-traditional-International 
Relations-approach to the organisation, interpreting ICANN as a regime-underpinned 
by states. They identify a strong-hegemonic role for the United States-government in 
creating the regime, as well as-contributions from other-state actors. They also 
identify a-strong continued influence-from governmental-authorities in shaping 
ICANN policymaking.  
 
The remainder-of-this-chapter-will-attempt-to categorise-and explore in more detail 
some of the-various-perspectives on ICANN offered-in the literature. It will-not, at 
this stage, attempt to-evaluate the-relative merits of-these perspectives, which will be 
dealt with in-Chapter 7 following more in-depth empirical investigation into the 
organisation-and its operations-in practice.  
 
Technical caretaker model 
 
Lawrence B. Solum interprets-ICANN as primarily a technical agency, best 
understood as ‘an attempt to institutionalise and preserve the autonomy of an 
engineering-based approach to-Internet governance in  face of pressures to cede 
control to either national governments or market mechanisms.’270  He points to 
ICANN’s statement of core values and its emphasis on ensuring the ‘operational 
stability, reliability, security and-interoperability-of the Internet’, which he sees as 
‘technical imperatives-that-reflect-the-corporation’s origins in the-community of 
network engineers’. 271 He also highlights the emphasis on making ‘well-informed 
decisions based on expert advice’. 272 The hypothesis of ICANN as an ‘engineering 
based’ approach-to-governance-is-confirmed, Solum argues, by the ‘facts’ of 
ICANN’s continuing-existence as a ‘nongovernmental’ organisation, and its 
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resistance to ‘market approaches.’273 However, both-of-these ‘facts’ may be-disputed, 
as-this-thesis-will-go-on-to-show.   
 
Maeng-Joo-Lee also identifies a strong role for the technical community, to the extent 
that he talks-about ‘technical capture’. He-points-out that IETF technical standards 
effectively limit ICANN’s freedom of action in important areas.274  
 
Other scholars-such-as Mueller are, however, sceptical of such claims. Mueller argues 
that governance of the DNS involves not neutral ‘technical co-ordination’ but 
economic regulation-together-with some-broader issues-of public policy.275 He argues 
that, while the RIRs retain strong ties to the technical community and its norms, 
ICANN has lost many of-these moorings. ICANN, he-asserts, thinks of-itself as a 
private-corporation-first-and-foremost.276 
 
‘Liberal democratic’ approach 
 
An-alternative-perspective, based-on a-view of ICANN-as-a-public-policymaker 
rather than a mere technical co-ordinator, asks-questions-revolving-around-the extent 
to which ICANN does-or should-meet ‘liberal democratic’ standards-of-legitimacy. 
This approach, taken by analysts such as Hans Klein277, Jonathan Weinberg,278 
Kathleen Fuller279 and Jonathan GS Koppell280, starts from the assumption that, as a 
public policymaking body, ICANN should be based upon those principles of liberal 
democracy that have underpinned notions of legitimate public authority in Western 
political culture. To the extent that ICANN does not meet such criteria, these writers 
see this as a problem that needs to be ‘fixed’ in order to secure ICANN’s legitimacy 
as a policymaking body. 
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Such concerns with ICANN’s legitimacy were a significant influence on the 
organisation’s-initial design. Dan Hunter argues-that-the US-government realised the 
organisation-would-undertake significant-regulatory functions, making-it look-like a 
governmental-actor of-some form-or another. As-a-result, he asserts, they-recognised 
that ICANN could-not operate just as a typical-corporate animal, but needed some 
concession (real or imagined) to democracy.281  Thus, the 1998 White Paper 
emphasised that ‘NewCo’, while ‘private’, should-also embody principles such as 
accountability to, and representation of, -an Internet ‘community’. 282     
 
Weinberg evaluates the techniques ICANN has used in its attempts to legitimise itself, 
and the limitations of these. Firstly, he-argues, ICANN has-invoked ‘techniques of 
administrative law’, by structuring itself to resemble-a-classic US administrative 
agency, using and purportedly bound by the tools of bureaucratic rationality. 
Secondly, he asserts, ICANN has invoked ‘techniques-of-representation’, by adopting 
structures and procedures that-make it resemble-a representative-government body. 
Finally, Weinberg states, ICANN has invoked ‘techniques of consensus’ by asserting 
that its-structure-and rules-ensure it can-only act in-ways that reflect the consensus of 
the Internet community. 283 
 
However, he goes-on to argue, none of-these bases for legitimacy stands-up to close 
scrutiny. He feels that ICANN could not derive legitimacy from its links-with the US 
government because these were ‘murky’.284 Unlike a-traditional federal agency, he 
observes, ICANN has no grant of power in a statute enacted by Congress or 
Presidential nomination-of its top administrators;285 furthermore, unlike-a 
conventional US government agency, ICANN’s actions are-not subject to-significant 
judicial review.286 ICANN’s appeal to the principles of representation-also fails, 
Weinberg argues, because, in-his view, ICANN does not actually represent the 
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Internet community in any-meaningful way.287 Finally, he argues, appeal-to the 
principle of-consensus as a basis for legitimacy does not work because genuine 
consensus-is-impossible to achieve in the domain-name context; and furthermore, 
ICANN-does-not, in-any case, have procedures that-would enable it to recognise 
consensus (or the lack of consensus) surrounding any given issue. 288  
 
Some analysts have-approached-the-legitimacy issue from the-perspective that-
ICANN is-indeed a US-governmental agency. According to this view, the-solution to 
the organisation’s lack of-accountability is-to make ICANN more closely accountable 
to the Department-of-Commerce. This was the position in taken by Michael Froomkin 
following the initial creation of the organisation; he argued that ICANN's relationship 
with the DoC was illegal, in-violation of either the Constitution or federal statutes. If 
ICANN was engaged in public-policymaking, he argued, it was either doing so as a 
private party, which is illegal-under the private non-delegation doctrine, or it was 
doing so on behalf of the DoC, also illegal-because ICANN did not comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.289 He felt-that-some of-these problems could be 
addressed by turning ICANN into a full-fledged US administrative agency290; 
however, Kathleen Fuller disagreed with this, arguing that a government agency 
necessarily operates at a slower pace, and that in the rapidly changing world of the 
Internet, this could be a fatal flaw.291  
 
Like Weinberg, Jonathan G.S. Koppell argues that ICANN is unclear about what its 
legitimacy is based upon, and appeals to not just one basis but several, a phenomenon 
he terms ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’.292 He identifies conflicting expectations 
derived from three substantive notions of accountability, which he defines as 
‘controllability’, ‘responsiveness’, and ‘responsibility’. He sees ‘controllability’ as 
‘vexing’ because, he asserts, it has never been clear who or what ought to control 
ICANN. ‘Responsibility’, he argues, is made difficult by ambiguities within the 
documents upon which ICANN is based, and the malleability of ICANN’s rules and 
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regulations compounds the lack of any precedent to guide behaviour. 
‘Responsiveness’ is equally difficult because ICANN’s constituency is divided and 
the boundaries of its responsibilities are ambiguous; while even ‘liability’ and 
‘transparency’ are challenging, as it is unclear whether ICANN should be judged by 
standards applicable to public or private organisations.293 
 
Mueller-argues-that ICANN’s failure-to create accountability and-trust has made it 
difficult even for proponents of a nonstate governance model to embrace its 
independence. The problem, he feels, lies in the way ICANN is constituted, with lack 
of a defined membership-to-which the Board and staff-can be held accountable. As-a 
substitute for real accountability, Mueller maintains, ICANN has created ‘a chaotic 
mélange of-participatory mechanisms, none of which have any real power and all of 
which can be-played against each-other by the corporation.’294 He goes-on to argue 
that the new oversight model-set out in the-Affirmation of Commitments fails to 
resolve ICANN’s accountability-problems, because-the members-of the review panels 
are ‘hand-picked by the leaders of ICANN’ largely from among ICANN’s own 
internal-subunits. No new-perspectives or checks and-balances, Mueller maintains, 
will result from such a process.295 
 
An alternative view-on accountability-is expressed by C. N. J. De Vey Mestdagh-and 
R. W. Rijgersberg, who claim there-is no need for ICANN to-have accountability 
mechanisms, because-the ICANN root-has competitors from alternative DNS roots, 
and users can therefore ‘vote with their feet’. Accountability to the public is ‘…simply 
constituted by the organisation’s capacity to attract customers and its ability to 
maintain to serve them according to their needs.’296 This argument might have strong-
merit if the alternative-roots represented-genuine competition to ICANN; however, 
this is highly questionable at best.  
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ICANN as a democracy 
 
The 2000 At-Large elections for a proportion of ICANN directors were, at the time, 
widely seen as the key to ICANN’s quest for legitimacy. Proponents believed that the 
elections-would-transform-the organisation into the first global democracy and 
perhaps set a precedent that future global governance organisations would follow. 
Hans Klein, writing in 2001, took this view.297 Although he acknowledged that the 
ideal of-global-democracy was not-fully achieved in the ICANN election, -he thought 
that the election process-would continue-to evolve and that it could light-the way for 
further-developments in-global democracy in other sectors.298  
 
However, such-enthusiasm was-premature. Numerous problems were encountered 
with the election, including difficulties in defining-an appropriate voter constituency, 
agreeing on criteria for registering as a voter and creating reliable mechanisms to 
prevent-electoral fraud. In 2002, the-Board scrapped the At-Large election mechanism 
as too complex, expensive and unpredictable. 299 The failure of the At-Large elections 
has arguably made it-all the more important that-ICANN finds alternative-means of 
ensuring accountability and legitimising itself.  
 
Susan P. Crawford, a former ICANN director, argues that a ‘democratic’ model does 
not work for ICANN because-democratic-theory does not fit in with the 
organisation’s necessary framework.300 One key problem, she reasons, is that its 
‘citizenry’ cannot be properly specified; it-could include, for example, anyone who 
had considered-registering a domain name-but decided not to because of some 
element of-the ICANN-required registration scheme, or anyone who had ever used 
WHOIS information, or indeed anyone who-had ever gone online. Without a clearly 
defined electorate, Crawford argues, no-one-could claim to be ‘representative’ of that 
citizenry, and-there is no way to-determine what a ‘majority’ position is.301 Weinberg 
likewise questions what it means to ‘represent’ any community as ill-defined as the 
Internet community. Both Weinberg and Dan Hunter also identify a fundamental 
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ambivalance about what sort of organisation ICANN is (technical agency, private 
corporation or public policymaker) that leads-to alternative views of the kinds of 
political commitments we should expect. 302  303 
 
Multistakeholder approach 
 
Some writers have found-a basis for ICANN’s legitimacy in-the multistakeholder 
representation model. This has been said to confer a form of accountability by means 
of interest representation, whereby interest groups affected by ICANN’s activities are 
represented within the organisation and given a voice in its policymaking processes. 
As McDowell and Steinberg explain, in this approach, governance is depicted as co-
ordination among actors, not as a way in which those actors can be constituted as 
‘citizens’.304 The concept is based on the idea of a pluralist political process 
reproduced within the agency itself. The reasoning is that, since agency 
decisionmakers must consider the wishes of all relevant groups, their decisions will 
resemble those that would be made by the people themselves.  
 
Crawford sees this concept of building consensus between interest groups as the real 
basis for ICANN’s legitimacy. 305 She asserts that ICANN’s authority to make rules is 
‘based on-contracts that-require compliance with future rules-only when those rules 
are based on the-demonstrated consensus of-those who have-chosen to participate in 
its forums and-are affected by its policies.’306  With this-contractual framework in 
place, -she argues, ICANN-can legitimately claim that-those bound by its rules-are 
mostly the same groups whose welfare was considered when making them.307 
However, other writers, including Weinberg, are sceptical of this model, questioning 
the extent to which the vastly heterogonous ‘Internet community’ can be meaningfully 
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represented within the ICANN structure and arguing that the concept of policymaking 
by consensus is unworkable in the ICANN context.308  
 
Weinberg, writing about the makeup of the DNSO constituencies in 2000, pointed-out 
that, while many interested parties could not find a home in any of the approved 
constituencies, other parties found themselves eligible to participate in multiple 
constituencies, with-considerable overlap between commercial entities and trademark 
interests, while-individual domain-name holders-and ordinary Internet end-users were 
not-represented on the Names Council at all. 309 Though-Weinberg was-writing about 
the old DNSO, today's GNSO constituencies follow a similar pattern. There-is still 
considerable overlap between the-commercial constituencies, with many companies 
eligible to join more than one, while only the NCUC offers representation to (some) 
civil-society participants. Ordinary Internet-users and domain name-owners still have 
no direct representation-on the-GNSO Council. John Mathiason identifies the three 
major groups of-stakeholders within ICANN as governments, the private sector and 
the ‘netizens’.310 These-are-broad categories covering many-interests that, in reality, 
are very diverse and not always in harmony. For example, prospective domain name 
registrars and intellectual property organisations both belong-to the private sector, but 
the one would-have an interest in expansion of the gTLD space while-the other would 
tend to oppose it. Nonetheless, using-Mathiason’s categories, it is clear that private 
sector interests dominate ICANN. As far as the GNSO is concerned, five of the six 
constituencies-fall into the private sector category and-only the NCUC can be said to 
represent ‘netizens’, or at least a proportion of them.  
 
Weinberg also suggested that the-issues within ICANN’s remit were not capable of 
resolution by consensus, -regardless of the mechanisms employed.  He argued that 
matters such as selection of registrars or resolution of domain name disputes involve 
competing claims of right, and-many of the-interested parties have strong economic 
interests in particular outcomes. Such matters are thus not suited to resolution by 
consensus. Ultimately, Weinberg argued, someone must make the hard choices.311 He 
concluded that ‘It would be undesirable for ICANN truly to seek consensus before 
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acting, for that would mean that it could-do nothing at all.’312 Weinberg contrasted 
ICANN to other Internet governance-organisations, such-as the IETF, that have 
traditionally and successfully operated on a consensus model. He argued that ‘rough 
consensus’ has proved-a workable model for-these organisations, firstly because-the 
community of engineers and system administrators making them-up has been a 
relatively small and homogeneous one, bound together by shared values and 
professional norms; and secondly because-the issues they address have been technical 
ones, with questions as to-whether a proposed solution works being capable of 
resolution via a relatively-neutral performance metric.313 Hunter similarly argues that 
there is a serious question to be answered as to how any significant political institution 
could ever meet the claim-that it governs by consensus, since political decisions, by 
definition, involve deciding to privilege-one set of values or one party’s interests over 
another.314 
 
In announcing-the ICANN reform-programme-in 2002, then-ICANN President-Stuart 
Lynn agreed-that the-consensus model was-unworkable for ICANN:   
 
 I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a purely private 
sector body, based on consensus and consent, has been shown to be 
impractical . . . In hindsight, the notion of truly ‘bottom-up’ consensus 
decision-making simply has not proven workable…To be effective, the 
ICANN Board of Trustees has to be clearly empowered to make decisions 
even if there is no clear consensus, to the extent they see it necessary to carry 
out the ICANN mission.315  
 
Corporate / free market approach 
 
An alternative perspective interprets ICANN as essentially a corporate animal or even 
as-a cartel of influential commercial actors. Such approaches-focus on the highly 
influential, arguably dominant, role played by corporate actors in ICANN’s 
policymaking processes.  
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The doctrine of a private, commercially driven-Internet was undoubtedly-a strong 
element in ICANN’s original design-and reflects-the ‘reflexive government’, neo-
liberal ideology of the Clinton administration,316 a doctrine-that places a high 
normative value on the ‘free market’-and-minimum governance.317  Jack Goldsmith 
and Tim Wu argue that the emphasis-on private investment, perhaps-somewhat 
paradoxically, ultimately underpinned the Clinton administration’s decision-to-retain 
ultimate-US-authority-over-the DNS. While the DoC wanted to avoid governmental 
micromanagement, they also recognised the need for a stable base to persuade 
companies to-invest-in the-Internet and-to-ensure security. The gTLD-MoU was 
thought to be too uncertain, while it was-thought-that the-ITU might over-regulate; 
thus a ‘private’ regulator remaining under-the ultimate authority of the US 
government-was-felt-to be the-best-compromise.318  
 
Despite-the 2002-reforms, which-have seen-more influence-handed-to-governmental 
actors through the GAC, many analysts still identify a corporate dominance of 
ICANN, and-some writers argue-that the organisation-is in effect-a ‘captured agency’. 
Geoff Huston, for-instance, argues-that ‘ICANN has been largely captured-by the 
names industry”.319 Hunter-similarly argues that the ICANN constituencies ‘in 
practice have displayed all the worst features of regulatory capture.’320 The language 
of ‘regulatory capture’ used-by these writers-is drawn from-concepts in public-choice 
theory. Regulatory capture refers to a situation in which a state regulatory agency 
created to act in the public interest instead becomes a ‘captured agency’ acting in 
favour of dominant commercial or special interests. According to public choice 
theorists such as George Stigler, regulatory capture occurs because groups or 
individuals with-high stakes-interests in the outcome of-policy or regulatory decisions 
focus their resources in attempting to gain the outcomes they prefer, while members 
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of the public, each-with only a tiny-individual stake in the outcome, do not possess the 
will, resources or organisational-capability to effectively influence policy. The cost to 
a group of attempting-to-influence regulatory decisions-is high; thus, -the-groups that 
are-willing and able to do this are-inevitably large corporations, because-the benefits 
to them are high and because, as a relatively small and homogeneous group, they are 
able to-take collective action. 321 Small companies, by contrast, would gain lower 
potential benefits and find it more difficult-to collectively organise; consumers do not 
organise because the costs would far outweigh the potential benefits to each 
individual. 322 Thus, in Stigler’s view, regulatory agencies inevitably come to serve 
large corporate interests. 
 
Like Huston, -Hans-Klein argues-that ICANN suffers-from regulatory-capture, mostly 
to the benefit of US-based corporations.323 He cites six key episodes to support this 
argument. The first-is what he describes-as the capture of the IFWP process-in 1998 
by powerful industry and technical stakeholders (IANA and NSI). Secondly, Klein 
asserts, the ICANN Board-was captured by-industry and technical interests-following 
the elimination of user representation in 2002. Klein-also identifies-corporate capture 
of ISOC since 2002, which, he argues, led to two derivative acts of capture: the 
capture of the .org registry, which is managed by ISOC; and capture of the ALAC, 
since the majority of certified user-related organisations in ICANN are chapters of 
ISOC. Finally, Klein describes NSI / VeriSign’s control of the dominant .com registry 
as an act of capture.324 
 
Whereas scholars such as Klein see ICANN as a regulatory agency that has been 
captured by corporate interests, Froomkin and Mark Lemley see the whole regime as 
an effective monopoly in its own right. They identify four potential antitrust 
challenges against ICANN: that the DNS and top level domains such as .com are 
essential facilities to which ICANN must give open access; that ICANN’s refusal to 
accredit registrars affiliated with alternative roots-is an act of monopolisation; -that 
ICANN’s requirement for registrars to adhere to the UDRP is an illegal cartel, and 
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that VeriSign’s ‘Waiting List Service’Note 3.1 approved by ICANN, is an exclusive 
dealing arrangement with anticompetitive consequences.325 Other writers have also 
seen ICANN as a commercial monopoly or as a cartel. Mueller agrees that ICANN’s 
refusal to recognise-alternate roots is a-consequence-of vested interests within 
ICANN.  He argues that, as a corporatist ‘industry self-regulatory’ body, ICANN 
represents a coalition-of the Internet technical community, intellectual property 
interests, incumbent registries, and-a few major telecommunication and ecommerce 
firms. He believes that-ICANN policy tends to-reflect the interests of these groups.326 
Konstantinos-Komaitis-likewise accuses ICANN of ‘anti-competitive’ practices, 
citing-as evidence examples such as ICANN’s refusal to accredit-registrars affiliated-
with alternative roots. Furthermore, like-Froomkin and Lemley, Komaitis points to the 
UDRP as another example-of ICANN's ‘anti-competitive’ status, -arguing that the 
requirement for all registrars to impose-a mandatory dispute-resolution-policy-on-
their-registrants represents a vertical agreement restricting-non-price competition. 327 
  
Statist model 
 
A quite-different approach to ICANN challenges-the notion that the-organisation is 
fundamentally a globalised institution beyond the control of states, instead 
emphasising the role of states and intergovernmentalism as the basis for the regime. 
This approach, taken by writers such as Daniel Drezner,328 Jack Goldsmith and Tim 
Wu,329 tends to-identify a strong-hegemonic role-for-the United States-government in 
setting up and underpinning-the regime, as well as a-strong continued influence from 
governmental authorities in shaping ICANN policy.  
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Drezner’s perspective on ICANN reflects his wider theoretical approach to 
globalisation in general. Drezner claims that globalisation is ‘responsible for a lot of 
bad international relations theory’.330  He takes issue with the notion that states are at 
the mercy of systemic forces, forcing policy convergence. Drezner claims that, while 
theoretical approaches based-on this-notion are conceptually elegant, -they share the 
‘twin flaws of-dubious theoretical presumption- and meagre empirical support.’331 
 
Statism in ICANN norm setting 
 
Drezner-identifies-the key actors in-setting up the ICANN regime as ‘great power’ 
states. (In this context, he regards-the EU as-a single actor and as a ‘great power’ 
alongside the United States). He emphasises the leading role of the US government in 
rejecting-the-IAHC process-and setting up a ‘private’ regime,332 but also-asserts that 
the EU, acting in concert-with the Japanese and-Australian governments, successfully 
ensured the final regime would not be dominated by the United States.333 Drezner also 
points out that key governments ‘vetted’ the initial roster of ICANN’s governing 
Board, and asserts that-elements of civil society were ‘largely shut out of the process’. 
Had this ‘great power’ intervention not occurred, he-argues, the outcome would have 
been quite different; the gTLD-MoU would have been carried-out, and oversight of 
the system would have-been housed in the ITU.334 Drezner feels that that the US and 
EU’s conscious delegation-of the domain name-system to ICANN deliberately-locked 
in a regime that favoured the ‘great powers’.335  
 
Drezner further identifies-a consistent trend-since 1998 whereby, in his view, nonstate 
and civil society actors continued to be-shut out from real influence, while-key 
governments have been consistent in ensuring their influence. 336 ICANN’s adoption 
of the UDRP, he argues, -reflected-US and EU preferences-on the matter; and he sees 
the Board as having been eager to cater to government-preferences. Drezner concedes 
that-nonstate actors have some ‘agenda-setting’ powers-within the regime, and some 
influence through-their technical expertise, but argues that, once-an issue comes-to the 
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attention of states, the-outcome-will ultimately reflect great-power preferences; and 
that they will set the-conditions-under which non-state actors may-exercise their 
influence.337  He believes that-governments deliberately-acted to-prevent NGOs and 
IGOs from acquiring too much-influence.338 Furthermore, he argues, WSIS saw 
efforts by smaller states to gain-more influence over DNS management-blocked by 
the ‘great powers’.  He-describes the-setup of the IGF as a ‘face saving compromise’ 
in light-of the-US refusal to-budge over ICANN.339  
 
Other writers have similarly-seen ICANN’s creation-as an-essentially-statist-affair, 
dominated by major powers-and particularly the US. George Christou-and Seamus 
Simpson suggest-that-ICANN’s formation was essentially-a ‘rationalist affair’, where 
the organisational-structure of-ICANN reflected the-relative power positions of the 
major state players-in the process,-and the EU accepted a-less than first-best outcome 
due to the ultimate control of the root servers by the US government. 340 Christou and 
Simpson identify a conflict between the EU’s co-regulatory public-private tradition 
and the US approach of industry self-regulation. 341 The US government, they argue, -
fulfilled the broad outlines of-its vision, with ICANN being incorporated as a private, 
-not-for-profit-corporation based-in the US; at-the same time, the EU did have enough 
influence to secure the presence of three Europeans on ICANN’s initial Board.342 
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Volker Leib likewise explains the differing positions of the US and EU with regard to 
ICANN’s initial form as stemming from their different regulatory traditions. Whereas 
the US government advocated a market-oriented solution and private sector self-
regulation of the Internet, the EU favoured a mixed public–private regime with a well 
established role for state authorities. In-the end, Leib asserts, -the EU was forced-to 
accept American leadership in the process, and the establishment of a private regime, 
but was nonetheless-able to achieve the-inclusion of public actors in-the new 
organisation, as well what Leib describes as an ‘adequate representation’ of 
Europeans-in its relevant bodies. However, Leib-also believes-that continued US 
authority over the ‘A’ root server remains an-outstanding issue that the EU is not 
willing to tolerate in the long run.343 
 
Christou and Simpson go on to argue-that, while the EU accepted ICANN’s key 
norms initially because of its-relatively weak position at ICANN’s inception, it then 
sought to modify them from-within the system-by a process of ‘rhetorical action’. 
They suggest that the EU pursued two main aims: firstly, a-stronger role for the GAC; 
and secondly, a .eu name to establish the EU’s online identity. They further-argue that 
the EU might also-have aimed to tip the-balance of power away from the US in the 
GAC and ultimately ICANN as a whole through weight of numbers from outside the 
American continent. 344 They see the EU as having successfully exerted some 
influence through a ‘rationalist process’ of interstate negotiation, resulting in the 
creation of the GAC and-the securing of three European seats on the initial ICANN 
Board. Furthermore, they argue, over time, the EU was able to use ‘rhetorical action’ 
to further modify the norms-pertaining to the GAC. They-point to the influence of the 
European Commission in establishing the draft-operating principles-adopted by the 
GAC at its inaugural meeting; and-they identify a-continued EU push for the GAC’s 
role to be-shifted towards a ‘public-private partnership’, which, to a considerable 
extent, was successful during the 2002-2003 ICANN reform process.345 Christou-and-
Simpson-identify this as ‘a clear normative change from a clear hands-off to a-more 
hands-on role for states’. However, they-also argue that the-change was a product of 
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‘norm manipulation’ rather than ‘norm replacement.’346 The second area where-they 
identify-a modification of-an ICANN norm-through EU ‘rhetorical action’ concerns 
the-creation of the .eu TLD. Since ccTLDs-are traditionally only assigned to 
‘countries’, and the EU is not a country per se, Christou and Simpson see the 
successful creation of .eu as effectively involving a norm manipulation. They attribute 
this success-to the .eu TLD not being-considered an ‘affront to ICANN’s standards of 
legitimacy’ and its creation being-viewed as a-concession that-might serve to lock in-
a powerful political actor at this early stage of the regime’s development. 347  
 
A view of the regime as being essentially underpinned by interstate politics, but 
having developed via a process of negotiation and bargaining, is similar to the 
neoliberal institutionalist position on regime theory. However, other writers have 
taken a position closer to realist hegemonic stability theory, laying much emphasis on 
ICANN as a tool of US hegemony. Nico Krisch, for instance, sees ICANN as a 
‘particularly powerful example’ of a tendency on the part of the US to use ‘private’ 
regulatory regimes to spread Western standards and conceptions without the limits 
imposed by conventional international law. 348 Kim H. Veltman similarly sees ICANN 
as an aspect of US political and cultural hegemony349  
 
Milton Mueller notes the increasing importance of state power within the ICANN 
regime, although he also argues that strong elements of multistakeholderism survive. 
He sees a strong hegemonic role played by the US in developing ICANN’s initial 
norms, made possible by the status of the IANA as US government contractors, giving 
the US the ability to ‘…exercise a kind of unilateral globalism’ in the construction of 
the ICANN regime. 350 At the same time, he notes a ‘fightback’ by other states against 
US unilateralism in the DNS sphere. Mueller identifies WSIS as a key moment in the 
assertion of governmental authority over the DNS, citing the Tunis Agenda, which 
proclaimed governments’ ‘sovereign right’ to set public policy for the Internet. 351 
However, he also goes on to question whether the principle of state sovereignty over 
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public policy will in practice prove compatible with the non-territorial nature of the 
Internet.352  
 
Mueller sees ICANN as a ‘nascent international regime’.353 He acknowledges that 
ICANN’s origins as ‘the product of an informal political agreement among national 
governments’, and the extensive role for private sector actors, make ICANN different 
from many other regimes,354 but still believes it more accurate to classify ICANN as a 
variant of a standard international regime rather than as a unique new form of global 
policymaking.355  
 
Statism and ccTLDs  
 
A number of analysts have focused on the question of national control over ccTLDs. 
Gregory R. Hagen and Kim von Arx feel this should be seen as a natural extension of 
national sovereignty, one that has been usurped by the ICANN regime. ICANN’s 
power to redelegate domains, they assert, represents an effective extension of US 
governmental power over areas that should be reserved to national sovereigns.356 They 
argue that the power of ICANN to threaten a ccTLD with potential redelegation or 
annihilation provides ICANN with a coercive mechanism to ensure ccTLD 
compliance with ICANN policies, something that diminishes the sovereignty of 
nations to adopt laws independently of ICANN. 357 They go on to list some specific 
examples, such as the possibility that ICANN may in the future extend the UDRP to 
ccTLDs, bypassing national trademark law,358 or ICANN’s ability to enforce WHOIS 
policy, which may conflict with national privacy, surveillance, and anonymity policies 
and legislation.359 They even identify a national security dimension, arguing that 
control over the ‘A’ root is a strategic asset, carrying with it the power to severely 
disrupt a state’s critical information infrastructure. 360  
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As a solution to these issues, Hagen and von Arx propose that the root server system 
should be replaced with national DNS roots and the introduction of a peer-to-peer 
protocol into the DNS. Such collaboration, they argue, would ensure that any 
international DNS policy organisation or framework would be accountable to 
sovereign nations, and ‘sovereign domains’ would ensure that the power over national 
policy and law is retained by the sovereign state. 361 362  They recognise, however, that 
this would require rewriting the DNS technical protocols, something that would be not 
only a major shift towards interstate governance of the DNS, but also a major 
technical change in the organisation of the network.363  
 
Y.J. Park sees the key issue as being less about ICANN as an extension of US 
hegemony, and more as a contest between state actors and nonstate actors for political 
authority over ccTLDs. Park identifies WSIS as the moment when states were 
recognised as holding final political authority over ccTLDs, a principle she believes 
has been recognised both by the ccTLD registries and by ICANN itself.  Park believes 
this to be the key reason for the increasing power of the GAC in the ICANN decision-
making process.364 To illustrate this, she points to the Board’s acceptance of the 
GAC’s principles for delegation and administration of ccTLDs.365 
 
However, others have contested the notion that authority over ccTLDs should 
constitute an aspect of state sovereignty. Mueller argues that the claim ‘is based on the 
flimsiest of grounds: an arbitrary semantic relationship, the notion that the ccTLD 
string “stands for” or “represents” the country, and that that semantic relationship is 
somehow exclusive and privileged.’366 He points out that there could in fact be many 
different TLDs referring to a specific country (e.g., .us, .usa, .america, and so on). 367 
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Public-private model 
 
An intermediate position between those who see ICANN as a nongovernmental 
authority, and those who emphasise the role of states, is taken by scholars such as 
Wolfgang Kleinwaechter368 and Slavka Antonova369. These writers describe ICANN 
as a 'public-private partnership' utilising important governance contributions from 
both states and nonstate actors. Jeffery Roy interprets ICANN as a unique form of 
transnational governance body, which acts as a bridge between governmental and 
corporate actors.370 Karin Geiselhart argues that ICANN, neither a government nor a 
for-profit corporation, is a hybrid that interacts with both.371   
 
The concept of the ‘public-private partnership’, associated with scholars such as 
Wolfgang Reinicke, is based around a ‘global public policy’ approach that 
differentiates between governance and government, and uncouples governance from 
the nation-state. It involves governance through delegation of tasks to nonstate actors 
and institutions, including not only public sector agencies like the World Bank and the 
IMF, but also business, labour, and NGOs.372This concept echoes models put forward 
by writers such as Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, and Cristoph Knill and Dirk 
Lehmukl. Knill and Lehmukl believe that the emergence of transnational information 
and communication networks challenge the autonomy and effectiveness of national 
governments in defining and providing public goods. The solution, they feel, lies in 
delegation of governance and regulatory functions to private actors. 373 They cite 
ICANN as an example of an organisation that ‘…oversees an area that can neither be 
completely left to the market nor be exclusively governed by national public 
authorities.’ Since domain names have become an important type of property, one that 
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represents ‘position, location, path, and identity’, the service of administering the 
Internet address system has, they argue, become a global public good. They see 
ICANN’s creation as representing a ‘shift from a hierarchical to a cooperative mode 
of public-private interactions’ in the provision of this public good. In their view, 
public actors have not only significantly contributed to the emergence of the 
organisation, but also still have significant influence over ICANN; they provide the 
framework for the organisational conditions that must be met in order for ICANN to 
obtain the authority to control and administer the registration and allocation of domain 
names.374  
 
Like Mueller, Antonova sees ICANN in its original form as both an experiment in 
creating an alternative multistakeholder regime for public policy-making, but also a 
potential avenue for its regulator, the US government, to exert ‘soft power’ in the 
international arena.375 However, he argues, the ‘lack of understanding of the political 
aspects of the technological issues undermined the attempts to implement the 
multistakeholder consensus model.’ As a result, he asserts, ICANN was redefined as a 
public-private corporation with an empowered Board and management, and relying on 
public consultations instead of the bottom-up consensus process.376 Like Mueller, 
Antonova identifies WSIS as a key point where other states asserted their rights with 
regard to the DNS regime. 377 
 
Kleinwaechter agrees that ICANN has moved towards a public-private model and 
away from the original plan of self-governance since 2001-02. He reminds us that the 
original Articles of Incorporation do not specify any governmental role in the 
corporation, and that the GAC was originally intended to have a very limited advisory 
role only.378 Christou and Simpson similarly see ICANN as having moved closer to 
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the EU’s preferred model of a ‘subcontracting partnership’ where governments have a 
shared role with private interests in creating public policy.379 
 
Kleinwaechter explains these initial norms as stemming from an ‘unwritten 
consensus’ of the main governmental players in favour of private leardership and low 
governmental involvement in DNS management, based on a desire to avoid a lengthy 
UN-based codification process involving all sovereign states, wth a ratification 
process by governments, which would have blocked further development of the DNS 
for years. The establishment of the GAC, he asserts, was a convenient way to avoid 
such a formal process.380  
 
Kleinwächter believes that the move away from this initial approach and towards a 
‘public-private’ model stems mainly from changed perceptions of the Internet and 
security since the 9/11 attacks. He believes that these changed security priorities were 
recognised by the then ICANN President, Stuart Lynn, when initiating the ICANN 
reform process from 2002, and that this was an important element in the shift towards 
greater governmental involvement381, which has resulted in the GAC evolving into 
something that resembles a de facto intergovernmental organisation.382 Kleinwächter 
goes on to assert that, with the changes to the ICANN bylaws in 2002-2003, 
‘governments got something akin to veto power’383 in reference to the new 
requirement that, if the Board rejects a GAC recommendation, it must inform the 
GAC and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice.384 
 
Nonetheless, Kleinwaechter sees the revised ICANN model very much as a 
governance partnership between governments and private actors, intended to avoid 
two extremes of a general governmental take-over or a totally private ICANN. 385 He 
concludes that ICANN is part of a broader pattern of transition, where ‘the old 
governance system, rooted in the concept of the sovereign nation-state, is increasingly 
complemented by an emerging new governance system’. 386 This new governance 
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system, he asserts, will be global in nature, based on a ‘trilateralism’ that includes 
actors beyond states and IGOs; issue-specific co-regulatory frameworks will be 
created in an attempt to combine the stability of governmental regulation with the 
flexibility needed to deal with issues at the global level. 387  
 
Rather than a ‘public private partnership’ per se, Mueller, in his latest work, describes 
ICANN as being on the front lines of a contest between two alternative models of 
governance, state-based and nonstate. He sees ICANN, together with the RIRs, ISOC, 
and the IETF, as forming a network of internet governance actors independent of and 
competitive to the nation-state system. He terms these actors ‘organically developed 
internet institutions’ and refers to them collectively as the ‘ODii network’.388 Mueller 
sees the development of this actor network as representing ‘….an important change in 
the manner and substance of policy and governance; a movement away from state 
actors to nonstate actors, to more open and participatory processes, and a shift to new 
kinds of technical expertise.’ 389 Mueller argues that the controversy around ICANN is 
‘ground zero for the conflict between global governance and the nation-state 
system.’390 
 
Conclusion to Chapter 3 
 
This chapter has attempted to categorise some of the extensive literature on ICANN 
into a number of groupings, including ‘technical caretaker’ models, ‘liberal 
democratic’ perspectives, corporatist perspectives, statist approaches and ‘public-
private partnership’ models. These competing perspectives on what sort of 
governance system ICANN represents reflect some of the ontological questions about 
ICANN’s nature that will be explored by this project. The thesis will examine the 
merits of these various perspectives on ICANN, by examination of ICANN’s history 
and policymaking procedures, and by reference to case study data pertaining to 
ICANN policymaking in practice. It will identify and explore the roles played by the 
key actors and interests that decided the parameters of the regime, and investigate the 
relative importance of various interests in shaping policy within the regime on an 
                                                 
387Ibid, PP1124-1125. 
388 Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. P217 
389 Ibid 
390 Ibid, P216 
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ongoing basis, in an effort to address these ontological debates. It will then go on to 
link the findings with the governance models described by international regime 
theories.  
 
The next stage of the thesis will examine case study data pertaining to ICANN 
policymaking in practice. It will identify and explore the roles played by the key 
actors and interests and assess their relative influence on ICANN policymaking. The 
findings of these investigations will be used to evaluate the relative merits of the 
various perspectives on ICANN discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Policy Development Case Study One: 
New Generic Top-Level Domains 
 
Introduction 
 
Overview 
 
This chapter looks primarily at the policy development process (PDP) for New gTLDs 
Policy in the period 2005-2011. The aim is to explore the range of actors involved in 
the PDP and the roles they played, leading to some assessment of the relative degree 
of influence held by each actor (or actor type) over the final policy outcomes. From 
this, the aim will be to draw some wider inferences regarding the relative influence 
exerted by various actors and interest groups within the ICANN regime, the ultimate 
purpose being to determine which of the organisational models explored in Chapter 3 
best describe how ICANN policy is actually made in practice. For example, evidence 
of strong influence over ICANN policymaking by governments would help to support 
a statist interpretation of the organisation, while evidence of influence being shared 
among a broad range of stakeholders would lend weight to the multistakeholder 
model.  As will be shown, the contests of interests that have played out over the 
course of this PDP refutes any notion that ICANN’s activities are apolitical or that 
ICANN policymaking is based upon ‘consensus’. The struggle for influence between 
various competing interest groups and actor types makes this policy area an ideal case 
study for the purposes of this investigation.   
 
Although the main focus of this chapter will be on the most recent New gTLDs PDP, 
it is important to put this into context by mentioning the previous history of the policy 
area. Addition of new generic top-level domains to the DNS root has been a recurring 
issue throughout ICANN’s existence; indeed, it predates the organisation’s founding. 
The original gTLDs (.com, .edu, .gov, .mil, .org and .net) were created in the 1980s, 
prior to the commercialisation and rapid expansion of the Internet. By the late 1990s, 
there was a general feeling in many quarters that additional gTLDs were required. In 
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1997, the gTLD-MoU had proposed to add seven new gTLDs;391 the failure of the 
initiative meant this did not come about. The question of new gTLDs was, however, 
mentioned in the 1998 White Paper392; and the initial Memorandum of Understanding 
between ICANN and the US DoC set as one of ICANN’s policy goals to ‘Collaborate 
on the design, development and testing of a plan for creating a process that will 
consider the possible expansion of the number of gTLDs.’ 393 As a result, there was an 
expectation that creation of new gTLDS would be one of ICANN’s first tasks. 
However, this was not unopposed.  
 
From a technical perspective, experts agree that the DNS is capable of supporting 
hundreds or indeed thousands of TLDs,394 and there is therefore no real technical 
argument against expansion. For non-technical reasons, though, the matter is a 
contentious one. Proponents of new gTLDs cite a requirement both to increase 
registry competition and to offer more choice to users.395 The nature of the DNS 
means that there can only be one registry per TLD; the only way to increase 
competition among registries, therefore, is to increase the number of TLDs. This 
argument carries significant weight, since promotion of competition is one of 
ICANN’s Core Values. Additional gTLDs are also held to be necessary since most of 
the desirable names in existing gTLDs have already been assigned. Opponents of 
expansion, however, argue that the existing gTLDs remain adequate since (with the 
possible exception of .com) they are by no means ‘full’ and could support many 
millions of additional second-level domain names. Namespace expansion has tended 
to be opposed particularly by intellectual property interests, who fear that increasing 
the number of TLDs will also increase opportunities for cybersquatting, forcing 
trademark owners to make many more defensive registrations and resulting in higher 
                                                 
391 IAHC (1997). Memorandum of Understanding on the generic top level domain space of the Internet 
Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU). February 28, 1997.  Retrieved March 25, 2009, from 
http://www.gtld-mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html. 
392 Referenced in: United States Department of Commerce (1998). National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration Statement of Policy: “Management of Internet Names and Addresses.” 
('White Paper'). 5th June 2007. Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02. Retrieved 5 October 2008, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm  
393 ICANN / US Department of Commerce (1998). Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
States Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 25th 
November 1998. Retrieved 10 January 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-
25nov98.htm  
394 ICANN (2008). DNS Stability Draft Paper: “The Effect of New Generic Top Level Domains on the 
Internet Domain Name System.” Retrieved 26th November 2008, from  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/dns-stability-draft-paper-06feb08.pdf 
395 See, for example, ICANN (2006). gTLD Registry Constituency Comments regarding terms of 
reference for new gTLDs. 30 January 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/gtld-registry-constituency-01feb06.pdf P2 
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costs.396 Other arguments against expansion include increased opportunities for 
malicious and / or criminal use such as ‘phishing’; likelihood of user confusion; and 
the difficulties for ICANN to police and enforce a larger number of registry 
contracts.397 These debates have been revisited each time that ICANN has examined 
proposals to expand the gTLD space.    
 
Following a policy development process lasting just over a year, ICANN introduced 
seven new gTLDs in 2000, ostensibly as a ‘proof of concept’ experimental exercise.398 
A further PDP in 2002-03 led to an additional six new TLDs of a special restricted 
type known as ‘sponsored’ TLDs (sTLDs).399 The latest policy process on new gTLDs 
ran from 2005 to 2011 and resulted in a policy that will see expansion of the 
namespace on a much larger scale, from the current 21 gTLDs to hundreds or perhaps 
thousands. This policy will allow corporations as well as communities of many 
different types to apply for and operate a TLD, for example .microsoft or .bank, and 
represents a very significant shift in the way the namespace is organised. However, 
the policy process has generated considerable controversy and consequently has 
dragged out over an extended period. Besides the inevitable strong opposition from 
the trademark community, many issues have emerged around questions such as legal 
rights protection and the potential political ramifications of allowing geographical or 
language-based identifiers to be used as TLD strings. Nonetheless, the process 
                                                 
396 See, for example, arguments against new TLDs submitted to ICANN Public Comments forum by 
representatives of intellectual property interests including: David Fares, News Corporation; Olive 
Gretchen, Corporation Service Company (CSC); Heidi C. Salow, Internet Commerce Coalition; 
Autumn Lotze, Retail Industry Leaders Association; Paul Tattersfield, Grange Project Management 
Group; Jolene A Neby, Ameriprise Financial; Mark Bohannon, Software & Information Industry 
Association (SIIA); Christian Merida, US Chamber of Commerce;   Philip Lodico, Fairwinds Partners; 
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc.; Kevin Rupy, USTelecom; Gretchen Lohmann, National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association; Natasha, Lipkina, HP.com; Dan Jaffe, Association of National 
Advertisers; Nick Wood, MARQUES (European Association of Trade Mark Owners); Aimee Nolan, 
W.W. Grainger, Inc;Thomas M. Blasey, ITT Corporation; Tom Watson, Bank of America  
Corporation; Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide Media, Inc.; Denise Yee (Kuwabara), Visa Inc.; 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; Furrer Urs, economiesuisse; 
Enoch Kim, contessa.com; and Ray Robertson, Tyndall Federal Credit Union. Retrieved 15 July 2011, 
from http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtld-guide/ There are many additional examples.  
397 See, for example, comments submitted to ICANN Public Comments forum on New gTLDS by 
David Fares, News Corporation; Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner; Heidi C. Salow, Internet Commerce 
Coalition; Jolene A Neby, Ameriprise Financial; Christian Merida, US Chamber of Commerce; Kevin 
Rupy, USTelecom; Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc.; Dan Jaffe, Association of National Advertisers; 
Tom Watson, Bank of America  Corporation; Dan Poliak, Adobe Systems; Jim Bikoff, International 
Olympic Committee; Ray Robertson, Tyndall Federal Credit Union; and George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtld-guide/ There are 
many additional examples. 
398 ICANN (2005). “New TLDs — Past Decisions and Documents.” 31 August 2005. Retrieved 14 
June 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/new-tlds-31aug05.htm  
399 Ibid 
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appears to have reached a conclusion, with final Board approval for the programme 
being given in June 2011.400 It is currently expected that the first round of applications 
for new gTLDs will begin in early 2012.401    
  
Summary of events  
 
1999-2000 New gTLDs round 
 
In May 1999, the Board instructed the DNSO to formulate recommendations on the 
question of adding new generic top-level domains.402 The DNSO in turn passed the 
matter to a working group, known as Working Group C.403 There was considerable 
debate on the issue, with trademark interests continuing to oppose expansion, or 
arguing that, at the least, a well-established and thoroughly tested UDRP needed to be 
in place before addition of any new TLDs. Two members of Working Group C took 
this position.404 Conversely, some participants in the working group advocated adding 
many new TLDs immediately to maximise consumer choice, create opportunities for 
entities that had been shut out under the current name structure, and create 
competition among registries.405  
 
Ultimately, Working Group C achieved a two-thirds vote of its members in support of 
a compromise position, under which ICANN would begin by adding six to ten new 
gTLDs, followed by an evaluation period. However, the Working Group produced no 
recommendations on selection criteria or allocation methods.406 As a result, it was 
largely left to ICANN staff to fill in these gaps.407 A discussion report in June 2000 
                                                 
400 ICANN (2011). Approved Board Resolutions, Singapore. 20 June 2011. Retrieved 14 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-20jun11-en.htm  
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402 ICANN (1999). Minutes of meeting of the initial Board. May 27, 1999. Retrieved 14 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-27may99.htm  
403 ICANN (2000). Report from Working Group C (New gTLDs). 21 March 2000. Retrieved 14 
September 2011, from www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report-21mar00.htm 
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Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 23 October 2003. Retrieved 14 September 
2011, from www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/19991023.NCwgc-report.html 
405 Ibid 
406 ICANN (2000). Report from Working Group C (New gTLDs). 21 March 2000. Retrieved 14 
September 2011, from www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report-21mar00.htm  
407 Weinberg, J. (2001). 'ICANN as Regulator.' E-paper, Cornell University Library, Computers and 
Society. Retrieved 20 October 2001, from  http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CY/0109099 P16  
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set out an application procedure for organisations seeking to operate a new gTLD.408 
Applicants would be required to submit a business and financial plan and show 
evidence of technical competence. A competitive evaluation between the submitted 
proposals would lead to the selection of a small number of applicants to operate new 
TLDs in this first, ‘experimental’ round. The Board approved this plan in July 
2000.409 Forty-seven applications were received,410 three of which were withdrawn 
prior to completion of evaluation. In November, applicants were invited to present 
their cases directly to the Board.411 Following discussion among the Directors, the 
Board approved a resolution selecting seven of the applications for contractual 
negotiations (.aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro).  
 
Analysis of the 2000 round 
 
The 2000 round was subsequently criticised for being disorganised, rushed and 
subjective in nature. The Council of Registrars (CORE), for example, noted that 
applicants had only a couple of weeks to prepare their proposals (yet had to try to put 
an application together, because nobody knew when ICANN would offer another 
opportunity to apply for a TLD); and that applicants were pushed into ‘pointless 
contention’ between each other, even when their submissions did not compete. 
Commentators from the academic community were equally critical. Jonathan 
Weinberg, for example, criticised the subjectivity and lack of predictability inherent in 
this kind of selection process. 412  
 
Weinberg also stated a belief that ICANN was deliberately maintaining an artificial 
scarcity of TLDs in order to enhance its own control.413 Milton Mueller made similar 
arguments,414 and reasoned that most of the interests represented within ICANN, 
                                                 
408 ICANN (2000). “Yokohama Meeting Topic: Introduction of New Top-Level Domains.” Posted 13 
June 2000. Retrieved 14 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/yokohama/new-tld-
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409 ICANN (2000). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board, 16 July 2000. Retrieved 14 September 
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including the Internet technical community, intellectual property interests, incumbent 
registries, and a few major telecommunication and e-commerce firms, had little to 
gain from adding new TLDs, while many had a direct economic or political interest in 
preventing such a move. These assertions have since been arguably undermined, 
however, by subsequent policy developments. 
 
However, many of the other criticisms of the 2000 round still seem valid. The policy 
development process was lightweight, rushed, not well thought out and subjective. 
Compared to the more sophisticated and in-depth PDPs that took place in later years, 
this suggests that ICANN policymaking mechanisms at that time were not yet mature; 
at that time no detailed procedure for a DNSO PDP was laid out in the ICANN 
Bylaws. The recommendations produced by the DNSO were vague and lacking in 
detail on important policy elements, including selection criteria, allocation criteria, 
contractual conditions, application procedure and a timetable for implementation. 
Instead of being the product of any ‘bottom-up’ policy development process, all of 
these details were simply supplied by ICANN staff and signed off by the Board. 
 
2002-03 New gTLDs round 
 
In 2002, then ICANN President Stuart Lynn presented the ICANN community with 
an Action Plan for proposed further new TLDs.415 This was posted for public 
comment in November 2002 and also discussed at ICANN’s Public Forum in 
Amsterdam on 14th December 2002. 416 Responses from the floor at this meeting 
demonstrated the demand for more TLDs.417 At the Board meeting the following day, 
the Board directed the President to develop a draft Request for Proposals for the 
Board's consideration for the purpose of soliciting proposals for a limited number of 
additional new sponsored gTLDs.418 This draft Request for Proposals was published 
on 24th June 2003. Further input was solicited and received by the GNSO, including 
expert papers, input from the GNSO Constituencies, public comment and discussion 
                                                 
415 Lynn, S (2002). “A Plan for Action Regarding New gTLDs.” Posted 8th November 2002. Retrieved 
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through the ALAC. The GNSO Council formed a Committee of the Whole to deal 
with the issue, which included representatives from the ALAC and the GAC, and 
carried out monthly teleconferences between February and May 2003. The Committee 
produced more detailed recommendations than the DNSO had done in 2000, including 
a set of criteria with which future TLD registries should have to comply.419 Following 
this, on 29 October 2003, the GNSO advised the Board to proceed with the process 
for an interim round of sponsored TLDs. On 31 October 2003, the Board agreed to 
open an application process in December 2003 for a limited number of new sponsored 
TLDs.420 Ten applications were submitted.421 Four of these were from unsuccessful 
applicants at the previous round. Seven of the ten applications were accepted for 
further negotiations; .asia .cat .jobs .mobi .travel .tel and .xxx.422 Six of these TLDs 
were subsequently introduced. The seventh application, for an .xxx TLD for adult 
material, submitted by ICM Registry, provoked significant controversy.  
 
After protracted deliberations, the Board accepted ICM’s application in principle on 1 
June 2005, authorising the President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations 
with ICM relating to proposed commercial and technical terms.423 This announcement 
brought opposition from several governmental actors, most significantly the US 
Department of Commerce.  In August 2005, the DoC urged ICANN to delay final 
approval of the contract with ICM to allow for an extensive global consultation, citing 
6,000 complaints over the proposed .xxx TLD that had been received by the 
Department.424 This was followed by a statement from the GAC advising that the ICM 
application was flawed, and also that several member governments were 
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‘emphatically opposed’ to a .xxx domain on public policy grounds425 (it did not state 
which governments took this line, but reported comments by ICANN CEO Paul 
Twomey suggest they included the US, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Brazil and 
Australia426). The governments of Sweden427 and Australia428 later went on to state 
their opposition to .xxx in formal correspondence with ICANN, while the UK 
government urged careful safeguards and compliance monitoring in the agreement 
with ICM.429 The .xxx proposal also generated an unprecedented amount of public 
comment, with over 1300 separate comments received in the public comment forums, 
including 946 comments against the establishment of .xxx430 (though there were also 
comments in favour.)431 In addition, some 200,000 emails were received by ICANN 
regarding the matter. 432   
 
On May 10 2006, the Board voted 9 to 5 to reject ICM’s proposed version of the .xxx 
Registry Agreement.433 On March 30, 2007, a revised application was rejected by the 
Board by nine votes to five with one abstention. The resolution stated that ICM's 
application and the revised agreement had failed to meet, among other things, the 
sponsored community criteria of the RFP specification. However, it also stated that 
approval of the ICM application was not appropriate in the light of the GAC’s public 
policy concerns.434 The Board’s decision to reverse its previous approval for .xxx 
raised questions over the extent to which the US government continued to exert 
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influence over ICANN policy from behind the scenes; though the US government was 
far from the only actor applying pressure on ICANN over the issue.  
 
However, ICM Registry exercised its right under the ICANN Bylaws435 to request 
arbitration of the decision by an Independent Review Process. The International 
Center for Dispute Resolution acted as arbiter, with the case being considered by a 
panel consisting of three retired judges. The panel delivered its verdict in February 
2010, ruling in favour of ICM, on the grounds that their application for the .XXX 
sTLD met the required sponsorship criteria, and that the Board’s reconsideration of 
that finding was ‘not consistent with the application of neutral, objective and fair 
documented policy’.436 In June 2010, the Board passed a resolution accepting the 
review panel’s verdict and directing ICANN staff to proceed into draft contract 
negotiations with ICM for a revised .xxx Registry Agreement.437 On 5 August 2010, 
the Board directed staff, upon receipt of ICM’s application documentation, to post 
ICM’s supporting documents and proposed registry agreement for public comment.438 
Despite further controvery in the public comments, and a GAC letter stating that there 
was no active GAC support for the ICM application and that some GAC members 
opposed it on public policy grounds439, the  Board approved the execution of the 
registry agreement with ICM for the .xxx sponsored top level domain. The resolution 
was passed by nine votes to four, with three abstentions.440 As the Board and GAC 
had not reached agreement on all aspects of the application, the Board also set forth a 
rationale providing reasons why the GAC advice was not followed, pursuant to 
ICANN Bylaws.441 
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(See Appendix 4.1 for a more complete coverage of the .xxx affair.)   
 
Analysis of 2003 round  
 
This PDP was more comprehensive and arguably better planned than its predecessor. 
Following the ICANN reform process of 2002, the GNSO had replaced the DNSO as 
the Supporting Organisation with remit for this policy area, and had more detailed and 
formalised procedures for a policy development process (as laid out in Annex A to the 
new Bylaws442). In accordance with these new procedures, the GNSO solicited a 
wider range of inputs than had been the case in 2000, including expert papers as well 
as public comments and input from the ALAC. The GNSO supplied substantially 
more detailed policy advice than the DNSO had done in 2000, leaving fewer gaps to 
be filled in by ICANN staff. However, examination of the GNSO’s final policy report 
suggests that most of its recommendations were ultimately agreed among the GNSO 
Constituency representatives themselves. 443 The annex to the report included the 
statements made by the Constituencies and also by the ALAC, but mentioned nothing 
of the inputs received from public comments, expert papers or the GAC. It therefore 
remains questionable just how far the policy represented ‘consensus’ or was the 
product of a truly broad-based, ‘bottom-up’ policy development process. 444    
 
The .xxx affair, in its own right, proved an interesting case study of various aspects of 
the ICANN regime. It raised questions over the extent of US governmental influence 
in ICANN policymaking; it saw the appeals process invoked under Article IV, Section 
3 of the ICANN Bylaws; and it ultimately resulted in one of the rare occasions where 
the Board has been prepared to reject GAC advice.  
 
2005 – 2011 New gTLDs PDP 
 
By contrast with the earlier rounds, the most recent new gTLDs round has seen a 
much more protracted and complex policy development process. 
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The PDP was initiated in September 2005, when the GNSO Council requested 
ICANN staff to prepare an Issues Report setting out the main issue areas for 
discussion relating to the possible introduction of new TLDs.445 The Issues Report, 
released on 5th December 2005, set out four issue areas for study: 
 
1 Whether to introduce new TLDs 
2 Selection criteria for any new TLDs (e.g. sponsored or unsponsored, purposes, 
which strings) 
3 Allocation criteria for new TLDs (criteria for deciding which entities will 
operate them) 
4 Contractual conditions for new TLD operators. 446 
 
These four terms of reference formed the framework for the GNSO’s subsequent work 
on the PDP.  
 
Following release of the Issues Report, a Public Comments period was opened on 6th 
December 2005 to solicit responses to the four areas set out in the Report.447 
Responses were also submitted from the GNSO Constituencies, and a call for ‘Expert 
Papers’ was made on 3 January 2006. 38 Public Comments448, 7 Expert Papers449 and 
7 Constituency Statements450 were submitted.   
 
On 19th February 2006, a Draft Initial Report451 was released, authored by ICANN 
staff (as prescribed in Annex A of the Bylaws).452 It stated that a consensus on further 
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introduction of new gTLDs appeared to be at hand, but with diverging views on 
conditions, orientations and limits for such an introduction. It did not make any 
specific recommendations on the issues under discussion, but advised that the next 
step was to develop the discussions on these issues, within the GNSO itself and in 
consultation with other ICANN Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees 
and the wider Internet community. 453  
 
A second Public Comments period was opened between 20th February and 13th March 
2006 to solicit comments on the Initial Report, to which only seven responses were 
submitted.454 Also in February 2006, a New TLDs Committee was set up by the 
GNSO Council, tasked with producing detailed policy recommendations on the issue. 
Its membership included representation from the Constituencies as well as members 
from the GAC, the ALAC and the Nominating Committee (see Appendix 4.2 for list 
of members). It was chaired by Bruce Tonkin, also the GNSO Council chair.  
 
A second Draft Initial Report was released on 15 June 2006, authored by the New 
TLDs Committee. 455 Unlike the first version, this document included outline policy 
recommendations on all four terms of reference, as well as summarising some of the 
issues discussed in the public comments, Expert Papers and Constituency Statements. 
Another PCP was held between 9th and 29th August. Response was again very limited, 
with a mere 14 comments submitted.456 Following this, the New TLDs Committee 
conducted another set of face-to-face consultations in Amsterdam between 29th and 
31st August to further refine the Committee's findings and to develop a set of draft 
Recommendations.457 These were initially released on 14th September.458 An updated 
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version was released on 18th October following a further two-hour teleconference 
among the Committee’s members. 459 The Committee met again at ICANN's Sao 
Paulo meeting in December 2006 to produce a draft of the Final Report, released on 
5th December. 460 Following release of the December draft, small sub-groups of the 
TLDs Committee continued to meet to iron out various points. 461  
 
At this point, the GAC began to become more involved in the issue. A finalised set of 
‘GAC Principles Regarding New TLDs’ was agreed by the GAC at its meeting in 
Lisbon and presented to the ICANN community in March 2007.462 The GAC 
Principles are listed in Appendix 4.3. These were not at odds with the GNSO draft 
recommendations for the most part, but differed mainly on the question of approving 
geographical identifiers (such as city or territory names) as TLD strings (Principles 
2.2 and 2.7 ). The Principles asserted that the introduction of any new gTLDs using 
geographic identifiers should require the explicit approval of the relevant 
government(s).463 
 
The Final Report was submitted for Committee comment between 30th July and 6th 
August 2007, and a full meeting of the Committee was held on 6th August.464 A public 
comments period on the Final Report was held between 9th and 29th August, which 
attracted 65 comments.465 On 6th September, the GNSO Council voted on the 
recommendations and approved466 the Final Report on the Introduction of New Top-
Level Domains. 467 On 2nd November 2007, the Council submitted the Report to the 
Board, and on 26th June 2008, the Board approved in principle the GNSO 
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recommendations contained in the Final Report.468 The Board further instructed the 
GNSO to move forward with developing a detailed set of implementation 
guidelines.469 
The GNSO published a consolidated set of Principles, Recommendations and 
Implementation Guidelines in time for the Cairo meeting in October-November 
2008.470  These were in fact identical to those in the Final Report (despite the 
intervening PCP on the Final Report held from the 10th to the 30th August 2007).471 
A Draft Applicant Guidebook based on these Principles, Recommendations and 
Implementation Guidelines was also posted on the 24th October 2008.472 This 
Applicant Guidebook, authored by ICANN staff, was intended to set out the details of 
the process for applying to run a new top-level domain. These are summarised and 
briefly explained in Appendix 4.4.   
As it was to turn out, however, subsequent revisions of the DAG would amount to 
significant changes to the New gTLDs policy itself. A significant amount of 
controversy over the first version of the DAG was evident in the public comments 
period held between October 24 and December 15; in fact, this PCP generated far 
more comments than any of the previous PCPs.473 A significant number of these 
public commentators attempted to re-open the debate about whether new TLDs were 
required at all; these mostly represented trademark interests. As will be shown later in 
this chapter, a number of other aspects of the DAG also proved contentious, both in 
the public comments and to the GAC.  
Following the public comments period, four ‘overarching issues’ requiring further 
study were identified by ICANN staff. These included: trademark protection; security 
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and stability; malicious conduct; and demand and economic analysis.474 A number of 
study groups were set up to address these issues, including an Implementation 
Recommendation Team (IRT) together with various workgroups including the Special 
Trademark Issues (STI) group; the Vertical Integration (VI) group (working on 
registry/registrar separation issues)475; the Zone File Access (ZFA) group476; the 
Temporary Drafting Group (TDG) (working on a draft registry contract)477; and the 
High Security Top‐Level Domain (HSTLD) group (working on technical stability 
and security issues).478  The IRT and the working groups consisted of ‘experts’ in the 
relevant areas; public comment on their work was also invited.479 
A number of iterations of the DAG followed between 2009 and 2011, each one being 
subject to a public comments period. The IRT made recommendations prior to the 
publication of into DAGv3.480 The most significant of these represented attempts to 
strengthen trademark protection, including a Uniform Rapid Suspension system (a 
mechanism to quickly suspend infringing domains); a Trademark Clearinghouse (a 
database of information pertaining to trademark authentication); a Globally Protected 
Marks List (a list of globally recognised trademarks that would be made unavailable 
as TLD strings); a Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Process (a mechanism to allow 
trademark holders to proceed against registry operators accused of acting in bad faith 
after the TLD has been delegated) and a ‘thick WHOIS’ model.481 
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DAG v3, however, did not incorporate all of these. The Trademark Clearinghouse 
proposal was passed to the GNSO for consideration; the URS system was included as 
a ‘best practice’ for new registries but not as a requirement; the Globally Protected 
Marks list was not included; while the ‘thick WHOIS’ proposals were adopted. The 
PDDRP was also adopted in DAG v3.482  The PDDRP differed in principle from the 
UDRP in that it allowed trademark owners to seek redress from the registry that 
allowed the infringement, not just from the domain name registrant.  
Meanwhile, a number of economic studies pertaining to the potential costs and 
benefits of new TLDs were commissioned by ICANN. This may to some extent have 
been prompted by a letter from the DoC in December 2008, reminding ICANN on 
behalf of the US government that they should not move forward with new gTLDs 
until appropriate research had been carried out, including completion of the 
economic/market study and cost-benefit analysis.483 In March 2009 ICANN released 
two studies by Dennis Carlton, an economist at the University of Chicago.484 Carlton 
concluded that ICANN’s proposed framework for introducing new TLDs was ‘likely 
to improve consumer welfare by facilitating entry and creating new competition to the 
major gTLDs’.485 He also advised against registry price caps, which he considered 
unnecessary to ensure competitive benefits and potentially inhibiting to the 
development of new registries.486 In June 2009, ICANN commissioned Carlton to 
write two further papers on the economic impact of new gTLDs. The first combined 
and updated his two earlier studies and reiterated their conclusions.487 The second 
responded to a study commissioned by AT&T, authored by Michael Kende, which 
had concluded that restricting the number of new gTLDs was the best solution to 
trademark holders' concerns.488 In response, Carlton argued that the proposed 
trademark protection mechanisms would be sufficient to protect trademark holders’ 
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interests; in addition, he argued that data presented by Kende was flawed and 
appeared to exaggerate the need for defensive registrations.489 Carlton also disputed 
Kende's suggestion that the absence of price caps for new gTLDs would require 
elimination of price caps for existing TLDs.490  
These studies did not, however, prove satisfactory to all interested parties. In 
September 2009, leaders from the U.S. Congressional House Committee on the 
Judiciary wrote to ICANN expressing concerns that new TLDs would likely result in 
serious negative consequences for U.S. businesses and consumers and again asking 
whether ICANN planned to carry out a ‘credible’ economic study on the launch of 
new gTLDs.491  ICANN subsequently commissioned another group of economists 
(Michael L. Katz, Gregory L. Rosston and Theresa Sullivan) to produce a further 
economic study, which was published in June 2010.Note 4_1 The authors of this study 
came to two conclusions: firstly, that it may be wise to continue ICANN’s practice of 
introducing new gTLDs in discrete, limited rounds in order to minimise any adverse 
impact; and secondly that, in order to derive the ‘greatest informational benefits’ from 
the next round of gTLD introductions, ICANN should ‘adopt practices that will 
facilitate the assessment of the net benefits from the initial rollout of additional 
gTLDs.’492  
However, this study still did not prove satisfactory to the DoC, which issued another 
letter in December 2010 warning ICANN not to proceed with new gTLDs until 
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adequate economic studies had been undertaken. 493 Shortly afterwards, a follow-up to 
the July study was published, by the same authors, which attempted to provide more 
specific estimates of the costs and benefits of new TLDs using empirical data. It 
concluded that, while the exact incremental benefits and incremental costs of 
introducing a given TLD would very likely be uncertain and would vary by 
application, a range of processes and policies could be implemented to reduce 
potential costs, particularly trademark and intellectual property protection 
mechanisms such as sunrise periods, a reserved marks list, and post-registration 
enforcement mechanisms.494   
Meanwhile, further iterations of the DAG were produced. DAG v4 (May 2010) 495 
incorporated the Trademark Clearinghouse mechanism and made the URS mandatory; 
it also made changes to rules for geographic TLDs, including a prohibition on country 
names as gTLDs. DAG v5 (November 2010) 496 saw a reversal of policy on registry / 
registrar separation, with unrestricted cross-ownership now being permitted. 497 This 
decision to allow cross-ownership was taken by the Board on 5 November 2010498, 
following the inability of the GNSO’s Vertical Integration Group to reach agreement 
on the issue499. 
Following release of DAG v5, and on subsequent revisions, the GAC provided further 
advice on the issue of geographic names and other issues. However, the Board did not 
accept all of the GAC’s recommendations, leading to the GAC suggesting that it 
might invoke the Bylaw provisions providing for resolution of a Board-GAC 
dispute500, which would have been the first occasion that this had occurred in 
                                                 
493 Strickling, L.E. (2010). Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling to Rod Beckstrom, 2 December 2010. 
Retrieved 18 July 2011,from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/pdf3Ep9MhQVGQ.pdf   
494 Katz, M.L., Rosston, G.L., and Sullivan, T (2010). “Economic Considerations in the Expansion of 
Generic Top-Level Domain Names, Phase II.” 3 December 2010. Retrieved 18 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/phase-two-economic-considerations-03dec10-en.pdf  
495 ICANN (2010). New gTLDS Draft Applicant Guidebook, Version 4. 28 May 2010. Retrieved 19 
July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-clean-28may10-en.pdf  
496 ICANN (2010). gTLD Applicant Guidebook Proposed Final Version. 12 November 2010. Retrieved 
19 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-clean-12nov10-en.pdf  
497 Ibid, P24 
498 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 5 November 2010. Retrieved 19 July 
2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-05nov10-en.htm  
499 Gomez, C. (2010). Email from Chuck Gomez to Peter Dengate Thrush, 7 October 2010. “RE: 
Vertical Integration Recommendations for the New gTLD Program.” Retrieved 19 July 2011, from  
http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/council/msg09754.html  
500ICANN (2010). GAC Communiqué – IXL – Cartagena, 10 December 2010. Retrieved 9 July 2011, 
from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540144/GAC_39_Cartagena_Communique.pdf?versi
on=1&modificationDate=1312225168000     
 108 
ICANN’s history. In the event, the Bylaw provisions were not formally invoked, but 
discussions proceeded between the Board and GAC.  
 
A final discussion draft of the DAG was released in April 2011.501 Some of the key 
changes included: increased governmental authority over geographical names; 
allocation of funds to the ALAC to pay for some Objection Fees; the Sunrise 
mechanism and Trademark Claims Service both becoming mandatory (previously 
registries had to provide one or the other); and a ‘loser pays’ mechanism being 
included in the Uniform Rapid Suspension process. A final PCP was held on this 
document; following this, a finalised seventh iteration of the Applicant Guidebook 
was issued. No public comment was invited on the finalised Guidebook, which the 
Board approved on 20 June 2011.502  
 
Commenting upon the final version of the Guidebook, the GAC recognised that some 
of its outstanding concerns had been addressed, but noted that several substantive 
issues remained unresolved.503 In the following Communiqué, the GAC appeared to 
effectively concede on the remaining points, acknowledging that the Board had 
provided a rationale for not following certain elements of GAC advice, as required by 
the Bylaws.504 
 
Following Board approval, the New gTLDs PDP is now considered to be complete. 
The first application round is scheduled to begin in January 2012.505 However, 
discussions continue on some aspects of policy; for example, a decision on whether 
the relaxation of cross-ownership rules would be extended to existing gTLDs was 
deferred, pending further discussions including with competition authorities.506  
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Analysis of PDP: Actors and Interests  
Role of the GNSO Constituencies 
GNSO Policy Development Process 2005-2007 
The initial stages of policy development were in the hands of the GNSO New TLDs 
committee, which was dominated by the Constituency representatives. The initial 
positions of the Constituencies were set out in the Constituency Statements submitted 
in early 2006, at the start of the PDP. None of the Constituencies opposed outright the 
principle of adding further gTLDs to the root. However, the BC507 and IPC508 stated a 
preference that new gTLDs be limited to sponsored and IDN TLDs, while the ISPCP 
also advocated that any new gTLDs should be sponsored.509   
Some Constituencies showed a certain amount of caution about the programme at this 
point. The BC advocated further analysis on the need and demand for new TLDs, 
including evaluation of the previous rounds of gTLD introduction510, while the IPC 
claimed there was no evidence to substantiate a pressing need for new gTLDs and 
pointed to statistics suggesting 80% of registrations in the previously introduced new 
open gTLDs were defensive registrations.511 The IPC512 further recommended that 
any new gTLD programme be carried out in a slow and controlled manner, while the 
Registrars513 advocated an upper limit on the total number of TLDs to be introduced 
(though they still envisaged a programme that might result in hundreds or possibly 
thousands of new TLDs, but not tens of thousands or millions). The Registries were 
strongly in favour of new gTLDs, arguing that the previous application rounds had 
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September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
510 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for 
new generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P2  
511 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New 
gTLDs. January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf P1 
512 Ibid, P2 
513 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. 
Revised March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/registrars-02mar06.pdf PP2-3 
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adequately validated that there was ample demand to operate a TLD.514 The NCUC 
was also strongly in favour of new gTLDs.515 
 
Overall, then, there was clearly a degree of consensus among the Constituencies that a 
new TLDs programme should be pursued (or at least, in the case of the IPC, a 
qualified acceptance of the principle), but an initial lack of consensus on some 
significant issues, particularly the question of whether further gTLDs other than 
sponsored and IDN TLDs ought to be introduced. There were also some significant 
disagreements among the Constituencies regarding some of the specifics of selection 
criteria, allocation methods and contractual conditions (see Appendix 4.5 for more 
details).   
 
Despite these differences, the New gTLDs Committee was able to produce a fairly 
comprehensive set of recommendations on how the process could be moved forward. 
It is difficult to get a clear picture of precisely how this process unfolded, since not all 
of the Committee’s discussions are publicly documented. However, in email 
correspondence with the author, Bruce Tonkin, who chaired the committee, recalled 
that the meetings mostly took the form of constructive discussion rather than 
adversarial hard bargaining.516 This was confirmed by Phillip Sheppard, who was also 
a member of the Committee, in a telephone interview.517 In addition, a few of the 
teleconference meetings of the Committee were recorded and are available as audio 
files from ICANN.518 These support the picture of agreement being gradually forged 
through constructive discussion.  
The extent to which the recommendations of the Final Report matched up with the 
initial proposals put forward by the GNSO Constituencies is demonstrated in 
Appendix 4.6, which compares the Report to the initial Constituency Statements on 
New gTLDS submitted at the beginning of the policymaking process in early 2006. 
The first and most fundamental Principle, that new gTLDs should be introduced, was 
                                                 
514 ICANN (2006). gTLD Registry Constituency Comments regarding terms of reference for new 
gTLDs. 30 January 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/gtld-registry-constituency-01feb06.pdf P3 
515 ICANN (2006). Noncommercial Constituency comments submitted to the GNSO in response to the 
call for comments on the terms of reference for new gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 15 September 
2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ncuc-01feb06.pdf  
516 Email from Bruce Tonkin to Paul White, 16 February 2009.  
517 Telephone interview between Phillip Sheppard and Paul White, 20th February 2009. 
518 See, for example, audio files available at http://audio.icann.org/gnso/new-gtld-20070726.mp3 and 
http://audio.icann.org/gnso/new-tlds-06aug07.mp3 Accessed 2 March 2009. 
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basically compatible with all of the initial Constituency papers; however the 
recommendations by BC, IPC and ISPCP that new gTLDs should be limited to sTLD 
and IDN types did not make it into the Final Report. The remaining Principles were 
fairly uncontentious. Likewise, most of the Recommendations were not fundamentally 
at odds with any of the initial Constituency statements, although the decision that 
applications would be initially assessed in rounds ‘until the scale of demand is clear’ 
(Recommendation 13) could be seen as a compromise between the ISPCP and 
registrars’ advocacy of a rounds-based model and the RyC’s desire for an ongoing 
application process. With regards to the Implementation Guidelines, these were again 
mostly uncontentious. The level of application fees was a point of contention in the 
Constituency statements, with the BC advocating fees be set as low as possible and 
the registrars advocating large fees to ensure applicants were financially capable of 
running a registry; however, Guideline IG B, which states that application fees will be 
set to ensure cost recovery for the new gTLD process, avoids mentioning any specific 
figures.    
One area of disagreement among the Constituencies was the issue of methods for 
resolving contention over strings, with the BC & IPC favouring comparative 
evaluations; the NCUC advocating ballots; the Registrars favouring a mixture of 
ballots, auctions and lotteries; the ISPCP proposing that domain names for single 
companies should be auctioned, while those involving general and/or noncommercial 
communities should be distributed by lottery; and the Registries specifying no clear 
preference, except to say that the use of comparative evaluations should be limited. 
Guideline IG F appears to have left this question rather open-ended, stating that, in the 
event of contention for strings, the parties should be given the opportunity to resolve 
their differences between themselves; in the absence of agreement, community 
applications should be given priority over non-community applications; and in the 
event of there being no such agreement and no such claim to community support by 
one of the applicants, ‘a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of 
contention’, with the Board having the ability to make a final decision. The nature of 
this contention resolution process is not specified and could, presumably, take the 
form of auctions, ballots, lotteries or comparative evaluation.   
 
It is important to note that certain points of contention among the Constituencies 
remained after the finalisation of the recommendations in the Final Report. The major 
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outstanding disagreements are summarised in Appendix 4.7. However, it would 
appear that, in something of an echo of the 2000 and 2003 PDPs, those issues that the 
Constituencies could not agree on were simply left for ICANN staff to work out in 
creating the DAG.  
Post-Final Report  
To a very great extent, policymaking up to the release of the Final Report could be 
said to be mostly the work of the GNSO Constituencies. However, the more recent 
stages of the process, including the various iterations of the DAG, have been removed 
from the direct control of the GNSO, and in some areas, subsequent evolution of New 
gTLDs policy has resulted in recommendations substantially different from, or even in 
opposition to, the policy proposals agreed by the GNSO in 2007. As a result, some of 
the Constituencies have been critical of various provisions in the DAGs.  
Appendix 4.8 shows criticisms of the DAGs made by various Constituencies. As the 
table shows, some of these were resolved in subsequent versions of the DAG, but the 
majority were not. The Registrars and the BC appear to have had a greater proportion 
of their concerns addressed than other Constituencies, however, at the same time these 
two Constituencies made fewer comments than the Registries, the NCUC and the IPC. 
Some of the comments from the GNSO and GNSO Constituencies directly accused 
the Board of ignoring GNSO advice. For example, Avri Doria submitted comments on 
behalf of the GNSO to the PCP on DAG v3 criticising the work of the IRT on rights 
protection mechanisms (RPMS). Doria argued that, in defining a required RPM, the 
IRT went against the policy decisions of the GNSO Council as approved by the 
Board, since the GNSO New gTLDs Committee had previously concluded that there 
was no set of RPMs that fitted all circumstances and had consequently recommended 
that there would not be a required RPM. Doria argued that a decision to ignore this 
recommendation would be making an ‘end run’ around the principle of bottom-up 
policymaking.519 Comments submitted to the PCP on DAGv5 by the BC520 and IPC521 
                                                 
519 Doria, A. (2009). 'The Requirement of Rights Protections Mechanisms'. Comment posted to ICANN 
public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.3. 9 November 2009. Retrieved 8 July 2011, 
from http://forum.icann.org/lists/3gtld-guide/msg00008.html  
520 ICANN (2010). ‘Comments and Recommendations of Business Constituency (BC)’. Comment 
posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.5. 6 December 2010. 
Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/msg00025.html  
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similarly expressed a feeling that their concerns were not being taken into account. 
The BC’s comments on DAG v6, while acknowledging the acceptance of many BC 
recommendations, also claimed that many others had been ‘disregarded without 
explanation’.522 Note 4_2 
In summary, while the GNSO Constituencies were highly influential in deciding the 
broad strokes of policy up to and including the Final Report, their influence over the 
final specifics of policy as set out in the Applicant Guidebook was much more 
limited.  
Role of public comments 
Between December 2006 and May 2011, more than a thousand public comments were 
posted to ICANN’s public comments forums on the matter of new gTLDs. These 
addressed a very broad range of points and expressed a wide variety of views, 
reflecting the hugely complex nature of the issue-area. The majority of the comments 
were posted during the comments periods on various iterations of the DAG; by 
                                                                                                                                            
521 ICANN (2010). ‘Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency’. Comment posted to ICANN 
public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.5. 9 December 2010. Retrieved 8 July 2011, 
from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/msg00061.html  
522 ICANN (2011). ‘Business Constituency Comments on April-2011 Guidebook for new gTLDs’. 
Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.6. 15 May 2011. 
Retrieved 8 July 2011, from  http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/msg00055.html 
Note 4_2 These were listed as follows: 
• The Guidebook calls for processing new applications in batches, with the first batch being 
500 applications. The BC believes this first batch should be significantly fewer than 500 
applications, in order to test the operational readiness of newly designed application 
processing and objection / contention systems. 
• Applicants should be granted fee reductions for additional versions of the applied-for 
string in IDN scripts and other languages. 
• String Similarity contention sets should not include similar strings requested by a 
applicant seeking linguistic variations of the applicant's other applied-for string. 
• Applicants should be required to pay an objection Response Filing Fee in order to defend 
the rationale already included in their original application. 
• Community priority should be given to applicants scoring at least 13 points, not 14. 
• RPMs are still substantially weaker than those recommended by the IRT. Consumers 
and businesses will inevitably be harmed by cybersquatting and other fraud likely to 
occur in hundreds of new gTLDs, especially at the second level. Picking-up on 
discussions during a US Congressional Hearing on 4-May-2011, the BC reiterates its 
Business Constituency Comments on April-2011 Applicant Guidebook v3 
support for Globally Protected Marks List (GPML). Absent a GPML, trademark holders 
must pay for unwanted defensive registrations. 
• While not part of the Guidebook, effective Communications and Outreach activities are 
essential to the success of this gTLD expansion. 
Source: ICANN (2011). ‘Business Constituency Comments on April-2011 Guidebook for new gTLDs’. 
Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.6. 15 May 2011. 
Retrieved 8 July 2011, from  http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/msg00055.html 
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contrast, relatively few comments were received during the public comments periods 
on the earlier GNSO policy development process.  
 
As shown in Appendix 4.10, an analysis of the comments received over ten public 
comments periods suggests that the two most controversial issues overall were the 
basic question of whether to introduce new gTLDs at all, and trademark protection. 
Overall, 11.9% of posters declared themselves opposed outright to new gTLDs. The 
level of opposition peaked around the time of the PCPs on DAGs version 1 and 2, but 
later declined, as illustrated by the following graph:  
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Figure 4.1: Opposition to new gTLDs in Public Comments Periods 
By the final public comments period, expressions of outright opposition to new 
gTLDs had declined to just 3 posts out of 69. Opposition to new gTLDs had never 
amounted to more than a substantial minority of posters (around 21% in PCPs 5 and 
6), despite claims from George Kirikos that the public had decisively rejected the new 
gTLDs programme.523 Nevertheless, clearly there was never a consensus on the issue 
among the wider Internet community, and so the programme could not truly be 
described as ‘consensus policy’. The majority of those opposing new gTLDs appear to 
have been made up largely of trademark holders, trademark lawyers and organisations 
representing trademark interests. Over the course of the policy development 
programme, 19.1% of all posts criticised the proposed trademark protection 
mechanisms as inadequate. Again, the vast majority of these posters were trademark 
holders, trademark lawyers and organisations representing trademark interests, such as 
INTA and MARQUES.  
                                                 
523 Kirikos, G. (2011). 'ICANN continues to ignore the public that overwhelmingly disapproves of new 
gTLDs (comments of Leap of Faith Financial Services Inc.).' Comment posted to ICANN public 
comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.6. 15 May 2011. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/msg00027.html  
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The PCP on the 2007 GNSO Final Report saw neither overwhelming support for, nor 
strong opposition to, most of the policy recommendations; however, the morality and 
public order (MAPO) provisions were opposed by 51 individuals (41 of whom appear 
to have submitted an identical or near-identical copy-and-paste text from the website 
keep-the-net-neutral.org).524 The issue of intellectual property rights protections also 
aroused significant discussion in this PCP, with six commentators (including IPC and 
BC representatives) arguing in favour of stronger trademark proections and four 
others (three of whom represented online free speech organisations) opposing this.525  
 
Opposition from trademark interests grew markedly stronger during the public 
comments periods on the Draft Applicant Guidebooks. Successive iterations of the 
DAG appear to have responded to such criticism, as increasingly robust trademark 
protection mechanisms were introduced. Despite this, in the final PCP (April-May 
2011), 19 out of 65 (27.5%) of posts remained critical of the proposed trademark 
protection mechanisms.526 Again, this underlines the fact that the Applicant 
Guidebook in its final form could not truly be described as ‘consensus policy’, if this 
is taken to mean broad consensus among the wider stakeholder community.    
 
The high percentage of posts from the trademark lobby highlights the fact that these 
'public' comments periods were in fact dominated by certain (mostly commercial) 
interest groups rather than the Internet-using general public. The great majority of 
‘public commentators’ represented businesses of various sizes and types, together 
with a few individuals with a direct interest in the topic. The extent to which public 
comment affected the outcomes of policy development is, however, more difficult to 
quantify. The broad range of viewpoints expressed on many different points of policy 
underlines the fact that ICANN cannot possibly hope to ‘please all of the people all of 
the time’ when dealing with such complex and nuanced policy areas. Nonetheless, on 
a number of specific points of policy, some of the proposals put forward by some of 
the public commentators appear to have been addressed in subsequent policy drafts. 
This is illustrated by Appendix 4.11, which summarises key issues and points from 
                                                 
524 Public Comments Period on the GNSO new TLDs Committee Final Report: "Introduction of New 
Top-Level Domains" (10th - 30th August 2007). Retrieved 10 March 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtldfinalreport-2007/mail2.html  
525 Ibid  
526 Public Comments Period PCP on New gTLDs Draft Applicant Guidebook v6  (15 April 2011-15 
May 2011).   Retrieved 18 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/    
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each PCP that attracted significant discussion (defined as having been raised by three 
or more individual posters in a given public comments period), together with a 
summary of whether these issues were addressed in the subsequent policy draft.     
 
A second approach in attempting to gauge the overall influence of public comments 
was to directly question some ICANN policymakers, such as members of the New 
TLDs Committee, about how they had taken public comment into account in 
formulating policy.  Philip Sheppard, who sat on the New TLDs Committee, stated in 
a telephone interview that the Committee had attempted to incorporate the public 
inputs ‘as much as possible’ but also pointed out that full consensus on these issues 
was impossible and that some ideas would inevitably win out over others.527 
Similarly, Bruce Tonkin, who chaired the Committee, affirmed that the points raised 
from these sources were discussed and considered by the Committee.528 Sheppard 
added that all participants in the TLDs Committee had at least read the syntheses of 
comments prepared by ICANN staff and that ‘some’ had taken the time to read the 
original comments in detail.  
 
In the later stages of policy development, after each public comments period on 
successive iterations of the DAG, ICANN produced a summary and analysis of public 
comments that attempted to show how public input was being addressed in the 
subsequent Guidebook draft.529 However, on numerous points these documents 
simply offered a justification as to why a particular public comment or proposal 
would not be implemented. These documents therefore merely confirm what has been 
evidenced by the data in Appendices 4.9 and 4.11; i.e., that some of the suggestions 
and issues raised in public comments were in fact addressed in subsequent versions of 
the DAG, while others were not. Nonetheless, the existence of these documents and 
their attempts to justify why certain comments were rejected does at least demonstrate 
that public comments are noted and acknowledged, if not necessarily acted upon (and, 
as discussed, it would have obviously been impossible to satisfy everyone as there 
were conflicting views on numerous points).     
 
                                                 
527 Telephone interview between Phillip Sheppard and Paul White, 20th February 2009. 
528 Email from  Bruce Tonkin to Paul White, 16 February 2009. 
529 These files are available from the Applicant Guidebook archive page at 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/dag-en.htm Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
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Some-of-the-public-commentators-themselves, however, were-sceptical-as to-how far 
their views were being taken into account. One notable critic, already mentioned, was 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial Services), who argued in almost every PCP 
that ICANN-was-pressing-ahead-with-the-new gTLDs programme against the wishes 
of public commentators. There-were-others-who-made-similar claims; for example, 
over the course of the final two public comments periods, a-number-of commentators-
accused-ICANN-of-ignoring-public-comment-on aspects-of the proposed policy. 
These included Janet O' Callaghan (News Corporation)530; Yvette Wojciechowski 
(CADNA)531; Paul Tattersfield (GPMGroup)532; Elizabeth Cummings (CADNA) 533; 
Søren Ingemann Larsen (H.Lundbeck A/S)534; and even the ALAC.535  
 
Appendix 4.9 contains a more in-depth summary and analysis of ten Public 
Comments periods on new gTLDs held in the period between December 2006 and 
May 2011. Appendix 4.10 draws together some statistics for all ten of these public 
comments periods over the course of the entire policy development process. 
 
Role of the GAC 
 
The GAC supplied one member to the New TLDs Committee, Suzanne Sene. 
However, she appears to have attended only one meeting of the Committee.536 
  
                                                 
530 News Corporation (2010). 'News Corp Comments on the Proposed Final Applicant Guidebook'. 
Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v. 5. 9 December 
2010. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/msg00064.html 
531 CADNA (2010). 'CADNA Comments on version 5 of the New gTLD Draft Applicant Guidebook'. 
Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.5. 10 December 
2010. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/msg00088.html  
532 Tattersfield, P. (2010). ' Serious failings of both process and design which need to be remedied prior 
to implementation '. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant 
Guidebook v.5. 10 December 2010. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-
guide/msg00079.html  
533 CADNA (2011). 'ICANN’s New gTLD Applicant Guidebook: April 2011 Discussion Draft – Public 
Comment'. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.6. 13 
May 2011. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/pdfeexNsFhMzT.pdf  
534 Larsen, S.I.  (2011). 'The program of new TLDs should be STOPPED due to lack of interest from 
the internet society'. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Draft Applicant 
Guidebook v.6. 4 May 2011. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-
guide/msg00002.html  
535 ICANN (2010). 'ALAC Statement on Draft Final Guidebook'. Comment posted to ICANN public 
comments forum on Draft Applicant Guidebook v.5. 8th December 2010. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/msg00038.html 
536 ICANN (2007). GNSO new TLDs Committee Final Report Part B: “Introduction of New Top-Level 
Domains.” 18 June 2007. Retrieved 20 July 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-fr-b-
18jun07.pdf P9 
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In October 2006, TLDs Committee Chairman and GNSO Council Chair, Bruce 
Tonkin, sent-formal-correspondence-to-the-Chair-of-the-GAC-requesting the GAC's 
assistance with the public policy impacts of the introduction of new TLDs. The GAC 
addressed this at its next meeting on 2nd – 8th December 2006 in Sao Paulo, where it 
discussed the development of GAC public policy principles applicable to the 
introduction, selection-process-and-operation-of new-gTLDs.  The-first-set of draft 
GAC principles were submitted to the GNSO Council in December 2006.537 A 
finalised set of ‘GAC Principles Regarding New TLDs’ was agreed by the GAC at its 
meeting in Lisbon and presented to the ICANN community on March 28th, 2007.538   
 
The preamble to this document invoked the WSIS declaration of 2005, which 
recognised ‘…the need for further development of, and strengthened cooperation 
among, stakeholders for public policies for generic top-level domains’. Paragraph 1.2 
of the preamble also cited the WSIS Declaration of 2003, which recognised that 
‘…policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of 
States’ and that states ‘…have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-
related public policy issues.’539 The invocation of the WSIS Declarations is interesting 
and gives the impression that the GAC is attempting to reinforce and assert its 
authority over public policy aspects of ICANN’s work by drawing on the authority of 
the United Nations.   
 
On 16 April 2007, the New TLDs Committee held a teleconference with GAC 
members aimed at ‘clarification’ of the GAC Principles.540 The discussion focused 
upon finding more precise definitions of some of the terms used in the Principles (for 
example, what-constituted ‘geographical names’ or ways in which a proposed TLD 
string could-be said-to violate-human rights standards), as well-as discussion 
regarding what-mechanisms-could be put-in place-to evaluate-proposed strings 
against such criteria. The transcript-of-the teleconference-suggests that it took the 
                                                 
537 ICANN (2006). GAC Communiqué XXVI – Sao Paulo, 6th December 2006. Retrieved 8 February 
2011, from http://gac.icann.org/web/communiques/gac26com.pdf  
538 ICANN (2006).  GAC Principles regarding New gTLDs. March 28 2007. Retrieved 8 February 
2011, from http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD_principles_0.pdf  
539 ICANN (2006).  GAC Principles regarding New gTLDs. March 28 2007. Retrieved 8 February 
2011, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/4817665/gTLD_principles_0.pdf?version=1&modifica
tionDate=1323820021837  
540 ICANN (2007). Transcript of GAC-GNSO New gTLD Committee Teleconference. 16 April 2007.  
Retrieved 12 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/meetings/transcript-gac-gnso-new-gtlds-
16apr07.pdf  
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form of constructive discussion on these issues. 541  One interesting comment made in 
this discussion-suggested-that some-GAC members (it was not specified which) were 
particularly sensitive about geographic names, while others were less so. 542 However, 
the GAC was insistent that a-mechanism-should-be put in-place that-would allow 
governments to challenge-proposed-names with-national geographic significance.    
  
Appendix 4.12 compares the GAC Principles on Public Policy Aspects of new gTLDs 
to the GNSO policy recommendations as drafted in the Final Report. Eight of the 
fourteen GAC Principles (2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10) were in harmony 
with the GNSO Final Report, while four (2.11, 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14) more were not 
covered by the Report but represented established ICANN practice or were addressed 
in other documents (2.11 was addressed by the gTLD Registry Failover Plan in 
2008).543 The main point of contention concerned the issue of geographical identifiers 
(place names) as TLD strings. GAC Principles 2.2 and 2.7 recommended that 
geographical identifiers should be permissible only with the explicit agreement of 
governmental authorities. The Final Report, however, incorporated the 
recommendations of the Reserved Names Working Group (RN-WG), which noted 
that the proposed challenge mechanisms currently being proposed in the draft new 
gTLD process would allow national or local governments to initiate a challenge, and 
stated that no additional protection mechanisms were needed regarding geographical 
names.544 Under such a system there would not only be no automatic requirement for 
governmental approval for a geographical TLD, but any challenge by governments 
would not be guaranteed to succeed.   
 
Dialogue continued before and after the release of the GNSO Final Report. GAC 
Communiqué 28 (San Juan, June 2007)545 noted the GAC’s appreciation of ‘the work 
undertaken to reflect elements of the GAC Principles on new gTLDs in the latest 
report.’  Following release of the Final Report, however, GAC Communiqué 29 (Los 
                                                 
541 Ibid 
542 Ibid, P13 
543 ICANN (2008). ICANN gTLD Registry Failover Plan. 15 July 2008. Retrieved 11 November 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/registries/failover/icann-registry-failover-plan-15jul08.pdf  
544 ICANN (2007). GNSO Final Report – “Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains.” 8 Aug 
2007. Retrieved 18 February 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-
08aug07.htm 
545ICANN (2007). GAC Communiqué XXVIII –Lisbon, 28 March 2007. Retrieved 8 October 2010, 
from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540189/GAC_28_Lisbon_Communique.pdf?version=
1&modificationDate=1312228620000  
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Angeles, October 2007)546 drew-attention-to-the-failure-of the-Report to-take GAC 
Principle 2.2. ‘fully into account’, and argued that-in practice-some countries would 
not-be-in-a position-to avail-themselves-of the-proposed-objection mechanism.547 At 
the ICANN meeting in Paris, June 2008, the GAC-conducted-further face-to-face 
meetings with the GNSO Council. GAC Communiqué 32 (June 2008) again expressed 
concern that the GNSO proposals did not reflect ‘important elements of the GAC 
principles’548, in particular sections 2.2 and 2.7 but also section 2.6 (which deals with 
the need to ensure that new gTLDs do not negatively affect the security, stability and 
global interoperability of the Internet and-promotes competition, consumer choice, 
geographical and service-provider diversity). The communiqué further stated that 
‘ICANN needs to adopt an implementation-procedure that further facilitates new 
entrants to the registry, registry-services and registrar markets and avoids unduly 
favouring those existing registries and-registrars involved directly in the Policy 
Development Process.’ 549  The GAC also held a joint meeting with the Board in Paris 
in which the GAC again raised the conflict between their own recommendations and 
those of the Final Report. The-representative of Brazil believed this was a result of the 
lack of interaction between the GAC and the GNSO until a late stage of the PDP, and 
proposed closer interaction between the two bodies in the future. 550 
 
The first release-of the DAG-appeared-to incorporate-GAC Principles 2.2 and 2.7, by 
specifying that applicants for a gTLD string that-is a geographical term would be 
required-to-submit-a statement-of-support or-non-objection for its application from 
the relevant government(s) or public authorities.551 GAC Communique 33 (Cairo, 
November 2008) welcomed this, stating that the GAC ‘appreciates the level of 
engagement inter-sessionally with ICANN staff which lead to better reflection of the 
GAC principles on New gTLDs in the Draft Applicant Guidebook, particularly 
                                                 
546ICANN (2007). GAC Communiqué XXIX. San Juan, 28 June 2007. Retrieved 8 October 2010, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540188/GAC_29_San_Juan.pdf?version=1&modifica
tionDate=1312228402000   
547 ICANN (2007). GAC Communiqué XXX – Los Angeles, October 2007. Retrieved 8 October 2010, 
from http://gac.icann.org/web/communiques/gac29com.pdf  
548 ICANN (2008). GAC Communiqué XXXII –Paris, 26 June 2008. Retrieved 8 October 2010, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540187/GAC_32_Paris_Communique.pdf?version=1
&modificationDate=1312228254000  
549 Ibid 
550 ICANN (2008). Transcript  of GAC Meeting with the ICANN Board (Open session), Paris, 24th 
June 2008. Retrieved 8 October 2010, from https://par.icann.org/files/paris/GAC-ICANNBoard-
Open_24June08.txt  
551 ICANN (2008). New gTLD Program: Draft Applicant Guidebook (Draft RFP). 24 October 2008. 
Retrieved 16 February 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-24oct08-en.pdf  
PP 1.14-1.15 and 2.8 to 2.10  
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principles 2.2 and 2.6.’. 552 However, it went on to note that, as a result of this 
exchange and subsequent meeting with the CCNSO, the GAC had become ‘more 
sensitive to the potential blurring of the existing distinction between the ccTLD and 
gTLD namespace’ and that questions related to the consideration of country and 
territory names needed to be addressed further.553  
 
An annex to GAC Communique 34 (Mexico) incorporated the GAC’s detailed 
comments on DAG version 1. (Annex B) This document touched on a much wider 
range of issues than the GAC had previously concerned itself with. It began with an 
observation that the study requested by the Board in October 2006 on economic 
questions relating to the domain registration market had not yet been carried out. The 
GAC urged completion of this study as soon as possible. The proposed single fee 
structure was criticised as likely to have a ‘deterrent effect’ on prospective proposals 
for new-domains-emanating-from SMEs, developing-countries-and non-commercial 
entities. The GAC-proposed-that-consideration-be given to-the introduction-of a-new 
type of TLD, a non-commercial ‘social and cultural’ TLD (scTLD) designed to 
‘address the needs and interests of a clearly defined social and/or cultural 
community’. It-went-on to identify a lack-of transparency-about-cost-evaluation 
principles applied-in-determining-the proposed-fee level, and-also-highlighted-the 
issue of registry contract compliance, asserting that ICANN must show sufficient 
capacity to enforce registry contracts. The GAC also stated that it ‘shares the concerns 
of business-stakeholders-about-a range of-overarching-issues-relating-to overall-costs 
to business’ and emphasised the need for efforts to help limit the need for defensive 
registrations in the new gTLDs, including appropriate-mechanisms-to-prevent 
fraudulent-registrations. It-went-on to question whether auctions would be an 
appropriate mechanism-for selecting-new-gTLD-operators. The-final part-of the 
statement-returned-to-the question-of geographical-names as TLD-strings-and 
reiterated the GAC’s position with respect to its gTLD Principles 2.2 and 2.7. 
 
The-following-months-saw ongoing-exchanges-between the GAC and Board as 
successive versions of the DAG were released. In its Sydney554 and Seoul555  
                                                 
552 ICANN (2008). GAC Communiqué XXXII –Cairo, 5th November 2008. Retrieved 8 October 2010, 
from http://gac.icann.org/web/communiques/gac31com.pdf   
553 Ibid 
554 ICANN (2009). GAC Communiqué XXXV – Sydney, 26 June 2009. Retrieved 9 October 2010, 
from 
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Communiqués, the GAC continued to express similar concerns to those outlined in the 
Mexico Communiqué.  On 18 August 2009, GAC chairman Janis Karklins addressed 
a letter to the Board regarding the issue.556 This reiterated some of the concerns 
expressed in previous communiqués, including the need for further studies regarding 
scalability, security and the economic demand for new TLDs; concerns regarding 
potential costs to business; the risk of user confusion; the need for ICANN to increase 
its administrative resources in order to manage the increased workload arising from an 
expansion of the TLD space; the level of awareness among businesses of the new 
gTLDs programme; the proposal that ICANN should consider more categories of 
TLD, including scTLDs; fee levels; and the potential complexity and cost of the 
objection and dispute resolution  procedures. The issue of geographical identifiers was 
covered in some detail, with Karklins stating that DAG v2 ‘does not yet fully reflect 
the GAC position that governments and other public authorities, as representatives of 
citizens of a sovereign state, territory, province or city, have a legitimate interest in 
the use of geographical names as new TLDs.’ He proposed two amendments:  firstly, 
that ‘strings that are a meaningful representation or abbreviation of a country name or 
territory name should not be allowed in the gTLD space’; and secondly that ‘gTLDs 
using strings with geographic names other than country names or territories (so called 
geoTLDs) should follow specific rules of procedure.’ These rules would involve 
application of the ‘principles of subsidiarity’ after delegation. For example, an 
approval or non-objection from the relevant national authority could be made 
conditional on the registry meeting certain conditions; the national authoritity could 
be given the authority to initiate a re-delegation process for the TLD in the event of 
breach of this agreement or of national law.  
 
Karklins’ proposal to block strings constituting a ‘meaningful representation’ or 
abbreviation of a country name or territory name from entering the gTLD space under 
any circumstances (rather than only in the case of government non-approval) seems to 
represent a different interpretation of GAC Principle 2.2 than the one taken by 
                                                                                                                                            
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540154/GAC_35_Sydney_Communique.pdf?version
=1&modificationDate=1312227158000 
555ICANN (2009). GAC Communiqué XXXVI – Seoul, 30 October 2009. Retrieved 9 October 2010, 
from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540147/GAC_36_Seoul_Communique.pdf?version=1
&modificationDate=1312227059000  
556 Karklins, J. (2009). Letter from Janis Karklins to Peter Dengate Thrush, 18 August 2009. Retrieved 
14 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/karklins-to-dengate-thrush-18aug09-
en.pdf  
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ICANN staff. Karklins argued that such strings should be dealt with as ccTLDs, over 
which the principle of national sovereignty should apply. Furthermore, his second 
proposed amendment appears to be an attempt to establish a great deal of 
governmental regulatory authority over geographic TLDs beyond the ability to 
approve or veto the string at initial delegation. This proposal from Karklins seems to 
go well beyond the original GAC Principles.  
 
In his response to Karklins’ letter, Board Chairman Peter Dengate Thrush pointed out 
that a security and stability review was already being conducted by the RSSAC and 
SSAC, and that there had been ‘substantial work’ on the economic questions, 
including a number of economic studies commissioned by ICANN. He argued that 
‘the analytical value of further studies will be small’ although he did not rule them 
out. Most of the other issues raised by the GAC, he asserted, were also already being 
examined by various study groups, including the Implementation Recommendation 
Team (IRT). On the question of geographic identifiers, Dengate Thrush argued the 
requirement for applications for country and territory names to provide evidence of 
support or non-objection from the relevant government or public authority was 
consistent with GAC principle 2.2. He also stated there was nothing to prevent a 
government or public authority conditioning the granting of their approval of TLD 
requests to the TLD operator and thus influencing policymaking ‘in a manner 
appropriate and acceptable to the government or public authority for that TLD.’   
 
In March 2010 Karklins addressed another letter to the Board557 commenting on 
version 3 of the DAG. He reiterated the importance of addressing comprehensively 
the four ‘overarching issues’ of root scaling implications; safeguards against 
malicious conduct and abuse of the DNS; intellectual property rights; and an ‘urgent 
need’ for further economic studies to assess whether the benefits of new gTLDs were 
likely to outweigh any costs to users, as well as to assess whether any registry 
operator would be able to exercise market power before any relaxation of rules 
requiring vertical separation between registries and registrars. On the issue of 
geographical identifiers, Karklins stated that the definition of geographical strings 
continued to be ‘insufficient’ and not in accordance with GAC gTLD Principles 2.2 
                                                 
557 Karklins, J. (2010). Letter from Janis Karklins to Peter Dengate Thrush, 10 March 2010. 
http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/karklins-to-dengate-thrush-10mar10-en.pdf    
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and 2.7; for example, he asserted, commonly used abbreviations or regions not listed 
in ISO 3166-2 should nonetheless be considered as geographical names. He reiterated 
the GAC’s view that ‘strings that are a meaningful representation or abbreviation of a 
country name or territory name should not be allowed in the gTLD space’, explaining 
that the GAC interpreted paragraph 2.2 of the GAC gTLD Principles to mean that 
strings which are a ‘meaningful representation or abbreviation of a country or territory 
name’ should be handled through the forthcoming ccTLD PDP, and other 
geographical strings should be allowed in the gTLD space only with the agreement of 
the relevant government or public authority. Karklins further asserted that the 
proposed objection mechanisms should be improved, ensuring that objection fees 
were cost-based and that objections to individual applications submitted by individual 
govemments were not subject to payment of a fee. He asserted that the Bylaws gave 
GAC members the right to provide advice directly to the Board and that they should 
not be required to subject objections to an independent third party service provider. 
He also urged that mechanisms be established for the resolution of post-delegation 
deviation from conditions for government approval of or non-objection to the use of a 
geographical name. Note 4_3 
 
On 10th August Dengate Thrush responded to the GAC’s March letter.558 On the 
matter of root scaling, he pointed to the studies carried out by the RSSAC and SSAC. 
On the issues of malicious conduct and trademark protection, he highlighted the 
enhanced protection mechanisms in DAG version 4; while in response to the GAC's 
call for further economic studies, he pointed to the June study by Katz, Rosston and 
Sullivan. 559 On the matter of geographical names, Dengate Thrush confirmed that the 
GAC’s ‘clarification’ of their interpretation of Principle 2.2 had resulted in a change 
of approach for DAG version 4, namely that country and territory names would not be 
                                                 
Note 4_3 Karklins also made a number of other points in this letter, including expression of support for the 
proposal to allow two character strings for most scripts used for IDN TLDs and further analysis be 
undertaken of the one character issue; assertion of a need to explore further the regime applicable to 
single registrant TLDs; reservation over auctions as a method of resolving string competition and 
questioning of how those proceeds might be used by ICANN; and a reiteration of the importance of 
fully exploring the potential benefits of further categories of TLD (or track differentiation).  
 
558 Dengate Thrush, P (2010). Letter from Peter Dengate Thrush to Heather Dryden, 5 August 2010. 
Retrieved 6 July 2022, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/dengate-thrush-to-dryden-
05aug10-en.pdf 
559 Katz, M.L., Rosston, G.L, and Sullivan, T. (2010).  “An Economic Framework for the Analysis of 
the Expansion of Generic Top-Level Domain Names, prepared for ICANN.” June 2010. Retrieved 18 
July 2011, from http://icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/economic-analysis-of-new-gtlds-16jun10-en.pdf   
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available for delegation in the first round of new gTLD applications. He defended the 
decision to base the definition of country and territory names on ISO 3166-1 in order 
to provide clarity and to remove the ambiguity created by use of the term ‘meaningful 
representation.’ Dengate Thrush confirmed adoption of the GAC’s suggestion for a 
clause in the registry agreement requiring that, in the case of a dispute between a 
relevant Government and the registry operator, ICANN must comply with a legally 
binding decision in the relevant jurisdiction. On the question of the objections 
procedure for governments, he commented that it was 'not clear that Bylaw was 
intended to provide an avenue for governments to provide advice on operational 
matters of this nature.' He also referred the GAC to the secondary avenue of recourse 
available by way of the objections mechanism in the DAG.Note 4_4 
 
In a further letter to the Board dated August 4 2010,560 the GAC strongly advised the 
Board to replace the MAPO objection with ‘an alterative mechanism for addressing 
concerns related to objectionable strings’, as there was clearly no internationally 
agreed definition of ‘morality and public order’.561 The GAC addressed another letter 
to the Board on September 23, authored by new GAC chair Heather Dryden.562  
Again, this covered a range of issues, including: root scaling; market and economic 
impacts; registry-registrar separation; protection of rights owners; legal recourse for 
applicants; and addressing the needs of developing countries. On the matter of 
geographical names, Dryden expressed the GAC’s approval of provisions excluding 
country and territory names from the first application round; however, she argued, this 
exclusion should be prolonged until the completion of the new ccTLDs PDP. The 
GAC also remained of the view, she asserted, that the definition of geographical 
strings should not be limited to names in the ISO lists. On the matter of city-name 
TLDs, she expressed concerns that an applicant could seek to avoid the safeguards of 
government support or non-objection if the application simply stated that the intended 
use of the name is for non-community purposes, and requested removal of this 
‘loophole’. On the matter of post-delegation disputes between governments and 
                                                 
Note 4_4 Dengate Thrush also responded to another of Karklins’ criticisms, defending the use of auctions 
as an objective ‘method of last resort’ for resolving string contention and suggesting several possible 
uses for the funds generated. 
560 Dryden, H. (2010). Letter from Heather Dryden to Peter Dengate Thrush, 4 August 2010. Retrieved 
16 July 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/gac-to-dengate-thrush-04aug10-en.pdf  
561 Ibid 
562Dryden, H. (2010). Letter from Heather Dryden to Peter Dengate Thrush, 23 September 2010. 
Retrieved 16 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/dryden-to-dengate-thrush-
23sep10-en.pdf  
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registrars, she welcomed the proposal for contractual clauses in the registry agreement 
to respect a legally binding decision in the relevant jurisdiction. However, she 
requested a response from ICANN concerning the GAC view that the operations of 
registry operators of ‘geo-TLDs’ should be conducted under the legal framework of 
the relevant country.  Noting that ICANN had referred governments to the ‘secondary 
avenue of recourse available by way of objections’ in the Chair’s letter of 5 August 
2010, she asked ICANN to ensure that the criteria for community objections were 
‘implemented in a way that appropriately enables governments to use this instrument 
to protect their legitimate interests.’ She also reiterated that governments should not 
be required to pay a fee for raising objections to new gTLD applications. 
 
The Board discussed this correspondence in its October meeting. The discussion 
seemed to focus on the likely consequences if the differences with the GAC could not 
be resolved.563 Though the Bylaws called for consultation between the Board and 
GAC, no standing procedure was in place specifying the manner and logistics of this. 
Bruce Tonkin suggested that, prior to a full Board-GAC meeting, a smaller group 
should confer, including representatives from the Board, the GAC and the GNSO, to 
discuss the issues and look for further areas of compromise. Dryden, present at the 
meeting as an observer, stated that any consultation would likely be expected to be 
between the full Board and open to the full GAC, but that this would likely not 
preclude the ability to have a smaller working group convene earlier. Following this 
discussion, Dengate Thrush responded on behalf of the Board to the GAC’s most 
recent letter clarifying and reiterating the Board’s position on the major points of 
disagreement. 564 Note 4_5 
                                                 
563 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the Board, 28 October 2010. Retrieved 16 July 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-28oct10-en.htm  
564 Dryden, H. (2010). Letter from Heather Dryden to Peter Dengate Thrush, 23 September 2010. 
Retrieved 16 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/dengate-thrush-to-dryden-
23nov10-en.pdf   
Note 4_5 On the matters of root zone scaling and market and economic impacts, he referred the GAC to 
the latest studies that had been conducted on these issues. Regarding registry-registrar separation, he 
noted that the Vertical Integration Working Group had been unable to achieve consensus and that the 
Board had therefore taken the decision, voting to allow registries to own registrars in its 9th November 
meeting. On the matter of trademark protections, he reiterated that the Board had accepted the advice of 
the IRT. On geographic names, he stated that the current criteria for defining geographic names as 
reflected in version 4 of the Draft Applicant Guidebook were “considered to best meet the Board's 
objectives and are also considered to address to the extent possible the GAC principles.” The matter of 
country and territory names, he said, would be reconsidered by the Board after the first round of new 
gTLD applications. He again defended the decision to base the definition of country and territory 
names on ISO 3166-1 and similar lists on the grounds of clarity for applicants and avoiding ambiguity 
over the term ‘meaningful representation’. City names, he argued, were unable to be afforded complete 
protection because city names may also be generic terms or brand names, and are often not unique. He 
 128 
 
On November 22, the GAC posted some Interim Comments Related to New gTLDs, 
which stated that the GAC was ‘prepared for exchanges’ with the Board, and 
emphasised that the GAC ‘particularly wishes to discuss further the Board’s 
statements that the Bylaw provisions pertaining to GAC advice may not extend to 
“operational matters”....and that “governments pay fees for other services, enter into 
agreements, and pursue conflict resolution.”’565 The Cartagena Communiqué (9 
December 2010) suggested a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the GAC with the 
Board’s responses to its advice, expressed in some fairly strong terms. The GAC 
remained ‘very concerned’ that many of the points it had raised remained unresolved 
in the latest version of the DAG, and asserted that this situation had arisen ‘primarily 
from the fact that the Board adopted the GNSO recommendations on new gTLDs 
without taking due account of GAC advice at that time, thereby creating a flawed 
process.’ The communiqué went on to state that, in view of the Board’s position that it 
could not accept elements of the GAC’s advice, the GAC would assume that the 
Board was invoking the provisions in the ICANN Bylaws to seek a mutually 
acceptable resolution of these differences.566  
 
In the event, the Bylaw provisions were not formally invoked; however, a Board-GAC 
Consultation took place in Brussels between 28 February and 2 March 2011.567 The 
GAC produced a ‘scorecard’ identifying twelve outstanding issues for discussion568 
(see Appendix 4.13). The Board released its response a few days later, in which it 
conceded some points to the GAC but stood firm on others (See Appendix 4.13). In 
Communiqué 40 (San Francisco, 18 March 2011), the GAC’s tone appeared to have 
                                                                                                                                            
stated that the Board did not agree with the GAC’s position that governments should not be required to 
pay an objection fee, pointing out that the system will be run on a loser-pays basis so that governments 
will not have to bear the costs in cases where they prevail. On MAPO objections, he defened the policy 
as the product of GNSO consensus and extensive legal research. However, he invited the GAC to 
suggest an alternative solution, pointing out that an expression of dissatisfaction was not helpful unless 
accompanied by an alternative proposal.      
  
565 Dryden, H. (2010). Letter from Heather Dryden to Peter Dengate Thrush, 22 November 2010. 
Retrieved 16 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/dryden-to-dengate-thrush-
22nov10-en.pdf  
566ICANN (2010). GAC Communiqué – IXL – Cartagena, 10 December 2010. Retrieved 9 July 2011, 
from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540144/GAC_39_Cartagena_Communique.pdf?versi
on=1&modificationDate=1312225168000     
567ICANN (2011). “ICANN Board-GAC Consultation in Brussels 28 February and 1 March 2011.” 
Retrieved 14 July 2011, from http://meetings.icann.org/board-gac-spring11  
568 ICANN (2011). GAC indicative scorecard on new gTLD outstanding issues listed in the GAC 
Cartagena Communiqué. 23 February 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2011, from  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-scorecard-23feb11-en.pdf  
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softened somewhat, describing the inter-sessional meeting in Brussels as ‘constructive 
and positive’.569 In response to the Board’s March reply, the GAC produced a further 
statement, which in turn conceded some of the Board’s arguments but provided 
further advice on other points.570 The April discussion draft of the DAG (DAG v6) 
incorporated much of the GAC’s revised advice, but continued to reject some 
elements. Nonetheless the GAC won substantial concessions. A GAC ‘Early Warning 
Procedure’ was created, a mechanism by which the GAC could give notice that a 
particular application might be problematic.571 Although the Board was not compelled 
to accept GAC advice under this procedure, GAC opposition to an application would 
normally create a ‘strong presumption’ that the application should not proceed. The 
definition of ‘geographical names’ was extended to include names by which a country 
is commonly known.572 The decision on which level of government was appropriate 
to give support to an application was recognised as a ‘matter of national 
sovereignty’573; furthermore, it was stated that, if governmental support for an 
application was conditional on the registry meeting some criteria, and the registry 
subsequently failed to meet those criteria, ICANN would comply with any order from 
a national court to shut the registry down.574 The GAC’s comments on the revised 
DAG acknowledged the incorporation of some of its previous advice and reiterated 
some of those recommendations that had not been incorporated.575 
 
This was followed by the release of the seventh version of the Applicant Guidebook in 
May, which acknowledged that a GAC Early Warning could be issued for any 
reason.576 A line was also added stating that if the Board does not act in accordance 
                                                 
569 ICANN (2011). GAC Communiqué XL – San Francisco, 17 March 2011.  Retrieved 14 July 2011, 
from http://gac.icann.org/communiques/gac-2011-communique-40  
570ICANN (2011). GAC comments on the Board response to the GAC scorecard. 12 April 2011. 
Retrieved 17 July 2011, from  
http://gac.icann.org/system/files/20110412_GAC_comments_on_the_Board_response_to_the_GAC_sc
orecard_0.pdf  
571 ICANN (2011). New gTLD Applicant Guidebook: April 2011 Discussion Draft (redline version). 
Retrieved 17 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-redline-15apr11-
en.pdf P11 
572 Ibid, P66 
573 ICANN (2011) New gTLD Applicant Guidebook: April 2011 Discussion Draft (redline version). 
Retrieved 17 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-redline-15apr11-
en.pdf P69 
574 Ibid, P70 
575ICANN (2011). GAC comments on the new gTLDs. 26 May 2011. Retrieved 18 September 2011, 
from http://gac.icann.org/system/files/GAC%20Comments%20on%20the%20new%20gTLDs%20-
%2026%20May%202011.pdf  
576 ICANN (2011) New gTLD Applicant Guidebook: Version 7 (redline version). Retrieved 17 July 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-redline-30may11-en.pdf P11 
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with GAC advice over an application, it must provide a rationale.577 It was also 
clarified that the GAC may provide advice on any topic and is not limited to the 
grounds for objection enumerated in the public objection and dispute resolution 
process. 578 The GAC recognised that the seventh version of the AG addressed some 
of the GAC's outstanding concerns, but noted that several substantive issues remained 
unresolved.579 Note 4_6 
 
Despite this, the Applicant Guidebook was approved by the Board without further 
alteration. In the following Communiqué, the GAC appeared to effectively concede 
on the remaining points. Though it stated its ‘concern’ that several elements of its 
advice were not followed prior to the approval of the gTLD programme, it 
acknowledged that other advice was followed, and that the Board had provided a draft 
rationale for its decision to reject GAC advice. It concluded by stating the expectation 
‘that the implementation of the new gTLD programme will respect applicable law in 
order to avoid detrimental consequences to parties involved’ and expressed its 
willingness to ‘continue to work constructively with the whole ICANN community on 
the new gTLD programme’. 580  
 
Overall analysis of GAC role  
 
The gTLDs policy development area provides a fascinating insight into the still-
evolving relationship between the GAC and Board. It represents the first policy area 
where significant conflict emerged between the Board and GAC, and the resolution of 
that conflict required the ad-hoc creation of new procedures for negotiation between 
                                                 
577 Ibid, P14 
578 Ibid, P152 
579 ICANN (2011). GAC communication on new gTLDs and Applicant Guidebook. 18 June 2011. 
Retrieved 19 July 2011, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540128/GAC+communication+on+new+gTLDs+and
+Applicant+Guidebook-+20110618.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1312364027000  
 
Note 4_6 These included:  
-Competition concerns, in particular those resulting from changes to registry-registrar cross-
ownership rules; 
-The demonstration of use requirement for trademark holders wishing to avail themselves of 
the propose trademark protection mechanisms;and 
-Removal of references in the gTLD Guidebook that attempt to specify that future GAC 
early warnings and advice must contain particular information or take a specified form, as 
these references are inconsistent  with the GAC operating principles and the ICANN 
Bylaws. 
580 ICANN (2011). GAC Communiqué  XLI- Singapore. 23 June 2011. Retrieved 14 September 2011, 
from https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540134/Singapore+Communique+-
+23+June+2011_2.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1312392506000  
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the two bodies. As noted, though the Bylaws specify that consultation between the 
GAC and Board must take place in the event of a dispute, they do not specify the form 
such consultation should take and, prior to this episode, there were no precedents. In 
the event, the Bylaw provisions were not formally invoked as such; however, the 
threat of this was used effectively by the GAC to encourage negotiations. To a 
considerable extent, significant elements of the final Applicant Guidebook ended up 
being negotiated directly between the GAC and the Board. Although the GAC did not 
achieve every one of its aims in the end, it did win some extensive concessions, 
particularly in the area of governmental authority over geographical names.  
 
The GAC’s particular concern with this topic gives important clues regarding some of 
their most fundamental priorities, namely recognition of the ‘sovereignty’ of states 
over matters relating to territory and geography. An attempt was made to contact Janis 
Karklins to seek further explanation as to why the GAC saw this as an issue of 
sovereignty, but he did not respond. However, the same question was put to current 
GAC members Andrew Maurer (Australia) and Maria Häll (Sweden). Maurer did not 
answer this question, but Häll noted that different countries have different views on 
the issue581, which echoes what was said at the 2007 GNSO-GAC teleconference (see 
above). Thus, it would seem that not all GAC members necessarily regard geographic 
identifiers as particularly problematic, but all appear to support the principle that the 
matter is one for national governments to decide.  
 
The GAC also won substantial concessions on other points and particularly on the 
principle that governments should have special rights to object to an application; the 
recognition that they are not limited to the grounds for objection set out in the public 
objection and dispute resolution process, and the creation of a special mechanism for 
GAC objections that bypasses the normal objections procedure.  This could be seen as 
further strengthening of governmental claims to special public policy authority within 
the ICANN regime.   
  
Role of the Board 
 
In this policy area, particularly towards the latter stages of the process, the Board has 
not limited its role to simply considering policy proposals developed by other ICANN 
                                                 
581 Email from Maria Häll to Paul White. 11 January 2012 
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bodies for approval. It has, at times, actively intervened and participated in the policy 
development process, most notably over the issue of vertical integration of registries 
and registrars; and to some extent, the final phases of drafting the Applicant 
Guidebook consisted of direct negotiations between the Board and GAC. Such active 
intervention by the Board is arguably not in the spirit of the supposed ‘bottom up’, 
consensus based policy development model and has been criticised from some 
quarters, including the US government582 and the IPC583, as arbitrary and lacking in 
transparency.   
 
The New gTLDs policy proposals have not commanded a complete consensus even at 
Board level. Although the GNSO Final Report was accepted unanimously by the 
Board in June 2008584, approval for the Final Applicant guidebook and 
implementation of the programme was passed on a majority vote in June 2011, with 
thirteen votes in favour, one opposed and two abstentions.585 The opposing Director, 
George Sadowsky, explained his opposition on the grounds that there were ‘still some 
significant and strongly felt differences of opinion between the content of the 
resolution and the views of the GAC and some of its members’ and, while he 
supported the principle of introducing new gTLDs, he felt that the programme should 
not go ahead until such differences had been resolved. He also opposed the way in 
which assistance for developing-world applicants was being handled.586 Similarly, 
Mike Silber abstained due to his belief that there were still significant outstanding 
unresolved issues, and argued that the policy was not being developed ‘based on facts 
and on a bottom-up basis’. Like Sadowsky, he also argued that providing financial 
assistance to a few needy applicants was not the best way to go about addressing the 
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needs of communities in the least developed economies.587 Bruce Tonkin abstained 
due to a conflict of interest.588 
 
Role of ICANN staff 
 
ICANN staff have arguably held a considerable amount of influence over the policy 
development process through their role of creating reports and detailed policy 
implementation documents from the more generalised policy principles supplied by 
bodies such as the GNSO. ICANN staff produced the initial Issues Report in 2005, 
thus setting the initial parameters for discussion. Furthermore, following each Public 
Comments Period, it has been the role of staff to produce summaries of public 
comment and, in doing so, to use their own judgement and discretion to decide what 
to include and what to leave out. Although all of the original comments were available 
to policymakers, some of them would have relied heavily on the summaries to inform 
themselves of the input from public comments.589 Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, ICANN staff drafted the initial DAG and for the most part were 
responsible for producing the text of subsequent redrafts. This involved making 
decisions on certain aspects of policy that were left open by the GNSO in the Final 
Report. For example, it appears to have been staff that selected auctions as the 
contention resolution mechanism, something the GNSO had hinted at but did not 
make a final decision upon.  
 
Roles of other actors 
 
US government  
 
Since the US government still ultimately claims ownership of the DNS root, in the 
final analysis its acquiescence is required for any new TLDs to be added. While there 
has been no suggestion of such consent being refused, it is worth remembering that 
the DoC retains this theoretical power.    
                                                 
587 Ibid 
588 ICANN (2011). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 20 June 2011. Retrieved 23 July 2011,  
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589 This was confirmed by Philip Sheppard, who stated that all participants in the TLDs Committee had 
at least read the syntheses of comments prepared by ICANN staff but only some had taken the time to 
read the original comments in detail. (Telephone interview between author and Phillip Sheppard, 20th 
February 2009)  
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The DoC has, however, provided some fairly strong comments to ICANN over certain 
aspects of new gTLDs policy. On December 18 2008, Meredith A. Baker (Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information) wrote to ICANN590 
expressing concern as to whether some key questions had been properly addressed, 
beginning with the ‘threshold question’ of whether the potential consumer benefits of 
new gTLDs outweighed the potential costs. Baker also urged ICANN to: ensure that 
the introduction of a potentially large number of new gTLDs, including IDN TLDs, 
will not jeopardise the stability and security of the DNS; demonstrate that ICANN has 
sufficient capacity to enforce contract compliance with an as-yet-unknown number of 
new contracting parties; and state how ICANN will conduct legal reviews of 
applications, consider legal objections from third parties, and discharge its 
responsibility to ensure that the process of introducing new gTLDs respects all 
relevant national and international law, including intellectual property rights. 
Furthermore, Baker recommended changes to the proposed DAG including: the 
imposition of registration price caps; introduction of mechanisms for competitive 
bidding between prospective gTLD operators; and introduction of a mechanism that 
provides for the expansion of the gTLD reserved names for technical or infrastructure-
related names. He also criticised the proposed mechanism for morality and public 
order objections, arguing that such matters were outside ICANN’s technical remit and 
more properly addressed by governments. Finally, Baker urged ICANN to articulate a 
clear rationale for the proposed fee structure as well as a transparent mechanism for 
the disposition of any excess revenues.  
 
Baker’s recommendations do not, however, appear to have unduly influenced 
subsequent versions of the DAG. Price caps were not implemented and MAPO 
provisions remained. No rolling mechanism was introduced for the expansion of the 
reserved names list, although this is periodically reviewed by the GNSO. A 
mechanism for competitive bidding between prospective registry operators was 
introduced, but only as a method of last resort if comparative evaluations should fail 
to resolve conflict. Economic and technical studies were, however, carried out 
                                                 
590 Baker, M.A. (2008). Letter from Meredith A. Baker to Peter Dengate Thrush, 18 December 2008. 
Retrieved 23 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/baker-to-dengate-thrush-
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(although the economic studies did not prove satisfactory to the DoC) and some 
attempt was made to propose a rationale for the proposed fee structure.     
 
New gTLDs were specifically mentioned in Article 9.3 of the 2009 Affirmation of 
Commitments between ICANN and the DoC, which commits ICANN to ensure that 
‘as it contemplates expanding the top-level domain space, the various issues that are 
involved (including competition, consumer protection, security, stability and 
resiliency, malicious abuse issues, sovereignty concerns, and rights protection) will be 
adequately addressed prior to implementation.’ It further specifies that, if and when 
new gTLDs have been in operation for one year, ICANN will organise a review; and 
that further reviews will be conducted two years after the first review, and then no less 
frequently than every four years.591  
 
In December 2010, a strongly worded letter was addressed to the ICANN Board by 
the new Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, 
Larry Strickling. 592  It urged that the current version of the DAG (DAG v5) not be 
approved, on the grounds that ICANN still had not published sufficient economic 
analyses; that it had not adequately explained its decision to allow vertical integration 
of registries and registrars; and it had not given sufficient time for the community to 
review the most recent version of the guidebook. Strickling suggested that on the basis 
of the current proposals, ICANN was failing to meet its obligations under the 
Affirmation of Commitments.593  
 
Strickling again raised the issue in his keynote address to the 40th meeting of ICANN 
in March 2011, stating that the Board had still not explained its decision ‘to shift from 
no cross ownership to de minimus cross ownership to full cross ownership over the 
course of a single calendar year’ and also criticising the Board for its failure to publish 
a rationale for its decision on January 25 not to commission any further economic 
studies regarding the impact of new gTLDs. He remarked that these points 
demonstrated that ICANN ‘still has work to do to ensure that decisions made related 
                                                 
591 ICANN  /  US Department of Commerce (2009). Affirmation of Commitments by the United States 
Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Signed 30 
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592Strickling, L.E. (2010). Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling to Rod Beckstrom, 2 December 2010. 
Retrieved 22 July 2011, from   http://news.dot-nxt.com/sites/news.dot-nxt.com/files/strickling-to-
beckstrom-2dec10.pdf  
593 Ibid  
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to the global technical coordination of the DNS are in the public interest and are 
accountable and transparent.’594 At the same ceremony, ICANN CEO Rod Beckstrom 
countered by calling for full ICANN independence.595   
 
Shortly before approval of the gTLD application process in June 2011, James J. 
Tierney on behalf of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) sent a communication to 
ICANN via the DoC, which stated that the decision to remove registry-registrar cross 
ownership restrictions required a ‘more thorough examination’ of the potential harm 
to consumers.  The DoJ did, however, suggest cross-ownership was permissible with 
the smaller top-level domains due to their limited market power, provided that this 
was validated by consultations with stakeholders and independent analysts.596 This 
development did not, however, prevent the Board from approving the new gTLDs 
programme, including the vertical integration provisions, although a decision on 
whether the relaxation of cross-ownership rules would be extended to existing gTLDs 
was deferred, pending further discussions including with competition authorities.597  
 
In summary, the friction between the US government and ICANN on this issue needs 
to be seen in the wider context of ICANN’s push for full independence against an 
apparent residual reluctance on the part of the US government to loosen the final ties. 
To date, the Board does not appear to have been unduly swayed by DoC pressure on 
the new gTLDs issue.  
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European Union  
 
The EU has mostly contributed to the PDP via the GAC and, as of December 2008, 
the European Commission stated its preference for that arrangement.598 Recently, 
however, the issue of vertical integration of registries and registrars prompted the 
Commission to write directly to the Board, expressing concern that the Board’s 
decision to end registry-registrar separation may have negative implications for 
competition. The Commission argued that the principle of vertical separation had 
played a key role in ensuring a level playing field for competition at registrar level, 
and that a move away from this ‘fundamental principle’ was premature given the 
absence of both expert advice based on well-founded empirical analysis of the 
relevant market and consensus among stakeholders.599 The Commission thus appears 
to closely echo the position of the US government on this matter; nonetheless, the 
intervention of these governmental actors did not prevent the Board from signing off 
the new gTLDs policy unaltered a few days later.  
 
CCNSO 
 
Since generic TLDs are obviously outside the remit of the CCNSO, the role of that 
body in the PDP has been peripheral. Nonetheless, the CCNSO did supply some 
comments. Its main concern echoed one of the key concerns of the GAC; namely that 
the division between ccTLD and gTLD namespaces should not be allowed to become 
blurred and ‘meaningful representations’ of country and territory names should not be 
allowed in the gTLD namespace. CCNSO Council Resolution 24-04, adopted in 
October 2007600, urged ICANN to prohibit the introduction of gTLDs consisting of 
the name of a territory listed in ISO 3166-1 or a meaningful abbreviation of it, 
including representation in a non-ASCII script or any recognised language represented 
in that script. The CCNSO Council reiterated this call in December 2008, April 2009, 
                                                 
598 Paulger, G. (2008). Letter from Gregory Paulger to Paul Twomey, 4 December 2008. Retrieved 24 
July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/paulger-to-twomey-04dec08.pdf  
599 Graaf, G. and L. McCallum (2011). Letter from Gerard de Graaf and Linsey McCallum to Rod 
Beckstrom and Peter Dengate Thrush, 17 June 2011.  Retrieved 24 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/eu-to-icann-17jun11-en.pdf  
600 ICANN (2007). Minutes of meeting of the CCNSO Council, 31 October 2007. Retrieved 24 July 
2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/meetings/losangeles/CCNSO-council-minutes-31oct07.pdf   
 138 
and July 2009.601 The CCNSO also submitted comments to the Public Comments 
Periods, particularly on DAG3, reiterating these arguments.602  
 
The CCNSO has also taken part in discussions with the GNSO on the subject of IDN 
TLDs, which is relevant to the IDN aspect of the new gTLDs programme. (See 
Chapter 5 for further details).  
 
RSSAC and SSAC 
 
The primary role played by the RSSAC and SSAC has been to evaluate the potential 
effects of scaling up the root to include thousands or tens of thousands of TLDs. In 
carrying out this responsibility, these two bodies, dominated by the technical 
community, have illustrated their primary function in the ICANN regime; that of 
providing the necessary technical advice to ensure ICANN’s commitment to 
preserving the stability of the DNS is fulfilled. They have not been directly involved 
in the ‘politics’ of new gTLDs policymaking and have shown little evidence of 
promoting any agenda of their own. Their role has been a functional one that reflects 
the type of apolitical technical work some early analysts saw as being ICANN’s 
primary function, but which very often is overshadowed by the ‘political’ aspect of 
policymaking in the present-day regime.    
 
ALAC 
 
The ALAC supplied one member to the New TLDs Committee, Bret Fausett, who 
was a regular attendee. 603 An attempt was made to contact Mr. Fausett in order to 
question him about his role, however he did not respond. 
 
The ALAC’s initial position on the issue was set out in its response to the call for 
‘expert papers’ commenting on the Terms of Reference for New gTLDs set out in the 
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Initial Report.604 The ALAC was supportive of new TLDs and favoured an ongoing 
open application process as opposed to application ‘rounds’. It favoured open, as 
opposed to sponsored TLDs, and questioned whether trademark rights should be 
applicable in every TLD created. It opposed the concept of a reserved names list, 
citing the lack of a common set of standards on cultural, religious, legal and political 
reasons why a given string might not be appropriate for designation as a TLD; instead, 
it advocated case-by-case evaluation of each proposed string on a cost/benefit basis to 
the Internet community. On allocation methods, the ALAC opposed auctions and 
favoured a ‘first-come-first-served approach’. It also expressed a desire to keep 
application fees ‘affordable’ particularly to developing country and non-profit 
applicants. On contractural conditions, the ALAC favoured insertion of a clause into 
the registry contract binding the registry, as ICANN’s designated agent, to act in 
accordance with ICANN’s Bylaws, particularly provisions concerning transparency, 
openness, fairness and independent review. 605    
 
The ALAC’s role in shaping the DAGs appears to have been limited to the submission 
of a few comments. The ALAC submitted a statement to the PCP on DAG v2 which 
was overall supportive of new gTLDs. However, it stated a belief that categorisation 
of new gTLD applications into ‘open’ and ‘community-based’ was inadequate and 
that more than two categories may be necessary to adequately address the diversity of 
stakeholders and potential applicants. It also criticised the proposed fee schedule as a 
‘clear barrier to entry of potential applicants’ and went on to argue that, because of the 
substantial pent-up demand for new gTLDs, it was not reasonable to initially allow 
string allocation to be based on ‘first come, first served’ principles. It went on to 
propose that ICANN should hold one gTLD application round, after which the 
concept of ‘rounds’ should be eliminated and subsequent gTLD applications accepted 
on a rolling ‘first come, first served’ basis. The ALAC further expressed concern that 
the proposed legal rights objection protocol ‘exceeds existing territorial and class-of-
goods limitations contained in current international trademark treaties’. It also called 
for the complete abolition of provisions for objections based on morality and public 
order, and argued that being convicted of a crime, on its own, should not disqualify 
someone from being part of a gTLD application. Most of these recommendations 
                                                 
604 ICANN (2006). Draft ALAC Response Regarding New gTLD Terms of Reference. 31 January 
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were not incorporated into subsequent DAGs, apart from the proposal that the initial 
application process should take the form of an application round of limited 
duration.606  
 
The ALAC’s comments on DAG v5607 were heavily critical, characterising the 
changes as a ‘deliberate step backwards in some areas, away from transparency and 
accountability and towards secrecy and arbitrary action.’ It focused particularly on 
three areas: Dispute Resolution; Applicant Support; and the Independent Objector. On 
the matter of dispute resolution, the ALAC reiterated that morality and public order 
objections should be dropped. On applicant support, the ALAC maintained that the 
recommendations of the Joint Applicant Support (JAS) working group, a joint GNSO 
/ ALAC initiative, should be given more consideration by the Board.  On the matter of 
the Independent Objector, the ALAC argued that ‘critical safeguards of the public 
interest’ had either been removed or left out, and that the IO had been ‘re‐architected 
as a tool to allow the introduction of anonymous, unaccountable, opaque objections.’ 
The ALAC recommended that the role of the IO must be eliminated completely as 
there was too much potential for misuse.608 
 
Again, the ALAC was not successful in achieving most of these aims, although the 
final Applicant Guidebook did state that ICANN will allocate funds to the ALAC to 
pay for some Objection Fees. 
 
In the PCP on DAG v1, Danny Younger (an online journalist and former member of 
the DNSO General Assembly), criticised the ALAC as merely a ‘think tank’ in which 
just a few select individuals make statements on behalf of the worldwide user 
community, instead of its intended role as ‘a coordination point that facilitated an 
upward flow of input from grassroots communities on issues within ICANN's remit 
that were of concern to individual Internet users.’609 Responding to Younger’s 
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criticisms, Cheryl Langdon-Orr on behalf of the ALAC stated that the organisation 
aimed to engage with the RALOs on the issue of new gTLDs and ‘get REAL 
Regional input’.610 
 
In order to further investigate the extent to which ALAC advice on new gTLDs had in 
fact been based on grass-roots user input, Ms. Langdon-Orr was contacted by the 
author. After she had responded to the initial email agreeing to assist611, she was asked 
directly to what extent the ALAC’s advice on this matter was based on grass-roots 
input and how such input was gathered. She did not respond to this question. The 
same question was also put to current ALAC chair Olivier Crépin-Leblond; he 
likewise did not respond.  
 
Overall, the ALAC's apparent influence in this PDP appears to have been fairly 
limited, and the extent to which it represented the worldwide user community 
questionable.  
 
Conclusions to Chapter 4 
 
Summary and analysis of key patterns  
 
The New gTLDs policy development process has proved controversial throughout its 
course. The very principle of adding new gTLDs in large numbers cannot truly be 
called a ‘consensus policy’ since it has met with considerable opposition, though it 
should be remembered that majority opinion always appears to have been in favour of 
expanding the gTLD space and that outright opposition appears to have largely 
(though not completely) melted away towards the end of the process. Many of the 
details of policy, however, have been more controversial. Given the range of interests 
involved and viewpoints expressed, it was inevitable that there would be winners and 
losers. No single stakeholder group has been wholly successful in achieving all of its 
aims, but some have had more influence than others.   
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The three most important groups of actors have been the GNSO constituencies, 
governments through the GAC, and intellectual property interests (together with 
ICANN staff and the Board itself). The GNSO constituencies (most of which 
represent commercial interests) were the most important actors in the initial stages of 
policy development up to and including the Final Report. The Report, which was 
endorsed by all six constituencies, set the broad parameters of new gTLDs policy; 
however, some important details of policy were later modified in the DAGs, not 
always to the satisfaction of all the GNSO constituencies. The extent to which policy 
development was taken out of the GNSO’s hands after 2007-08 seems, to some 
extent, to undermine the model of policymaking in a given area being chiefly the 
responsibility of the relevant Supporting Organisation.  
 
Governments, as represented through the GAC, have likewise had a strong influence 
on policy. The ability of the GAC members to come to a united position on this 
complex and controversial issue is notable, taking into account the nature of GAC 
members as representatives of a very diverse set of governments. As suggested by 
Andrew Maurer612 and Maria Häll’s613 comments, there appear to have been some 
differences among GAC members on matters such as the importance attached to the 
geographic names issue, but the GAC nonetheless presented a united front in arguing 
that these matters should be left to sovereign governments to decide. 
 
As shown, the GAC was successful in getting most of its concerns addressed, 
although there were a few areas where GAC advice was not implemented. There were 
some important concessions to the principle of state sovereignty, particularly with 
regards to geographical names, but also with the adoption of a mechanism allowing 
governments to object to any given application separate from the main public 
objections procedure, without limitation on grounds for objection and without the fees 
normally payable for an objection proceeding. It remains to be seen how this 
mechanism will operate in practice, but the effect may be to give governments 
something like a veto over any applications they find unacceptable, in addition to the 
effective veto they have been granted over geographical names. The course of events 
has also demonstrated the reluctance of the Board to come into open conflict with the 
GAC. The GAC’s threat to formally invoke the Bylaw provisions regarding non-
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acceptance of GAC advice seems to have strengthened its negotiating position very 
considerably. 
 
By contrast, the ‘global Internet using public’ has had very little real influence, and 
indeed participated only to a very limited extent. The public comments periods were 
largely dominated by interested parties, especially commercial interests. The role of 
the ALAC was also very limited, and in any case it is questionable just how far that 
body really represents the ‘public at large’.  
 
For intellectual property interests, the final outcome was something of a mixed result. 
Evidence from the public comments periods, and also from the initial statements of 
the IPC, suggests that a substantial element of the intellectual property lobby would 
have preferred no new gTLDs at all, while others favoured a limited introduction only 
of mainly sponsored and IDN TLDs. Obviously, they failed to achieve their aims in 
this regard. However, there were some major concessions to trademark interests in the 
final iteration of the DAG. These included: the Trademark Clearinghouse; WHOIS 
requirements; the Post-Delegation Disputes Resolution Process ; the Uniform Rapid 
Suspension system; mandatory sunrise periods; legal rights objections; mandatory 
post-launch intellectual property claims procedure; and automatic rejection of 
applications from ‘habitual’ cybersquatters. Despite all of this, however, in the last 
two PDPs on DAGs 5 and 6, 27.5% of posters, mostly representing trademark owners, 
were still not satisfied with the level of trademark protection.  
 
Prospective new registries, many of which were also commercial interests, were 
obviously some of the biggest winners out of the process, in that they will finally have 
an opportunity to move forward with their business plan. Of course, not all groups 
wishing to obtain a TLD are commercial interests, and some of the potential 
‘community’ applicants may be priced out of the market by the level of fees. 
Similarly, the fees could be a major barrier to a small business startup. Groups with 
substantial financial resources are realistically in the best position to get a TLD, and in 
this sense the policy favours existing businesses. The relaxation of vertical integration 
rules (assuming this is not reversed) will be a major business opportunity for some of 
the registrars to expand their operations into the registry market.  
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The role played by ICANN staff should also be noted. Although, overall, staff have 
not been left to decide so many details of policy as was the case in the 2000 new 
gTLDs round, their influence has still been significant. The case study has also 
demonstrated that the Board’s role in policymaking can extend in practice beyond the 
simple approval or non-approval of policy proposals developed by other ICANN 
bodies. The Board has intervened directly in developing some aspects of New gTLDs 
policy, particularly with regard to vertical integration. This undermines the notion of a 
wholly ‘bottom-up’ policy development model.   
 
 Conclusions 
 
The new gTLDs case study offers a convincing demonstration that ICANN deals with 
issues of public policy, refuting any view of the organisation as a mere apolitical 
technical co-ordinator. New gTLDs policy affects numerous and often competing 
interests. It has implications for intellectual property rights and issues of freedom of 
expression. It has major implications for the gTLD registry market and issues of 
competition. ICANN’s decisions as to how many gTLDs will be added and the 
selection and allocation criteria for those TLDs affects how many registrars there can 
be in the market and who will and will not be allowed to set up business as a registrar. 
New gTLDs policy also impacts upon issues of identity for organisations and other 
entities such as cities, subnational territories and cultural groups. So far only one 
cultural group has its own TLD (.cat, representing the Catalan community); ICANN’s 
new gTLDs policy affects whether other cultural groups will be allowed to follow 
suit, which ones will be allowed to have a TLD and which ones will be excluded. 
Such issues are often contentious, and in deciding between them ICANN is clearly 
making public policy.  Where competing interests and views are involved, there will 
inevitably be winners and losers. The evidence from this case study strongly supports 
Weinberg’s contention614 that the issues dealt with by ICANN are not amenable to 
resolution by consensus.  
 
Furthermore, the gTLDs study has demonstrated the limitations of the concept of 
policy development on the basis of broad-based, ‘bottom up’ participation by the 
Internet stakeholder community, particularly the claim that the general Internet-using 
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public has any meaningful influence on policy. The initial phase of the policy 
development process was effectively in the hands of the GNSO constituencies; and 
despite the theory of broad-based 'bottom up' policymaking, the GNSO actually has a 
fairly closed policymaking procedure, where only a small elite (of dubious 
accountability and representing mainly commercial interests) actually make policy, 
though the wider public get the opportunity to voice an opinion. In the latter phase of 
policymaking, during the drafting of the Applicant Guidebook, a few other groups 
appear to have gained considerable influence over the final shape of policy, most 
notably governments through the GAC and – judging by the number of concessions 
made on trademark protection - the intellectual property lobby. Nonetheless, the range 
of groups that had substantial real influence was ultimately limited to a few powerful 
commercial and governmental interests. At best, the process could be described as 
policymaking through ‘narrow multistakeholderism’ rather than truly ‘broad 
multistakeholderism’.   
 
All of this tends to suggest that the initial, perhaps idealistic, vision for ICANN as a 
governance system based on broad-based fair representation for all affected parties 
and consensus-based decisionmaking, may have been overtaken by economic and 
political realities. The result appears to be a system where a few groups and entities, 
those with real leverage through political, economic or positional power, hold the real 
influence, and ICANN policymaking in practice is largely a matter of finding a 
mutually acceptable working compromise between these groups. 
 
The strong influence held by governments in this policy development area could be 
used to lend some weight to a statist interpretation of ICANN, as put forward by 
writers such as Drezner. 615 However, it is clear that governments were not the only 
actors of significance and were not able to get their own way on every point of policy. 
Similarly, the evidence would not support a simplistic ‘corporate capture’ model, 
since the influence of corporate actors was balanced by that of governments; in any 
case, there was no single ‘commercial interest’; commercial actors of various types 
(from both the ‘supply side’ and the ‘consumer side’ of the domain name industry) 
often had competing interests (for example, the desires of registries and registrars for 
large scale gTLD expansion versus the desires of intellectual property interests to 
                                                 
615 Drezner, D. W. (2007). All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, PP113-117 
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limit the extent of expansion). To some degree, the evidence would support the notion 
of policymaking via a ‘public-private partnership’, but also suggests that 
governmental and private actors (as well as various different types of private actor) 
are to a significant extent rivals for influence in the ICANN system rather than wholly 
co-operative partners.  
 
The New gTLDs case study also provides a good demonstration that some of 
ICANN’s norms remain in flux and are being tested and redefined through the 
ongoing interactions of policy development. One good example of this is the debate 
surrounding the proposed abolition of rules prohibiting vertical integration of 
registries and registrars, something that has been an ICANN ‘norm’ since the 
organisation’s early days. Its abolition would be of benefit to the registrars but has 
been opposed by some governments, including some fairly strong reaction from the 
US DoC and the European Commission.Note 4_7 Another example of this ongoing 
evolution of norms concerns the relationship between the GAC and Board; such as the 
dispute that developed between the two over the provisions in the Bylaws pertaining 
to GAC advice and whether these are applicable to ‘operational’ matters. 
 
The next stage of the investigation is to ascertain the extent to which these patterns are 
mirrored in other areas of ICANN policy development. The next chapter will examine 
a quite different policy development area (though one with a certain degree of overlap 
with New gTLDs), namely policy relating to the implementation of Internationalised 
Domain Names, or IDNs.   
  
                                                 
Note 4_7 The GAC does not appear to have taken a formal position for or against permitting registry-
registrar cross-ownership, except to note that governments tend to support restrictions on vertical 
integration but also recognising some potential benefits. The GAC did, however, criticise the Board for 
taking an arbitrary decision on the matter in what the GAC saw as a non-transparent fashion. See 
ICANN (2011). ICANN Board- GAC Consultation: Registry – Registrar Separation. 21 Februarry 
2011. Retrieved 27 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-board-registry-
registrar-separation-21feb11-en.pdf 
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Chapter 5 
Policy Development Case Study Two: 
Internationalised Domain Names 
 
Introduction  
 
Overview 
 
Following on from the New gTLDs study, this chapter will investigate an equally 
topical policy development area, the deployment of Internationalised Domain Names 
(IDNs). The term ‘Internationalised Domain Names’ refers to technologies designed 
to allow representation of domain names in characters other than the Latin script (for 
example Cyrillic, Arabic or Chinese). Such technologies were first proposed in the 
1990s, and a definitive technical standard was published by the IETF in 2003. For 
much of its existence, ICANN has been developing policy pertaining to the 
implementation of IDN technology in the live DNS environment, initially at the 
second level of the domain name hierarchy and later at the top level.   
 
This chapter will explore the history and current state of ICANN’s IDN policy 
development process. As with the gTLDs study, the aim of the chapter is to explore 
the range of actors involved in the PDP, the roles they played, and the relative degree 
of influence held by each actor or actor type over the final policy outcomes. The 
answers to these questions will help to determine which of the organisational models 
explored in Chapter 3 are best reflected in ICANN’s actual policymaking processes.  
 
IDNs-concept and history  
 
The original architecture of the Domain Name System is based around ASCII 
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange) and thus utilises the Latin 
character set to represent domain names. This can be disadvantageous for users 
educated in a different script, such as Cyrillic, Chinese or Arabic, for whom Latin 
characters may be alien. As the Internet diffused to non-English speaking countries, 
many national governments and ccTLD registries began to advocate a system of 
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multilingual or internationalised domain names, which would allow, for example, 
Russian or Chinese domain names to be written in their own native scripts. Such a 
system would ease accessibility problems for people unfamiliar with Latin characters, 
thus reducing the global ‘digital divide’ and broadening the reach of the Internet.    
 
The concept of internationalised domain names predates ICANN by some years. In 
the 1990s, academic research explored the technical feasibility of creating some 
mechanism to allow non-Latin character sets to be automatically converted to and 
from ASCII equivalents, allowing these character sets to be supported without having 
to fundamentally redesign the existing DNS. The first steps towards an IDN solution 
included Martin Duerst’s Internet Draft at the University of Zürich in December 
1996,616 which specified a method for character set conversion in the context of 
domain names. In March 1998, the first operational IDN testbed was created at the 
National University of Singapore by a team led by Tan Tin Wee and Leong Kok 
Yong. 617 Other testbeds followed, run by organisations such as the Asia Pacific 
Networking Group (APNG), formed in July 1998.618 These experiments involved not 
only academic teams but also registry operators, particularly the country-code 
registries of Singapore, Taiwan, China, Japan and South Korea619. By 2000, there 
were more than ten multilingual testbeds run by groups such as iDNS 
(Internationalisation of the Domain Name System) and MINC (Multilingual Internet 
Names Consortium).  All of these experiments worked with IDNs at the second-level 
only; that is, top-level domain labels (such as .jp or .cn) still had to be supplied in 
ASCII, but subdomains under these TLDs could be expressed in the relevant native 
script. There was still no single agreed standard for IDNs at this time. An IETF IDN 
Working Group was formed in January 2000, chaired by James Seng and Mark 
Blanchet. This group eventually produced the IDNA (Internationalising Domain 
                                                 
616 Duerst, M. (1996). Internet Draft: ‘Internationalisation of Domain Names.’ Retrieved 8 January, 
2009, from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-duerst-dns-i18n-00. 
617MINC (2011). “History of MINC.” Retrieved 18 June 2011, from  
http://www.minc.org/site_content.aspx?page_key=about_History_of_MINC&lang=en  
618 Wee, T. T. (2001). “National and Regional Approaches to Multilingual Internet Names: Asia Pacific 
Perspective.” Multilingual Domain Names: Joint ITU / WIPO Symposium. Geneva, ITU. Retrieved 5 
May 2009, from http://www.itu.int/mlds/presentations/dayone/tan2.ppt  
619 For example, in 1999 an IDN Testbed was launched under the auspices of APNG with participation 
from CNNIC, JPNIC, KRNIC, TWNIC, THNIC, HKNIC and SGNIC. See MINC (2011), “iDOMAIN 
TestBed of iDNS implementations in the Asia Pacific.” Retrieved 21 August 2011, from 
http://www.minc.org/site_content.aspx?page_key=idomain_testBed_of_idns&lang=en  See also 
Subbiah, S. (2007). “History of Internationalised Domain Names.” Retrieved 30 July 2011, from 
http://www.domainname.com.ua/history-Internationalised-domain-names.php.   
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Names in Applications) standard in 2002,620 which became the basis of subsequent 
IDN implementations.    
  
Meanwhile, NSI/VeriSign, the largest registry with control of the .com, .net and .org 
namespaces, announced a test programme in August 2000 that would allow 
registration of second-level IDN domain names under.com, .net and .org.621 Though 
described as a testbed, critics saw VeriSign’s action as a commercial venture in 
another guise. VeriSign was accused of offering commercial IDN registrations before 
the IETF standard was ready and trying to capture the market prematurely.622  
 
ICANN was not deeply engaged in these early IDN developments; however, the 
testbed programmes proved the technical feasibility of IDNs and put the issue on the 
agenda. In September 2000, in an announcement regarding VeriSign’s testbed, the 
ICANN Board made its first official recognition of the importance of IDNs for 
improving Internet accessibility for users of non-Latin scripts.623  Following this, 
ICANN began to examine the issue and ultimately to develop policy for IDN 
implementation in the live DNS environment. Up to 2005, ICANN’s work on IDNs, 
like the early testbeds, centred around second-level domains. However, from 2005, 
policy was being developed on IDN top-level domains, and this has cross-links with 
the New gTLDs programme.  
 
Technology and standards 
 
In early discussions regarding development of a standard, there had been some debate 
as to whether conversions between native scripts and the ASCII DNS system should 
be dealt with at DNS server level, or by software residing on the user’s own computer. 
The IETF elected to develop a client-side solution, where non-ASCII domain names 
would be converted to a suitable ASCII-based form by web browsers and other 
applications residing on the user’s computer. In 2002 the IETF specified a standard 
                                                 
620 IETF (2011). “IDN Status Pages: Internationalized Domain Name (Concluded WG).” Retrieved 20 
August 2011, from http://tools.ietf.org/wg/idn/ 
621 ICANN (2000). Announcement: ‘ICANN Comment on NSI Registry Multilingual Domain Name 
Testbed’. 25 August 2000. Retrieved 28 May, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/comment-25aug00.htm  
622 See issues raised at ICANN’s first Public Comments Period on IDNs, available at 
http://forum.icann.org/idn1 Retrieved 7 August 2011.  
623 ICANN (2000). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 25 September 2000. Retrieved 4 January 
2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-25sep00.htm  
 150 
for IDNs, known as IDNA (Internationalised Domain Names in Applications), 
documented in RFCs 3490, 3491 and 3492.624 Note_5.1 Since that time, ICANN and all 
other major players have recognised IDNA as the authoritative standard for the 
implementation of IDNs. 
 
Some fundamental issues 
 
Since the beginning of the IDN development process, certain inherent problems have 
been repeatedly cited.   
It was recognised early on that IDN technology could potentially be misused by 
website spoofers and cybersquatters. This is because different characters in different 
scripts can look the same, depending on the font used. For example, Unicode 
character 0430, Cyrillic lowercase letter a, can look identical to Unicode character 
0061, Latin lowercase letter a. Thus, an internationalised domain name utilising a 
mixture of Latin and Cyrillic characters could be made to appear to the user visually 
identical to an existing ASCII domain name, but pointing to a different website. This 
phenomenon potentially opens users up to phishing attacks and also has implications 
for trademark rights. Finding some means to deal with this issue has been one of the 
key policy concerns surrounding IDNs from the start of the process.  
Other difficulties, technical, linguistic and political, arise from the task of defining 
and codifying a language or script. For example, if a language is spoken across more 
than one state, there may be no agreement on how to define that language. This 
                                                 
624 ISOC (2003). Request For Comments: 3490, 3491 and 3492. March 2003, Retrieved 12 August 
2011, from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3490.txt; http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3491.txt; 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3492.txt  
 
Note_5.1 An IDNA-enabled application is able to convert between the ASCII and non-ASCII 
representations of a domain, using the ASCII form ‘behind the scenes’ for DNS lookup but being able 
to present the non-ASCII form to users. The conversions between ASCII and non-ASCII forms of a 
domain name are carried out by algorithms called ToASCII and ToUnicode. These algorithms are 
applied separately to each ‘label’ in the domain name, a label being one element of the domain name 
(excluding dots); for example the domain name www.microsoft.com contains the labels www, 
microsoft, and com. When presented with a label containing at least one non-ASCII character, 
ToASCII will translate the label to ASCII using Punycode (an encoding syntax by which a Unicode 
string of characters can be translated into ASCII, specified in RFC 3492). After translation of the label 
to ASCII, ToUnicode prepends the label with the 4-character string "xn--"., known as the ACE (ASCII 
Compatible Encoding) prefix, which is used to distinguish Punycode-encoded labels from ordinary 
ASCII labels. ToUnicode reverses the action of ToASCII, stripping off the ACE prefix and applying 
the Punycode decode algorithm. (See RFCs 3490, 3491 and 3492, retrieved 20 August 2011, from 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3490 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3491  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3492)   
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problem is particularly difficult with regard to gTLDs, as ccTLD operators could use 
their own codification within their own namespace, but a French (for example) IDN 
gTLD would be aimed at French speakers throughout the world, which may become a 
problem if, for example, French and French Canadian authorities could not agree on 
how to define the French language. With regard to minority languages, there may in 
some cases be political sensitivities regarding their recognition. Such issues have been 
among the public policy challenges to be overcome in the development of IDNs 
policy.  
 
ICANN and IDN policy development: summary of events  
 
Second-level IDNs 
 
The first ICANN Board discussions on IDNs took place on September 25th, 2000, 
prompted by the VeriSign testbed.625 Following discussion, the Board passed a series 
of resolutions recognising a need for the DNS to evolve to be more accessible to those 
who did not use the ASCII character set, and stating that internationalisation of the 
DNS ‘must be accomplished through standards that are open, non-proprietary, and 
fully compatible with the Internet's existing end-to-end model and that preserve 
globally unique naming in a universally resolvable public name space’.  626  The Board 
called on VeriSign to consult closely with the IETF and IAB concerning the design 
and implementation of the testbed, with the goal that the testbed ‘should promote, 
rather than complicate, technical standardisation efforts in this area’ and to ‘conduct 
the testbed in full compliance with its agreements with ICANN, including by 
providing equivalent access within the testbed to all ICANN-accredited registrars that 
meet reasonable technical-qualification’. 627   
 
In November 2000 at ICANN’s annual meeting at Marina del Rey, California, the first 
of a series of Workshops on IDNs was held. 628 This was followed by the first Public 
                                                 
625 ICANN (2000). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 25 November 2000. Retrieved 10 August 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-25sep00.htm  
626 ICANN (2000). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 25 September 2000. Retrieved 4 January 
2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-25sep00.htm  
627 Ibid 
628 ICANN (2000). ICANN meetings in Marina Del Ray. 13-16 November 2000. Meeting schedule. 
Retrieved 23 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/mdr2000/   
 152 
Comments Period on IDNs (February – March 2001).629 ICANN’s Melbourne 
meeting (9th-13th March 2001) saw the first statements from the DNSO and the GAC 
on the issue; the DNSO presented a business plan calling for the establishment of a 
task force to develop consensus policies for IDN implementation630, while the GAC 
produced an initial statement identifying public policy areas relevant to the issue-
area.631  (See Appendix 5.1.A) The Board meeting at Melbourne recognised both of 
these developments, and also noted that the RSSAC had begun discussions on the 
possible implications of these efforts for the operation of the root servers.  It then set 
up a Working Group of Directors on IDNs to research the issues further.632  
 
At the following meeting in Stockholm (June 2001), the GAC produced its initial nine 
Principles on IDNs (See Appendix 5.1.B). The Board Working Group presented its 
Final Report on 9th September 2001.633 It recommended that ICANN should begin 
considering IDN policy issues on the assumption that the IETF would adopt a 
standard in the near future. A number of issues for further study were also 
identified.Note_5.2 It further recommended that the Board charter a steering committee 
to study these policy areas and provide it with recommendations. 634  
In response to the Working Group Report, the Board created an IDN Committee, 
chaired by Masanobu Katoh, and including Board members as well as representatives 
from the Supporting Organisations and the GAC.635 The IDN Committee was 
intended to serve as a general co-ordinating body for work on IDN policy issues and 
to produce recommendations for Board consideration. It began work in November 
                                                 
629 ICANN (2004). Public Comment Forum: Introduction of Internationalised Domain Names. 
Retrieved 25 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/idn1/  
630 ICANN (2001). Business Plan for the DNSO Names Council 2001-2002. Retrieved 4 February, 
2009, from http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/2001-02.NCbusinessplan.html    
631 ICANN (2001). GAC Communiqué VIII-Melbourne, 10 March 2001. Retrieved January 6, 2009, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/communique-10mar01.htm  
632 ICANN (2001). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 13 March 2001.  Retrieved 9 February, 
2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-13mar01.htm  
633 ICANN (2001). Report of the Internationalized Domain Names Internal Working Group of the 
ICANN Board of Directors. Retrieved 18 May, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/final-report-28aug01.htm  
Note_5.2 These included whether to introduce IDN TLDs in only the ccTLD market or to have IDN 
gTLDs; prevention of cybersquatting and resolution of trademark disputes in IDN environments; the 
application of principles of competition, market access, consumer protection, and intellectual property 
protection; and interoperability of the present and future Internet, including the use of testbeds. 
634 ICANN (2001). Report of the Internationalized Domain Names Internal Working Group of the 
ICANN Board of Directors. Retrieved 18 May, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/final-report-28aug01.htm  
635 ICANN (2001). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 10 September 2001. Retrieved 2 February, 
2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-10sep01.htm  
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2001 and presented its Final Report to the Board on 27 June 2002.636 This report did 
not make any specific policy proposals, but recommended that the ICANN Board 
should continue to take a ‘conservative approach’ to IDN policy issues and also 
recommended that ongoing policy development should be facilitated by the 
establishment of an ‘Expert Group’ that would serve as a ‘general advisory body’on 
IDN issues. In response, the Board stated that it had ‘begun consideration of the 
substance and implications of the IDN Committee's papers and final report’ but was 
‘not yet prepared to determine its next steps in this area.’637 The Board also delayed 
formal termination of the IDN Committee until the October ICANN meeting in 
Shanghai, so that the Committee would remain available to monitor developments, 
review community feedback and advise the Board as needed.638  
At Shanghai (31st October 2002), the Board further extended the life of the IDN 
Committee until the 2002 Annual Meeting.639  At that meeting (15th December 
2002)640 the Committee was further extended for an additional two years, with an 
additional committee, known as the President's IDN Registry Implementation 
Committee, being created  “to consider and exchange information on ways to resolve 
the issues associated with implementation of IDN capabilities in existing top level 
domains”. This body was to be composed of interested registries, registrars, and 
technical experts.641 
In March 2003, the IETF produced the long-awaited IDNA standard with the 
publication of RFCs 3490, 3491 and 3492.  This left ICANN with the task of 
producing an implementation strategy, which would take the form of ‘guidelines’ for 
registries to follow in implementing IDN second-level domains under their 
namespaces. The first draft of these guidelines was produced by the IDNs Committee 
shortly afterwards and published in a Topic Paper for public comment642 and 
                                                 
636 ICANN (2002). Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee: Final Report to the ICANN 
Board. 27 June 2002. Retrieved 8 January, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/final-
report-27jun02.htm  
637 ICANN (2002). Preliminary Report: ICANN Meeting in Bucharest. 28 June 2002. Retrieved 12 
May, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/prelim-report-28jun02.htm. 
638 Ibid 
639 ICANN (2002). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 31 October 2002. Retrieved April 11, 
2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-31oct02.htm  
640 ICANN (2002). Minutes of fourth annual meeting of the Board. 15 December 2002. Retrieved 19 
January, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-annual-meeting-15dec02.htm  
641 Ibid 
642ICANN (2003). Submissions to the IDN Comments Forum. Retrieved 20 January 2009, from 
http://forum.icann.org/riodejaneiro/idn-comments/general/index.html  
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discussion at the ICANN meeting in Rio de Janeiro (26 March 2003).643 VeriSign was 
initially hostile to the proposed IDN Guidelines, arguing that they should not be 
mandatory and that ICANN was proposing to supplement the IETF standard with new 
conditions that significantly exceeded the scope of that standard.644 VeriSign were to 
some degree supported by the representative of the Japanese ccTLD manager, 
NaoMasa Marayuma (JPNIC), who argued that all guidelines apart from point 1 
should be recommendations, not mandatory.645  
Following further refinement, a finalised version of the Guidelines was unanimously 
endorsed by the ICANN Board on 27th March 2003.646 (See Appendix 5.2.A). This 
marked the ‘official’ implementation of IDN second level domains in the ICANN 
system. The Guidelines were initially adopted by the registries for  .cn, .info, .jp, .org, 
and .tw, making these the first TLDs to ‘officially’ offer IDN registrations (as 
opposed to a ‘testbed’).647  In February 2004, the Board approved a set of procedures 
put forward by PIR (.org operator) and VeriSign for migration of their testbed 
registrations to the IETF standard. 648 This was a significant victory for VeriSign, who 
were allowed to retain their ‘testbed’ registrations into the commercial IDN 
environment. However, not all registries that participated in the IDN testbed elected to 
continue supporting IDN registrations after the migration to the new standard. 
Although IDNs had now been officially implemented at the second level of the DNS 
hierarchy, discussions continued on the issue, including proposals for modifying the 
Guidelines and the question of IDN TLDs. A series of IDN Workshops provided one 
of the main forums for discussion. These workshops did include representatives from 
                                                 
643 ICANN (2003). Rio de Janeiro Meeting Topic: Internationalized Domain Names. 13 March 2003. 
Retrieved 20 January 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/riodejaneiro/idn-topic.htm 
644 Lynn, S. (2003).  'VeriSign's Response to ICANN's IDN Proposal.' 21 Mar 2003. Comment posted 
on ICANN Rio de Janerio public comments forum on internationalised domain names. Retrieved 5 
September 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/riodejaneiro/idn-comments/general/msg00002.html  
645 Maruyama, N. (2003). ‘Comments from NaoMasa Maruyama, Japan Network Information Center 
(JPNIC) on proposed IDN Guidelines.’ 26 March 2003. Comment posted on ICANN Rio de Janerio 
public comments forum on internationalised domain names. Retrieved 5 September 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/riodejaneiro/idn-comments/general/msg00006.html  
646 ICANN (2003). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 27 March 2003. Retrieved 4 May, 2009, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-27mar03.htm#InternationalizedDomainNames. 
647 ICANN (2003). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Version 
1.0. 20 June 2003. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-
20jun03.htm  
648 ICANN (2004). Preliminary Report: Special Meeting of the Board. 18 February 2004. Retrieved 9 
March, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/prelim-report-18feb04.htm#item3  
Also see ICANN (2004). Advisory: ‘Internationalized Domain Names (IDN): Implementation Update: 
20 February 2004’. Retrieved 23 March, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/advisory-
20feb04.htm 
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various stakeholders but predominantly from the domain name supply side. Following 
the Luxembourg ICANN meeting, a working group of registries with IDN experience 
was formed to work on a revision of the guidelines, to be put forth for public 
comment.649 The draft revised Guidelines650 (see Appendix 5.2.B) were offered for 
public comment 30 days from 20 September 2005.651 On 4th November, the 
Guidelines for Implementation of IDNs version 2.0652 were posted as final following 
Board approval on 8th November.653 There were some relatively minor changes, 
mostly to wording, but the underlying policy remained substantively unchanged 
compared to the draft. (See Appendix 5.2.C). 
 
On 8 November 2005, the Board passed a resolution tasking the IDN Working Group 
to continue its work and return to the Board with specific IDN improvement 
recommendations before the ICANN Meeting in Morocco (June 2006).654 The 
Working Group responded by producing another amended set of Guidelines, 
numbered version 2.1.655 (See Appendix 5.2.D). The proposed amendments were 
limited to the addition of an additional Guideline 9, which set a new technical 
condition.  
IDN TLDs 
The next phase in IDN implementation concerned development of a strategy for IDN 
deployment in top-level domains. Dialogue on the potential for IDN TLDs took place 
in IDN Workshops held at successive ICANN meetings, which seem to have acted as 
a forum bringing together a wide range of stakeholders including the registries and 
registrars, software vendors, the technical community, At-Large groups and even 
UNESCO. (See Appendix 5.3.)  
                                                 
649 ICANN (2005). Announcement: ‘Draft Revised IDN Guidelines: Public Comment Period: 20 
September 2005.’ Retrieved 14 March, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-20sep05-en.htm  
650ICANN (2005). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Draft 
Version 2.0. 20 September 2005. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-
guidelines-20sep05.htm  
651 ICANN (2007). IDN Guidelines Public Comments Forum (archived). Retrieved 3 July 2009, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-guidelines 
652 ICANN (2005). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Version 
2.0. 8 November 2005. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-
guidelines-14nov05.htm  
653 ICANN (2005). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 8 November 2005. Retrieved 4 July 2009, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-08nov05.htm   
654 Ibid 
655 Guidelines for Implementation of IDNs, version 2.1. 22 February 2006.  Retrieved 6 July 2009, from 
at http://www.icann.org/topics/idn/implementation-guidelines.htm  
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In May 2006, the GNSO requested that ICANN staff produce a preliminary Issues 
Report regarding the implementation of IDNs into the root zone of the DNS. The 
Issues Report identified several issues for discussion related to the implementation of 
top-level IDNs, which were very similar to those identified in the issues report for 
new gTLDs (December 2005).656 These included selection criteria, allocation methods 
and contractual criteria. Among other matters, the issue of whether entities other than 
the existing TLD registry should be allowed to run an IDN equivalent of that TLD 
was raised as an issue.  The Issues Report went on to recommend that the GNSO 
launch a policy development process on these issues, in cooperation with the CCNSO 
(on the ccTLD aspects) and the GAC (on the public policy aspects), as well as in 
‘close consultation with the broader ICANN community’.657 In response, the GNSO 
Council established a joint working group in coordination with the CCNSO to 
‘analyse, prioritise, and select issues for further policy development’.658  
 
In October 2006, the IETF began to revise the original IDNA standards in line with 
the latest version of Unicode (version 5.0).659 The basic framework for discussion was 
published as RFC 4690, which highlighted a number of issues including: language 
specific character issues where the same script is used across different languages; 
issues related to cases where languages can be expressed by using more than one 
script, bi-directional cases; and the question of visually confusing characters. Of 
particular importance, the IETF also would determine the ‘inclusion list’ of characters 
that could be used for IDN TLD in the DNS. This was a very significant development 
in that what had been a controversial issue (deciding which characters / code points 
would be permissible) was effectively taken out of ICANN’s hands.  
 
In March 2007, the GNSO IDN Working Group produced its Outcomes Report.660 
This identified seven issue areas to be prioritised for discussion: 
                                                 
656 ICANN (2006). GNSO Preliminary Issues Report: “Policy Issues relating to IDN at the top-level: 28 
May 2006.” Retrieved 18 February 2009, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/idn-tlds/issues-report-
28may06.htm  
657 Ibid 
658 Ibid 
659 ICANN (2006). Announcement: ‘IDNA Protocol Review and Proposals for Changes: 31 October 
2006’. Retrieved 14 May, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-
31oct06.htm  
660 ICANN (2007). Outcomes Report of the GNSO IDN WG, Version 3.1, 22 March 2007. Retrieved 
28 March, 2009, from 
https://st.icann.org/data/workspaces/alac/attachments/lisbon_documents:20070322133647-0-
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• Aspects on introduction of IDN gTLDs in relation to new non-IDN gTLDs 
• IDN aspects on Geo-Political Details 
• Aspects relating to existing gTLD strings and existing IDN SLDs 
• Aspects relating to existing SLD Domain Name Holders 
• Specific Techno-Policy Details relating to IDN gTLDs 
• Particular IDN aspects relating to Privacy & Whois Details 
• IDN aspects on Legal Details 
 
The last two topics were accorded a lower priority and were only discussed initially 
by the Working Group. The Report went on to set out some ‘areas of agreement’ 
where the Working Group had achieved rough consensus under these headings, and 
also ‘areas of support’ where debate still existed. On the matter of priority rights for 
existing gTLD operators, the report noted agreement among the Working Group that 
priority rights for new strings did not derive from existing strings.   
 
In May 2007, ICANN published another modified draft of the IDN Guidelines for 
public comment. This draft was the first version of the IDN Guidelines to make 
specific reference to IDNs in top-level labels.661 (See Appendix 5.2.E). The draft was 
the work of the same group (comprised of ccTLD and gTLD registries) that produced 
version 2.1 of the Guidelines.   
 
Extensive technical testing was carried out to ensure that there would be no 
unexpected adverse effects in deploying IDN TLDs. In October 2006, ICANN entered 
into a contract with Autonomica AB, a Swedish company, to test the impact of IDN 
on the DNS in a laboratory setting.662 On 7th March 2007, ICANN announced the 
successful completion of these tests.663 The next phase in testing involved 
experimental insertion of IDN TLDs in the root zone for evaluation. 664 On 31 January 
                                                                                                                                            
22034/original/GNSO%2520IDN%2520WG%2520Final%2520Outcomes%2520Report%2520-
%2520EN.pdf  
661 ICANN (2007). Announcement: ‘Draft IDN Guidelines, v.2.2 for Public Comments: 11 May 2007’. 
Retrieved 12 June, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-2-11may07.htm  
662 ICANN (2006). Announcement: ‘IDN Laboratory Testing Progress: 19 October 2006’. Retrieved 4 
May, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-19oct06.htm  
663 ICANN (2006). Announcement: ‘IDN Laboratory Test Design Plans: 5 December 2006’. Retrieved 
18 May, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-05dec06.htm 
664 ICANN (2007). Update: ‘IDN .test Root-Zone Evaluation: 23 August 2007 Update’.   Retrieved 4 
June, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-2-19jun07.htm. 
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2008, ICANN announced that these tests had been successful. 665 Note 5_3 With the 
successful completion of these tests, the way was opened for development of policy 
for full-scale deployment of IDNs.  
 
Policy development for IDNs in the ccTLD and gTLD namespaces effectively became 
separated into two tracks, though dialogue continued between the GNSO and CCNSO 
on IDN issues of mutual interest.    
 
IDN ccTLDs  
 
At ICANN’s São Paulo meeting (December 2006) a series of joint IDN working 
group meetings between the GNSO and CCNSO and between CCNSO the and GAC 
allowed the exchange of information about each working group’s position and 
progress regarding IDN. These joint meetings identified the need for a ‘fast track’ to 
expedite implementation of certain ccTLD IDNs.666 This was seen as desirable 
because attempting to move forward with IDN implementation across all ccTLDs 
simultaneously risked the whole process being indefinitely delayed by difficulties 
                                                 
665 ICANN (2008). Announcement: ‘Successful Evaluations of .test IDN TLDs: 31 January 2008’.   
Retrieved 1 July, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-31jan08.htm 
Note 5_3 In August 2007, a technical procedure was finalised for insertion into the root of a number of 
TLDs representing the top-level domain .test in various scripts, including provision for their emergency 
removal in the event of their causing an unforeseen problem in the operation of the DNS (which was 
considered ‘very unlikely’). (See ICANN. (2007). Procedures for IDN TLD Evaluation Deployment in 
the Root Zone: 6 August 2007. Retrieved 28 March, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-06aug07.htm)  
On 14 August the Board approved the finalised IDN .test Evaluation Plan based around the delegation 
of eleven evaluative top-level domains representing the term 'test' translated into Arabic, Persian, 
Chinese (simplified and traditional), Russian, Hindi, Greek, Korean, Yiddish, Japanese and Tamil. (see 
ICANN (2007). Procedures for IDN TLD Evaluation Deployment in the Root Zone: 6 August 2007.   
Retrieved 28 March, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-06aug07.htm)  
The test went live on 15 October 2007, with Internet users in the relevant languages being encouraged 
to register experimental names under the IDN .test namespaces. A publicity campaign with the tagline 
‘My Name, My Language, My Internet’ was launched by ICANN to promote this. (See ICANN (2007). 
"Announcement: My Name, My Language, My Internet: IDN Test Goes Live: ICANN launches global 
test of Internationalized Domain Names "   Retrieved 11 March, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-15oct07.htm) This marked the first 
deployment of IDN TLDs in a live environment. On 31 January 2008, ICANN announced that the .test 
IDN TLDs evaluation had been successful. (See ICANN. (2008). Announcement: ‘Successful 
Evaluations of .test IDN TLDs: 31 January 2008.’   Retrieved 1 July, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-31jan08.htm 
666 ICANN (2009). IDN ccTLD Fast Track Program Proposed Implementation Details Regarding 
Financial Contributions to Support the Development and Deployment of IDN ccTLDs. 29 May 2009. 
Retrieved 18 August 2011, from  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/proposed-implementation-details-financial-contributions-
29may09-en.pdf P1  
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with individually problematic cases, due to linguistic, coding or political issues.667 In 
response, the Board asked the CCNSO and the GAC to produce an Issues Report 
relating to the introduction and selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 
3166-1 two letter codes.668  The Issues Paper produced by the GAC a few months later 
was subsequently adopted by the CCNSO669 and submitted to the Board as a joint 
GAC / CCNSO Issues Paper in July 2007.670  It identified a set of questions as a 
framework for further discussion (See Appendix 5.4). The Board invited input from a 
range of ICANN bodies on the issues identified by the Issues Paper. 671 At the next 
ICANN meeting in LA (November 2007), the GAC reiterated its support for the 
adoption of a fast track approach for IDN ccTLDS, as well as for the CCNSO Council 
proposal to create an IDN working group; it stated its intention to actively engage in 
this process.672 Broad support was also received from the GNSO and ALAC. In 
October 2007, the Board requested that the chairs of the ALAC, CCNSO, GAC and 
GNSO collaborate to establish and appoint members to the IDNC Working Group.673  
 
On 13 June 2008, the IDNC Working Group Draft Final Report of Recommendations 
for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Mechanism was made available and posted for 
comments.674 It asserted that the fast track approach required two specific 
mechanisms: a mechanism for the selection of the IDN ccTLD string; and a 
mechanism to designate an IDN ccTLD manager. It also set out a methodology to 
accomplish this. Furthermore, the report set out a number of guiding principles, 
including an assertion that delegation of an IDN ccTLD should only be permitted in 
the fast track where the IDN ccTLD string and the designation of the selected delegate 
                                                 
667 ICANN (2006). Report from CCNSO-GAC Meeting – Sao Paulo. 5 December 2006. Retrieved 18 
August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/meetings/saopaulo/CCNSO-gac-meeting-05dec06.htm  
668 ICANN (2006). Adopted Resolutions from ICANN Board Meeting: 8 December 2006. Retrieved 8 
June, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/minutes/resolutions-08dec06.htm#_Toc27198296. 
669 At its meeting on 27 June 2007, the CCNSO Council adopted the GAC Issues Paper as a CCNSO 
Issues Paper.  See ICANN (2011). Minutes of meeting of the CCNSO Council. 27 June 2007. Retrieved 
10 July 2010, from http://ccnso.icann.org/meetings/san-juan/amended-CCNSO-council-minutes-
27jun07.pdf  
670 ICANN (2007). Issues Paper: Selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two letter 
codes. Retrieved 7 July, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/CCNSO-gac-issues-report-on-
idn-09jul07.pdf. 
671 ICANN (2007). Adopted Board Resolutions - San Juan, Puerto Rico. 29 June 2007. Retrieved 21 
April, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-29jun07.htm   
672 ICANN (2007). GAC Communiqué XXX-Los Angeles. 31st October 2007 . Retrieved 4 July, 2009, 
from http://www.gac.icann.org/index.php?name=communiques&mode=detail&commId=47  
673 ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idncwg.htm  
674 ICANN (2008). Announcement: ‘Draft Final Report of Recommendations for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Mechanism Made Available: 13 June 2008’. Retrieved 4 July, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-3-13jun08-en.htm  
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were both non-contentious within the territory.675 Following a Public Comments 
Period, the IDNC Working Group submitted the report to the Board, together with the 
statement of GAC and CCNSO on the recommendations included in the report.676 At 
the Paris meeting, (26 June), the Board approved the report and instructed ICANN 
staff to begin work on a detailed implementation strategy.677 Staff duly produced a 
ccTLD Fast Track Draft Implementation Plan678, and a number of revisions to this 
draft were made over the following months. Public Comments periods were held on 
successive iterations of the Draft Implementation Plan in October-November 2008679, 
February-April680 and May-July 2009.681 On 30th September 2009, a proposed final 
version of the implementation plan was announced.682 Final public comments were 
invited between that date and the Board meeting in Seoul. On 30th October 2009, the 
Board approved the Implementation Plan,683 684 and the Fast Track process became 
operational from 16th November. (See Appendix 5.5 for details of the IDN ccTLD 
Fast Track application process). The first IDN ccTLD delegations were considered by 
the Board on 22 April 2010. 685 Note 5_4 As of July 2011, 33 applications have been 
received for IDN ccTLDs in 22 languages under Fast Track.687  
                                                 
675 ICANN (2008). IDNC Working Group Board Proposal. Retrieved 28 March, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idnc-wg-board-proposal-25jun08.pdf    
676 ICANN (2008). Announcement: ‘Now Available: Board Proposal IDNC WG, the Final Report 
IDNC WG on Fast Track Process for IDN ccTLDs: 26 June 2008’. Retrieved 4 May, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-26jun08-en.htm  
677 ICANN (2008). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 26 June 2008. Retrieved 25 February, 
2009, from https://par.icann.org/files/paris/ParisBoardMeeting_26June08.txt  
678 ICANN (2008). Draft Implementation Plan for the IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. Retrieved 14 
August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-
23oct08-en.pdf  
679 ICANN (2008). Announcement: ‘Public Comment: IDN ccTLD Fast Track Draft Implementation 
Plan’. Retrieved 14 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-3-
23oct08-en.htm  
680 ICANN (2009). Announcement: ‘Public Comment: Fast Track Proposed Solutions’. 18 February 
2009. Retrieved 14 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-
18feb09-en.htm  
681 ICANN (2009). Announcement: ‘Public Comment: Fast Track Implementation (3rd Revision)’. 31 
May 2009. Retrieved 14 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-
31may09-en.htm  
682 ICANN (2009). Proposed Final Implementation Plan: IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 30 
September 2009. Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-2-30sep09-en.htm  
683 ICANN (2009). Adopted Board Resolutions. 30 August 2009. Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-30oct09-en.htm#2  
684 ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-
implementation-plan-16nov09-en.pdf  
685 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the Board.  Retrieved 14 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-22apr10-en.htm  
Note 5_4 These included .рф (“R.F.”), representing the Russian Federation; دوةــ ي. (“Al-Saudiah”) 
representing Saudi Arabia; تارا. (“Emarat”) representing the United Arab Emirates; and ر. (“Misr”) 
representing Egypt. The delegations were approved by the Board by twelve votes in favour, with three 
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A CCNSO Working Group continues to examine issues of delegation and 
redelegation.688 However, this issue must be handled with caution; as Janis Karklins 
of the GAC has noted, it is a sensitive area for governments and the measure of 
whether, for example, community support exists for the ccTLD has ultimately been 
based on whether the government says it does.689 A second CCNSO Working Group 
is to report on changes to Article IX and relevant Annexes in the ICANN Bylaws to 
include IDN ccTLD registries as full members in the CCNSO on equal footing with 
the current members.690 
Beyond Fast Track, the CCNSO is currently conducting a full PDP to formulate 
policy for IDN ccTLDs in the longer term. This was initiated by the CCNSO Council 
in October 2007691 and confirmed in April 2009. An IDN ccPDP Working Group was 
formed to coordinate discussions and includes members from the GNSO, ALAC and 
GAC as well as from the ccTLD registries.692 The CCNSO has further coordinated 
with the GNSO on IDN issues via the CCNSO/GNSO Joint IDN Working Group 
(JIG), formed after the Sydney meeting in June 2009.693   
 
 
IDN gTLDs 
The New gTLDs programme, approved by the Board in June 2011694, incorporates 
provision for IDN TLD applications.695 (See Chapter 4) For the most part, IDN 
                                                                                                                                            
abstentions and no opposition. The abstaining delegates explained their abstentions on the grounds of 
inadequate information and / or documentation. See ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the 
Board.  Retrieved 14 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-22apr10-en.htm 
687 ICANN (2011). “IDN Fast Track Process.” Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/  
688 ICANN (2011). “CCNSO IDN PDP Working Group 1.” Retrieved 14 August 2011, from  
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ipwg1.htm  
689 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special  meeting of the Board. 5 August 2010,  Retrieved 14 August 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-05aug10-en.htm  
690 ICANN (2009). “CCNSO IDN PDP Working Group 2.” Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ipwg2.htm  
691ICANN (2009). Final Issues Report on IDN ccPDP. 2 April 2009. Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/final-issues-report-idn-ccpdp-02apr09.pdf  
692  ICANN (2011). “CCNSO IDN PDP Working Group 1.” Retrieved 14 August 2011, from  
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ipwg1.htm 
693 ICANN (2009). Joint CCNSO-GNSO IDN Working Group (JIG WG) Draft Charter. Retrieved 15 
August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/jiwg-charter.pdf  
694ICANN (2011). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 20 June 2011.  Retrieved 15 August 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-20jun11-en.htm  
695 ICANN (2011). gTLD Applicant Guidebook. 30 May 2011. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-30may11-en.pdf  
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gTLDs will be covered by the same set of policies as new ASCII gTLDs, as set out in 
the New gTLDs Applicant Guidebook.696 However, there are a few policies that apply 
specifically to IDN gTLDs; for example, unlike their ASCII counterparts, which must 
contain three or more characters, IDN gTLD strings will be allowed to consist of a 
minimum of two characters.697 Note 5_5 In addition to the other requirements that must 
be met by all new gTLD applicants, entities applying for IDN gTLDs must provide 
information indicating compliance with the IDNA protocol and other IDN-specific 
technical requirements698 as well as the IDN Guidelines.699 IDN tables must be 
submitted to ICANN for approval.700 Additionally, as with IDN ccTLDs, mixed 
scripts in IDN labels are not permitted.701  
 
 As mentioned, dialogue is also ongoing between the GNSO and the CCNSO on IDN 
issues of mutual interest.   
 
Draft IDN Guidelines version 3.0 
 
In July 2011, ICANN published a new draft of the IDN guidelines for discussion.702 
This draft was developed by the IDN Guidelines Revision Working Group (comprised 
of ccTLD and gTLD registry representatives with IDN experience), and modified the 
Guidelines from Version 2.2 to reflect the IETF’s revision of the initial IDNA 
protocol (known as the IDNA2008 protocol).703 Following the ICANN Board's 
acceptance of the new version at the October 2011 meeting in Dakar, Senegal, 
                                                 
696 Ibid 
697 Ibid, P65 
Note 5_5 The Joint CCNSO-GNSO IDN Working Group (JIG) has made recommendations that this 
section be revised to allow for single-character IDN gTLD labels, however this has not yet been 
incorporated into policy. See ICANN (2011). Joint CCNSO-GNSO IDN Working Group Final Report 
in Single Character IDN TLDs. 30 March 2011. Retrieved 19 August 2011, from  
http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/jig-final-report-30mar11-en.pdf. 
698 ICANN (2011). gTLD Applicant Guidebook. 30 May 2011. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from   
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-30may11-en.pdf P34 
699 Ibid, P290  
700 Ibid, PP36-37 
701 Ibid, P64  
702 ICANN (2011). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalised Domain Names. 25 July 
2011. Retrieved 15 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/idn-guidelines-discussion-
draft-clean-25jul11-en.pdf  
703ICANN (2011). Announcement: ‘Proposed IDN Guidelines Revision’. 27 July 2011.  
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-27jul11-en.htm  
 163 
ICANN gave notice of implementation for version 3.0 of the Guidelines on 22 
November 2011.704   
Analysis of PDP: Actors and Interests  
 
Role of the IETF 
 
The IDN policy area provides a good example of the working relationship between 
ICANN and the IETF in action. The IETF played a key role in developing technical 
standards (RFCs 3490, 3491, and 3492) for the implementation of IDNs, while 
ICANN developed public policy and co-ordinated laboratory and live testbeds.  
Although some initial controversy was generated by ICANN’s decision to allow 
testbeds to go ahead before the IETF’s initial standard was complete, ICANN went on 
to accept the IETF standards unequivocally. All of ICANN’s IDN Guidelines have 
used the IETF standards as a basis and required registries to adhere closely to them. 
The IETFs decision in October 2006 that it would determine the ‘inclusion list’ of 
permissible characters for IDN TLDs also took this tricky and potentially 
controversial issue out of ICANN’s hands. ICANN has effectively recognised the 
IETF’s authority as the rightful technical standardisation body, even though the IETF 
standards arguably affect some aspects of public policy related to IDNs, for example, 
string selection, in that they set limits on which strings and characters will be 
permissible. Unequivocal acceptance of the IETF standards may have limited 
ICANN’s room for manoeuvre somewhat in defining IDN policy; on the other hand it 
has allowed IDNs policy development to take place in the context of, and underpinned 
by, a degree of technical certainty that would otherwise have been lacking.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
704 ICANN (2011). Announcement: ‘Implementation Notice - Version 3.0 of IDN Guidelines’. 22 
November 2011. Retrieved 22 January 2012, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-3-22nov11-en.htm  
 164 
Role of the registries 
 
Registry operators, particularly certain ccTLD registries and VeriSign, were some of 
the most important actors in developing and testing IDN technology prior to 2001, and 
their efforts placed the IDN issue on the agenda. Since that time, the registries have 
remained crucially important stakeholders and participants in ICANN’s development 
of IDN policy.  Both ccTLD and gTLD registries have played a key role on numerous 
IDN policy development groups, including the IDN Committee705, the IDN Working 
Group706, the IDNC Working Group707, the GNSO-CCNSO JIG708 and the IDN 
Guidelines Revision Working Group.709 
  
The prominent role accorded to the registries in IDN policy development reflects 
working realities; the registries are the entities that actually run IDN TLDs and as 
such their cooperation is essential, as is the practical real-world expertise they bring to 
the table. Clearly the registries have their own agendas and, as most of them are 
commercial businesses, their ultimate aim in offering IDNs is to sell more domain 
names. Indeed, Patrik Faltstom, who represented the IETF on the IDNs Committee, 
claims that the entities keenest to promote IDNs were those trading domain names 
rather than using them.710 Nonetheless, the registries have worked in a highly 
collaborative manner with each other and with other ICANN stakeholders to make 
this possible.  
 
Some of the ccTLD registries, such as SaudiNIC,711 have shown opposition to being 
bound by mandatory formal contracts with ICANN, a position supported by some 
                                                 
705 ICANN (2011). “Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee.” Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/    
706 ICANN. (2005). Announcement: ‘Draft Revised IDN Guidelines: Public Comment Period: 20 
September 2005.’   Retrieved 14 March, 2009, from 
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707 ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
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711SaudiNIC (2009). Comments and Feedback On the Draft Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Process By the SaudiNIC (.sa ccTLD registry). 7 January 2009. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from  
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governments, such as Egypt.712 The Asia Pacific Top Level Domain Association 
(APTLD), an organisation for ccTLD registries in the Asia Pacific region, has also 
consistently opposed mandatory formal contracts as a condition of delegation. 713 
APTLD has also urged that financial contributions to ICANN by IDN ccTLD 
registries should be voluntary only. As discussed, both of these points were accepted 
into policy under Fast Track. APTLD also favoured awarding any variant strings to 
the same ccTLD manager714; this issue has yet to be decided upon and will likely form 
part of the discussions surrounding IDN ccTLD policy beyond Fast Track. 
 
All registries offering IDNs have accepted the IDN Guidelines. As discussed, 
VeriSign was initially resistant to the Guidelines, arguing that they were not required 
to do anything the IETF protocol didn't specify, but eventually accepted the 
Guidelines. John Klensin, a member of the IDN Committee, explains VeriSign’s 
change of position as being due to a realisation that ‘….someone would hold them 
responsible for registrations that went outside accepted best practices and encouraged 
phishing and other crimes... and that the enforcer would more likely be courts in the 
US than ICANN.’715  An alternative explanation might be that VeriSign agreed behind 
closed doors to accept the Guidelines in return for being allowed to carry over its 
‘testbed’ IDN registrations into the live environment. While there is no direct 
evidence to prove such a link, this would explain the Board’s decision to permit 
retention of the ‘testbed’ registrations, which was a significant gain for VeriSign.   
 
As pointed out by Mueller, an important issue raised by the prospect of IDN TLDs has 
been the question of whether incumbent registries should have priority rights on an 
IDN string that corresponds to the meaning of their existing string in other scripts.716 
The question has significant implications for issues of competition; critics argue that 
such a policy would project incumbents’ market power to the new IDN spaces and 
lock in their dominance.717 As far as gTLD registries are concerned, under current 
                                                 
712 Government of Egypt (2009). ‘Comments and Feedback By the Government of Egypt On the Draft 
Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process.’ Comment posted to ICANN public 
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713 Shea, J (2009). Letter from Jonathan Shea to Rod Beckstrom. 22 October 2009. Retrieved 15 July 
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714 Ibid  
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policy as laid out in the New gTLDs Applicant Guidebook, incumbent registries are 
permitted to apply for IDN equivalents of their TLDs but may face competition for 
those strings; in that event, the outcome would be settled via the string contention 
process, possibly ultimately resuting in auction.718 VeriSign has announced plans to 
apply for 9-20 IDN equivalents of .com in various scripts719 and has also continued to 
lobby the Board for a change in policy to permit 'bundled' IDN packages, which 
would allow them to make a single application for the rights to operate TLDs equating 
to .com in numerous other scripts rather than having to apply for each separately.720 
Some of the prospective new gTLD registries have also supported a ‘bundled’ 
application policy.721 It is unclear whether VeriSign could feasibly be assigned a 
Chinese - character equivalent of .com, which would clash with the Chinese 
government's own unilaterally created version of that TLD (see below). With regards 
to ccTLDs, the question of whether existing registries should have automatic rights to 
IDN equivalents of their ASCII TLDs was raised as part of the discussions around 
Fast Track. Current policy is that this decision will be left to national authorities. 722 
Klensin argues that the prospect of gaining additional IDN TLD strings was a key 
factor motivating the ccTLD registries in their work on Fast Track.723 
 
The role played by the registries in this PDP illustrates the point that, despite any 
idealistic notions of policymaking influence being shared equally among a wide range 
of stakeholders, in practice some stakeholders are always likely to be more influential 
than others, simply because their co-operation is vital to make the system work. This 
potentially gives them much leverage over policy; they hold a ‘positional power’ that 
other stakeholders do not. Nonetheless, the registries did not get their own way on 
every issue (particularly the question of whether incumbent registries would be 
accorded automatic priority rights on IDN equivalents of their strings).  
                                                 
718 ICANN (2011). gTLD Applicant Guidebook. 30 May 2011. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-30may11-en.pdf Section 1.1.2.10: String 
Contention.  
719 DomainNameWire (2011). “VeriSign’s Pat Kane Discusses New TLDs and IDNs.” 
DomainNameWire: The domain industry’s news service. 7 July 2011. Retrieved 16 August 2011, from 
http://domainnamewire.com/2011/07/07/VeriSigns-pat-kane-discusses-new-tlds-and-idns/  
720 Andruff, R.N. et al (2011). Letter from Ronald N Andruff et al  to Peter Dengate Thrush. 11 May 
2011. Retrieved 19 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/andruff-et-al-to-
dengate-thrush-beckstrom-11may11-en.pdf  
721 Ibid 
722 See reply by Tina Dam to question by Rahman Khanjohn at IDN ccTLD Fast Track Workshop, 26 
October 2009, Seoul, Korea. Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://sel.icann.org/meetings/seoul2009/transcript-idn-cctld-fast-track-26oct09-en.txt  
723 Email from John Klensin to Paul White, 13 July 2009 
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Role of the GNSO 
 
The GNSO has played a significant and collaborative role in most of the policy 
development processes related to IDNs since its inception. Although it supplied no 
representatives to the original IDN Committee724 (since this committee was formed 
before the GNSO’s creation), three representatives from the GNSO’s Registries 
Constituency sat on the subsequent IDN Working Group that was responsible for the 
redrafting of the IDN Guidelines.725  
 
In May 2006, the GNSO Council requested that ICANN staff produce a preliminary 
Issues Report regarding the implementation of IDN TLDs. The Issues Report 
identified several issues for discussion, which were very similar to those identified in 
the issues report for new gTLDs (December 2005). These included: selection criteria, 
allocation methods and contractural criteria.726 The GNSO Council subsequently 
established an IDN working group, which reported in March 2007.  It identified seven 
areas for discussion, including: the relationship between IDN gTLDs and non-IDN 
gTLDs; management of existing IDN second level domains; geopolitical implications 
of IDNs; issues relating to existing IDN SLD holders; technical policy relating to IDN 
gTLDs; IDN aspects relating to Privacy & WHOIS Details; and IDN aspects on legal 
details. 727 The last two topics were accorded a lower priority and were only discussed 
initially by the Working Group. The report went on to set out some ‘areas of 
agreement’ where the Working Group had achieved rough consensus under these 
headings, and also ‘areas of support’ where debate still existed. None of its proposals 
appear particularly radical, in that they mostly advocate what was already established 
practice (enshrined in the Guidelines) for second level IDNs to be extended to IDN 
TLDs. For example, the Report proposed a ‘no mixed scripts’ rule that was already 
established practice for second-level IDNs, and recommended an approach to 
                                                 
724 ICANN (2011). “Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee.” Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/  
725 ICANN (2005). Announcement: ‘Draft Revised IDN Guidelines: Public Comment Period’. 20 
September 2005. Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-20sep05-en.htm  
726 ICANN (2006). GNSO Preliminary Issues Report Policy Issues relating to IDN at the top-level. 28 
May 2006. Retrieved 16 July 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/idn-tlds/issues-report-
28may06.htm  
727 ICANN (2007). Outcomes Report of the GNSO IDN WG, Version 3.1. 22 March 2007.   Retrieved 
28 March, 2009, from 
https://st.icann.org/data/workspaces/alac/attachments/lisbon_documents:20070322133647-0-
22034/original/GNSO%2520IDN%2520WG%2520Final%2520Outcomes%2520Report%2520-
%2520EN.pdf 
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intellectual property / priority rights, including an assertion that the UDRP does not 
require modification to deal with IDNs728, that was in line with the approach to these 
issues followed at the second level. 729 
 
At ICANN’s São Paulo meeting in December 2006, joint IDN working group 
meetings took place between the GNSO and CCNSO, as well as between the CCNSO 
and GAC, which identified the need for a ‘fast track’ for some IDN ccTLDs.730 The 
concurrence of opinion among the GNSO, CCNSO and GAC on this matter led to the 
Board’s request for the CCNSO and the GAC to produce an issues paper relating to 
the selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two-letter codes.731 This 
paper was published on 9 July 2007 and identified a number of general and specific 
issues for further discussion (see Appendix 5.4 for details).732 Commenting on the 
CCNSO-GAC Issues Paper, the GNSO declared itself supportive of ‘efforts to 
determine the feasibility of a fast track process to enable the assignment of a few non-
controversial IDN ccTLDs in the interim’ and recommended that these should be 
limited to one IDN ccTLD per ISO 3166-1 country or territory, except in those cases 
where governmental policy makes selecting a single script impossible.733 However, 
the GNSO did warn against allowing IDN ccTLDs to become de facto gTLDs, 
recommending that the classification of TLDs should be determined prior to 
allocation of any IDN TLDs and that this should be done jointly by the GNSO and 
CCNSO. 734    
 
Following publication of the Issues Paper, the Board created the IDNC Working 
Group, which included two members from the GNSO.735 These representatives 
worked collaboratively with other Working Group members to produce the group’s 
                                                 
728 Ibid 
729 Ibid 
730 ICANN (2006).  Captioning of GNSO Council Meeting in Sao Paulo. 6 December 2006. Retrieved 
16 July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/meetings/saopaulo/captioning-gnso-councilmeeting-
06dec06.htm  
731 ICANN (2006). Board Resolutions, 29 July 2007. Retrieved 16 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/minutes/resolutions-29jun07.htm#m 
732 ICANN (2007). CCNSO-GAC Issues Paper: “Selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 
3166-1 two letter codes”. 9 July 2007. Retrieved 18 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/CCNSO-gac-issues-report-on-idn-09jul07.pdf  
733 ICANN (2008). ‘GNSO comments in response to the CCNSO-GAC Issues Report on IDN Issues.’ 
Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD issues. Retrieved 16 July 2011, 
from http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-issues/msg00013.html  
734 Ibid 
735 ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idncwg.htm 
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Final Report in August 2008. (Hiro Hotta, who was a member of this group, stated in 
email correspondence with the author that all members of the Working Group 
operated in a highly collaborative manner, holding ‘vigorous’ discussions both online 
and in person736). Commenting on the Final Report, the GNSO Council was 
supportive of moving towards implementation of Fast Track.737 The Council did, 
however, draw attention to some issues that it felt required further work.738 These 
included questions of how to deal with proposed strings not listed in the UNGEGN 
manual Note 5_6; the GNSO felt that this should be handled in the context of the WIPO 
II discussions and recommendations regarding territory names and IDNs, along with 
experience from the geopolitical names discussion in the new gTLD process and 
expertise from UNESCO. The GNSO further recommended that requests for 
information be sent to relevant governments and ccTLD managers ‘to gain an 
understanding of the interest of territories to participate in the Fast Track’, and 
advised that the introduction of new Fast Track IDN ccTLDs should be processed in 
well publicised and predictable time schedules in order for stakeholders to attend and 
respond to the process. It also recommended that IETF work on updating the IDN 
standards should be completed before the introduction of any IDN TLDs. 739  
 
In the same document, the GNSO went on to identify some further areas of concern. 
One of these was the proposal to introduce a method whereby a territory would 
unilaterally propose a TLD string. This, the GNSO argued, was a significant departure 
from the current ccTLD practices, and therefore the overall process ‘must be designed 
and implemented with caution and should include ongoing public review’. It also 
stated the need for a mechanism to determine the non-contentiousness of a proposed 
IDN ccTLD. Furthermore, the GNSO expressed concern that, without some form of 
‘expressed understanding’ between the registries and ICANN, it was not clear how 
ICANN policy requirements for IDN deployment, including compliance with IDNA 
standards and the ICANN IDN Guidelines, could be enforced. Finally, it warned that 
                                                 
736 Email from Hiro Hotta to Paul White, 18th July 2009 
737 ICANN (2008). ‘GNSO Council Comments on IDNC WG Final Report.’ Comment posted to 
ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track implementation. 14 August 2008. 
Retrieved 16 July 2011,http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-fast-track/pdfGQBTTw4OVN.pdf  
738 Ibid 
Note 5_6 The UNGEGN (United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names) manuals, published 
in 2006, address technical issues regarding standardisation of  ‘geographical names’ and their use in 
geo-referenced digital databases.. See United Nations Statistics Division (2011). Statistics and 
Statistical Methods Publications: Technical reference manual for the standardization of geographical 
names. Retrieved 18 August 2011, from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pubs/gesgrid.asp?id=377  
739 Ibid 
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‘confusingly similar’ strings should be avoided, and also of the need to safeguard 
against misuse of IDNs for spoofing purposes. Nonetheless, the GNSO felt that the 
Fast Track process should move forward as expeditiously as possible. 740   
 
The GNSO provided further comments on the Draft Implementation Plan for the IDN 
ccTLD Fast Track Process (January 2009).741 It again argued for the need for some 
sort of contract or formal ‘understanding’ between IDN ccTLD operators and ICANN, 
which would clarify how compliance with IDNA standards and ICANN policy could 
be enforced. On the matter of financial contributions from IDN ccTLD operators, the 
GNSO argued that the IDN ccTLD Fast Track implementation should be fully self-
funding and that any contract between the registry and ICANN should include 
financial requirements as well as technical and operational ones. The GNSO also 
reiterated that Fast Track IDN ccTLD strings must not be confusingly similar to 
existing TLDs. 
 
As discussed, many of the GNSO’s concerns were in fact addressed.  In the final 
implementation plan, strings deemed to be confusingly similar to other requested 
strings or existing TLDs were not permitted.742 Procedures were put in place for 
evaluating the non-contentious nature of requested TLDs and for dealing with any 
disputes.743 ccTLD managers were not required to sign a formal Registry Agreement 
type contract, but were required to agree to a minimum set of conditions, including: a 
commitment to operate in a stable, secure manner; to adhere to IDNA protocols, other 
pertinent RFCs, and IDN Guidelines; to engage in cooperation to resolve disputes; 
and not implement DNS redirection and synthesised DNS responses.744 On cost 
recovery, application fees were levied from ccTLD applicants; however, payment of 
the fee (USD $26,000) for the processing of a request in the String Evaluation Stage 
was deemed to be ‘expected but not mandatory’.745 Thus, it could be argued that the 
                                                 
740 Ibid 
741 ICANN (2009). ‘GNSO Council Comments on Draft Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Process.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
implementation. 7 April 2009. Retrieved 8 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-
implementation/pdfv6YTzcuZ9Q.pdf  
742 ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-
implementation-plan-16nov09-en.pdf 
743 Ibid 
744 Ibid  
745 ICANN (2009.) Requestors Manual: Fast Track Request System. Prepared for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Participants. 16 November 2009. Retrieved 4 September 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-requestors-manual-16nov09-en.pdf  P4  
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GNSO failed to ensure that IDN ccTLD registries would be subject to the same terms 
and conditions as their IDN gTLD counterparts.  
 
The GNSO is also currently supplying four representatives to the IDN ccPDP 
Working Group set up by the CCNSO Council to develop IDN ccTLD policy beyond 
Fast Track. The GNSO has further co-ordinated with the CCNSO on IDN issues via 
the CCNSO/GNSO Joint IDN Working Group (JIG), formed after the Sydney meeting 
(June 2009)746 to deal with issues related to the introduction of IDN TLDs that are of 
common interest to both the GNSO and CCNSO.747 The JIG has identified three 
issues of common interest to date; single character IDN TLDs; IDN TLD variants; 
and universal acceptance of IDN TLDs. 748 
 
Role of the CCNSO 
Like the GNSO, the CCNSO has played an important and collaborative role in the 
development of IDNs policy. The importance of the ccTLD registries in developing 
IDNs has already been discussed; for the past nine years the CCNSO has been the 
main vehicle through which the ccTLD registries have participated in ICANN’s IDN 
policy development processes. 
The original IDN Committee was formed before the CCNSO’s creation and so there 
were no CCNSO representatives per se on that body, though there was a 
representative of a ccTLD registry (Vincent Wen-Sung Chen of TWNIC).749 
However, the subsequent IDN Working Group, which redrafted the IDN Guidelines, 
included two CCNSO members out of a total of five.750   
As discussed, when IDN TLDs first began to come onto the agenda, the CCNSO 
opened dialogue with both the GNSO and the GAC, culminating in the discussions at 
Sao Paulo that first identified the need for a ‘fast track’ to expedite implementation of 
                                                 
746 ICANN (2009). Joint CCNSO-GNSO IDN Working Group (JIG WG) Draft Charter. Retrieved 15 
August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/jiwg-charter.pdf 
747 ICANN (2011). “Ad-Hoc CCNSO/GNSO Joint IDN Working Group.” Retrieved 25 August 2011, 
from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/jiwg.htm  
748ICANN (2010) JIG Initial Report on Single Character IDN TLDs. 26 July 2010. Retrieved 25 August 
2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/node/13979 
749 ICANN (2011). “Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee.” Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/ 
750 ICANN (2005). Announcement: 'Draft Revised IDN Guidelines: Public Comment Period'. 20 
September 2005. Retrieved 15 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-20sep05-en.htm  
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‘non-controversial’ IDN ccTLDs.  The CCNSO Council subsequently adopted the 
GAC Issues Paper as a CCNSO Issues Paper at its meeting on 27 June 2007.751 
Following this, the CCNSO supplied ten members to the IDNC Working Group, 
considerably more than any other ICANN organisation (for comparison, the GNSO 
supplied two members and the GAC three).752  
 
Following publication of the IDNC Working Group’s Final Report, drafting of the 
actual Implementation Plan was passed to ICANN staff. However, the CCNSO 
continued to provide comments on the process. On 4 March 2009, the CCNSO 
Council made a statement of its position753, in which it addressed a number of the 
outstanding issues. It asserted that formal registry agreements between ICANN and an 
IDN ccTLD manager should be voluntary and not a requirement for the delegation of 
the IDN ccTLD  (matching current policy with regards to ASCII ccTLDs). However, 
it went on to state that such a documented relationship should be ‘encouraged’, and 
that it was in the best interest of IDN ccTLDs managers to adhere to all relevant IETF 
standards and the IDN Guidelines. On the matter of financing and cost recovery, the 
CCNSO stated that financial contributions should be voluntary and should not be a 
requirement for the delegation of an IDN ccTLD. As discussed, the final 
Implementation Plan complied with both of these recommendations. 
 
Beyond Fast Track, the CCNSO is currently working on a full PDP to create future 
policy that will eventually guide the delegation of additional IDN ccTLDs. In October 
2007, the CCNSO Council initiated the country code Policy Development Process 
(ccPDP) to develop policy for the selection and delegation of IDN ccTLDs and asked 
ICANN to create an Issue Report.754 A finalised Issues Report was released after some 
delay in April 2009.755  It identified five areas for discussion regarding ccTLDs (see 
Appendix 5.6) and recommended that the CCNSO Council proceed with an IDN 
                                                 
751ICANN (2007). Minutes of meeting of the CCNSO Council – San Juan. 27 June 2007. Retrieved 23 
August 2011, from  http://ccnso.icann.org/meetings/san-juan/amended-CCNSO-council-minutes-
27jun07.pdf  
752 ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idncwg.htm  
753ICANN (2009). Resolution of the CCNSO Council in respect to IDN ccTLDs delegated under the 
Fast Track. 4th March 2009. Retrieved 29 July 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idn-
resolution-04mar09.pdf  
754 ICANN (2007). Minutes of meeting of the CCNSO Council – Los Angeles. 31 October 2007. 
Retrieved 29 July 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/meetings/losangeles/CCNSO-council-minutes-
31oct07.pdf  
755ICANN (2009). Final Issues Report on IDN ccPDP. 2 April 2009. Retrieved 29 July 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/final-issues-report-idn-ccpdp-02apr09.pdf  
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ccPDP to develop policy for the selection and delegation of IDN ccTLDs. The 
CCNSO Council voted to proceed with the ccPDP on 7 April,756 setting up an IDN 
ccPDP Working Group to ‘report on and identify a feasible policy for the selection 
and delegation of IDN ccTLDs associated with the territories listed in ISO 3166-1’, 
within the context of the wider IDN ccPDP.757 The Working Group included 17 
representatives from ccTLD registries, but also had members from the GNSO, ALAC 
and GAC, as well as from the SSAC, the technical community and ICANN staff.758  
Its initial draft topic paper (October 2009) identified thirteen areas for discussion759 
(see Appendix 5.7.A for further details), which were near-identical to those set out in 
the CCNSO-GAC Issues Paper of 2007.760 A Public Comments Period was held on 
the draft topic paper between 20th October and 3rd November 2009,761 however no 
relevant comments appear to have been made on the specified forum during that time 
period.762 A further topic paper was produced in February 2010, which expanded 
slightly on the range of issues for discussion763 (see Appendix 5.7B for more details). 
The Working Group published its first Progress Report in November 2010,764 
reporting agreement on some draft points of policy but ongoing discussion on others. 
Areas where tentative agreement was reached can be found in Appendix 5.7.C. A PCP 
was announced on the progress report between 29th November 2010 and 14th January 
2011765; however no comments were submitted to the specified forum.766  
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758 Ibid 
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As mentioned, the CCNSO has further co-ordinated with the GNSO on IDN issues via 
the CCNSO/GNSO Joint IDN Working Group (JIG).767 
 
Role of the GAC  
The GAC has been strongly supportive of ICANN’s work on IDNs and has 
participated actively and collaboratively in the policymaking process, particularly 
through the representatives it has supplied to the IDN Committee and to the IDNC 
Working Group, and also through ongoing dialogue with other ICANN bodies at 
successive workshops and meetings. Unlike the New gTLDs policy development area, 
no significant disputes have emerged between the GAC and Board over IDNs. A key 
priority for the GAC appears to be securing recognition for the primacy of 
governmental public policy authority particularly over IDN ccTLDs; so far IDN 
ccTLD delegation has complied with that principle.   
Initial GAC policy statements on IDNs 
The first GAC statement on IDNs was produced at the Melbourne meeting (March 
2001). It recognised three key public policy considerations in the introduction of 
IDNs: ‘the essential importance of interoperability of the present and future Internet; 
the prevention of cyber-squatting and resolution of disputes in the IDN environments; 
and the application of competition and market access, consumer protection and 
intellectual property principles.’ 768 The GAC established an IDN working group to 
examine these public policy issues and provide substantive advice regarding IDNs.769  
At the following meeting in Stockholm (June 2001), the GAC stated nine Principles 
on IDNs (see Appendix 5.1.B). These mainly concerned the ‘testbeds’, which the 
GAC was concerned should not be allowed to endanger the stability and security of 
the DNS; should not be assumed to confer any rights in future live IDN environments; 
                                                 
767 ICANN (2009). Joint CCNSO-GNSO IDN Working Group (JIG WG) Draft Charter. Retrieved 15 
August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/jiwg-charter.pdf  
768ICANN (2001). GAC Communique VIII – Melbourne. 10 March 2001. Retrieved 8 July 2011, from 
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769 Ibid 
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should not undermine the standardisation process; and should not become effectively 
premature market launches in another guise.770   
 
IDN Committee 
 
The GAC supplied one representative to the IDN Committee, Mohamed Sharil 
Tarmizi (Malaysia).771 Following the release of the IDN Committee’s Final Report in 
June 2002772, the GAC released a brief statement noting the recommendations and 
restating its advice that ICANN should ‘exercise great care in the introduction of 
IDNs and to consult all parties affected by the introduction of IDNs’.773 
 
 IDN Guidelines: GAC response 
 
The GAC made no specific comment on any iteration of the IDN Guidelines. 
However, the GAC continued to be supportive of ICANN’s efforts towards 
implementation of IDNs, as shown in GAC communiqués and correspondence with 
the Board.774  
 
IDN ccTLDs and Fast Track 
 
The GAC played a particularly important role in setting up the Fast Track process for 
IDN ccTLDs. As discussed, the initial concept for the IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
developed out of discussions between the GNSO and CCNSO and between the 
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CCNSO and the GAC.775 The GAC produced the initial Issues Report relating to the 
introduction and selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two letter 
codes, which was subsequently adopted by the CCNSO776 and submitted to the Board 
as a joint GAC / CCNSO Issues Paper entitled ‘Selection of IDN ccTLDs associated 
with the ISO 3166-1 two-letter codes.’ 777 Upon establishment of the IDNC Working 
Group, the GAC supplied three members: Bertrand de La Chapelle (France), Manal 
Ismail (Egypt) and Janis Karklins (Latvia / GAC Chair).778 
 
On 13 June 2008, the IDNC Working Group Draft Final Report of Recommendations 
for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Mechanism was made available and posted for 
comments.779 The GAC remained supportive of the implementation strategy, with 
Karklins stating a belief that the ccTLD Fast Track should progress to implementation 
in 2009.780   
 
At the Nairobi meeting (March 2010), the GAC adopted a set of ‘GAC Interim 
Principles on IDN ccTLDs’.781 (See Appendix 5.8) Among other points, these 
principles were an assertion of governmental public authority over IDN ccTLDs; this 
was explicitly stated in Principle 4.  Principle 5 declared that no IDN ccTLDs should 
be created without the express approval of the government in question, while 
Principle 10 asserted that only the relevant government could give authoritative 
advice about the legitimacy of a given application.   
                                                 
775 ICANN (2009). IDN ccTLD Fast Track Program Proposed Implementation Details Regarding 
Financial Contributions to Support the Development and Deployment of IDN ccTLDs. 29 May 2009. 
Retrieved 18 August 2011, from  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/proposed-implementation-details-financial-contributions-
29may09-en.pdf P1  
776 At its meeting on 27 June 2007, the CCNSO Council adopted the GAC Issues Paper as a CCNSO 
Issues Paper.  See ICANN (2011). Minutes of meeting of the CCNSO Council, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 
10 July 2010, from http://ccnso.icann.org/meetings/san-juan/amended-CCNSO-council-minutes-
27jun07.pdf  
777 ICANN (2007). Issues Paper: “Selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two letter 
codes”. Retrieved 7 July, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/CCNSO-gac-issues-report-on-
idn-09jul07.pdf. 
778 ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idncwg.htm  
779 ICANN (2008). Announcement: ‘Draft Final Report of Recommendations for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Mechanism Made Available: 13 June 2008’. Retrieved 4 July, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-3-13jun08-en.htm  
780Karklins, J. (2009). Letter from Janis Karklins to Peter Dengate Thrush, 10 March 2009. Retrieved 
30 August 2011, from http://gac.icann.org/system/files/karklins-to-dengate-thrush-10mar09-en.pdf  
781ICANN (2010). GAC Communique XXXVII – Nairobi. 10 March 2010. Retrieved 30 August 2011, 
from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540146/GAC_37_Nairobi_Communique.pdf?version
=1&modificationDate=1312226773000  
 177 
 
Since delegation of the first IDN ccTLDs began in April 2010, the GAC has had the 
opportunity to comment on each delegation via its liaison to the Board. On the 
occasion of the first four ccTLD delegations being brought before the Board, Janis 
Karklins, attending the meeting as GAC representative, raised no objections, although 
he did caution that without full definition of the community support requirements, 
there was a risk that some countries and territories would be differently organised and 
it would be unfair to impose an undefined standard. 782 
 
The GAC is currently supplying one member to the IDN ccPDP Working Group set 
up by the CCNSO Council to develop IDN ccTLD policy beyond Fast Track.783 The 
draft policy points (‘Overarching Principles’) so far produced by this group784 can be 
compared to several of the Interim GAC Principles on IDN ccTLDs, particularly the 
recognition that the relevant Government or Public Authority ‘needs to be involved as 
a key factor (“has to be taken very seriously”) and at a minimum express its non- 
objections’.  
 
IDN gTLDs 
 
The implementation of IDN gTLDs forms an integral part of the new gTLDs policy 
development process and thus the GAC’s response to these has been integrated with 
its approach to new gTLDs in general. Although there have been significant disputes 
between the GAC and Board over some aspects of the new gTLDs programme, these 
have not related specifically to IDNs.  
 
Role of public comments 
 
(See Appendix 5.9A for a detailed review of each public comments period. See 
Appendix 5.9B  for a statistical breakdown of all public comments periods.) 
 
                                                 
782 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 22 April 2010. Retrieved 30 August 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-22apr10-en.htm  
783 ICANN (2011). “CCNSO IDN PDP Working Group 1.” Retrieved 14 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ipwg1.htm  
784 ICANN (2010). Progress Report: “IDN ccTLD String Selection Criteria and Requirements IDN 
ccPDP Working Group. 1-29 November 2010”. Retrieved 30 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/final-progress-report-idn-ccpdp-wg1-29nov10-en.pdf  
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Overall analysis of online public comments  
 
The most striking observation is the low volume of public comments submitted in this 
policy development area. A total of only 143 comments have been received across all 
official public comments periods (excluding comments submitted outside of official 
comments periods) and some PCPs attracted no comments at all. This suggests that 
IDNs policy is of interest to fewer individuals and interest groups than new gTLDs 
policy, and may also suggest that the policy area is less controversial. Of the 143 
comments that were received, only three posters were opposed outright to the 
principle of introducing IDNs (all in the first PCP), and most of the discussion 
focused on particular points of policy, as opposed to the general question of whether 
IDN SLDs or TLDs ought to be introduced. Again, this contrasts with gTLDs policy, 
where a significant minority (11.9% over all PCPs) were opposed outright to new 
gTLDs. This may be partly explained by the fact that existing gTLDs could arguably 
be said to be adequate for the time being, and it can therefore be plausibly argued that 
no new gTLDs are required at this time, whereas it is difficult to make the argument 
that IDNs are not required at all.   
    
The intellectual property lobby was conspicuous by its absence. Only two comments 
were posted by trademark interests (INTA) and only a handful of comments across all 
PCPs focused on trademark protection mechanisms. This is perhaps surprising, given 
the potential for IDNs to eventually result in many new TLDs and therefore open up 
new opportunities for cybersquatting. It represents another huge contrast with the new 
gTLDs policy development area, where 19.5% of the comments focused on trademark 
issues, and where similar protection mechanisms to those proposed for IDNs, such as 
sunrise periods, were not felt by the intellectual property lobby to be adequate. 
  
Nonetheless, the comments that were received represented quite a wide variety of 
stakeholders, as shown in Appendix 5.9B . Unfortunately, around half of posters did 
not disclose their background or affiliation; nonetheless, those that could be identified 
represented a mix of registries, registrars, other private companies, governments and 
governmental agencies, academics, technical organisations such as APTLD, internet 
governance bodies such as the IAB and IETF, regional technical IGOs such as the 
Arab Team for Domain Names and Internet Issues, ICANN staff, the GNSO and its 
constituencies, INTA and private individuals. This represents a useful cross-section of 
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the range of organisations and entities involved in IDN issues. Private companies 
represented the largest single group of commentators, making up almost half of all 
identifiable posters (note that this includes registries and registrars).  Overall, as with 
new gTLDs, it is clear that the ‘public’ comments periods were dominated by 
interested parties rather than the general ‘Internet using public’. 
 
The overall effect that public comments had on IDNs policy development is more 
difficult to gauge, but some general observations may be offered. For the most part, 
the comments received on the drafts of the IDN Guidelines do not appear to have 
influenced the final versions of those documents. However, Fast Track policy seems 
to be mostly in accordance with majority opinion on the public comments boards. For 
example, the final version of the Fast Track Implementation Plan specified that 
payment of a percentage of registration fees to ICANN would be voluntary (though 
‘expected’) 785, an approach supported by more public commentators than mandatory 
payment. Contracts between ICANN and IDN ccTLD registries were also made 
voluntary, with registries having to make a mandatory commitment ‘to TLD 
operations that will secure and enhance the stability and interoperability of the 
Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) for the benefit of the local and global Internet 
community, and to working in good faith together with ICANN towards a stable and 
secure Internet DNS.’ 786 This was the model favoured by the majority of those who 
commented on this issue.     
 
Patrick Faltstrom, who served on the IDNs Committee, was contacted by the author 
and asked directly how public comments were taken into account by the Committee; 
he replied that public comments were used to help determine ‘what the consensus 
was’ but offered no further details. This appears to have some echoes of the remarks 
made by Bruce Tonkin and Philip Sheppard that public comments were taken into 
account by the New TLDs Committee ‘as much as possible’.787 In other words, 
Committee members appear to have been aware of the public comments and may or 
may not have been influenced by them, but they were apparently not used in any 
systematic way.    
                                                 
785 ICANN (2009). Proposed Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 30 
September 2009. Retrieved 22 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-
cctld-implementation-plan-30sep09-en.pdf P38 
786 Ibid, P39 
787 Email from Patrik Faltstrom to Paul White, 12 July 2009 
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In any event, given the low number of comments offered in most PCPs on IDNs, 
perhaps it would not be reasonable to expect the opinions of a handful of people or 
organisations to have a major influence on policy outcomes.   
 
Role of public input at ICANN meetings 
 
An examination of transcripts from IDN Workshops reveals that very few members of 
the ‘general public’ spoke at these meetings. The limited number of people who 
commented from the floor were almost invariably individuals with a stake or direct 
interest in IDN matters. (See Appendix 5.3). 
 
Role of the Board 
 
The Board does not appear to have intervened in the policy development processes 
surrounding IDNs to anything like the extent it did with New gTLDs policy. Instead, 
it has mostly acted to approve policy proposals developed from below, which is more 
in keeping with the way the ICANN model is meant to operate. IDN issues have been 
mostly uncontroversial at Board level. The decision to approve IDN implementation 
at the second level by acceptance of the initial IDN guidelines was passed 
unanimously (March 2003).788 Approval for the ccTLD Fast Track (October 2009) 
was passed with one abstention.789 Approval for IDN gTLDs (June 2011) came as part 
of the approval for the new gTLDs programme, which was passed by majority vote790; 
however the issues that caused certain Directors to vote against or abstain were not 
related specifically to IDNs according to their statements at the meeting in question.791 
  
Role of RSSAC and SSAC 
 
The IDNs policy area also offers some illustration of the roles played by the RSSAC 
and SSAC within the ICANN regime. These bodies, dominated by the technical 
                                                 
788 ICANN (2003). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 27 March 2003. Retrieved 19 August 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-27mar03.htm  
789 ICANN (2009). Transcript of regular meeting of the Board. Retrieved 19 August 2011, from 
http://sel.icann.org/meetings/seoul2009/transcript-board-meeting-30oct09-en.txt  
790 ICANN (2011). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 20 June 2011. Retrieved 23 July 2011,  
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-20jun11-en.htm  
791 ICANN (2011). Transcript of regular meeting of the Board. 20 June 2011. Retrieved 23 July 2011,   
from http://singapore41.icann.org/meetings/singapore2011/transcript-board-new-gtlds-20jun11-en.txt  
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community, have had relatively little direct involvement in policymaking and have 
shown little evidence of promoting any agenda of their own. They have, however, 
been called upon at several stages in the process to oversee laboratory and live testing 
and to evaluate the potential effects of introducing IDNs, particularly into the root 
zone. Given ICANN’s core mandate to ensure the technical stability and security of 
the DNS, the advice of these bodies on such matters carries much weight. Current 
RSSAC advice is that the proposed introduction of no more than 1000 TLD entries 
per year for the next several years is anticipated to cause no stability problems. 
RSSAC will carry out further studies in order to model the theoretical capacity of the 
root nameserver system and will also monitor the system's performance.792 The 
SSAC, however, has warned about potential instabilities that could be caused by IDN 
TLD variants; some technical and operational matters remain to be worked out, 
including methods to ensure that variants point to the same locations.793  
 
Roles of other actors 
 
United States government 
 
As with other types of TLD, the addition of IDN TLDs to the root requires 
acquiescence from the US Department of Commerce, since the US government still 
claims legal ownership of the root. The DoC appears to have been relatively silent on 
this issue-area, compared with its strongly worded comments on new gTLDs. Its main 
concern appears to have been the need to ensure that the introduction of IDN TLDs 
would not have detrimental effects on the stability of the DNS.  
 
 In December 2008, a letter from Meredith A. Baker (Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information) urged ICANN to ensure that the introduction of a 
potentially large number of new gTLDs, including IDN TLDs, would not jeopardise 
the stability and security of the DNS.794  This was echoed in Article 5 of the 2009 
                                                 
792 Murai, J. (2010). Letter from Jun Murai to ICANN Board, 25 June 2010. Retrieved 25 August 2011, 
from   http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/murai-to-board-25nov10-en.pdf  
793ICANN (2010). SSAC Update on Root Scaling Issues.9 March 2010.Retrieved 22 August 2011, 
from  http://nbo.icann.org/meetings/nairobi2010/presentation-root-scaling-09mar10-en.pdf  P6 
794 Baker, M.A. (2008). Letter from Meredith A. Baker to Peter Dengate Thrush. 18 December 2008. 
Retrieved 30 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/baker-to-dengate-thrush-
18dec08-en.pdf  
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Affirmation of Commitments, which, however, also states that ‘DOC recognizes the 
importance of global Internet users being able to use the Internet in their local 
languages and character sets, and endorses the rapid introduction of internationalized 
country code top level domain names’, provided related security, stability and 
resiliency issues are first addressed. 795 
 
European Union 
 
The EU has mostly contributed to the PDP via the GAC. In its only official 
correspondence with ICANN on the matter, the European Commission endorsed the 
principles of IDN TLDs and Fast Track.796  
 
Chinese government  
 
In February 2006, the PRC government unilaterally announced the creation of three 
Chinese-character TLDs, corresponding to .com, .net and .org, in the nameservers 
under its control.797 These domains only appear as TLDs from within China; if 
accessed from outside the country they appear under the .cn namespace, thus 
maintaining compatibility with the ICANN root. Mueller argues that, by taking this 
action, China effectively pre-empted the award of these IDN TLDs; with them in 
place, ICANN would not dare to award similar Chinese-character TLDs to anyone 
else because of the incompatibilities and instabilities that would result.798 Thus, he 
concludes, the matter provides an instance of ICANN’s authority being effectively 
checked by the threat that states will defect from the network.799 As will be argued, 
                                                                                                                                            
Also see NTIA (2008). Comments for ICANN's public consultation on new generic top level domains 
(gTLDs). 18 December 2008. Retrieved 30 August 2011, from  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2008/comments-icanns-public-consultation-new-generic-top-level-domains-gtlds  
795 ICANN / United States Department of Commerce (2009). Affirmation of Commitments by the 
United States Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers. Signed 30 September 2009. Retrieved 20 June, 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/documents/affirmation-of-commitments-30sep09-en.htm  
796Zangl, P (2007). Letter from Peter Zangl to Vint Cerf. 29 October 2007. Retrieved 29 August 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/zangl-to-cerf-29oct07.pdf  
Reding, V. (2009). Letter from Viviane Reding to Rod Beckstrom. 16 November 2009. Retrieved 29 
August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/reding-to-beckstrom-16nov09-en.pdf  
797 Ward, M (2006). “Big push for Chinese net domains.” BBC News, 3 March 2006. Retrieved 9 
August 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4767972.stm  
798 Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
799 Ibid  
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the potential for states to defect from the regime is a key factor giving them 
considerable leverage over ICANN policy.    
 
Other national governments 
For the most part, governments have contributed to the process via their GAC 
representatives; however, a few individual governments (besides the US) submitted 
comments directly. Governmental agencies of Egypt800, Morocco801, Jordan802 and 
Qatar803 submitted comments to the Public Comments forum. Quatar and Egypt 
favoured voluntary financial contributions only and a ‘lightweight’ relationship 
between ICANN and IDN ccTLD operators, without mandatory formal contracts; as 
discussed, this has been the policy adopted for Fast Track. Jordan also opposed formal 
contracts. The governments of Russia,804 Bulgaria805 and Greece806 sent formal 
correspondence to ICANN endorsing the Fast Track programme and requesting to be 
a part of it. No government appears to have expressed significant dissatisfaction with 
ICANN’s implementation of IDN policy to date.   
The Arabic Team for Domain Names, a body created by the intergovernmental Arab 
League, also supplied some comments. This group also opposed formal registry 
                                                 
800 Egypt /NTRA  (2008). ‘Comments by the National Telecom Regulatory Authority of Egypt on the 
Draft Methodology for Fast Track.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN 
ccTLD Fast Track implementation. 24 April 2008. Retrieved 5 August 2009, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-fast-track/msg00014.html  
and 
Egypt / NTRA (2009). ‘Egypt's Comments on Rev3.0 of the Draft Implementation Plan for IDN 
ccTLDs Fast Track Process.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track implementation. 15 July 2009. Retrieved 5 August 2009, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-
implementation/msg00034.html  
801 ANRT / Morocco (2008). ‘Comments from the Moroccan National Telecommunications Regulatory 
Agency (ANRT) regarding the DRAFT Methodology for Fast Track.’ Comment posted to ICANN 
public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track implementation. Retrieved 5 August 2009, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-fast-track/msg00012.html  
802 NTIC/Jordan (2008). ‘Comments of National Information Technology Center of Jordan on IDN Fast 
Track.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
implementation. 16 July 2008. Retrieved 5 August 2009, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-
fast-track/msg00022.html  
803 Qatar Supreme Council of Information and Communication Technology (2009). ‘Plan for the IDN 
ccTLD ( Rev.3), ictQATAR, State of Qatar.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on 
IDN ccTLD Fast Track implementation. Retrieved 5 August 2009, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-
implementation/msg00035.html  
804Schegolev . I.O. (2008) Letter from Igor O. Schegolev to Paul Twomey, 19 June 2008. Retrieved 29 
August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/shchegolev-to-twomey-19jun08.pdf 
805Vatchkov, P. (2008) Letter from Plamen Vatchkov to Paul Twomey, 18 June 2008. Retrieved 29 
August 2011, from   http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/vatchkov-to-twomey-18jun08-en.pdf 
806Anastasopoulos, G. (2008). Letter from George Anastasopoulos to Paul Twomey, 28 July 2008. 
Retrieved 29 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/anastasopoulos-to-twomey-
28jul08.pdf 
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agreements807 and mandatory financial contributions from IDN ccTLD registries to 
ICANN.808  
ALAC 
The ALAC had a certain amount of direct involvement in the policymaking process 
via its supplying of two representatives to the IDNC Working Group.809 The ALAC 
also submitted comments to the Public Comments Periods.  
In August 2009, the ALAC submitted a formal statement to the Board regarding its 
position on Fast Track.810 The statement was generally supportive of the programme 
and urged concerted action by all relevant stakeholders to resolve all remaining issues 
and move forward with Fast Track implementation in the last quarter of 2009. The 
ALAC did, however, warn that the estimated processing fees of approximately 
$24,391 per request plus $115,000 of fixed costs was 'prohibitively high' and 
represented a financial barrier for IDN ccTLD managers especially from developing 
countries which would 'widen the digital divide'. The ALAC proposed an alternative 
model of cost recovery intended to result in a more affordable up-front fee. 
Ultimately, in the final implementation the ALAC's alternative model was not 
adopted, but payment of the fee was, as discussed, deemed 'expected but not 
mandatory'.811  
 
The ALAC also currently supplies one member to the IDN ccPDP Working Group set 
up by the CCNSO to develop IDN ccTLD policy beyond Fast Track.    
 
                                                 
807 Oueichek, I. (2008). 'Comments from the Arabic team for domain names regarding the fast track 
draft interim report'. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
implementation. 22 April 2008. Retrieved 30 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-
fast-track/msg00009.html  
808 Oueichek, I. (2009). 'Comments from the Arab Team for Domain Names and Internet Issues on 
Rev3.0 of the Draft Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLDs Fast Track Process.' Comment posted to 
ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track implementation.16 July 2009. Retrieved 30 
August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-implementation/msg00036.html  
809ICANN (2008). “IDNC Working Group (Former).” Retrieved 8 July, 2009, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idncwg.htm 
810 ICANN (2009). ‘ALAC Comment on the 3rd Revision of the Draft Implementation Plan for IDN 
ccTLDs.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
implementation. 27 July 2009. Retrieved 24 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-
implementation/pdfXTXo9udqHp.pdf 
811 ICANN (2009.) Requestors Manual: Fast Track Request System. Prepared for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Participants. 16 November 2009. Retrieved 4 September 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-requestors-manual-16nov09-en.pdf  P4  
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DNSO 
 
Prior to its replacement by the GNSO and CCNSO in the 2002-03 reforms, the DNSO 
had begun to play a role in ICANN’s early work on IDNs. In March 2001, the DNSO 
Names Council established an interim committee to propose terms of reference on 
Multilingual Domain Names.812 The Names Council also requested ICANN to review 
and evaluate the VeriSign testbed prior to live launch of IDN registrations813 and 
presented a business plan at the Melbourne meeting calling for the establishment of a 
task force to develop consensus policies for the implementation of internationalised 
domain names. 814 The DNSO’s recognition of the IDN issue, together with the 
interest shown by the GAC, helped to put the matter on the ICANN agenda.815  
 
Following the creation of the IDN Committee in September 2001, the DNSO supplied 
one member to that Committee.816  
 
ICANN staff 
 
Compared with new gTLDs policy, ICANN staff appear to have played less of a role 
in filling in details of policy. Staff were, however, responsible for drafting up the 
implementation plan for Fast Track.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Summary and analysis of key patterns  
 
In some respects, the IDNs policy development case study has revealed some quite 
different patterns compared with new gTLDs policy. Whereas the addition of new 
ASCII TLDs is trivial task from a technical perspective and raises only public policy 
                                                 
812 Park, Y.J. (2001). Email from Y.J. Park to DNSO Council members: RE: Interim Committee on 
Internationalized Domain Names. 16 March 2001. Retrieved 30 August 2011, from 
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/council/Arc05/msg00018.html  
813 Park, Y.J. (2001). Email from Y.J. Park to IDN Task Force members: RE: IDN TF Update. 2 
October  2001. Retrieved 30 August 2011, from http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/nc-
idn/Arc00/msg00001.html   
814ICANN (2001). Minutes of regular meeting of the Board. 13 March 2001. Retrieved 24 August 2011, 
fromhttp://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-13mar01.htm  
815 Ibid 
816 ICANN (2011). “Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee.” Retrieved 15 July 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/    
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issues rather than technical ones, IDN implementation has been uncharted territory in 
terms of technology as well as public policy. Particularly in the earlier years, ICANN 
was heavily reliant on other organisations in developing IDN technology. It has relied 
on the IETF for the IDNA standard, ISO and the Unicode Consortium for character 
tables, and software developers such as Microsoft and the Mozilla Foundation to 
provide IDNA compatible applications. There has also been a reliance on outside 
agencies to provide the linguistic and cultural expertise that does not exist within 
ICANN, particularly when dealing with matters such as defining a language or script 
and creating relevant conversion tables.   
 
Compared to new gTLDs policy, the development of IDNs policy appears to have 
been somewhat less controversial for the most part. This is all the more interesting 
considering the range of organisations and interests that have been represented in the 
policymaking process. The IDN working groups and committees have tended to draw 
their membership from across ICANN and even from outside agencies. This policy 
development process has thus appeared, on the surface, to be very much 
‘multistakeholder’ in nature. Furthermore, the various groups involved in bodies such 
as the IDNs Committee have tended to work collaboratively. Although this was 
difficult to confirm from the documentary evidence alone, it is the perception 
expressed by members of those bodies contacted by the author.Note 5_7 
 
However, closer inspection reveals that, despite the collaborative nature of the various 
policy committees working on IDNs, IDN policymaking could not be said to have 
been based on broad multistakeholderism in the truest sense. While a wide set of 
groups may have been given a chance to voice an opinion, a much more limited set of 
stakeholders have often been in the driving seat in terms of producing concrete policy.  
                                                 
Note 5_7 According to one of its members, Patrik Faltstrom (a representative of the technical community), 
the IDN Committee operated mostly in a collaborative manner as opposed to a bargaining forum 
between different interests. However, Falstrom also noted that some representatives were there for 
‘political reasons’ and did not contribute a great deal to the process (he did not specify which ones). 
(Patrick Falstrom, email to Paul White, 15 July 2009.) Hiro Hotta (a representative of the .jp registry), 
who acted as a consultant to the Committee, confirmed this, stating that “As far as I remember (or 
perceive), Committee members from gTLD registries and ccTLD registries were very collaborative. On 
the other hand, registries other than Committee members were not very much involved.” (Email from 
Hiro Hotta to Paul White, 18 July 2009). 
The collaborative rather than confrontational style of the discussions is similar to the way the New 
gTLDs  Committee operated (see previous chapter) but it is also interesting that those registries that 
served on the IDNs Committee (together with members of the technical community, such as Klensin) 
appear to have been the main driving force behind its work. 
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With regard to IDN implementation at the second level, the IDN Committee was 
dominated by the supply side (registries and registrars), and the IDN Guidelines in 
their several incarnations have been largely the work of the registries. To some 
degree, this makes practical sense, as the registries are the entities responsible for 
implementing IDNs in practice and thus in bringing real-world practical experience 
and expertise to policy setting; but it nonetheless makes the claim of multistakeholder 
policymaking somewhat less convincing.  
 
In terms of IDN TLDs, the split between gTLD and ccTLD policy was brought about 
by the creation of the Fast Track process for IDN ccTLDs, promoted by an alliance 
between the country-code registries and the GAC. Such close cooperation between the 
GAC and the CCNSO is perhaps an interesting reflection of the links between 
governments and their ‘national’ namespaces, notwithstanding the fact that some of 
the ccTLD registries are private corporations lacking formal close ties with their 
respective national governments. For many ccTLD registries, the incentive to support 
rapid introduction of IDN ccTLDs is likely to have been largely commercial (at any 
rate for those registries that are profit-making entities), particularly in those cases 
where Fast Track gives additional domains to the established operators rather than 
letting others propose to compete in-country (this decision is left to the discretion of 
national authorities817). On the governmental side, the GAC claims to be representing 
the interests of national language communities. There is strong pressure from many 
governments for IDN introduction, usually presented in the context of a need to 
broaden accessibility to the Internet, in line with goals set at WSIS. However, while 
these issues are important, it is also worth noting that demand for IDNs can become 
something of a political football and perhaps used to divert attention away from other 
issues. John Klensin notes that many of the languages that have been promoted by 
governments as ‘needing’ IDNs are used in territories that have very low literacy 
rates, as well as very low rates of Internet access. As he points out, people who have 
no Internet connection and who cannot read in any case will not derive much benefit 
from IDNs. Thus, the demand from governments for IDNs in those languages may 
have more to do with politics than a real urgent need, or an excuse to divert attention 
away from the real barriers to Internet penetration in the regions in question. Klensin 
                                                 
817 See reply by Tina Dam to question by Rahman Khanjohn at IDN ccTLD Fast Track Workshop, 26 
October 2009, Seoul, Korea. Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://sel.icann.org/meetings/seoul2009/transcript-idn-cctld-fast-track-26oct09-en.txt  
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argues that some of the IGF discussions on the issue have been characterised by 
‘IDNs as excuse’ for not having good Internet penetration in a given country despite 
significant investment; he cites both Brazil and China as examples of this.818  
 
Despite the strong support for IDNs from many governments, it is also the case that 
recognition and definitions of languages and scripts can potentially be politically very 
sensitive; in politics, passions can, of course, run very high around language and 
culture, and this could potentially spill over into IDN issues. There could, for 
example, be considerable political ramifications if ICANN were to grant an IDN TLD 
to a language community not officially recognised by the sovereign state where it 
resides. Fast Track is thus a pragmatic approach that allows the IDN ccTLD 
implementation process to move forward without being held up by controversial 
cases; in a sense, its very existence is recognition that some languages and scripts 
could prove controversial. It effectively gives governments control over what they 
will and will not accept; the measure for whether the ccTLD is required has been 
based ultimately on governmental request, and issues such as whether community 
support for the TLD exists have ultimately been settled on the basis that the relevant 
government says it does.819 It is also interesting that a number of governments have 
tended to oppose formal registry agreements for ccTLDs; this could be interpreted as 
a resistance to increased ICANN control over what governments see as ‘national’ 
ccTLD registries.  
 
Fast Track therefore effectively gives strong recognition to the primacy of 
governmental authority, and it does so for fundamentally pragmatic reasons. Whether 
this will continue to beyond Fast Track will depend upon the final shape of the future 
IDN ccTLD policy currently being developed by the CCNSO. It also remains to be 
seen whether more controversial cases will arise when IDN gTLDs begin to be 
created, or whether the governmental objection procedure will be used to allow 
governments to effectively control what they will and will not accept with regards to 
IDN gTLDs also.  
 
                                                 
818 Email from John Klensin to Paul White, 15 July 2009  
819 ICANN (2010). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 5 August 2010. Retrieved 24 August 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-05aug10-en.htm  
 189 
Overall, though, the pattern to date concerning governmental input has been similar to 
that observed in the new gTLDs area, in that the GAC has wielded strong influence 
and the principle of state sovereignty has been respected to a strong degree.   
 
Turning to the gTLD registries, the pattern has once again been one of collaboration 
with other ICANN agencies. The gTLD registries worked effectively with their 
ccTLD counterparts in developing and rewriting the various iterations of the IDN 
Guidelines. Collaboration between the ccTLD and gTLD registries has also been 
reflected in the ongoing dialogue between the CCNSO and GNSO via initiatives such 
as the CCNSO/GNSO Joint IDN Working Group (JIG). Nonetheless, there have been 
some areas of disagreement. On the question of mandatory formal contracts and 
mandatory financial payments for IDN ccTLD registries, the GNSO failed to secure a 
level playing field between ccTLD and gTLD IDN registries.   
 
Besides the GAC and the registries, other stakeholders have had a voice, but have 
tended to be less influential in the creation of real concrete policy. The ALAC, 
together with various other groups such as UNESCO, have had some input through 
the IDN Workshops and similar channels, but have had limited involvement with the 
groups that actually drew up policy (though the ALAC did supply two representatives 
to the IDNC Working Group). The RSSAC and SSAC have played a role in the 
creation of testing programmes and in providing evaluation of the likely technical 
impact of introducing IDN TLDs to the root zone, but have not tended to be involved 
in the public policy aspects. It is difficult to quantify exactly how much impact public 
comments have had, but given the very limited number of comments submitted, 
public commentators do not appear to have played a very large role in the process. As 
with new gTLDs, those comments that were submitted came mostly from interested 
parties rather than the ‘Internet-using public at large’.  
 
Intellectual property interests do not seem to have had a particularly large impact on 
the IDNs policy development area, and indeed have been much less vocal compared 
to their input into the new gTLDs PDP.  Although the no-mixed-script rules were 
introduced to combat potential for cybersquatting and spoofing, other measures 
advocated in public comments and workshops by members of the intellectual property 
lobby, such as mandatory sunrise periods and modification of the UDRP, have not 
become part of policy so far as the IDN ccTLDs introduced to date have been 
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concerned. However, the strong intellectual property protections incorporated into the 
new gTLDs programme will, of course, apply to IDN gTLDs as well as to ASCII 
gTLDs. Furthermore, a policy development process to re-examine the UDRP is 
currently being considered (see Chapter 6), which, if it goes ahead, may well pay 
attention to some of the particular issues raised by IDNs.   
 
Another interesting pattern that has emerged throughout the case study has been the 
apparent contest between ICANN’s attempts to centralise policymaking and the 
registries’ efforts to maintain autonomy. Something of this was identified in the 
gTLDs case study, but it has been more prominent here. VeriSign, in particular, has 
resisted such centralisation. Ultimately, however, VeriSign and other registries have 
accepted the Guidelines. John Klensin’s view, that VeriSign reconsidered its position 
due to the threat of being held responsible by the US courts for registrations outside of 
best practice, would seem to suggest that ICANN’s authority was implicitly propped 
up by the US judicial system. Whether this is the case or not, the episode did provide 
another demonstration of an area where regime norms, and the limits of ICANN’s 
authority, were not set in stone and were being explored and tested.  
 
A somewhat similar pattern can be discerned in the discussions around whether IDN 
ccTLD registries should be compelled to sign a formal contract with ICANN. On the 
one hand, formal registry agreements are not mandatory for existing ASCII ccTLD  
registries, and so to make them mandatory for IDN ccTLDs would in some ways 
appear to be an extension of ICANN’s authority over and above that currently existing 
for ASCII ccTLDs. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to suggest that some sort 
of agreement is required to enforce compliance with relevant IDN standards and 
policies. It remains to be seen whether the compromise reached in Fast Track, of 
avoiding full mandatory registry agreements while requiring the registry to sign up to 
a certain minimum set of conditions, including compliance with the IDNA standard 
and the IDN Guidelines820, will be carried over beyond Fast Track.    
 
Commercially, IDNs have so far been perhaps less successful than some of the 
registries might have hoped. Uptake of second-level IDNs has been steady, but not as 
                                                 
820 ICANN (2011). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 20 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/CCNSO-gac-issues-report-on-idn-
09jul07.pdf P36   
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spectacular as some had predicted. At the end of 2007, 3.8% of all domain 
registrations were IDNs.821 Looking at the example of Japan, a country where IDNs 
are well established at the second level, IDN registrations do not appear to have 
displaced traditional ASCII registrations to any great degree. As of January 2012, 
14% of all general purpose domain registrations under the .jp namespace were 
IDNs.822 Since these figures include all pre-existing registrations, it is inevitable that 
ASCII names would continue to outnumber IDN ones for at least a while; however, 
the number of IDN registrations in the .jp namespace has actually fallen from its peak 
in 2009 and registration rates show that .jp IDNs are still being registered at a much 
lower rate than ASCII ones823, so on current trends there is no sign of an end to the 
dominance of ASCII registrations under the .jp namespace. If Japanese IDNs have 
seen relatively modest uptake, on the other end of the scale there is very little interest 
at all in minority languages with a small number of speakers, and therefore little 
commercial incentive from the registries’ perspective to offer IDN registrations in 
those languages.  
 
Ultimately, most of the registries, particularly the gTLD registries, are commercial 
interests, and their aim is to make a profit from selling domain name registrations. If 
support for a given language / script is left to pure market considerations, it seems 
likely that minority scripts that do not currently represent a significant market will be 
ignored by the registries. In the final analysis this is likely one reason why many small 
/ minority language groups have not yet obtained IDN support and may find it 
difficult to do so in the future. However, that is not to say that market considerations 
are the only barrier to the provision of IDNs for smaller language groups. The chapter 
has highlighted the difficult task involved in even getting a language defined and 
drawing up relevant Unicode tables. Creation of language tables is very complex 
matter and requires intimate knowledge of a particular language. Minority languages 
are particularly likely to pose problems since they usually have no clear orthographic 
authority (such as a ccTLD manager) to define them, and additionally, as discussed, 
there are also often political considerations / controversy relating to their recognition. 
                                                 
821EURID (2008).  EURID’s Quarterly Progress Report to the European Commission, First Quarter 
2008,. Retrieved 24 August 2011, from http://www.eurid.eu/files/Q1_08.pdf.   
822 JPRS (2012). “Time-Series Data of JP Domain Name Registration (since 1992).” Retrieved 23 
January 2012, from http://jprs.co.jp/en/stat/domains.html  
823 Ibid 
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The advent of IDN gTLDs, and later the expansion of the IDN ccTLD programme 
beyond Fast Track, may prove to open up more opportunities for small language 
communities to gain an IDN TLD, but political and economic barriers are likely to 
remain in at least some cases. With regards to IDN gTLDs, governments may use the 
governmental objection procedure to block any applications they find politically 
unacceptable, while the substantial fees are also likely to prove a barrier to small 
groups, particularly in developing countries.   
A good example of these issues may be provided by the case of India. In January 2011 
ICANN approved the delegation of seven IDN ccTLDs to the National Internet 
Exchange of India, representing various languages spoken in the country. 824 While 
this represents a major step in providing IDN support for speakers of India’s most 
common languages, there are actually several hundred languages spoken across the 
country, at least 85 of which are in written use,825 and it seems unlikely that all of 
these will be granted a ccTLD in the foreseeable future. Smaller Indian language 
communities might have more chance of obtaining an IDN gTLD, but here too there 
are barriers. These include the challenges of putting together a consortium with 
sufficient financial backing to pay the gTLD application fees; this may not be 
economically viable for a language community with only a few tens or hundreds of 
thousands of speakers, as is the case with many Indian languages. Just as significant a 
barrier may be presented by the difficulties of drawing up language tables for each 
individual Indian language and making them distinct from each other. For example, 
the Tamil character வ  (U+0BB5) is similar to the Malayalam character (U+0D16) 
and in some fonts may be virtually indistinguishable. 826 If there are difficulties in 
supporting both languages, it seems likely that the more widely spoken (and already 
implemented) Tamil will win out. 
 
 
 
                                                 
824 ICANN (2011). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 25 January 2011. Retrieved 29 August 
2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-25jan11-en.htm  
825 Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs. (2001). “Census of India 2001: Data on 
Language.” Retrieved 8 July 2011, from 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/data_on_language.h
tml 
826 Hussain, S. and R. Mohan (2008). ‘Localization in Asia Pacfic.’ Digital Review of Asia Pacific 
2007-2008. F. Librero and P. B. Arinto. New Delhi, Sage Publications India: 43-58. P48  
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Conclusion to Chapter 5 
 
The IDNs case study provides further evidence to undermine the conception of 
ICANN as a mere ‘technical co-ordinator’. While IDNs policy is partly about the 
implementation of an IETF technical standard while safeguarding the stability of the 
DNS, it also inevitably raises political and public policy issues, such as issues of 
which groups will get an IDN TLD and how to define a language or script. 
Furthermore, there is clearly a potential for significant political controversy over IDN 
implementation, particularly with regard to recognition or definition of languages. The 
existence of Fast Track is effectively an acknowledgement of this; its purpose being to 
prevent the whole process being stalled by intractable ‘problem’ cases. While ICANN 
appears to have avoided getting embroiled in any major overt political controversy 
over IDNs so far, there is clearly always a danger of this. The desire to avoid such 
controversy has resulted in significant approval or veto power being handed to 
national governments over which languages / scripts will be supported.  
 
Notwithstanding this, IDNs policy development has arguably come somewhat closer 
to the ideal of‘consensus’ based policymaking than the New gTLDs PDP, in that 
IDNs policy has proved significantly less controversial overall. For the most part, the 
broad strokes of policy have been widely supported; unlike new gTLDs, there does 
not appear to have been much opposition to the basic principle of creating IDN sLDs 
and TLDs. Nonetheless, some areas of policy have been contested. There have been 
significant commercial interests and competition issues at stake, for example the issue 
of whether incumbent ASCII registries should be entitled to the IDN equivalent of 
their existing TLD string; political interests, including questions surrounding the right 
of governments to approve or veto applications; and questions as to whether IDN 
ccTLD registries should be subject to mandatory registry agreements and compulsory 
annual fees. Overall, therefore, the case study lends further support to Weinberg’s 
contention that the issues dealt with by ICANN are not amenable to resolution by 
consensus.827  
 
At-least on-the-surface, the-patterns-observed through-the-policy-development  
                                                 
827 Weinberg, J (2000). “ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy.” Duke Law Journal 50(1):187-260. 
P252 
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process have-appeared-to-conform-to-the-multistakeholder-model, given the range of 
ICANN bodies and associated interest groups-playing-a-role-in-the-process. However, 
closer-examination reveals that some-groups-and-interests-have played-a much-more-
dominant-role-than-others-in-terms-of-actually-producing-concrete policy. The-IDNs-
case study provides further-demonstration of the influence-held both by-governments-
via-the-GAC, and-some-commercial-interests, particularly-on the supply side; it is the 
registries, along with governments, that appear to have largely driven the IDNs 
process. Despite the fact that the intellectual property lobby has been much-less-
prominent-compared-with-the-new-gTLDs-policy-area, the overall pattern with regard 
to IDNs has-therefore-reinforced-the-lessons-gleaned-from-the gTLDs study; that two 
of the most significant forces within ICANN are commercial interests, and political 
(governmental) ones. By contrast the ‘global Internet using public’ has had very little 
influence and in fact has hardly participated. Like the New gTLDs study, therefore, 
the IDNs case study provides further evidence to support a model of ‘narrow 
multistakeholderism’ as opposed to the truly broad-based multistakeholder 
policymaking model-promoted-by-ICANN’s founders and-by some-subsequent 
anaylsts-such as Mathiason-and-Crawford.  
 
The-strong-influence-held-by governments-in this-policy-development-area-could-be 
used-to-lend-some-weight-to-a statist-interpretation-of ICANN. While such a view 
would be too simplistic, as governments were-obviously not-the-only-actors-of 
significance, with the registries being at least as important, the influence held by 
governments in this policy area-tells-us something-both-about-governmental priorities 
and-the-leverage-they have within-the regime. Mueller-believes that-governments-
got-their-own way-on a number of issues related to IDN ccTLDs (including issues of 
application fees, annual financial contributions and registry agreements) because there 
was a credible threat of them opting to defect from the regime over the issue and 
create national IDN roots much as China did in 2006.828 
 
Like the new gTLDs study, the IDNs case study also provides a further demonstration 
that some of the ICANN regime norms remain in flux and are being modified via the 
interactions of policy development. A good example of this has been the contest 
between ICANN’s efforts to exert authority over the registries versus the desire of 
                                                 
828 Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. P234 
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some registries (particularly VeriSign) to remain as autonomous as may be; and also 
in the debates surrounding the issue of mandatory versus voluntary registry 
agreements for IDN ccTLD registries.    
 
The policy area also highlights the fact that ICANN does not operate in isolation but 
forms part of a wider web of Internet governance bodies. There has been a reliance on 
other agencies to provide both technical standardisation and the linguistic and cultural 
expertise that does not exist within ICANN.  
 
On a final note, the process of implementing IDNs is far from complete, but based on 
uptake so far, IDNs do not appear to have yet had a big enough impact to really 
transform Internet accessibility and perhaps provoke a new online commercial boom 
in the way some proponents have hoped. However, from the foundations laid over the 
last decade in terms of testing, developing and maturing IDN technology, these goals 
may eventually come to fruition. It remains to be seen whether commercial and 
political interests will continue to dictate which languages are supported, or if non-
commercial groups, particularly minority language and cultural groups, are able to 
press their case strongly enough within the ICANN system to ensure that their 
interests are served also. In the longer term, the answers to these questions may 
provide further interesting insights into the nature of the ICANN regime. 
 
The next chapter will turn to a significantly different but no less important area of 
ICANN policy, namely the Uniform Domain-Name Disputes Resolution Policy 
(UDRP).    
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Chapter 6 
Policy development case study 3: 
Uniform Domain Name Disputes Resolution Policy 
(UDRP) 
 
Introduction 
 
ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) is a mechanism 
for the resolution of disputes pertaining to the registration of domain names. The need 
for such a system was recognised by ICANN’s founders due to the activities of 
‘cybersquatters’, a group of speculators who would register names that corresponded 
to the trademarks of companies and then seek to resell the names to those companies 
at a greatly increased price. The UDRP is intended to provide a fast, cheap arbitration 
system as an alternative to lengthy and expensive court proceedings in cybersquatting 
cases. Based on a WIPO study829 commissioned by the Clinton administration 
immediately prior to ICANN’s founding, it was adopted by ICANN’s initial Board in 
late 1999.830 It has so far survived unchanged since that time, though an abortive 
review took place in 2002-03 and the GNSO is currently considering whether to 
initiate another review. 
 
The fact that the UDRP has survived without modification for so long makes this 
policy area quite different to the previous two case studies. However, the policy’s 
longevity is interesting in itself. This chapter will explore why the UDRP has 
persisted unchanged for more than a decade, and whether this is due to a consensus 
view that the policy is basically sound, or to the influence of certain interests within 
ICANN.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
829 WIPO (1999). Final Report of the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process. April 30, 1999. 
Retrieved 15 September 2011, from  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process1/report/index.html  
830 ICANN (1999). Minutes of Meeting of the Initial Board. 26 August 1999. Retrieved 20th September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-26aug99.htm  
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Background 
 
UDRP Overview 
 
The UDRP consists of two documents: the Policy itself831, and the UDRP Rules, 
which provide the baseline procedural requirements that must be followed in a UDRP 
proceeding.832 It currently applies to all .biz, .com, .info, .name, .net, and .org gTLDs, 
and has been adopted, either in its original form or a modified one, by many ccTLD 
registries. When a domain name is registered in one of these TLDs, the registrant is 
required to ‘represent and warrant’ that registering the name ‘will not infringe upon or 
otherwise violate the rights of any third party’ and agree to UDRP arbitration should 
any third party assert a claim. The scope of the policy is limited to cases of bad faith 
cybersquatting as defined in the policy, and is not intended to apply to any other kind 
of domain name dispute. The UDRP’s stated aim is to create a streamlined process for 
resolving such disputes, intended to be quicker and cheaper than a standard legal 
challenge. However, a dissatisfied party may still challenge a UDRP decision in 
court.833  
 
A trademark or service mark owner that believes it can prove a case of cybersquatting 
initiates a UDRP proceeding by filing a complaint with one of the four ICANN 
accredited dispute-resolution service providers (DRPs): the Czech Arbitration Court 
(CAC), the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADRC); the National 
Arbitration Forum (NAF); and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO).834 There have also been two other accredited dispute resolution providers in 
the past, including the CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution, and eResolution. 835 All DRPs follow a similar procedure as mandated by 
the UDRP.  A panel of one or three members acts as arbiter; the party that initiates the 
proceeding (called the ‘complainant’) specifies whether a one or three member panel 
is desired.  If the complainant designates a single-member panel, the domain name 
                                                 
831 ICANN (1999). Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. Adopted: August 26, 1999. 
Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm  
832ICANN (1999). Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"). As 
approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 30 October 2009. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm  
833 ICANN (1999). Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. Adopted: August 26, 1999. 
Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm  
834 ICANN (2011). List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers. Retrieved 16 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm  
835 Ibid 
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owner (the ‘respondent’) may elect to have the dispute heard by a three-member 
panel, at extra cost which is met by the respondent, otherwise the whole fee is paid by 
the complainant. 836 Fees for a standard proceeding for one domain name with a one-
member panel vary from US $1000 (ADRC)837 to US $1500 (WIPO)838, rising to 
$2500 (ADRC)839 to $4000 (WIPO)840 for a three-member panel.    
 
To secure a name transfer under the UDRP, the burden is on the complainant to 
demonstrate each of these three elements: 
 
(i) The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and 
(ii) The holder has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain 
name; and 
(iii) The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. 841  
 
It should be noted that both bad faith registration and use are required to be 
demonstrated in order to secure transfer. Paragraph 4(b) of the policy lists some 
examples of what might be considered ‘bad faith’ registration and use, but the list is 
non-exhaustive and leaves panellists much scope to use their own judgement. 842   
 
If the panel deems all three criteria to have been adequately demonstrated, it will 
order transfer or cancellation of the domain name. There is no appeal mechanism, 
although, as noted, a dissatisfied party retains the right to take the matter to a national 
court. Losing respondents are allowed ten business days to file a challenge in a 
competent court, otherwise the domain name is transferred to the complainant (or 
occasionally cancelled).843  
                                                 
836 ICANN (1999). Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. Adopted: August 26, 1999. 
Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm 
837ADRC (2011). Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre: Fees (US Dollars). Retrieved 16 
September 2011, from  https://www.adndrc.org/hk_schedule_fees.html  
838 WIPO (2011). Schedule of Fees under the UDRP (valid as of December 1, 2002). Retrieved 16 
September 2011, from http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/index.html  
839 ADRC (2011). Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre: Fees (US Dollars). Retrieved 16 
September 2011, from https://www.adndrc.org/hk_schedule_fees.html  
840WIPO (2011). Schedule of Fees under the UDRP (valid as of December 1, 2002). Retrieved 16 
September 2011, from http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/index.html  
841 ICANN (1999). Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. Adopted: August 26, 1999. 
Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm 
842 Ibid 
843 Ibid 
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Rule 15 gives panels the power to designate bad faith complaints as ‘reverse domain 
name hijacking’ (RDNH) attempts; however there are no actual sanctions for an 
RDNH finding. 844 A panel has the freedom to apply ‘any rules and principles of law 
that it deems applicable’.845 In practice, some panellists have used this clause to apply 
the laws of a party’s home country; however, sometimes they apply the laws of their 
own country, and in other cases apply no laws at all, instead inventing or adopting 
UDRP rules to deal with a particular situation. 846  
 
Policy development: history  
 
Initial policy creation  
 
With the commercialisation of the Internet in the 1990s, domain names began to be 
viewed as an important identifier, or even as a brand name, by corporate entities. 
Once domain names were thought of as a brand, it quickly led trademark holders to 
the conclusion that trademarks might or should imply rights to corresponding domain 
names.847 At the same time, from the mid-1990s, the phenomenon known as 
‘cybersquatting’ emerged. In response to pressure from trademark owners to tackle 
the issue, NSI developed a Dispute Settlement Policy, first implemented in November 
1996. Under this policy, a complaint about a domain name registration from a 
corresponding trademark owner resulted in the name being suspended until the 
dispute was resolved, either in court or by mutual agreement.848 However, this policy 
attracted much criticism, as the domain name would be automatically suspended 
regardless of the rights and wrongs of the case. Additionally, since the domain name 
was made unavailable for use by any party until the dispute was settled, and because 
court proceedings could take a long time, companies wanting to make immediate use 
                                                 
844 ICANN (1999). Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"). As 
approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 30 October 2009. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm Rule 15. 
845 Ibid 
846 Simon, D.A. (2011). “An empirical analysis of fair use decisions under the Uniform Domain-Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy.” Boston College Law Review 53(1) (forthcoming 2012). Retrieved 18 
November 2011, from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1993121_code1008893.pdf?abstractid=1887888&
mirid=1 P27 
847 Froomkin, M. (2002). "ICANN’S ‘Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’ – Causes and (partial) 
Cures." Brooklyn Law Review 67(3): 605-718. PP620-622  
848 Network Solutions Inc. (1995). NSI Domain Dispute Resolution Policy Statement. July 2005. 
Retrieved 15 August 2011, from http://www.lectlaw.com/files/inp08.htm  
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of the disputed domain name often had no choice but to settle the issue by making a 
payment to the other party, even in clear cases of cybersquatting.849 
 
In the White Paper (June 1998) that led to the formation of ICANN, the US 
government stated its intention to commission the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) to conduct a consultative study on domain name/trademark 
issues.850 This was carried out between July 1998 and April 1999, during which time 
ICANN came into being. The final WIPO report was submitted to ICANN on 30th 
April 1999 and recommended institution of a policy followed uniformly by all 
registrars in the .com, .net, and .org TLDs. On May 27th, the ICANN Board 
commended WIPO on its report, instructed the testbed registrars to collaborate on a 
model dispute resolution policy for voluntary adoption, and referred the WIPO report 
to the DNSO for its recommendations. 851  
In response, the DNSO appointed a working group, known as Working Group A, to 
study the matter. (See Appendix 6.1 for full list of members). On 29 July 1999, 
Working Group A submitted its final report to the DNSO Names Council, 
recommending establishment of a uniform domain-name dispute-resolution policy for 
all registrars. The Names Council adopted the Working Group A report (with minor 
revisions) on 4th August and sent it to the ICANN Board as a consensus 
recommendation. It should be noted that the newly-formed Non-Commercial Users 
Constituency (NCUC) was not invited to participate in this process, a fact that was 
later criticised by a number of posters in the public comments periods. 852 
                                                 
849 Kur, A. (2002) “UDRP: A Study by the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, 
Copyright and Competition Law, Munich." 15 January 2002. Retrieved 12 September 2011, from 
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The registrars' model policy was published on August 20. 853 An ICANN Staff Report 
“Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars" was presented to the 25 
August public forum held in Santiago, Chile. It was supportive of most of the points 
of the GNSO report and recommended that a UDRP be introduced based on the 
registrars’ model policy.854  
On 26 August, the Board accepted the DNSO recommendation for establishment of a 
uniform domain-name dispute-resolution policy, and instructed ICANN staff to 
prepare implementation documents for approval after public comment, using the 
registrars' Model Policy as a starting point.855 On 29 September a Staff Report on 
Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, together with 
implementation documents consisting of the written UDRP and uniform rules, were 
published.856 These were presented for public comment until 13 October 1999.857  
 
Despite numerous objections in the Public Comments periods858 and at the Public 
Forum in Santiago859, the process of implementing the proposals went ahead. On 24 
October 1999, a Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy was presented to the Board.860 This document noted the 
input received in the public comments, but recommended that implementation should 
go ahead of an essentially unaltered policy, pointing out that the nature of the policy 
had already been approved. It further suggested that implementation should not be 
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further delayed and that any refinements to the implementation strategy could be 
studied by the DNSO at a later date.861   
 
The Board approved the implementation documents on the same date.862 On 29 
November, the first dispute-resolution service provider (WIPO) was approved, and the 
service became active on 1 December. The first proceeding under the UDRP 
(worldwrestlingfederation.com) commenced on 9 December 1999.863 
2002- 03 UDRP review 
Despite the apparent haste with which the UDRP was brought into being, very little 
opportunity has been given since for reconsideration or revision. The only significant 
review of the UDRP to date took place in 2002-2003, as part of the wider ICANN 
reform process that took place at that time. The issue was initially studied by the 
DNSO UDRP Review Task Force, and subsequently taken over by the DNSO’s 
successor organisation, the GNSO.  
The DNSO Task Force was made up of about 20 members, including representatives 
from each of the DNSO's constituencies and the DNSO General Assembly, 
representatives from the dispute resolution servive providers, panellists, a 
representative complainant and respondent, and independent experts from the ADR 
and academic communities.864 A questionnaire to solicit public comment was posted 
to the DNSO and ICANN websites for response.865 A total of 377 responses were 
received. 866 In addition, the Task Force utilised a range of other existing studies and 
reports concerning the UDRP.867  The positions of the various DNSO Constituencies 
in the matter are included in Appendix 6.2.  
                                                 
861 Ibid, Section 4.  
862 ICANN (1999). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 24 October 1999. Retrieved 16 August 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-24oct99.htm  
863 Source: ICANN (2011). “Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy.” Retrieved 16 September 2011, from 
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864 ICANN. (2003). Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review. Retrieved 23 September, 2009, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/gnso/issue-reports/udrp-review-report-01aug03.htm   
865 ICANN (2001). UDRP Review Questionnaire. 2 November 2001. Retrieved 18 September 2011, 
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866 Ibid 
867 ICANN (2003). Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review. 1 August 2003. Retrieved 17 
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The work of the Task Force, however, was interrupted following the disbandment of 
the DNSO in the 2002-2003 reforms. The GNSO Council, under whose remit the 
matter had now fallen, dissolved the UDRP Task Force and instead requested ICANN 
staff to produce an Issues Report on UDRP review, to be based on the research 
conducted by the Task Force. 868 This Issues Report was published on 1 August 2003 
and identified a number of issues for further investigation, including both procedural 
and substantive issues.869 However, it then went on to state that, based on the above, 
revision of the UDRP was likely to be contentious, as there were not many (if any) 
areas obviously amenable to achieving consensus; that, while there were some areas 
where improvements may be possible, there did not appear to be an urgent need for 
revision; and that the GNSO Council had other issues to deal with that may warrant a 
higher priority.870 
 
The GNSO Council responded by requesting all Constituencies review the Issues 
Report.871 Following this, however, the issue of UDRP review appears to have been 
quietly dropped, with no formal vote being held on whether to proceed with a PDP.   
 
IDN-related UDRP reform proposals 
 
Calls for UDRP modification to deal with the issues presented by IDNs were received 
in various public comments periods and meetings as part of the IDNs PDP (see 
previous chapter). The IDN Working Group (2001) recommended new guidelines 
setting out how the UDRP should be applied in disputes involving IDN 
registrations872, but this has so far not been implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
868 Ibid 
869 Ibid 
870 Ibid 
871ICANN (2004). A review of the GNSO Council voting record. 22 December 2004. Retrieved 17 
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872 ICANN. (2001). Report of the Internationalized Domain Names Internal Working Group of the 
ICANN Board of Directors. Retrieved 18 May, 2009, from 
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eUDRP  
 
A proposal to move the UDRP towards a ‘paperless’ procedure, or ‘eUDRP’   was 
submitted by WIPO on December 30, 2008873 and posted for public comment in 
summer 2009. On 30 October 2009, the ICANN Board approved changing the Rules 
to allow for electronic filing of complaints (previously required in hard copy), so long 
as hard copy notification that a complaint has been filed is provided to a 
respondent.874   
 
2011 Issues Report 
 
On 3 February 2011, the GNSO Council requested that ICANN staff prepare an Issues 
Report on the current state of the UDRP and whether a new PDP was required.875 To 
support staff research activities, the Council convened a drafting team that focused on 
two efforts to quickly discern current thinking on the UDRP. 876 These included a 
UDRP Questionnaire sent to each of the ICANN approved UDRP providers877, and a 
UDRP ‘Webinar’, or online seminar, conducted on 10 May 2011.878  
 
The ‘Webinar’ consisted of a series of short presentations by selected speakers. A list 
of these speakers is included in Appendix 6.3. The majority of speakers were 
individuals who could be expected to have a pro-UDRP bias, such as representatives 
of the DRPs, UDRP panellists and trademark lawyers. Most speakers opposed any 
substantive changes to the UDRP, though a number did suggest certain procedural 
changes and / or additional clarification of certain points.879 Three speakers favoured 
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changes to the ‘bad faith’ requirement so that complainants would need to 
demonstrate only bad faith registration or use, rather than both. An academic speaker, 
Konstantinos Komaitis, was the only individual to suggest deep substantive changes 
to the policy. Following the presentations, questions were taken from four members of 
the public.  
 
The input from the questionnaires and ‘Webinar’ largely formed the basis of the 
Issues Report. The extent to which the Issues Report was based on balanced input is 
therefore somewhat questionable, since critics of the UDRP (with the exception of 
Komaitis) were not consulted in either of these exercises; and the apparently one-
sided and closed nature of this process raises questions about the extent to which 
ICANN staff have been captured by the trademark lobby.  
 
The Issues Report, published on 27 May 2011, recommended that a PDP on the 
UDRP not be initiated at this time.880 It did, however recommend that a small group 
of ‘experts’ be convened to produce proposals on procedural improvements only. 
However, the final decision on whether to initiate a PDP rests with the GNSO 
Council, and at the time of writing that decision has not yet been made.  
 
Perspectives on the UDRP 
 
There has been a substantial amount of analysis and comment on the UDRP in the 
academic literature, some of which has focused upon understanding the UDRP in the 
context of international trademark law, and much of which has tended to be critical of 
various aspects of the policy. 
 
UDRP and international law 
 
DNS is a good example of how global digital technologies, which transcend national 
boundaries, can challenge the jurisdictional competence of any single nation state. 881 
                                                                                                                                            
  
880ICANN (2011). Preliminary GNSO Issue Report : “The Current State of the UDRP.” 27 May 
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881Helfer, L. R. (2001). “International Dispute Settlement at the Trademark-Domain Name Interface.” 
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Research Paper No. 2001-9. April, 2001. Retrieved 10 September 
2011, from http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=265922  P1 
 206 
The issue is, of course, not unique to domain names; however, previous efforts to 
create cross-border intellectual property regimes have been based on interstate 
treaties. The UDRP, as a system set up by a nongovernmental entity (ICANN), 
departs significantly from this principle. Furthermore, under more conventional 
intellectual property regimes, day-to-day enforcement is left to private party actions 
before national courts. Unlike these, the UDRP does not rely on state-based 
enforcement of its decisions; since it controls the DNS root, ICANN has the capacity 
to enforce its decisions over domain name registration disputes without reference to 
any other agency.  
 
Because of these factors, a number of analysts have seen the UDRP as effectively 
playing the role of a private, globalised domain name trademark ‘law’. David Sorkin, 
for example, sees the UDRP as having effectively given rise to a new system of 
international common law, with panelists increasingly citing, and relying upon, 
previous UDRP decisions.882 Elizabeth Thornburg similarly sees the UDRP as an 
attermpt to create an effective ‘international trademark law’ that is difficult to 
reconcile with national law because of differences in substantive law and 
procedure.883 Konstantinos Komaitis also views the UDRP as a supranational law of 
trademarks that amounts to a ‘usurpation of legislative rights of the nations of the 
world.’884  
 
A counter-argument is that, in contrast to other forms of legal arbitration, UDRP 
arbitration is not legally binding except on the registrar, and does not take away the 
possibility to submit the case to national courts. In a study for the Max Planck 
Institute, Annette Kur argues that the UDRP is not in itself “law”, but ultimately 
draws its legal basis from contract law; in the contract between the registrar and the 
domain name registrant, the registrant expressly submits to the Policy and the 
Procedural Rules by which it is implemented.885  
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2003(1).  Electronic journal. Retrieved 14 October 2009, from  
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Graeme Dinwoodie and Laurence Helfer describe the UDRP as a ‘new legal creature 
unlike any of its international dispute settlement antecedents’; a hybrid system made 
up of elements from three decision-making models: judicial, arbitral, and 
ministerial.886 Unlike other transborder dispute settlement systems, they point out, 
neither the UDRP’s substantive content nor its prescriptive force necessarily depend 
upon the laws, institutions, or enforcement mechanisms of any single nation-state or 
treaty regime.887 While it constitutes ‘soft law’ in theory, they assert, the UDRP 
represents much ‘harder law’ in practice, since the external checking role of national 
courts is very much weaker than might initially appear to be the case.888 Not only is 
the window to initiate a court proceeding extremely brief, they assert, but furthermore 
respondents who do challenge panel decisions in court may not possess a clear cause 
of action in the relevant jurisdiction. Since national laws vary widely, diverse national 
courts are likely to differ widely over the extent of review they grant to UDRP rulings 
and over conflict-of-laws methodologies they apply to determine the applicable 
substantive rules.889 Helfer argues that the UDRP’s operation has been ‘far more 
autonomous in practice than its drafters had envisioned.’890 
 
It is certainly the case that only a very small percentage (less than 2%) of UDRP 
rulings are actually challenged in national courts.891 Furthermore, critics, such as 
Michael Froomkin, argue that courts in the US and elsewhere would be inclined to 
defer to the UDRP decision.892 No statistics appear to be available as to the percentage 
of cases where this has occurred. On some occasions, though, courts have shown 
themselves willing to overturn UDRP rulings.  WIPO lists a ‘selection’ of UDRP 
cases that have subsequently been challenged in court, but only 31 cases are listed, 
and the final verdicts are not recorded on the list.893 One of these cases, however, was 
well publicised, when a US court overturned a NAF panel decision (case 
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892 Froomkin, A.M. (2002), “ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, Causes and (Partial) 
Cures”. Brooklyn Law Review, 67(3): 605-718. P637 
893 WIPO (2011). “Selection of UDRP-related Court Cases.” Retrieved 18 September 2011, from 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/challenged/index.html  
 208 
FA0204000112565). The original NAF decision (July 15, 2002) had transferred the 
domain name freebie.com to the complainant Freebies Publishing, Carpinteria, CA, on 
the grounds that the complainant held a trademark in the name ‘Freebies’, despite the 
fact that the respondent, Retail Services, Inc., Plano, TX , was engaged in a very 
different line of business to the complainant.894  The decision was overturned by a US 
court. In overturning the decision, the judge ruled that UDRP decisions are not 
afforded deference by the district courts.895 This ruling was subsequently upheld by 
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that the term "freebies" is 
generic.896 In a similar case, that of barcelona.com, the US Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, again ruled that it would not grant UDRP decisions any deference.897 
 
Helfer sees the UDRP as a largely American invention, asserting that, although the 
original WIPO study had considered a wide variety of sources, the final text of the 
UDRP was dominated by American laws and legal structures and, he feels, bears 
‘more than a passing resemblance’ to the US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (ACPA).898 Note 6.1 Furthermore, Helfer argues, legal challenges to UDRP 
decisions have tended to be submitted mainly in US courts. He reasons that trademark 
owners find US courts attractive because of the existence of the ACPA, which offers 
the potential of claiming statutory damages, while for registrants, the ACPA is the 
only national law to create an express cause of action for review of UDRP rulings, 
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allowing registrants to establish the legality of their conduct and restore their 
ownership of the domain name.899 
 
Helfer further claims that US courts may give less weight to non-US trademarks, 
citing the Barcelona.com case, in which the panel judged that, because the City 
Council of Barcelona had no US trademark rights in the word ‘Barcelona’, the 
registration and use of a domain name containing ‘Barcelona’ was not unlawful under 
US law. The logical consequence of this reasoning, Helfer notes, is that foreign mark 
owners will always lose UDRP review cases filed by domain name registrants in US 
courts. 900  
 
Helfer argues that other national governments have tended to acquiesce to this 
extension of US control over the domain name system, rather than, for example, 
passing their own national legislation that might conflict with the ACPA.901 He 
suggests several possible reasons for this. Firstly, since nearly half of all UDRP 
disputes involve US mark owners or US registrants, it may be that other governments 
are content to let the US serve the world’s domain name policeman. Secondly, Helfer 
suggests, governments may be willing to acquiesce to US dominance over gTLD 
disputes because they are primarily concerned with sovereignty over their ccTLDs.902   
 
Criticism of the UDRP 
 
Since the UDRP’s inception, two broad categories of criticism have been levelled at 
the policy. The first is based around the notion that, while some form of trademark 
protection for domain names is legitimate and necessary, the current UDRP is flawed, 
frequently returning inconsistent and often unjust decisions. The second type of 
criticism focuses upon a more fundamental issue, namely the extent to which 
trademark rights should hold sway over domain names and the inherent conflict with 
principles of free speech.  
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Criticism of policy design and procedure   
 
Soon after its inception, Helfer challenged the legitimacy of the UDRP on the basis 
that a legitimate disputes resolution mechanism must ensure that the private parties 
affected by the system have significant involvement in developing its mandatory 
rules, or at least a meaningful ability to challenge the results in specific cases, and that 
national governments must also have opportunities to contribute to the system’s 
substantive outcomes. Helfer argues that the UDRP is deficient in both of these 
areas.903   
 
Another early critic, Robert Badgley, asserted that the first year of UDRP operation 
had resulted in numerous low quality decisions, which, he argued, was the result of 
flawed UDRP design. Badgley proposed a series of reforms to rectify this, including: 
penalisation of bad-faith complaints; clarification of the analysis required to establish 
identity or confusing similarity; confirmation that “sucks.com” domain name is not 
identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark; clarification of the 
relationship between free-speech rights and trademark rights in the context of protest 
sites; clarification of the definition of competitors; and clarification of the burden of 
proof on the rights or legitimate interests element.904  
 
The compressed timeline of the UDRP, while lauded as a desirable feature by its 
proponents, has been seen as problematic by its critics, such as Elizabeth Thornburg 
and Michael Froomkin, who feel that the 20-day notice period is inadequate to allow 
respondents to prepare a proper defence;905 906 Froomkin believes this may be the 
main reason for high respondent default rates.907 Komaitis notes that the short notice 
period affects the respondent only, as the complainant can take as much time as they 
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please to prepare their case before submitting the complaint.908 Froomkin also argues 
that the UDRP fails even to ensure that the respondent has actual notice of the 
proceeding,909 and that the ten-day limit for losers to begin legal proceedings 
represents “a very crabbed and limited opportunity” for complainants who lose a 
UDRP action to get their cases into court.910  
 
Sorkin argues that US courts should not rely on the decisions reached by the UDRP 
system, given the problems of its procedure.911  He feels that many of the decisions 
being relied upon as precedent involved controversial rulings, often reaching results 
that were inconsistent with other decisions or with the UDRP itself, and argues that 
the problem is compounded by the lack of an appeal or review procedure.912 Sorkin 
believes that, while the UDRP was intended to balance the interests of trademark 
owners with those of domain name registrants, in practice it is quite unbalanced, and 
fails to afford parties the due process protections they would have in a legal 
proceeding.913 Thornburg likewise criticises the UDRP as lacking the basic 
characteristics necessary for an adequate regime, arguing, like Sorkin, that it falls far 
short of due process ideals,914 that it favours trademark holders915 and that its 
problems are compounded by the lack of mechanisms to reconcile differing 
interpretations or rectify bad decisions. 916 Thornburg also identifies the lack of face to 
face arbitration, with no opportunities for cross-examination, as problematic.917 Other 
analysts, including Kesan and Gallo, also agree that problems with the UDRP 
procedure are compounded by the absence of a review mechanism. 918  
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In her 2002 UDRP review, Kur took a more balanced view, concluding that the UDRP 
was functioning satisfactorily and had no major flaws.919 She did, however, concede 
that “considerable differences” existed between the outcome of decisions reached by 
eResolution panels on one hand and NAF and WIPO panels on the other. She also 
made some recommendations for improvement, mostly related to procedure and 
clarification of policy guidelines, including: consideration of the conditions under 
which a domain name is found to be "confusingly similar" with a mark; measures to 
be taken in order to safeguard the interests of free speech; and rules concerning the 
burden of proof and the standards to be applied in the assessment of the parties' 
contentions. She felt that discussion between all providers and panellists on the aims 
and scope of the policy would help to reduce inconsistencies, and also suggested that 
an appeal mechanism should be considered, together with consideration of a rule that 
the respondent automatically forfeits the domain name in case of default.920  
 
 Similarly, Douglas Hancock, while overall supportive of the UDRP, acknowledges 
some of its shortcomings, including lack of a clear system of precedent, resulting in 
decisions continuing to go both ways on questions such as bad faith and the 
legitimacy of ‘parody’ names. 921 Hancock also acknowledges a number of other 
shortcomings of the policy, including: lack of guidance in choice of law questions; 
continuing uncertainty over the ambit of the UDRP as it relates to celebrities and 
geographical areas without registered trademarks; and difficulty in dealing with 
certain cases effectively based on the restricted length of submissions required of the 
parties.922   
 
A recent study by David Simon found that on some of these questions, such as the 
legitimacy of ‘parody’ names, two competing viewpoints or sets of precedent have 
emerged among panellists. For example, a proportion of WIPO panels have held to 
the view that use of a trademarked word in a domain name aimed at criticism or 
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parody of the trademark owner represents fair use, while a rival doctrine holds to the 
opposite view. A similar situation exists with regard to ‘fan site’ names.923  
The cause of inconsistencies in UDRP decisions, Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, stems 
from the lack of effective checking mechanisms in the policy’s design. They argue 
that, despite the hybrid nature of the UDRP, checking devices found in one or another 
of the adjudicatory, arbitral, and ministerial models are missing or insufficient to 
constrain UDRP panel decision making; moreover, they assert, ambiguities and 
contradictions as to the source and content of the UDRP’s checking functions send 
conflicting messages to panels and create incentives for them to act in ways the 
UDRP’s drafters did not intend.924 In the traditional arbitration model, they assert, 
checks arise from the fact that the arrangement is entered into voluntarily by both 
parties; whereas the UDRP is mandatory. Furthermore, they argue, in contrast to 
traditional arbitration, UDRP proceedings lack meaningful external controls by 
national courts. 925 Moreover, whereas traditional arbitration mechanisms rely 
ultimately on national courts to enforce their decisions, the UDRP does not, and this 
removes another opportunity for a “second look” at the arbitral award. This leaves 
internal checking functions as the principal constraint on arbitral excesses, yet, 
Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, UDRP panels have only weak incentives to limit their 
own authority, as competition incentives are skewed in favour of complainant 
intellectual property owners; since complainants, not respondents, choose the dispute 
settlement provider and pay panel fees in all single-panelist cases.926 This 
phenomenon of ‘forum shopping’ by complainants has also been identified by other 
analysts, as will be examined below.  
The types of checking mechanism found in the ‘ministerial’ model of dispute 
settlement, Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, are similarly lacking in the UDRP. They 
define the ‘ministerial’ or ‘nondiscretionary administrative decisionmaking’ model as 
referring to systems in which the authority granted to decision makers is constrained 
by a tight set of predetermined rules that compel a particular result in response to a 
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given set of facts. Under such a model, dissatisfied parties may be able to exercise a 
right to appeal against decisions that are in error or otherwise not in accordance with 
the rules.927 In the case of the UDRP, however, such checks are missing due to the 
absence of any review procedure.928 
 
Several attributes of the UDRP, Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, resemble the 
adjudicatory functions of domestic courts and international tribunals. These include 
the requirement for published, reasoned decisions, indicating an interpretive role for 
panels and the creation of trademark-domain name jurisprudence. However, they 
question whether UDRP panels are competent to create such jurisprudence within the 
constraints the policy imposes on them.929 They go on to identify several potential 
checks on panels’ adjudicatory power, none of which they find adequate. The first of 
these would be to include clear rules and limiting principles in the UDRP’s founding 
documents; however the UDRP does not do this unequivocally.930 Another checking 
mechanism might arise from the requirement for published, reasoned explanations for 
decisions; however, in practice, Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, there are few actual 
structural incentives for panels to produce carefully reasoned decisions, not least 
because well-reasoned decisions require a certain amount of deliberation, something 
that the compressed UDRP timeline is not conducive to.931 Finally, panels’ 
interpretative powers could have been constrained through external checking 
functions; however, Dinwoodie and Helfer assert, no effective external checks 
exist.932  
 
Komaitis advances a number of similar arguments. He too feels that the UDRP 
diverges from conventional arbitration due to its non-voluntary nature; he also lists a 
number of other differences between the UDRP and traditional arbitration, including 
lack of information-sharing between the parties; the non-binding nature of the 
decisions; the reliance on written statements only, with no opportunity for cross-
examination; the lack of ‘meaningful’ hearings, with no penalties for making false 
statements; the fact that choice of law is not available to the parties; and the lack of 
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opportunity for the parties to negotiate details of the arbitration agreement.933 
Likewise, Elizabeth Woodard finds that the UDRP differs from traditional arbitration 
on similar grounds, and agrees with Dinwoodie and Helfer that the flexibility in the 
UDRP has resulted in inconsistent decisions.934 
 
Orion Armon argues that panellists treat the loose substantive and procedural 
provisions as a license to ‘do justice’ in each case, even in some cases ignoring the 
express language of the UDRP itself in order to reach the outcome they think is best. 
Some of the best examples of panelists overreaching the scope of the UDRP, he 
argues, are those cases where panels have construed non-use of the domain name as 
constituting bad faith ‘use’.935 
 
Mueller has been similarly critical of the amount of latitude afforded to UDRP 
panellists, particularly their latitude to ‘classify anything they want as bad faith 
registration and use.’936  He points to the tendency of panellists to cite non-response 
by the registrant as evidence of bad faith registration and use, despite this not being 
specified in the UDRP rules. Thornburg advances similar arguments.937 In a study of 
the first 4000 UDRP cases (up to February 2002), Mueller found that respondents 
defaulted in 52% of cases and that, in 96% of cases where default occurred, transfer of 
the domain name was awarded to the complainant (99% in the case of NAF).938 From 
this, he reasoned that a complainant who simply wants a domain name held by 
another party has at least a 50/50 chance of succeeding ‘by default’ under the UDRP, 
arguing that this creates incentive for unethical complainants to file meritless claims, 
knowing that they have a good chance of success even despite having a weak case 939.  
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Mueller estimated that 25% of all defaults appeared to be cases in which there was no 
solid evidence of bad faith registration other than the respondent’s failure to 
respond.940 
 
Another of the most consistently cited criticisms of the UDRP has been the alleged 
phenomenon of ‘forum shopping’. Like Helfer and Dinwoodie, analysts including 
Mueller, Froomkin and Geist argue that, since complainants pick which arbitration 
provider is used, dispute providers have an incentive to compete to appear the most 
“plaintiff friendly” provider. 941 942 943 Mueller and Geist argue that the two ICANN-
accredited providers with the most favourable outcomes for complainants (WIPO and 
NAF) quickly captured the lion’s share of the caseload.944 945 Both supported their 
statements by statistical analysis. Geist also found differences in decisions when the 
panel is composed by three arbitrators, with single member panels more likely to find 
in favour of the complainant.946  
 
Mueller, Geist and Froomkin also all raise the possibility of the UDRP being used for 
‘reverse domain name hijacking’ from legitimate holders. All mention cases where 
complainants have used or attempted to use the UDRP to capture domain names from 
what appear to have been legitimate registrants.  
 
In response to these criticisms, the International Trademark Association (INTA) 
produced a rebuttal of Geist’s work, challenging his methodology and assumptions. 947 
Geist was criticised for assuming that complainants should not win more than 50% of 
cases and failing to consider reasons that could justify a high complainant win 
percentage (i.e. the fact that the UDRP was designed to deal with abusive cases). 
INTA criticised Geist for reliance on bare statistics, rather than examining the relative 
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merits of the cases; and argued he had failed to specify exactly what was wrong with 
the UDRP rules. INTA further argued that the difference in respondent win 
percentage with three member panels did not prove three member panels to be ‘fairer’. 
Rather, respondents who feel they have a strong case may be more likely to select a 
three member panel (for which they must pay a fee) than ones who know they have a 
weak case. Furthermore, INTA argued, perceived friendliness to complainants is 
likely not the only factor in ‘forum shopping’.948   
 
Kesan and Gallo provided further empirical evidence on the phenomenon of ‘forum 
shopping’ by complainants and performance differences across UDRP providers. 
They too found that the current system ‘favors providers who are friendly to 
complainants, and the providers’ optimal strategy is to favor complainants in order to 
ensure that they continue to be chosen in the future.’949 However, Kesan and Gallo 
also reason that perceived bias towards trademark owners is not the only explanation 
for the phenomenon of forum shopping; other factors may include provider 
performance and efficiency.950  
 
Criticism of principles: trademark protection vs. free speech  
 
Criticism has not been limited to procedural issues or policy design shortcomings; the 
very principle of how trademark law should be applied to domain names has also been 
challenged. Although domain names have latterly been seen as equating to 
trademarks, they were not originally intended to fulfil that purpose, and the nature of 
DNS means that attempting to apply principles of trademark law to domain names can 
be problematic. Under conventional principles of trademark law, aside from a small 
number of globally famous marks (such as Microsoft or Coca-Cola) a trademark does 
not give the holder exclusive rights over every possible use of a trademarked word or 
term, especially when used by a business or entity not in direct competition with the 
trademark holder. Controversy has been generated over the extent to which the UDRP 
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does or should adhere to this well-established principle.951 The nature of DNS means 
that each domain name must be unique at a global level; for example, there can only 
be one ‘united.com’, but United Airlines, United Carpets, United Movers, and a 
considerable number of football clubs could all stake a legitimate claim to that name.  
 
The debate is summed up by Mueller, who believes that conflicts over domain names 
are not a simple matter of ‘wronged intellectual property holders versus sleazy 
cybersquatters’ but rather a complex social negotiation over the control of words and 
their function as messages, identifiers and locators in a globally networked space. 952 
Mueller believes that domain names are not equivalent to trademarks, and that the use 
of a trademarked term in a domain name should not automatically be assumed to be 
abusive. 953  Similar arguments are advanced by other analysts, such as Froomkin,954 
who argues that trademark law is ‘organized around a set of objectives and 
assumptions that map incredibly badly onto the Internet, and even worse onto an 
Internet that uses the current DNS.’955 Komaitis takes a similar view, and criticises the 
UDRP for approaching all domain names under trademark law rationalisations, 
regardless of whether the disputed domain name performs trademark functions.956 He 
too feels that the policy has resulted in a significant shift in favour of trademark 
holders compared to the more balanced approach under traditional principles of 
trademark law.957  
        
Mueller further argues that a key part of the problem lies, not merely in the design or 
intentions of the policy creators, but also in the mindset of many UDRP panellists, 
who mostly tend to be intellectual property lawyers. Their training and business 
associations, he asserts, make them highly sensitive to the nuances of how and why 
                                                 
951 Ibid, P311  
952Mueller, M. (2000). “Rough Justice: An. Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Disputes Resolution 
Policy.” The Information Society 17 (3): 151-163. P152  
953 Mueller, M. (2002). “Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes 
under ICANN’s UDRP. Report prepared for the Markle Foundation.” Retrieved 19 September 2011, 
from  http://dcc.syr.edu/PDF/markle-report-final.pdf P31 
954 Froomkin, A.M. (2002), “ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, Causes and (Partial) 
Cures.” Brooklyn Law Review, 67(3): 605-718. P611  
955 Froomkin, A.M. (2001). “The collision of trademarks, domain names, and due process in 
cyberspace.” Communications of the ACM 44 (2): 91-97. P92  
956 Komaitis, K (2011). “Trade mark law's increment through the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy.” Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 6 (8): 553-567. P556 
957 Ibid 
 219 
exclusivities in the use of names might be advanced and enforced, but much less 
sensitive to the interests of free and open public communication and commentary.958 
Thornburg959 and Kesan and Gallo960 echo Mueller in asking whether panellists’ 
backgrounds could have an influence over their verdicts.  
 
Summary and implications 
 
In summary, the UDRP’s proponents, particularly the intellectual property lobby, 
argue that the policy has proved highly effective in tackling cybersquatting and that it 
has proved to be an efficient, rapid and inexpensive alternative to court litigation. 
Many of its critics agree, but argue that this comes at the price of low standards of 
fairness, consistency and due process, thus calling its legitimacy into question. They 
argue that the policy gives trademarks far too much weight, especially with regard to 
generic terms or where the domain name registrant is not in competition with the 
trademark owner. Trademark holders, they claim, enjoy far more protection under the 
UDRP than under national law, and this affects rights of free expression.  
 
The next section will go on to further explore the validity of some of these criticisms, 
particularly the extent to which the UDRP does indeed appear to unduly favour 
trademark interests. If it can be shown to do so it, this would be evidence of capture of 
a major aspect of ICANN policy by the trademark lobby at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  
 
UDRP in action 
 
The following section will examine the UDRP’s operation in practice in order to 
explore in more depth the validity of some of the arguments and criticisms raised in 
the academic literature. It will examine, in particular, the assertions that the UDRP 
favours trademark owners and that it produces inconsistent, biased and low quality 
decisions.  
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Obviously, the definition of what constitutes a ‘low quality’ decision is difficult to pin 
down and is subjective. However, it is possible to examine case histories and make 
some assessment as to how well the decisions adhere to the UDRP’s stated rules and 
principles, whether the decisions tend to be consistent or arbitrary, and whether the 
rationalisations given for decisions appear to show objective logic or signs of bias.    
 
All cases statistical analysis 
 
There is an archived UDRP statistical analysis page on the ICANN website, but this 
has not been updated since 2004.961 For more up-to-date statistics, it is necessary to 
look at data made available by the dispute resolution providers.  
 
WIPO is easily the largest provider, with 21228 cases settled as of 17 October 
2011.962 The WIPO data shows that the complainant was wholly successful (transfer 
or cancellation of domain name) in 13934, or 65.64% of cases. A verdict wholly in 
favour of the respondent (complaint denied) was returned in 2228 cases, or 10.5% of 
the total. However, 4891 cases (23.04%) were dismissed, meaning that the respondent 
also retained the domain name in those cases. Unfortunately these figures do not 
specify the proportion of one member to three member panels. NAF does not appear 
to publish any statistics, but a search of the NAF online database of cases establishes 
that 16232 cases had been heard as of 17 October 2011, of which 12389 resulted in 
transfer and 40 in cancellation of the domain name. Thus the complainant was 
successful in 12429 cases, or 76.57% of the total. 963  ADRC likewise does not publish 
any statistics, but a list of case histories maintained.964 As of 11 October 2011, there 
were 573 cases on this list, of which 7 were pending, leaving a total of 566 finalised 
cases. 502, or 88.69% of these had resulted in domain name transfer or cancellation.  
 
In summary, therefore, ADRC, rather than NAF or WIPO, appears to be the most 
‘complainant-friendly’ of the current providers. This would seem to undermine the 
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assertion that complainants tend to choose the most ‘complainant-friendly’ provider, 
since the ADRC still only receives a much smaller number of complaints than NAF or 
WIPO.  
 
It has not been possible from this search to check the assertion that three-member 
panels are more ‘respondent friendly’ than single member panels, as those statistics do 
not seem to be readily available and there is no way to configure the online database 
searches to produce this data.  
 
Case history analysis  
 
In order to gain more insight into the workings of the UDRP in action, a sample of 
250 UDRP case histories were studied in detail. These were selected at random from 
the WIPO, NAF and ADRC databases.965  See Appendix 6.4 for a complete list of 
cases included in the sample.  
 
Statistically these cases break down as follows:   
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Table 6.1: Breakdown of sample of 250 UDRP case histories  
 
 Respondent retains domain 
name 
Transfer or cancellation of 
domain name 
WIPO – single member 
panel 
10 78 
WIPO – three member 
panel 
7 5 
WIPO – Total 17 83 
NAF – single member 
panel 
15 77 
NAF – three member 
panel 
5 3 
NAF – Total 20 80 
ADRC – single member 
panel 
4 40 
ADRC – three member 
panel 
2 4 
ADRC – Total 6 44 
All cases – Total 43 207 
 
 
As far as this sample is concerned, this does seem to correlate with the assertion that 
three-member panels rule in favour of the respondent far more frequently than single 
member panels.  
 
After carrying out this simple statistical analysis, the details of the 250 cases were 
considered. The intention was to check for evidence of consistency, adherence to the 
UDRP guidelines, and whether there appeared to be any bias, particularly in favour of 
trademark interests. Even from this small sample size, inconsistencies were apparent. 
 
With regards to interpretations of element 1 of the UDRP criteria, (confusing 
similarity) one such inconsistency reported by various scholars and apparent in this 
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sample relates to the legitimacy of ‘protest’ names, where a trademarked name is 
combined with another (usually derogatory) phrase. Within the sample, some panels 
found such names were not ‘confusingly similar’ to the trademark in question, and 
therefore denied the complaint on element 1, while other panels in similar cases took 
the opposite view. For example, in WIPO case No. D2000-1015 (31st January 2001, 
(<lockheedsucks.com> and <lockheedmartinsucks.com>), the complaint was denied 
on the grounds that the disputed domain names were not confusingly similar to the 
complainant’s trademarks. A similar verdict was returned in the case of NAF case FA 
550345 (<homedepotsucks.com>, Oct. 25, 2005).  On the other hand, in NAF case 
FA0612000861594 (<boycottplanetfitness.com>, January 18, 2007) the complaint 
was upheld. The panel in this case justified its decision by stating: ‘While the website 
to which the domain name resolves has some of the characteristics of a “gripe site,” it 
is used for commercial gain of Respondent in that it is for marketing the legal services 
of Respondent.’ This would indeed seem to be grounds for finding against the 
respondent on element 3 of the UDRP criteria, but the complainant is required to 
demonstrate all three elements. It is hard to see how element 1 has been met, 
particularly in light of the Lockheed Martin judgement; ‘boycottplanetfitness’ is 
unlikely to be mistaken for an official Planet Fitness site, any more than 
‘lockheedmartinsucks.com’ is likely to be mistaken for an official Lockheed Martin 
site.     
 
As various scholars have argued, this sort of inconsistency is clearly due to the fact 
that what constitutes ‘confusing similarity’ is not clearly defined by the UDRP.  Other 
case histories in the sample show similar inconsistency. For example, 
<goldmansex.com>, was found to be confusingly similar to <goldmansachs.com> 
(NAF case FA0606000741852), yet indb.com was not considered confusingly similar 
to imdb.com. (NAF case FA0503000436735). The panel in NAF case 
FA0511000597496 (January 30, 2006) ordered transfer of the domain name 
<everythingcooking.com>, despite the fact that ‘cooking’ is a generic term and used 
as a component of many domain names. On the other hand, in the case of 
<bassets.com> (NAF case FA0003000094333, June 16, 2000) the complaint was 
rejected on element 1, despite the fact that ‘bassets’ is arguably less generic than 
‘cooking’. Similarly, in NAF case FA0008000095415 (<800BEACHES.COM>, 
October 4, 2000), the panel denied the complaint on the grounds that the term 
‘Beaches’ has a generic meaning.  
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The panel in NAF case No. D2000-1687 (August 20, 2004, <reinfolink.com> ruled 
that a trademark granted after the registration date of the contested domain may not be 
considered valid grounds for transfer under the UDRP.  However, in ADRC case  HK-
0700150 (7th August 2008, <desciclopedia.org>, the panel found in favour of the 
complainant, despite the fact that the complainant’s trademark was registered after the 
domain name. Moreover, the panel did not explain why the trademark rights still 
stood under this circumstance.  
 
In ADRC case CN-0700134 (27 July 2007, <cqtv.com>), the Beijing office panel took 
the Chinese law interpretation that trademarks must be registered to hold any validity. 
This is interesting because the UDRP specifies that a service mark does not 
necessarily have to be registered in order to be considered legitimate under the policy. 
This provides an example of local law being taken into consideration by a panel, 
which has the discretion to do so under Rule 15 of the UDRP Rules.966 In contrast, a 
panel from the Hong Kong office of the ADRC recognised a non-registered trademark 
in case HK-0800183(18th July 2009, <likashing.org>. This is in accordance with Hong 
Kong law, which does recognise common law service marks. Although these two 
verdicts appear contradictory on the surface, therefore, the context was different. To 
some extent, the panels’ ability and willingness to apply local law also undermines the 
view that the UDRP is a globalised monolithic system that seeks to supplant territorial 
law. However, it must be borne in mind that the decision whether to apply local law is 
entirely at the discretion of the panel.   
     
If what constitutes ‘confusing similarity’ (element 1) is vague and produces 
contradictory interpretations, the same seems to be true of element 2 of the UDRP 
criteria (‘legitimate interests’). For example, in NAF case FA0509000567039 (29th 
September 2005, <teensmart.com>, despite the complainant having a trademark to the 
term ‘teensmart’, the respondent’s use of the domain name for a portal / links site was 
held to be legitimate use, and the complaint was rejected on these grounds. However, 
in an apparently similar case, NAF FA0612000864072 (January 23, 2007, 
<deltasigmatheta.com>), the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to resolve 
                                                 
966 ICANN (1999). Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"). As 
approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 30 October 2009. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm Rule 15 
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to a website that featured advertisements and links to other sites, was found to be 
‘neither a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶4(c)(i) nor a 
legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy.’  
 
Several other cases upheld the respondent’s ‘legitimate use’ rights despite the domain 
name corresponding exactly or closely to the complainant’s trademark. For example, 
in FA0106000097377 (July 23, 2001 <bioxide.com>), the complaint failed because 
the respondent had been using the name in connection with a ‘legitimate and 
substantial offering of goods and services’ since 1997, and became commonly known 
by the domain name. In NAF case FA003000094237 (April 4 2000, 
<sahajmarg.org>), Shri Ram Chandra mission of California, registered a complaint 
against another organisation with the same name in India over the latter’s use of the 
term ‘Sahaj Marj’ in its domain name, a term the Californian organisation held a US 
trademark for. The panel decided that, though the California organisation had a US 
trademark to the name ‘sahaj marg’, the Indian organisation had referred to the term 
in its constitution since 1945, and therefore had a legitimate interest in it (this 
complaint also failed on criterion 3). In WIPO case D2001-0903 (6th November 2001, 
<okidataparts.com>), the panel found in favour of the respondent, which was an  
authorized seller and repair centre for the complainant’s products, as it was using the 
<okidataparts.com> site to promote only Oki Data goods and services, and 
prominently disclosed that it was merely a repair centre, not Oki Data itself. The panel 
found this to be legitimate use. In a similar case, WIPO D2004-0481 (20th August 
2004, <porsche-buy.com> and <porschebuy.com>), the panel similarly found the 
respondent’s use of the domain name to deal in products produced by the complainant 
to be legitimate use.   
 
Like elements 1 and 2, element 3 of the UDRP criteria seems vaguely defined in terms 
of what is considered ‘bad faith’, and this has produced some contradictory 
interpretations in this sample. The panel in NAF case FA0002000093548 (April 22, 
2002, <zaploan.com>) held that the registration of a name in which one has no 
legitimate interests constitutes bad faith in itself, despite the fact that the UDRP 
specifically states that the domain must have been both registered and used in bad 
faith for a complaint to be upheld. Similarly, in WIPO Case No. D2002-0448 (7th 
December 2002, freemandecorating.com>) the panel held that ‘in the absence of any 
showing of rights or legitimate interest by Respondent, it is reasonable to infer bad 
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faith in Respondent’s registration and use of the Domain Name.’ In contrast, the panel 
in <okidataparts.com> stated that for a bad faith verdict, there had to be ‘a pattern of 
causing disruption’. In WIPO case D2002-030 (4th December 2002, 
<1ingrammmicro.org> and <ingrammmicro.net>), the panel found that the first two 
elements had been met, stating that ‘…there is no evidence that the Respondent has 
any particular right or legitimate interests in the domain names….’ but went on to 
dismiss the complaint on element 3, stating there was no evidence of bad faith use. 
The inconsistency shown in these these cases provides a good illustration of Armon’s 
findings regarding ambiguity over whether and how non-use of the domain name can 
be construed as bad faith ‘use’.Note 6.2    
 
In NAF case FA0112000103127 (January 14 2002, <idlj.com>), the panel found that 
there was no bad faith, as the respondent had never approached Complainant to try to 
sell the domain name, implying that this was a necessary criterion for a bad faith 
finding. However, in WIPO case D2005-0282 (6th August 2005, <alsa.com>), the 
panel did not find bad faith, despite the respondent openly admitting that he bought 
the domain name with the intention to sell it at a profit, which is basically the 
definition of cybersquatting under the UDRP. Similarly, in NAF case 
FA0006000095014 (26th June 2000, <littlefolkart.com>), the panel did not find bad 
faith even though the respondent had offered to sell the name to the complainant for 
$150,000. 
 
In ADRC case CN-0800198 (30th June 2008, <redoffice.com>), the panel found that 
the respondent had no legitimate interests in the name, since it was not currently being 
used, although it had previously been used for a nonprofit site. In ADRC case HK-
1100367 (9th June 2011, <olayclub.net>) the panel took the respondent’s non-use of 
the disputed name as evidence of bad faith, citing some previous precedents. 
However, in NAF case FA0612000868825 (January 22, 2007, <medhelp.com>), the 
panel found that the respondent had legitimate interests in the name, despite the fact 
that it was not being used at present, because it ‘intended’ to use the disputed domain 
                                                 
Note 6.2 According to Armon, the "nonuse as use" doctrine was created in Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear 
Marshmallows (WIPO case D2000-003) in which the panellist found that it was ‘possible, in certain 
circumstances, for inactivity by the Respondent to amount to the domain name being used in bad faith’. 
Armon argues that this analysis completely voids the intended effect of the UDRP provision requiring 
registration and use by suggesting that inactivity constitutes "use", and is contrary to the UDRP's plain 
language and the wording of the UDRP advisory committee. See Armon, O (2003). “Is This as Good as 
It Gets? An Appraisal of ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three 
Years After Implementation.” The Review of Litigation 22 (1): 99-141. PP124-125  
 227 
name to provide access to medical information. Similarly, in NAF case 
FA0006000095014 (26th June 2000, <littlefolkart.com>), the panel found that the 
holder had legitimate interests, although he was not using the name. In WIPO case 
D2001-1177 (3 December 2001, <bauhaus.com>, the panel decided that the domain 
name did not have to be pointing to a publicly visible website in order for the 
respondent to be making ‘legitimate use’ of it. In this case, the respondent had been 
using the name for pages in subdirectories (both http and ftp protocols) and for email 
(SMTP protocol), as well as a login page for private web pages.  
 
In WIPO cases D2005-0459, D2005-0877, D2004-0102, and D2002-0301, the 
respondents all retained the domain name despite not submitting a response. On the 
other hand, the panel in WIPO case D2001-1400 (20th January 2002, <panasonic.net>) 
inferred bad faith from the holder’s non-response.   
 
Summary and implications 
 
The analysis of these 250 case studies seems to underscore some of the criticisms of 
the UDRP made by various scholars. There is clear evidence of inconsistent rulings 
and widely varying interpretation of the rules even within this relatively small sample 
of 250 cases. Not all of the apparently poor quality decisions were in the trademark 
owners’ favour, however; while there were some decisions where trademark owners 
appear to have had questionable verdicts go in their favour, there have also been 
certain cases where the trademark owner lost despite apparently having a strong case.  
It should also be also noted that, despite the inconsistencies and questionable verdicts 
reached in a minority of cases, the majority of the 250 cases reviewed returned well-
reasoned verdicts that appear to be fully consistent with the UDRP rules.  
 
It is clear that decisions made under the UDRP do not invariably favour trademark 
owners, and in many cases respondents do appear to receive fair hearings against 
trademark owners. However, it seems that outcomes can be something of a lottery and 
are dependent upon the panel. As Mueller and various other scholars have noted, the 
UDRP rules are loose and allow much scope for panels to apply their own 
interpretations. Moreover, panels are not consistently guided by past precedent, 
sometimes appearing to apply precedent and other times appearing to ignore it, 
resulting in inconsistent decisions. In some cases, panellists even appear to ignore the 
 228 
express rules of the UDRP itself. These problems are compounded by the lack of an 
appeals procedure so that bad decisions cannot be corrected, except by going to court.  
 
It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the UDRP as it stands is, to some degree, a 
flawed policy; and its faults are well documented. Despite this, the policy has 
remained in place unmodified for well over a decade, during which time most ICANN 
policies, and indeed ICANN’s organisational structure, have undergone substantial 
change. There is a need, therefore, to ask why this is so; what interests and groups 
have kept the current UDRP in place for such a lengthy period, and in what ways have 
they been able to apply their influence within the ICANN structure?    
 
Analysis: Actors and interests in creating and sustaining the UDRP 
 
Role of intellectual property organisations 
 
Aside from the role played by WIPO in initial policy creation, the intellectual property 
lobby has been able to exert influence over this policy area in various ways. These 
have included the initial lobbying efforts that prompted the US government to 
commission the WIPO study; the influence intellectual property interests have held in 
the DNSO / GNSO particularly through the IPC and BC; the apparent influence of 
trademark interests with governments and their representatives in the GAC; and (as 
with New gTLDs), the willingness of trademark holders, trademark organisations and 
IP lawyers to make use of the public comments facility to make their voices heard.   
 
For the most part the intellectual property lobby has praised the UDRP, though some 
would like to see the rules made tougher with still greater protection for trademark 
interests; for example by removing the ‘bad faith’ requirement or implementing a 
‘loser pays costs’ model. Such positions were expressed from some quarters during 
the recent discussions around UDRP review.Note 6.3 The fact that such measures have 
not (so far) been adopted is a demonstration that the UDRP does in fact make some 
attempt to balance other interests and rights against trademark protection. 
 
                                                 
Note 6.3 See, for example, comments made by X, Paul McGrady (GT Law / IPC) and the Federation of 
Intellectual Property Attorneys on ICANN public comments forum. Retrieved 17 September 2011, 
from http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/pdf84ZHuNpmgo.pdf  
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Role of the DNSO / GNSO Constituencies 
 
Initial policy creation 
The Intellectual Property Constituency had a very strong presence on WG A (6 
members out of 15). There were also two members from the Business Constituency. 
In addition, there were two gTLD registry representatives, three representatives from 
the non-commercial constituency, and one member each for the ISPs and ccTLD 
registries constituencies. Working Group A was divided into four sub-groups working 
on different aspects of dispute resolution policy. On July 8, 1999, the WG-A 
recommendations were posted for public comment on the DNSO website. A final 
report of WG-A was sent to the Names Council on July 29, containing five 
recommendations. A vote was taken by email, with 15 of the 18 members of the 
Names Council voting. The Names Council members voted, first, on whether the 
report should be forwarded to the Board as a community consensus recommendation; 
13 of the Names Council members supported this. 967 The ballot also included 
separate votes on each of the five WG-A recommendations. The WG-A 
recommendations, and the Names Council vote on each, are shown in Appendix 6.5. 
As several public commentators pointed out at the time, it is questionable whether the 
DNSO’s approval for the policy was valid in accordance with ICANN’s Bylaws, 
given that the newly-organised NCUC was given no opportunity to participate or vote 
on the Names Council at the time the approval was given. Even without the NCUC, 
there was no consensus on the proposals, which were approved by a majority vote 
with a substantial amount of dissent regarding various issues. 968 Note 6.4 Despite these 
                                                 
967 ICANN (1999). ICANN Staff Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars.   
Retrieved 14 September, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm. 
968 Ibid.  
Note 6.4 The votes of the three gTLD representatives all contained a partial dissent noting: (a) that the 
DNSO General Assembly did not have significant input; (b) that registrars should be required to adhere 
to uniform dispute policies by contract with the gTLD registry administrator, rather than by 
establishment of the policy by ICANN; (c) that registrars should be satisfied with the process before it 
was put into place; (d) that variance should be allowed in fees, payment, dispute-resolution providers, 
and involvement of registrars; (e) that ICANN should not approve or accredit dispute-resolution 
providers; and (f) that registrars should work out remaining procedural problems before the policy is 
put into place. Furthermore, the ccTLD representative objected to recommending adoption of a policy 
without further study and to any continuing involvement by WIPO in the refinement or enhancement of 
procedures. One IPC representative also expressed dissent, stating that there was no consensus on 
expansion of the scope of the policy beyond abusive registrations, requesting that issue to be referred 
back to WIPO for further work, and stating that there was also no community consensus regarding the 
proposed timetable for implementation of voluntary arbitration. Source: ICANN. (1999). ICANN Staff 
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issues, the Board accepted the DNSO recommendation for establishment of a uniform 
domain-name dispute-resolution policy. 969   
The support of the registries and registrars was crucial (particularly since those 
constituencies carried double votes on the DNSO Council). The Registrars also played 
another significant role in initial policy development, in that the registrars' Model 
Policy was used as a starting point for the UDRP implementation documents.970 
 
GNSO and policy review  
 
Since 2003, the decision whether to review the UDRP has been the remit of the 
GNSO. Perhaps one reason for the GNSO’s inaction on the matter has been a lack of 
consensus among the Constituencies. With regard to the abortive 2003 review, the 
NCUC appears to have favoured some degree of procedural and substantive reform to 
provide safeguards and protections for registrants making legitimate non-commercial 
or fair use of their domain names. The BC and IPC were more concerned with the 
rights of the trademark holders, while registrars were keen to maintain a system that 
kept them out of having to act as arbiters in any disputes. Registries were supportive 
of the registrars as they too feared being drawn into disputes, and the ISPCP had little 
interest in the matter.971 By the time of the 2011 discussions, consensus was no closer. 
The NCUC again favoured reform to give more balance to considerations other than 
trademark rights.972 The BC and the IPC973 opposed a PDP on the UDRP974, while the 
                                                                                                                                            
Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars. Retrieved 14 September, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm. 
969 ICANN (1999). Minutes of meeting of the initial Board. 26 August 1999. Retrieved 16 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-26aug99.htm  
970 Ibid  
971 ICANN (2003). Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review. 1 August 2003. Retrieved 18 
September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/gnso/issue-reports/udrp-review-report-01aug03.htm  
972 ICANN (2011). ‘Comments of the Non Commercial Users Constituency on the current state of the 
UDRP.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the 
Uniform Domain-name Disputes Resolution Policy. 14 July 2011. Retrieved 18 August 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/msg00003.html  
973 ICANN (2011). ‘Comments from the Intellectual Property Constituency’. Comment posted to 
ICANN public comments forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the Uniform Domain-name 
Disputes Resolution Policy. Retrieved 18 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-
udrp/msg00020.html  
974 ICANN (2011). ‘Business Constituency (BC) comments on Preliminary Issue Report on the UDRP’. 
15 July 2011. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Preliminary Report on the State 
of the Uniform Domain-name Disputes Resolution Policy. Retrieved 18 September 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/msg00011.html  
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registrars favoured one. 975 The other GNSO constituencies did not submit comments 
to the PCP. 
 
Role of governments 
 
The United States government played an important unilateral role in establishing the 
UDRP, by commissioning the WIPO study as part of the process that led ultimately to 
the creation of ICANN.  The original proposal, as set out in the Green Paper of 
February 1998, had been to refer domain name disputes to US courts. 976 However, 
this proposal was protested by trademark holders and domain name registrants outside 
the United States, who characterised this as an inappropriate attempt to impose US 
trademark law as the law of the Internet.977 As a result, the White Paper referred the 
matter to WIPO instead978 and accepted the findings of that study. Since the UDRP’s 
inception, the DoC has continued to endorse it.979  
 
Although the newly-formed ICANN was not obligated to implement the findings of 
the WIPO study, the US government’s action was nonetheless clearly very influential 
in initiating the chain of events that led ultimately to the UDRP. Despite the fact that 
the matter was referred ultimately to WIPO, an international body operating under the 
auspices of the United Nations, some scholars, such as Helfer, have nonetheless 
                                                 
975 ICANN (2011). ‘RySG Comments - Preliminary Issue Report on The Current State of the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy. 13 July 2011.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on 
Preliminary Report on the State of the Uniform Domain-name Disputes Resolution Policy. Retrieved 
18 August 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/msg00001.html  
976 United States Department of Commerce (1998). National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration. “A proposal to improve technical management of Internet names and addresses.” 
Discussion draft, 30 January 1998. (Green Paper). Retrieved 25 July, 2009, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm#N_1_  
977 Referenced in: United States Department of Commerce: National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (1998). Statement of Policy: “Management of Internet Names and 
Addresses”. ('White Paper'). 5th June 1998. Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02. Retrieved 14 
February 2009, from  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm   
978 United States Department of Commerce (1998). National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration Statement of Policy: “Management of Internet Names and Addresses”. ('White Paper'). 
5th June 2007. Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02. Retrieved 5 July 2009, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm  
979 United States Department of Commerce: National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (2001). NTIA 2000 Annual Report to Congress. January 18, 2001. Retrieved 12 
September 2011, from http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2001/ntia-2000-annual-report-congress  
and 
United States Department of Commerce: National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (2002). Statement Regarding Extenstion of Memorandum of Understanding with 
ICANN (Amendment 5). Retrieved 12 September 2011, from 
http://ntia.doc.gov/page/2002/statement-regarding-extenstion-memorandum-understanding-icann-
ammendment-5 
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interpreted the UDRP as effectively an intellectual property regime imposed by a 
hegemon. 980 Note 6.5Dinwoodie and Helfer argue that, notwithstanding its status as a 
UN agency, in conducting the domain name study, WIPO was engaged in an act of 
collaboration between public and private entities quite unlike its historical role. It 
acted upon a request from a single national government to convene a study that would 
ultimately be submitted for consideration not by other national governments or a 
governmental treaty convention, but by a private corporation. This corporation would 
have the power to implement the WIPO proposals without further consultation with or 
approval by any of the many affected national governments, a power drawn from its 
relationship with the United States government and its control over the DNS.981 
 
Other governments do not appear to have had any significant direct influence on the 
policy, although almost half of ccTLD registries have adopted either the UDRP itself, 
or a variant of it. 982  
 
The GAC appeared to take little interest in the matter at the time of the UDRP’s 
inception. However, today the GAC appears to endorse the current UDRP and 
recently added its voice to those opposing a PDP on the matter at this time.983 Like 
some elements of the intellectual property lobby, the GAC reasoned that the current 
UDRP helps to provide stability at a time when the gTLD space is about to be greatly 
expanded; indeed, this was used by the Board as part of its rationale for rejecting 
certain elements of the GAC advice on new gTLDs. 984 The GAC’s opposition to a 
PDP at this time provides further evidence of the pervasive influence of trademark 
interests; they appear to have powerful allies at the governmental level as well as 
within the GNSO.   
                                                 
980 Helfer, L. (2003). "Whither the UDRP: Autonomous, Americanized or Cosmopolitan?" Princeton 
Law & Public Affairs Paper No. 03-10; Loyola-LA Public Law Research Paper No. 17. Retrieved 12 
September 2011, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=437182.   
Note 6.5 This forms an interesting parallel with other international intellectual property regimes, such as 
the TRIPS agreement, which have also been interpreted as arrangements imposed by the hegemonic 
power of the United States (and to some extent its allies, the EU and Japan). See, for example, 
Braithwaite, J. and P. Drahos (2000). Global Business Regulation. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. Chapter 7: ‘Property and Contract’: 39-85. PP61-67  
981 Dinwoodie, G B and Helfer, L (2001). “Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.” William & Mary Law Review 43(1): 141-273. P167  
982Dryden, H. (2011).  Letter from Heather Dryden to Stephane van Gelder. 14 September 2011. 
Retrieved 17 October 2011, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540170/GAC+advice+on+a+possible+UDRP+PDP+S
ep.+2011.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1317030819988  
983 Ibid 
984 Ibid 
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Role of public input 
 
As with the previous two case studies, the public comments periods have been 
dominated by interested parties rather than the ‘Internet using public’ per se. 
Representatives of the intellectual property lobby have been prominent in each PCP.  
 
Public comment on proposed UDRP (1999) 
A total of 118 comments by 83 individual posters were submitted on this topic.985 
Appendix 6.6 summarises the main positions taken by the public commentators. 
15 posters urged abandonment of the idea of a UDRP altogether. 39 posters did not 
oppose the principle but suggested changes to the specific proposals. 14 posters 
criticised the lack of consultation and / or felt that the process was not representative 
enough. 11 posters criticised the lack of representation for the newly-formed NCUC 
in the Names Council deliberations and vote. Only 3 posters gave unqualified support 
to the proposals, two of which were trademark interests and the third of unascertained 
background.  
A number of posters felt that the proposed policy unduly favoured trademark interests. 
Some representatives of trademark interests, however, wanted the rules made tougher 
than those proposed, with greater rights for trademark holders. Anne Lucey (Viacom), 
Scott B Schwartz (Intel), Caroline Chicoine (PeperMartin) and Sarah B. Deutsch (Bell 
Atlantic) all objected to the proposal that registrants could be permitted to retain the 
domain name if they were using it to make an offering of goods or services. Lucey 
also objected to the burden of fees being placed on the complainant. John Jacobs 
(affiliation unknown) suggested that losing registrants be made liable for all the 
trademark owner's costs, including UDRP fees, out-of-pocket expenses and legal fees.   
 
The comments included posts from two scholars cited in this dissertation, Michael 
Froomkin and Jonathan Weinberg. Froomkin argued that the policy development 
process to date had been ‘seriously deficient’ and that consensus had not been 
demonstrated. He argued that WG A was not properly constituted according to 
ICANN's own rules, since it did not contain a representative from each constituency 
                                                 
985 ICANN Public Comments forum on the UDRP. Opened 6 December 1999. Accessed 17 October 
2011, at http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/maillist.html 
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of the DNSO, and furthermore claimed that the Working Group was ‘manipulated and 
railroaded’ both by the exclusion of interested parties, and by being divided up into 
sub-groups, with people not always being allowed access to the sub-group they 
wished to be in. Froomkin went on to claim that the ultimate report was written 
single-handedly by the Chair, and posted for comment to the full working group for 
only a brief period. He further expressed doubts as to the validity of the Names 
Council endorsement of the WG-A report, since at the time it existed only in a ‘rump 
form’, and also argued that, since the drafting committee was composed entirely of 
North Americans, there were doubts as to whether non-US viewpoints had been heard.  
Weinberg expressed full support for Froomkin’s comments. Both Froomkin and 
Weinberg asserted that the two-week comment period had been the only time that the 
policy, or any direct predecessor, had been subject to scrutiny by a range of interested 
and internationally representative actors.  
 
Despite the considerable amount of criticism received, the public comments do not 
appear to have made any difference to the final shape of the policy. The Second Staff 
Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 
noted the input received in the public comments, but recommended that 
implementation should go ahead of an essentially unaltered policy, pointing out that 
the nature of the policy had already been approved. It further suggested that 
implementation should not be further delayed and that any refinements to the 
implementation strategy could be studied by the DNSO at a later date.986  On the same 
date as this report was published, the Board approved the implementation 
documents.987  
 
Public forum (25 August 1999)  
An opportunity for stakeholder input was available to those physically present at the 
ICANN meeting in August 1999 (Santiago, Chile). At the Public Forum988 (August 
25), Rita Rodin (AOL, Register.com) gave an endorsement to the registrars’ draft, 
                                                 
986ICANN (1999). Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy. Submitted for Board meeting of October 24, 1999. Retrieved 17 September 2011, 
from  http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm#4 Section 4 
987 ICANN (1999). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 24 October 1999. Retrieved 18 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-24oct99.htm  
988ICANN (1999). Scribe's Notes - ICANN Public Meeting. August 25, 1999 Santiago, Chile. Retrieved 
17 September 2011, from  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/santiago/archive/scribe-082599.html  
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arguing that the WIPO report represented a ‘majority rough consensus’ that tried to 
balance needs of trademark holders, registrars, and Internet users. However, some of 
the other comments were more critical. Kathy Kleiman, representing the Non-
Commercial Constituency, challenged the assertion that the WIPO report was 
representative of general consensus. She identified a need for a better definition of 
cybersquatting. Peter Dengate Thrush (ccTLD representative on WG A) stated that he 
was worried about the ‘end-run around the process.’ He claimed there was no 
recognition of ccTLD comments and that ccTLD registrars had no opportunity to 
participate in the process. Karl Auerbach (cavebear.com) argued that requests for 
comment should have been sent to those holding domain names via the WHOIS 
database. ‘Davidson’ (identity unknown) asked what the process would be for the 
working group to get the input of non-commercial and public interest communities.  
 
PCP on eUDRP 12 July-12 August 2009 
 
21 comments were posted by 20 individual posters.989 One of these was spam and two 
appeared identical (though apparently posted by different individuals). The main 
positions taken by the commentators are summarised in Appendix 6.7. 13 expressed 
open support for the eUDRP proposal, 6 offered no clear opinion for or against, and 
one was spam. No commentator completely opposed the principle of the eUDRP, 
although Frank Michlick (DomainCocoon) did state that his company opposed the 
eUDRP ‘as proposed’. He, together with several other commentators, recommended 
safeguards to ensure respondents have actual notice of a proceeding, such as 
mandatory paper letters. George Kirikos pointed out that it is very easy to miss an 
email; similarly, GoDaddy pointed out that email notification is not uniformly 
reliable.    
 
Those supporting the eUDRP included several representatives of the intellectual 
property lobby, including the Intellectual Property Constituency, the International 
Trademark Association, and the Internet Commerce Association, as well as several 
intellectual law firm representatives. Two of the ICANN DRPs, NAF and the Czech 
                                                 
989 ICANN Public Comments forum on eUDRP Proposals. Opened 12 July 2009. Accessed 17 
September 2011, at  http://forum.icann.org/lists/eudrp/ 
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Arbitration Court, also posted comments in support of the eUDRP, as did two 
registrars, a registry and a financial services company.  
 
The Board approved the eUDRP on 30th October 2009990 with the proviso that 
respondents must also be issued with hard copy notification of the proceeding. This 
appears to be in accordance with the arguments made by many contributors to this 
PCP.  
 
Public comment on Issues Report 15 May – 22 July 2011 
 
27 comments were submitted during this period.991 Appendix 6.8 summarises the 
main positions taken by the public commentators.  
 
As the appendix shows, 17 commentators opposed an immediate UDRP review. 
These mostly represented trademark interests and the dispute resolution providers 
(which naturally have an interest in maintaining the status quo, since they profit from 
handling UDRP disputes). However, some of these were willing to countenance a 
review at some point in the future, but argued the timing was currently wrong due to 
the present need to maintain the stability provided by the current UDRP in the context 
of the new gTLD programme. 7 commentators from a range of backgrounds 
supported an immediate review. 11 commentators, including some of those who 
argued against a full review, nonetheless believed that procedural amendments could 
improve the UDRP process. Only 3 commentators, two of whom were academics, 
argued for substantive change. One commentator (Kristine Dorrain of the NAF) 
opposed any kind of change, even procedural. Brian Beckham (WIPO) also argued 
that procedural change might become substantive change, although he did not say that 
there absolutely should not be any procedural change. 
 
A number of commentators objected to the Staff statement in the Issues Report that 
opening up the UDRP to review may ‘undermine’ it, including Danny Younger 
(online journalist), Konstantinos Komaitis (academic), George Kirikos (Leap of Faith 
                                                 
990 ICANN (2009). Resolutions of special meeting of the Board. 20 October 2009. Retrived 19 
September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-30oct09-en.htm  
991 ICANN Public Comments Forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the UDRP. Opened 24 July 
2011. Accessed 18 September 2011, at http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/  
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Financial Services Inc.) and the RySG. In addition, the NCUC declared itself 
unsatisfied with the Issues Report, which it described as being based upon an ‘internal 
opinion poll among insiders with an agenda’ rather than upon rigorous research. 
Shawn Gunnarson (Kirton & McConkie Attorneys at Law) argued that the Report had 
not been prepared in accordance with ICANN’s own Bylaws. He further claimed that 
there were ‘informal reports from multiple reliable sources’ that ICANN staff had 
been pressured into opposing a PDP on the UDRP at this time  
   
Role of the ALAC 
 
The ALAC’s role in this policy area has been extremely limited to date. At the time of 
the UDRP’s inception, the organisation did not exist. Its role in the recent discussions 
around a UDRP review has so far been limited to providing a statement, which was 
stated to be the product of extended discussions among the RALOs.992 The ALAC 
statement supported the Staff recommendation that a PDP on the UDRP should not be 
initiated at this time. However, it opposed the Staff recommendation that a small 
group of experts be convened to produce proposals to improve the process or 
implementation of the UDRP to be cause for concern; the ALAC argued that, if the 
UDRP was to be reviewed or studied, the group doing so should be more broadly 
based, open to all five geographical regions and ‘especially to experts from the 
non‐Latin‐language community and worldwide Internet community, who have no 
conflicts of interest.’993 
 
Role of the DRPs 
 
The dispute resolution providers obviously have a significant vested interest in 
retaining the UDRP, since they profit from handling disputes. Though they have no 
direct representation on ICANN’s decisionmaking bodies, they have been able to 
make their voices heard through various channels. In particular, in the recent 
discussions around a possible UDRP review, the DRPs were directly consulted via the 
GNSO’s information gathering exercises, as well as (in the case of WIPO and NAF) 
                                                 
992 ICANN (2011). ‘ALAC Statement on the Preliminary Issue Report on the Current State of the 
UDRP.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the 
Uniform Domain-name Disputes Resolution Policy. 21 July 2011. Retrieved 17 September 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/msg00026.html  
993 Ibid 
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contributing to the public comments process.994 995 Predictably, they opposed a 
review.   
 
Role of ICANN staff 
 
As with other policy development areas, ICANN staff played a key role in drawing up 
the details of the actual implementation strategy. In the Second Staff Report on 
Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (24 October 
1999), staff recommended immediate implementation of the UDRP despite noting that 
there had been numerous objections in the recent PCP996. The Board accepted the staff 
recommendation, approving the implementation documents on the same day the 
report was published.997.  
 
Furthermore, staff produced the 2003 and 2011 Issues Reports, both of which 
recommended against a PDP on the UDRP at that time. Though the GNSO is, of 
course, under no obligation to accept staff recommendations, it did not proceed any 
further with a PDP following the publication of the 2003 Issues Report. Whether that 
decision will be repeated this time around remains to be seen.    
 
Gunnarson’s claim that staff were pressured into advising against a PDP in the most 
recent Issues Report is interesting if unsubstantiated.  The 2011 Issues Report does, 
however, appear to be somewhat one-sided and based largely on input from groups 
likely to be pro-UDRP, with little attempt to balance this with input from the UDRP’s 
critics.   
 
 
 
                                                 
994 WIPO (2011). ‘WIPO Center observations on ICANN Staff "Preliminary Issue Report on the 
Current State of the UDRP"’. Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Preliminary 
Report on the State of the Uniform Domain-name Disputes Resolution Policy. 15 July 2011. Retrieved 
17 September 2011, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/pdfG7gPj3Hxss.pdf  
995  NAF (2011). ‘National Arbitration Forum Comments on UDRP PDP’. Comment posted to ICANN 
public comments forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the Uniform Domain-name Disputes 
Resolution Policy. 15 July 2011. Retrieved 17 September 2011, from 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-report-udrp/pdfigI749HNku.pdf  
996 ICANN (1999). Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy. Submitted for Board meeting of October 24, 1999. Retrieved 17 September 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm#4  Section 4 
997 ICANN (1999). Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 24 October 1999. Retrieved 18 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-24oct99.htm  
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Role of the Board 
 
In 1999 the Board effectively rubberstamped a policy drafted by ICANN staff, based 
on the registrars' model policy and recommended by the Names Council and by staff. 
The decision was a unanimous one.998 While questions can be raised about the 
appropriateness of an interim Board approving such a critical policy, particularly 
considering the obvious lack of true community consensus regarding the matter, no 
subsequent Board has appeared to show much enthusiasm for revisiting the issue. 
While the Board could intervene and request a PDP be begun, as it did in the case of 
new gTLDs, it has chosen to leave the question of whether to review the UDRP in the 
hands of the DNSO / GNSO.  
 
Conclusions to Chapter 6  
 
As with the previous case studies, the UDRP represents a public policy issue of 
enormous significance that goes far beyond mere technical standards setting. Indeed, 
it is the most obvious case of ICANN making something akin to international law. 
Arguably, it does so without infringing the principle of state sovereignty, because 
UDRP decisions are ultimately subject to review by national courts. In practice, 
however, such review is the exception rather than the norm, and, as Dinwoodie and 
Helfer assert, the UDRP constitutes much ‘harder law’ in practice than it does in 
theory.  
 
As with new gTLDs and IDNs policy, the UDRP could hardly be described as a 
‘consensus’ policy. Its initial creation could not be said to have been carried out in a 
multistakeholder manner, or to reflect consensus decisionmaking. The policy 
developed from the WIPO report, commissioned by the US government without 
involvement of other stakeholders. The issue was subsequently passed to the DNSO’s 
Working Group A, a body dominated by intellectual property and business interests, 
and the report it produced was accepted by the DNSO Names Council by 11 votes to 
4. Thus there was not even a consensus between the members of the Names Council 
on the proposals, let alone among other stakeholders; furthermore, the NCUC was 
given no opportunity to participate. The report was also criticised in public comments. 
The details of the actual policy were drafted by the registries and refined by ICANN 
                                                 
998 Ibid  
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staff, and only briefly made available for public comment. Despite criticisms, the 
policy was effectively adopted without further discussion. The whole process appears 
to have been railroaded through with very little time for discussion or policy 
refinement.   
 
Since that time, criticism of the policy has continued, particularly from the academic 
community but also from other quarters, as seen in the recent PCP. Despite the well 
documented and often well-founded criticism, however the policy remains in place. 
The reasons why the status quo has been maintained for so long are complex. One 
factor is probably the aforementioned lack of consensus. The UDRP ‘works’, in that it 
does provide cheap, fast dispute resolution, and despite its faults, in the absence of 
agreement on how it should be changed, and the likelihood of much contention in the 
event of a full PCP, it may simply be easier to leave the policy as it is. Undoubtedly, 
however, the strong influence of the trademark lobby within the GNSO and across 
other parts of ICANN (including the GAC) is another huge factor. The influence held 
by the trademark lobby, and its willingness and ability to pursue its interests in the 
domain name context, was previously demonstrated in the new gTLDs case study and 
is mirrored here.  
 
It is also very notable that the pro-UDRP voices appear to have had considerable 
success in capturing ICANN staff, to the extent that the 2011 Issues Report mostly 
ignored the voices calling for reform. Of course, the 2011 discussions must also be 
seen in the context of the new gTLDs programme. There appears to be considerable 
doubt in many quarters as to whether the UDRP should be tinkered with at a time of 
uncertainty generated by the unprecedented expansion of the name space; it has been 
seen as a bastion of stability, not least by the GAC.  
 
Against the powerful lobby in favour of the status quo, proponents of UDRP reform 
have had relatively little chance to assert themselves. Though there is no shortage of 
critics of the policy, these critics tend not to come from groups with any real influence 
in ICANN. The academic community carries little real weight within the organisation; 
neither does the average domain name owner who loses his/her domain name to a 
questionable UDRP verdict. This case study seems to confirm the pattern observed in 
the previous two chapters; that, while many groups have a voice in ICANN, rather 
fewer have real influence.  
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Chapter 7 
Perspectives on ICANN – evaluation 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will return to the competing perspectives on ICANN discussed in 
Chapter 3 and evaluate these in light of the evidence gained from the policy case 
studies. The case studies have revealed a complex picture, where the identities of the 
major actors in ICANN policymaking, and the relative influence they hold, is 
dependent upon the particular issue in hand. Some of the key characteristics of each 
policy development area are summarised in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of characteristics of case study policy areas 
 New gTLDs IDNs UDRP 
Recent PDP? Yes Yes No 
Public policy issue? Yes  Yes Yes 
‘Consensus’ policy? No No No 
Level of controversy /  
opposition, e.g. in public 
comments  
High Low Moderate to 
high 
Level of conflict between Board 
and GAC 
High Low Low 
Level of GNSO influence High Moderate None 
(historically) 
(DNSO-high) 
High 
(recently) 
Level of GAC influence Moderate to high High (particularly with 
regard to IDN ccTLDs) 
Low 
Level of CCNSO influence Low High Low to 
moderate 
(historically -
involved as 
part of 
DNSO) 
Low 
(recently)  
Level of ICANN staff influence Moderate to high  (especially 
authorship of DAGs) 
Low to moderate High 
Level of ALAC influence Low Low Low 
Level of influence of public 
commentators 
Low to moderate Low to moderate Low 
Level of US government 
influence 
Low Low Moderate to 
high 
(historically), 
low (recently) 
Level of influence of gTLD 
registries 
Moderate to high Moderate Moderate to 
high 
Level of influence of ccTLD 
registries 
Low High Low 
Level of influence of registrars Moderate to high  Moderate Moderate to 
high (drafted 
model Policy) 
Level of influence of intellectual 
property interests 
Moderate to high  Moderate High  
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As this chapter will show, the findings from the case studies lend weight to some of 
the previously examined perspectives on ICANN and discredit others.  
 
Competing perspectives on ICANN – Evaluation 
 
 Technical agency or public policymaker? 
 
All three case studies decisively demonstrate that ICANN is a public policymaker 
rather than a mere technical co-ordinator, thus supporting the assertions of analysts 
such as Mueller999 and Fuller1000 and refuting those of Solum.1001 In each of the three 
case study areas, policymaking has involved arbitration between competing sets of 
interests, discrediting any notion of ICANN as an apolitical technical agency only.   
 
ICANN’s decisions on New gTLDs policy, for example, have major implications for 
various sets of interests. Decisions as to how many TLDs will be added and the 
selection and allocation criteria for those TLDs affects how many registries there can 
be in the market and who will and will not be allowed to set up business as a registrar. 
New gTLDs policy also impacts upon intellectual property rights and issues of 
freedom of expression, as well as issues of identity for organisations and other entities 
such as cities, subnational territories and cultural groups. Furthermore, it has 
significant ramifications for issues of state sovereignty, particularly with regard to 
‘geographical’ names and governmental claims to authority over these. Similarly, the 
development of IDNs policy has important economic, social and political 
implications, such as issues of which groups will get an IDN TLD, how to define a 
language or script, the appropriate relationship between ICANN and IDN ccTLD 
registries, and questions around the extent to which governmental jurisdiction extends, 
particularly over IDN ccTLDs. The UDRP likewise represents a public policy issue, 
involving arbitration between trademark interests and other concerns, such as freedom 
                                                 
999 Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. P239 
1000 Fuller, K. E. (2001). "ICANN: The debate over governing the Internet." Duke Law and Technology 
Review 2(1). Online journal. Retrieved 12 February 2010, from 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0002.html P13 
1001 Solum, L. B. (2009). ‘Models of Internet governance.’ Internet Governance: Infrastructure and 
Institutions. L. A. Bygrave and J. Bing. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 48-91. PP60-61 
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of expression, and is in fact one of the most significant examples of what amounts to a 
system of private international ‘law’ in any regime area. 
 
ICANN is thus very much a public policymaker at the global level, and possesses 
some very real authority and coercive power in its issue-area by virtue of its control of 
the naming and numbering systems, unique resources critical to the Internet’s 
operation. Without an IP address, it is impossible to get online; without a domain 
name, one cannot be found. ICANN has the ability to delete or transfer domain names 
from those who refuse to comply with its policy. Despite this global scope and 
independent coercive power, however, ICANN is not entirely divorced from the 
Westphalian state system; yet neither is it a conventional intergovernmental 
organisation. It represents a much more complex and hybrid approach to governance.  
 
ICANN’s ‘political’ nature also undermines any attempt to view the organisation as a 
‘functionalist’ agency in the sense described by David Mitrany1002 and his successors. 
Since the 1930s, the functionalist school of IR theory has focused upon on the 
possibility of identifying common needs and interests among societies that cannot be 
fulfilled by traditional nation-states, particularly in technical and ‘non-controversial’ 
issue-areas. These scholars predicted that functional agencies above and beyond the 
nation-state system could arise to fulfil those needs, creating an ever-spreading web of 
international institutional relationships. They would initially concentrate on 
commonly experienced needs, gradually expanding the circle of the ‘non-
controversial’ at the expense of the political.1003 Thus, functionalism proposed to build 
a form of transnational authority linked with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise 
and technology.1004 As such, it provided a concept of authority no longer linked to the 
territorial nation-state.  If ICANN had turned out to be the apolitical technical 
regulator that some analysts had expected it to be, then there would have been a strong 
case for interpreting it as this kind of functionalist agency. However, its politicised 
nature in practice and its inability to fully divorce itself from the intergovernmental 
system discredits any attempt to view ICANN from a conventional functionalist 
perspective.   
                                                 
1002 Mitrany, D. (1933) The Progress of International Government. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
PP101-106 
1003 Haas, E. (1964). Beyond the nation-state: functionalism and international organization. Stanford, 
Stanford University Press. P6 
1004 Ibid, P9 
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‘Liberal democratic’ approach 
 
For analysts such as Weinberg,1005 Fuller1006 and Koppell1007, the key issues revolve 
around concerns as to the extent to which ICANN meets ‘liberal democratic’ criteria 
for legitimacy. As a globalised public policymaking organisation, they feel, ICANN 
should be representative of, and accountable to, the global Internet using public.   
As all three case studies have shown, these principles do not tend to underpin ICANN 
policymaking in practice. To be fair, Weinberg et al do not necessarily claim that 
ICANN actually lives up to the ‘liberal democratic’ model in reality, but seem to 
suggest that, ideally, it ought to. However, given the range of powerful interests 
involved in ICANN and the influence they can bring to bear, it must be asked whether 
such an approach could ever be realistically implemented. The influence of vested 
interests in the DNS issue-area seems to be far stronger than any idealistic vision of 
ICANN as a globalised ‘liberal democratic’ entity.  
 
With regards to Weinberg’s contention that ICANN has attempted to legitimise itself 
in three ways (the ‘techniques of administrative law’, the ‘techniques of 
representation,’and the ‘techniques of consensus’)1008, the evidence reviewed in this 
dissertation supports Weinberg’s conclusion that ICANN fails in each area. Though 
Weinberg made this statement in 2000, the evidence suggests that ICANN has made 
no progress towards legitimising itself on any of these bases, and arguably has moved 
further away from offering broad-based ‘representation’ with the scrapping of At-
Large elections in 2002. 
 
With regards to the first ‘source of legitimisation’, ICANN is clearly not a 
conventional US governmental agency; nor does the rest of the world think it should 
be. The US government is itself keen to emphasise ICANN’s operational 
independence from US governmental oversight; and the replacement of the MoU / 
JPA with the AoC represents a further loosening of ties between ICANN and the 
DoC. 
                                                 
1005 Weinberg, J. (2000). "ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy." Duke Law Journal 50(1): 187-260. 
1006 Fuller, K. E. (2001). "ICANN: The debate over governing the Internet." Duke Law and Technology 
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1007 Koppell, J. G. (2005). "Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple 
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1008 Weinberg, J. (2000). "ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy." Duke Law Journal 50(1): 187-260. 
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With regards to the ‘techniques of representation’, the case studies have shown little 
evidence of meaningful representation for the broad mass of the Internet using public 
within the ICANN system. Individual Internet users as well as interested organisations 
in theory are represented via the At-Large system; however, it is not clear that the At-
Large mechanism has much influence over policymaking in practice, making such 
representation of limited value. The limited role played by the At-Large community 
was summed up by EURALO Chair Wolf Ludwig. When questioned about the role of 
the RALOs in ICANN’s policymaking processes, Ludwig expressed scepticism about 
the ‘so-called bottom-up or user-oriented approach’ and commented that he could 
only try his best to counter-balance ‘vested interests from the business or 
governmental sector’.1009  Furthermore, there are serious questions regarding the 
extent to which the ALAC’s advice to the Board is actually based on broad-based 
grass-roots input. As some of its critics have noted in public comments, arguably the 
ALAC can be regarded as a few individuals claiming without a mandate to speak on 
behalf of the worldwide user community.  
 
Though the At-Large community has recently been given the right to select a single 
Director, this is still a far cry from old concept of one-third of the Board being directly 
elected by the global Internet-using public. The selection procedure has not yet been 
finalised; proposals have included a range of options, from selection of the Director 
candidate by the ALAC only, to a return to direct user elections; and also interim 
options such as joint selection by the ALAC and the RALOs.1010 Selection by the 
ALAC plus the RALO chairs is, however, the option recommended by the At-Large 
drafting team (which itself consists of ALAC and RALO representatives)1011.  
 
Perhaps the most important channels for public input are the public comments forums 
made available at numerous stages of a typical policy development process. However, 
considering that the global Internet using population is currently estimated to exceed 
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Retrieved 14 March 2011, from 
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two billion users1012, the comments received represent only an infinitesimal fraction of 
the world’s Internet using public. Furthermore, those who do comment appear to 
consist mostly of interested industry ‘insiders’. The extent to which public comments 
have actually influenced policy is more difficult to gauge, but the case studies have 
not produced much evidence that public comments play a very large role in shaping 
policy direction. In any case, public comments tend to produce a range of views on 
any given issue rather than anything close to a consensus; therefore, whatever 
decisions are taken will almost always be at odds with at least a proportion of the 
public comments. 
    
Overall, there is no evidence that ICANN’s decisionmaking processes in any way 
represent the views of any significant proportion of the global domain-name owning 
and / or Internet-using public.  
 
Finally, the three case studies confirm Weinberg’s contention that ICANN 
policymaking is not based upon consensus, nor is consensus realistically achievable 
regarding the types of issues that ICANN deals with.  
  
Mestdagh and Rijgersberg’s ‘market accountability’ approach1013 also fails to stand up 
to close scrutiny, since ICANN does not, in reality, have any true competitors. The 
true source of ICANN’s legitimacy, however, is arguably provided through states’ 
acceptance of the ICANN regime, and governmental participation in it via the GAC, 
despite the fact that this was not envisaged in the original vision for the organisation.  
 
Multistakeholder approach 
 
If the ‘liberal democratic’ model is unworkable for ICANN in reality, the notion of 
ICANN decisionmaking as being based on broad multistakeholder consensus-based 
decisionmaking, as suggested by writers such as Crawford1014, may be equally 
unrealistic. As discussed, the notion of making policy by finding ‘consensus’ among 
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stakeholders whose interests and aims are often in direct competition is completely 
unworkable. Furthermore, the range of stakeholders with real meaningful influence 
seems to be much narrower than proponents of multistakeholderism admit. 
Undoubtedly, ICANN does offer some degree of representation to a range of 
stakeholders in the industry; however, some stakeholders have much more influence 
than others. As discussed above, there are serious questions as to whether the 
individuals and organisations participating in the At-Large system have much 
meaningful representation or influence. Only the stakeholders participating directly in 
the Supporting Organisations, as well as governments through the GAC, appear to 
have more than a token amount of representation and influence.  
 
Nonetheless, it is true to say that the ICANN regime is based on a (sometimes uneasy) 
alliance between a few sets of major stakeholders, those that carry real clout in the 
issue-area. Some of the most important actors in the regime are the registries and 
registrars, but also of importance are governments, the technical community, 
intellectual property interests and major ISPs. All of these actors needed to be on 
board to make the regime work, and all of them had the capacity to disrupt it if their 
interests were not taken into account. From this perspective, ICANN’s creation could 
be seen as the forging of a deal between various crucial players.  
 
While the case studies have revealed that effective policymaking seems to have been 
in the hands of a relatively narrow group of stakeholders, the identities of the crucial 
stakeholders, and the relative amount of influence they wielded, has nevertheless 
varied depending on the policy area under discussion.  
 
Corporate / free market approach 
 
For writers like Klein, ICANN has been captured by corporate interests. 1015 There is 
some merit to this view as, in all three case studies, corporate entities played a huge 
role in shaping policy.  
 
                                                 
1015 Klein, H. (2005). “ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of Law. A policy analysis prepared for 
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Tunis. 16-18 November 2005.” Retrieved 10 
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The broad outlines of New gTLDs policy were drafted by the New gTLDs 
Committee, which drew its membership mostly from the GNSO Constituencies. Five 
of the six Constituencies represent commercial actors of one type or another. The final 
shape of the policy, as represented by the Applicant Guidebook, was influenced by 
actors other than the GNSO; however, commercial interests, particularly the 
intellectual property lobby, were again highly influential in the later stages of policy 
development. Moreover, the public comments boards were dominated by commercial 
entities of one sort or another. Governments through the GAC did have a significant 
influence in later stages of policy development; however, to a considerable extent they 
were in support of the views of commercial interests, for example calling for stronger 
intellectual property protections.  
 
Of course, in reality there was no single ‘commercial interest’ dominating the New 
gTLDs policy area, but rather multiple commercial actors or interest groups whose 
aims often clashed. For example, prospective registries had an interest in maximising 
the number of new gTLDs, while intellectual property interests aimed to minimise the 
number created. The intellectual property lobby was only partially successful in 
influencing policy; though there were many concessions made to intellectual property 
protection (far more than initially proposed by the GNSO in 2007), the number of new 
gTLDs to be introduced was to be very large and would include open ASCII TLDs, 
whereas the intellectual property lobby would have preferred a smaller number of 
TLDs and / or a restriction to sponsored and IDN TLDs. 1016 The final shape of the 
policy thus represented an accommodation between two powerful sets of commercial 
interests, one on the ‘supply side’ pushing for vast expansion of the namespace and 
the other on the ‘user side’ seeking to limit it. Prospective registries appear in many 
ways to be the biggest winners in from this process, since they are the ones likely to 
derive the most financial gain from new gTLDs.  
 
IDNs policy has likewise been powerfully influenced by corporate entities, 
notwithstanding the important role also played by the GAC. The IDN Committee was 
dominated by the supply side (the registries and registrars), and the IDN Guidelines in 
their several incarnations have been largely the work of the registries. Ultimately, 
                                                 
1016 IPC (2006). ‘Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency Terms of Reference for New 
gTLDS.’ Comment posted to ICANN public comments forum on Issues Report – Terms of Reference 
for New gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 8 March 2010, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
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most of the registries, particularly gTLD registries, are commercial interests, and their 
aim is to make a profit from selling domain name registrations. IDNs have so far 
tended to be implemented in those languages with a large number of speakers, which 
makes sense from a commercial perspective.  In the final analysis, the limited 
potential market for IDN registrations in languages with a small number of speakers is 
likely one reason (though not the only reason) why many of these groups have not yet 
obtained IDN support.  
 
Intellectual property interests seem to have had a lower level of interest in, and impact 
upon, the IDNs policy development area compared to the New gTLDs PDP.  
However, the no-mixed script rules in the IDN Guidelines were introduced to combat 
potential for cybersquatting and spoofing. Furthermore, the strong intellectual 
property protections incorporated into the new gTLDs programme will, of course, 
apply to IDN gTLDs as well as to ASCII gTLDs; while an initiative to re-examine the 
UDRP has recently been initiated1017  and may well pay attention to some of the 
particular issues raised by IDNs.   
 
The UDRP case study reveals further lessons about the powerful influence of 
intellectual property interests from the beginning of the ICANN regime and 
continuing to the present. During the initial regime creation phase, pressure for a 
trademark protection mechanism was applied in several fora. One of these was the 
Department of Commerce, and bore fruit in the commissioning of the initial WIPO 
report. In the next stage of UDRP policy development, the intellectual property lobby 
weilded influence via their strong representation on the DNSO’s Working Group A. 
Recent discussions surrounding the possibility of UDRP reform have demonstrated 
that the intellectual property lobby remains just as influential in ICANN today. It 
continues to have a powerful voice within the GNSO and across other ICANN bodies 
(including the GAC), and there is even a case to be made that trademark interests have 
had considerable success in capturing ICANN staff, given that that the 2011 Issues 
Report mostly ignored the voices calling for reform. 
 
In terms of regulatory capture theory, the models discussed by Stigler et al do not 
quite compare to the ICANN regime, because, unlike those models, the ICANN 
                                                 
1017 ICANN (2011). GNSO Council Resolution 20110203. 3 February 2011.  Retrieved 24 September 
2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/resolutions/#20110203 
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system always intended industry players to have a voice in policymaking. However, it 
was also intended, according to the original design expressed in the White Paper, that 
a range of other groups would also have considerable influence, and this has not really 
occurred, with groups like the At-Large community playing a minimal role. Thus, 
ICANN could be said to have been ‘captured’ by a narrow range of corporate 
stakeholders to a degree not intended by the founders. This is likely to have occurred, 
just as Stigler suggested, because these groups have the incentive and the 
organisational and financial capacity to play a crucial role. By contrast, the ordinary 
Internet-using public is not organised, and individual Internet users likely do not see 
themselves as having a big stake in ICANN’s decisions, if indeed they are even aware 
of ICANN and its activities at all; the fact that a typical PCP usually gets less than 100 
comments, and then mostly from industry insiders, would seem to bear this out.  The 
main challenge to complete corporate dominance of the organisation, however, has 
emerged in the shape of governmental influences, particularly through the GAC. This 
factor helps to lend some weight to the alternative, statist interpretations of the 
organisation put forward by writers such as Drezner.   
 
Statist model 
 
States, particularly the US, played a crucial role in bringing about the ICANN regime. 
The US government, finding itself almost by an accident of history in unilateral 
control of the root, was in a unique position to shape the regime according to its own 
interests. Nonetheless, even the US could not completely ignore the demands of other 
powers, particularly the EU, for fear of fracturing the root and destroying the principle 
of universal connectivity. As a result, those states were able to modify the initial 
norms. As well as playing a crucial role in the regime’s establishment, states helped to 
legitimise it through their recognition of its authority over the DNS. 
 
Despite the views of writers such as Hagen and von Arx that ICANN represents an 
instrument of US foreign policy1018, there is little evidence of the US continuing to 
play a hegemonic role in ICANN today, at least in terms of routine policymaking, 
though the US government’s continued claim to ownership of the root remains an 
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outstanding unresolved issue. Nonetheless, the legacy of US leadership in regime 
creation remains, not only in elements of ICANN’s institutional design but also in 
some aspects of policy, particularly regarding WHOIS policy and the UDRP. The 
UDRP was built into the ICANN system largely at the behest of the US, and it reflects 
Western, and particularly US, approaches to intellectual property law. However, the 
UDRP was created very early on. The case study chapters have revealed little sign of 
US interference in or direct influence over present-day ICANN policymaking. Though 
the DoC supplied some strongly worded comments on the New gTLDs programme, 
the Board did not appear to have been unduly influenced by them. There is, 
admittedly, an argument to be made that the DoC’s intervention on the matter of the 
proposed .xxx TLD demonstrated both an ability and a willingness on the part of the 
DoC under the Bush administration to interfere with ICANN’s policy processes when 
convenient. However, some other governments, as well as some highly vocal public 
pressure groups, also objected to .xxx, and it would be a big stretch to conclude that 
the DoC’s objections were the sole or decisive factor in blocking the .xxx application.   
 
Nonetheless, state actors continue to play a crucial and indeed growing role in the 
ICANN system, not only in terms of underpinning and legitimising the regime, but 
also in influencing its policy decisions. The case studies have revealed that, mainly 
through the GAC, states have considerable influence on ICANN policymaking in 
those areas where they choose to wield it. The GAC tends to intervene in certain areas 
of policy to uphold particular principles, one of the most important of which (as 
pointed out by analysts such as Park1019) concerns matters of ‘sovereignty’ over 
ccTLDs. This has been particularly strongly reflected in the GAC’s role in IDN 
ccTLD policy. The GAC did also intervene quite forcefully in the latter stages of New 
gTLDs policy development; but even in this policy area, the GAC’s biggest concern 
was with the issue of ‘geographical identifiers’, which governments appear to see as 
belonging under their rightful jurisdiction in much the same manner as ccTLDs. By 
contrast, the GAC played little role with regard to the development of the UDRP. At 
that time, of course, the GAC was less influential; but even today the GAC does not 
appear at all keen to see the matter re-opened.  In some ways, it may be seen as 
surprising that governments have not taken more interest in the UDRP, due to the 
potential for conflict between an internationalised, non-governmental disputes 
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resolution policy and national trademark law, with the attendant implications for state 
sovereignty. However, the fact that the UDRP does not apply to ccTLDs may be the 
factor that satisfies sovereignty concerns of national governments.    
 
Through the GAC, governments are pursuing their interests through the ICANN 
system, rather that attempting to break away from it as Hagen and von Arx suggest 
they do. This adds weight to Christou and Simpson’s model of regime construction, 
which recognises the key importance of states’ material interests, but at the same time 
acknowledges how behaviour within institutions may be regulated by the propagation 
and adoption of constitutive beliefs and practices within the institution. As Christou 
and Simpson suggest, within the institutionalised environment that has been built 
around DNS governance, it is the rational choice for governments to behave 
appropriately.1020 It is more rational for governments to pursue their concerns through 
the ICANN system than attempt to unilaterally break away from it, a move that might 
threaten the stability of the system and the principle of universal connectivity.  
 
Mueller’s identification of WSIS as the key forum through which governments have 
staked their claim to public policy authority over DNS1021 holds considerable merit. In 
its responses to both the new gTLDs process and the IDNs process, the GAC has 
included a preamble citing the WSIS declaration. In a sense, this merely highlights the 
uncertain authoritative status of GAC advice; the GAC attempts to reinforce its own 
authority by an appeal to a document backed by the intergovernmental authority of the 
UN system.  In his most recent work, Mueller argues that the GAC’s most important 
interest is to advance the principle of state authority at the expense of nonstate actors. 
He goes so far as to argue that ‘…the GAC rarely if ever addresses public interest 
objectives in domain name policy. Its interventions in ICANN policy processes, 
almost without exception, have been to claim special benefits or powers for its 
member governments’.1022 While it may be going too far to suggest that the GAC does 
not pursue public policy objectives but merely power for its own sake, the GAC’s 
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behaviour in both the new gTLDs and IDN policy areas bears out Mueller’s assertion 
that it consistently attempts to claim special authority or powers.   
 
In reality, however, there are clearly limits to the GAC’s power; its authority is 
ultimately subordinate to that of the Board.  The evidence from the case studies 
challenges Kleinwaechter’s assertion that the GAC gained ‘something akin to veto 
power’ through the Bylaw provisions stating that the Board must provide reasons in 
writing if it chooses to reject GAC advice. 1023 While the Board clearly does not reject 
GAC advice lightly, it has shown itself willing to do so on some occasions. In the 
New gTLDs case study, for example, the Board rejected some elements of GAC 
advice, though it did so only after protracted discussions in which the majority of 
GAC advice was accepted. As Mueller points out, the Board has no clear-cut rules or 
criteria for accepting or rejecting GAC advice; it can arbitrarily invoke the GAC when 
overruling the Supporting Organisations or vice-versa, and the effect of this is to make 
the Board less accountable.1024 In the event of a dispute between the GAC and the 
Supporting Organisations the Board effectively has the option to play one off against 
the other. Nonetheless, the GAC’s advice carries much weight and this may have 
more to do with the potential ability of governments to defect from the regime than 
any deference to abstract principles of state sovereignty. The IDNs case study 
provides one good example of this. As Mueller himself suggests, the favourable 
treatment shown to IDN ccTLDs compared to IDN gTLDs may have been prompted 
by the potential ability of governments to follow China’s lead and set up national IDN 
roots if they did not get their way within the ICANN system.1025  
 
One striking factor concerning the GAC is its ability to produce agreement on 
common positions between participating governments. The GAC’s Operating 
Principles include a facility for a range of governmental views to be provided to the 
Board in the absence of GAC consensus1026; however, this appears to occur only 
rarely.  Maria Häll (Swedish GAC representative) states that, while finding consensus 
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is not always easy, it is usually a matter of finding language acceptable to all 
members.1027 Andrew Maurer (Australian GAC representative) adds that there is a 
strong culture within the GAC of trying to be constructive, and also that ‘GAC 
representatives are generally conscious that they are not just putting forward their 
national positions, but are also contributing to the operation of the GAC itself as an 
important component of ICANN’.1028 This sense of solidarity among the GAC 
members and their desire to speak with one voice is undoubtedly one reason for the 
strong influence that the GAC is able to weild within ICANN; a divided GAC 
providing a range of views to the Board would likely not carry so much weight. The 
GAC’s ability to reach ‘consensus’ positions may also stem largely from the fact that 
participating governments often have common interests on the issues under 
consideration. For example, most governments would tend to support the principle of 
state sovereignty over ccTLDs.  
 
Public-private model 
 
The case studies have suggested that those writers who see ICANN as a ‘public-
private partnership’, such as Christou and Simpson, Knill and Lehmukl, Mueller and 
Antonova, are broadly on the right track. Mueller1029 and Antonova1030, in particular, 
identify a shift in the balance towards greater intergovernmentalism in the regime 
since 2002. The gTLDs and IDNs case studies support this assertion. Whereas 
governments through the GAC had virtually no input into the 2000 new gTLDs 
programme, their influence and involvement was greatly increased in the latest round. 
Similarly, the involvement of governments in IDNs policy has greatly increased in 
recent years.  
 
Maurer asserts that the GAC has made a conscious decision to try to act as a 
constituent body within ICANN, rather than as an external entity. He believes that, as 
ICANN’s sphere of action has grown to encompass a broader range of public policy 
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issues, so governments have become more interested and engaged in its activities. 
Maurer adds that governments bring expertise to the table on the legal, economic and 
social dimensions of public policy, and argues that as a result of this, the GAC's 
suggestions and commentary have often ‘hit the right note at the right time’.1031 Häll 
feels that in recent years ICANN has made more effort to involve the GAC earlier in 
the decisionmaking process, and states that ‘We now have a better dialogue between 
the GAC and ICANN even though everything is not perfect’. 1032   
 
Notwithstanding this, as noted, the term ‘public-private partnership’ is not wholly 
satisfactory, since it suggests a well-defined cooperative arrangement between 
governmental and private actors. ICANN differs from models offered by writers such 
as Ronit and Schneider1033 and Knill and Lehmukl1034, who talk of ‘cooperative 
patterns of interaction’1035  between private and public actors, where states delegate 
particular governance responsibilities to nongovernmental entities. ICANN is, in 
practice, not based on clear-cut delegation of particular well-defined competencies to 
nonstate actors by states; there is considerable friction over where governmental 
‘public policy’ authority begins and ends within the regime. Nor is the relationship 
between governments and nonstate actors always co-operative. Therefore, the ICANN 
regime is not always so much a public-private ‘partnership’ as a forum for a contest of 
interests between public and private actors.  
 
Mueller’s model of an ongoing contest between two competing approaches to 
governance, the nation-state system and the ‘ODii network’, is a useful conceptual 
tool, although it simplifies a more complex and nuanced reality. As Mueller himself 
points out, the ‘ODii network’ encompasses some diverse groups and interests and to 
a considerable extent blurs the boundaries between them. Individuals engaged in the 
network may have a foot in both the non-profit and commercial sectors; they may for 
example be based in academic or voluntary institutions but also consult for or sit on 
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the boards of commercial technical companies.1036 This is reflected in the 
backgrounds of many of the individuals serving in ICANN’s Supporting organisations 
or the Board. However, Mueller appears to see those engaged in the ‘ODii network’ as 
being essentially united by a common loyalty to the ‘ODii' system and the model of 
non-governmental governance of the Internet. He argues that ‘ODii’is ‘becoming a 
mature, institutionalized status quo, committed to maintaining itself and its 
prerogatives….its first commitment is to what it calls the community, by which it 
means: the ODii network itself’.1037 While there certainly appears to be a strong 
element of that ideology among many of the members of the ICANN community, 
particularly at Board level and among ICANN’s permanent staff, we also should not 
lose sight of the fact that the ICANN ‘community’ is far from a single homogenous 
group. It represents diverse interests often fiercely competing with each other, and 
sometimes some of these groups are not unwilling to enlist the support of 
governmental actors to advance their cause. Examples include intellectual property 
interests lobbying the GAC over new gTLDs; the various pressure groups that put 
pressure on the US government to oppose .xxx on their behalf; and the alliance 
between CCNSO registries and the GAC to promote IDN Fast Track. GAC 
representatives Maurer, 1038 Häll 1039 and Vera Sveinbjornsdottir1040 confirm that 
lobbying of GAC members by various interest groups takes place.   
 
Thus, ICANN politics cannot be reduced simply to a formula of ‘ODii’ versus 
governments; it represents a much more complex arena in which an array of 
competing actors and interest groups are willing to lobby and / or ally with whoever 
can help them advance their interests within the ICANN system, be that ICANN’s 
nongovernmental institutions, the GAC or individual governments. Depending upon 
the issue, governments may sometimes be aligned with other sets of actors, such as 
the intellectual property lobby in the case of new gTLDs, or the CCNSO registries in 
the case of IDN Fast Track; or in opposition to them, as, for example, when the GAC 
disagreed with the GNSO over the issue of mandatory contracts and fees for IDN 
ccTLDs.    
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Conclusions to Chapter 7  
 
The identities of the major players in DNS governance depend, to some extent, on 
what level one is discussing the regime; whether one is discussing the overall shaping 
of the ICANN system and its norms, or looking at routine policymaking within that 
framework. With regards to ICANN’s initial establishment, and to some extent 
underpinning its continued existence, the United States government played a 
hegemonic role. However, regarding policymaking within the regime, the US 
government is today one actor among many. In terms of ICANN’s policy 
development processes, the identities of the major actors, and the relative degree of 
influence they hold, are dependent upon the issue-area in hand; however the range of 
actors with real influence is, in all cases, somewhat different from, and narrower than, 
that envisaged by ICANN’s founders. 
 
The evidence reviewed refutes both ‘technical caretaker’ and ‘consensus-based 
policymaking’ interpretations of the ICANN system. ICANN is very much a public 
policymaker, since the issues with which it deals involve competing interests and 
claims of right. ICANN policymaking is in no way based on ‘consensus’, nor is there 
any way it realistically could be. Instead, it is based on bargaining and very often 
compromise between competing interests, with the Board acting as final arbiter. Even 
the Board does not always find consensus among its members; for example, the 
decision to approve implementation of the New gTLDs process (June 2011) was by 
majority vote. 1041 
 
There is some justification for Drezner’s position that sovereign states ultimately 
underpin the whole structure.1042 ICANN was created by a hegemonic state with input 
from another ‘great power’ (the EU); and it requires at least the acquiescence of other 
governments for its continued existence since, in the final analysis, governments 
possess the power to break up the regime, by the creation of national or international 
roots. However, this would risk destroying the universal connectivity of the Internet, 
unless a universally accepted intergovernmental alternative to ICANN could be 
agreed upon. In the absence of such agreement, governments appear willing to work 
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with the ICANN system in practice, mainly through the GAC, even if some of them 
continue to argue in principle for reform at venues such as WSIS and the IGF. The 
GAC provides a mechanism for governments to advance their interests within the 
ICANN system, one that has become increasingly influential, in line with the growing 
interest of governments in Internet-related public policy matters.  
 
Although the accommodation of governmental actors within the regime has proved 
crucial, the ICANN framework cannot be looked at from a statist perspective alone. 
Construction of the regime also required accommodation of some crucial 
nongovernmental actors, most of which represent commercial interests. Perhaps the 
most important of these are the registries and registrars, the actors that actually 
manage the DNS system below root level; the RIRs, which oversee management of 
the IP addressing system; and the ISPs, which also play a crucial role in the Internet 
infrastructure, including routing of data, maintenance of their own DNS servers, and 
distribution of IP addresses to end-users. The inclusion of these actors in the regime’s 
governance mechanisms was and is critical because of the operational role they play 
and because, like governments, they possess the potential to seriously disrupt the 
smooth running of the regime by withdrawal of their co-operation. In order to make 
the Internet an environment conducive to the commercial success aimed for by 
Clinton administration, it was also necessary to involve and accomodate other actors 
and interests, particularly intellectual property interests. These actors too possess a 
significant potential to cause disruption to the regime, for example through legal 
challenges. Other actors were also invited to play a role, such as the non-commercial 
users constituency and the At-Large community, but these actors have proved less 
influential, perhaps largely because, in the final analysis, they do not possess the same 
leverage in terms of ability to disrupt the regime as the more critical regime 
participants.  Thus, the ICANN system in practice represents ‘multistakeholderism’ of 
a sort, but not the broad ranging multistakeholderism that the idealists wanted. Rather, 
it is something of a mechanism for finding accommodation between a few powerful 
stakeholders, specifically those with the capacity to ‘rock the boat’ if ignored.  
 
Statist and corporatist perspectives on ICANN therefore both hold some merit, but 
each examines only one dimension of the regime. Perhaps the best starting point 
offered in the literature for a true understanding of the ICANN system is the concept 
of a ‘public-private partnership’, put forward by scholars such as Christou and 
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Simpson1043, Antonova,1044 and Kleinwaechter.1045 However, the term is still not 
entirely satisfactory, as it seems to suggest that governmental and corporate interests 
work co-operatively and in harmony, which, as the case studies have shown, is not 
always the case in reality. The clashes between the GAC and the GNSO over issues 
such as geographic identifiers in new gTLDs, for example, demonstrates that there is 
often a tension between private interests and governmental ones.  ‘Corporate interests’ 
are themselves not a single homogenous group and not always in alignment. For 
example, in the gTLDs and IDNs case studies, registry interests have clashed with 
intellectual property interests.  ICANN is, in practice, a forum for negotiation between 
various sets of interests, including those of governments and of various sets of 
nongovernmental actors.   
 
Overall, therefore, ICANN is perhaps best viewed both as the result of a ‘deal’ 
between various actors and interest groups, both governmental and nongovernmental, 
and as a forum for ongoing contestation of interests between those actors. Although 
the various actors and interest groups are not always in agreement, and their policy 
preferences may often clash, all have a shared interest in avoiding wholesale break-up 
of the regime, since this would likely mean the end of universal connectivity and the 
destruction of the Internet as we know it, an outcome that would be in no-one’s 
interest. ICANN is therefore a mechanism for accommodating and balancing the 
interests of various state and nonstate actors. Furthermore, the study has indicated that 
only those actors that must be accommodated, i.e. those with real potential to break up 
the regime, appear to have much real influence on policymaking. Other groups, such 
as the general Internet using public, do not have the same organisational capacity and 
the same potential to ‘rock the boat’, and thus, it appears, they do not have the same 
leverage as actors such as governments, registries and registrars, or the intellectual 
property lobby.  
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The role played by ICANN’s own staff should also not be ignored. Mueller argues 
that ICANN’s staff pursues its own personal and political agenda and often has more 
sway than the Board.1046 While this may be overstating the case slightly, the case 
study chapters have shown that ICANN staff often weild considerable influence over 
a policymaking process, particularly through their role in drafting reports and policy 
documents. 
 
The next chapter will further explore these findings in the context of international 
regime theory, in order to assess the extent to which ICANN represents a departure 
from conventional models of governance at the global level. 
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Chapter 8 
ICANN and international regime theory 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will draw upon international regime theory in an attempt to place 
ICANN within a broader context of patterns in global governance. It will ask what 
lessons ICANN can offer about the continuing applicability of the international 
regime concept, examining whether ICANN can in fact be understood as a regime, 
and will attempt to analyse the organisation in terms of concepts drawn from various 
paradigms on regime theory. It will also explore whether these theoretical models can 
help to explain why ICANN has evolved so much in a relatively short period of time.  
 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, ICANN is a complex, multifaceted system that 
can be interpreted in a number of ways. The evidence reviewed in this dissertation has 
eliminated some previously offered interpretations, such as the view that ICANN is an 
apolitical technical agency only. It has also demonstrated that ‘liberal democratic’, 
‘multistakeholder’ and ‘consensus based decisionmaking’ ideals expressed in the 
1998 White Paper have not translated very well into reality. However, various other 
perspectives on the organisation have, to varying degrees, been validated. There are 
some grounds for interpreting ICANN in terms of interstate politics, as per the 
perspectives offered by scholars such as Drezner; however, the interstate aspect 
represents only one dimension of the ICANN system. Corporate capture models 
likewise have relevance, since some of the key actors within the organisation are 
commercial entities. Yet commercial influences are, in their turn, balanced by the 
input of public authorities. Views of ICANN as a ‘public-private partnership’ go some 
way towards taking on board both these aspects of the organisation, but the term 
implies a co-operative relationship based on clear-cut delegation of particular well-
defined competencies to nonstate actors by states. In practice, the ICANN system is 
not that simple; nor is the relationship between states and nonstate actors always co-
operative. ICANN is often not so much a public-private ‘partnership’ as an arena for 
controlled contestation of interests between public and private actors.    
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There is, therefore, a need to reconcile these different perspectives in order to build a 
fuller understanding of the ICANN system as a whole, and also to show how it relates 
to the broader context of patterns in global governance. There is also a need to explain 
how ICANN’s principles and norms came to be modified over time. One key example 
concerns the shift away from the norm of a ‘private’ governance body with a very 
limited advisory role for governments, towards one where governments have real 
influence. At the same time, the original norm that envisaged a substantial role for the 
global Internet using public has been very much watered down. There has also been a 
de facto shift from a 'consensus' based model of policymaking to one based around 
arbitration between competing interests, and a shift from a 'bottom up' policymaking 
model in theory to a more 'top-down' model in practice.  
 
This chapter will examine these issues in the context of international regime theory. In 
some ways, this body of theory may not immediately appear to be the obvious choice 
for an analysis of ICANN, since international regimes have conventionally tended to 
be framed mainly in intergovernmental terms. By contrast, intergovernmentalism is 
only one aspect of the ICANN system and arguably not the predominant one. The 
state-centric nature of the conventional regime concept has meant that its applicability 
to non-state governance arrangements has been dismissed by scholars such as Susan 
Strange.1047 However, this chapter and the subsequent one will argue that the regime 
concept remains useful when applied to organisations such as ICANN, and that, 
despite some obvious differences, ICANN can still be understood as an international 
regime using the definition created by Stephen Krasner in 1983. Krasner defined 
international regimes as: 
 
 ‘…sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.’1048  
 
As A. Claire Cutler asserts, there is no reason why this definition could not apply to 
the activities of nonstate actors.1049 She points out that the regime concept actually 
                                                 
1047 Strange, S. (1997). ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis.’ The Politics of Global 
Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. P. F. Diehl. London, Lynne 
Rienner: 41-55. P52 
1048 Krasner, S. D. (1983). ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables.’ International Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 2-22. P2  
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originated as an attempt to address inadequacies in the state-centric, formalistic realist 
approaches to international relations theory that predominated at the time. Cutler feels 
that regime analysis subsequently became ‘captured’ by a realist-neoliberal synthesis 
and in the process became progressively more state-centric.1050 However, she argues, 
the regime concept does not necessarily have to be understood in interstate terms. She 
develops the concept of the ‘private international regime’, which she defines as ‘an 
integrated complex of formal and informal institutions that is a source of governance 
for an economic issue-area as a whole’. 1051 This definition applies quite neatly to 
ICANN.  
 
Milton Mueller agrees that ICANN should be interpreted as a ‘nascent international 
regime’.1052 He acknowledges that its origins as ‘the product of an informal political 
agreement among national governments’ and the extensive role for private sector 
actors make ICANN different from many other regimes,1053 but still believes it more 
accurate to classify ICANN as a variant of a standard international regime than as a 
unique new form of global policymaking.1054  
 
The first section of this chapter will further explore how ICANN may be understood 
in terms of the international regime concept. Subsequent sections will draw upon 
various paradigms on regime theory in an effort to analyse various facets of the 
ICANN regime and show how these can be reconciled to form a comprehensive 
analysis of the organisation.  
 
 ICANN as a regime   
 
Despite its unique characteristics, there seems to be no reason why ICANN cannot be 
classified as an international regime using Krasner’s classic definition, since it has 
identifiable principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge.  
                                                                                                                                            
1049 Cutler, A. C. (2007). ‘Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation.’ The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance. R. B. Hall and T. J. Biersteker. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 24-41. P27  
1050 Ibid, P26  
1051 Ibid, P26  
1052 Mueller, M. L. (2002). Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. P212 
1053 Ibid, P217 
1054 Ibid, P218 
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Using Krasner’s definition as a starting point, this section will set out the basic 
parameters of the ICANN regime, both in terms of the actors and interests engaged in 
it, and the principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures that define it.  
 
Actors  
 
Actors in regime construction  
 
In the initial regime construction phase, the US government was the most influential 
single actor in terms of setting out the underlying principles and norms that would 
define the basic parameters of the regime. Because of its control of the root, the US 
government was in a position to enforce its policy choices. It effectively ignored the 
gTLD-MoU and presented its own framework in the Green and White Papers. Other 
actors were allowed to work out the finer details within this framework, but the broad 
strokes for the regime were set out in these documents. These basic parameters 
included the principles of private sector governance, free market competition and the 
‘multistakeholder’ model.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the European Union, though playing a very much junior 
role to that of the US, also made significant contributions to the initial organisational 
design. The EU’s preferred model was a mixed public–private regime with a well-
established role for state authorities.1055 Although the EU was forced to accept 
American leadership and the establishment of a ‘private’ ICANN, it was nonetheless 
able to successfully argue for the inclusion of public actors in an ‘advisory’ capacity 
in the form of the GAC.1056 Over time, this proved to be a more important 
contribution than initially realised, since the GAC has grown to a much greater 
prominence than intended or predicted in 1998.    
 
Certain nonstate actors also made important contributions to the initial regime design. 
Although Postel’s IANA and the technical community failed to get their way on the 
gTLD-MoU, they nonetheless played a very significant role in drafting up the 
                                                 
1055 Leib, V. (2002). "ICANN – EU can’t: Internet governance and Europe’s role in the formation of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers." Telematics and Informatics 19(2): 159-171. 
P160  
1056 Ibid 
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specifics of the new organisation, including its Bylaws. NSI likewise had important 
input into this process; indeed the final proposal that became the blueprint for ICANN 
became known as the ‘IANA/NSI Draft’. The intellectual property lobby also had 
significant influence at this stage, as evidenced by the proposal for a WIPO study 
incorporated into White Paper, which later became the basis of the UDRP.  
 
Certain other actors had a voice but were ultimately less significant. The Japanese and 
Australian governments lent their support to the EU’s push to establish a GAC. A 
great deal of input from the wider public was received in the online discussions that 
surrounded the IFWP process. The ccTLD registries, the RIRs and other elements of 
the technical community had input into the IFWP process and Postel’s online 
discussions, but ultimately were shut out of the final phase of the drafting process that 
produced the IANA / NSI Draft. This was not exactly planned; the organisers of the 
IFWP had intended to produce a draft based on input from a much wider range of 
groups. Ultimately, however, the IFWP failed to produce a fully articulated plan for 
‘NewCo’, and the DoC went with the IANA / NSI blueprint. The ccTLD registries 
did, however, organise their own constituency within ICANN; they were initially 
incorporated into the DNSO structure, but would later split off to form their own 
Supporting Organisation as part of the 2002-03 reforms. The other DNSO 
Constituencies were also essentially self-organising. The RIRs created their own 
Supporting Organisation, the ASO. 
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Actors in policymaking  
 
Many of the actors that played a role in regime construction have continued to 
influence ICANN’s operational policymaking processes. However, the US 
government has not had the same hegemonic dominance over ICANN’s ongoing 
policymaking affairs as it did over initial regime construction. Furthermore, the 
number of governments actively involved in the GAC is much larger than the handful 
of governments directly involved in ICANN’s formation.Note 8.1 A much larger number 
of individual ‘supply side’ actors are also involved. In 1998, NSI was the sole registry 
and registrar for gTLDs, whereas today there are a considerable number of 
independent registries and registrars represented through their respective GNSO 
Constituencies, though NSI’s successor VeriSign arguably remains the biggest and 
most important of the registries because of its control of the .com namespace. The 
GNSO structure also provides formalised avenues of representation for various other 
groups, such as the ISPs Constituency, the Business Constituency and the Non-
Commercial Users Constituency. Some individual organisations from these 
constituencies did participate in the IFWP process but were not organised as coherent 
blocs at that stage. The general Internet-using public has continued to play only a 
relatively minor role in practice.  
 
The role of the ‘technical community’ as a distinct bloc has arguably been less 
significant in terms of ongoing policy development than in initial regime construction. 
The technical community provides specialist knowledge and advice about the 
specifics of policy implementation, through the RSSAC and SSAC as well as links 
with key technical standards bodies through the Technical Liaison Group and IETF 
Liaison. However, none of these groups appears to have had much direct involvement 
in the big ‘political’ decisions, such as selection criteria for new gTLDs or questions 
of intellectual property rights in domain names. While there is no single ‘technical 
constituency’ organised as a distinct bloc, however, it must be pointed out a great 
many of the individuals sitting on ICANN’s key policy development bodies, up to and 
including Directors, are drawn from technical backgrounds, and some representatives 
                                                 
Note 8.1 Around a hundred governments have currently named representatives to the GAC (see 
http://gac.icann.org/gac-representatives, accessed 18 July 2011). Of these, around forty regularly attend 
meetings (for details of attendance at any given meeting, see http://gac.icann.org/communiques, 
accessed 18 July 2011). 
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of technical organisations are recruited to assist in the policy development process, for 
example the IDNs Committee included members from the IETF and IAB.1057  
 
Table 8.1 Actors in policy development  
 
Actor(s) / interest 
group(s) 
Main avenue for 
representation 
Relative influence on 
policy development  
Governments  Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC) 
High  
Regional Internet 
Registries (RIRs) 
Address Supporting 
Organisation (ASO) 
High (within their own 
sphere of influence)* 
gTLD registries  
 
GNSO Registries 
Constituency  
High, particularly 
regarding gTLDs policy 
ccTLD registries CCNSO High, particularly 
regarding ccTLDs policy  
Registrars GNSO Registrars 
Constituency 
High 
Intellectual property lobby GNSO Intellectual 
Property Constituency 
(IPC) 
Moderate to high 
General business interests GNSO Business 
Constituency (BC) 
Moderate 
Non-commercial users GNSO Non-Commercial 
Users Constituency 
(NCUC) 
Moderate 
Internet Service Providers  
(ISPs) 
GNSO ISP Constituency 
(ISPCP) 
Moderate 
Technical community Root Server System 
Advisory Committee 
(RSSAC) and Security and 
Stability Advisory 
Committee (SSAC), IETF 
Liaison, Technical Liaison 
Group 
Low to moderate  
Domain name registrants, 
general Internet-using 
public 
At-Large Advisory 
Committee (ALAC) 
Public comments 
Low to moderate 
Language & cultural 
groups 
Not directly represented Low 
 
 
 
                                                 
1057 ICANN (2011). “Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee.” Retrieved 15 July 2011, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/committees/idn/  
* The RIRs, through the ASO, control policymaking with regards to IP addressing. However, this area 
of ICANN’s work, unlike DNS policy, tends not to be highly politicised for the most part. Though 
some developing states have, in the past argued that existing IPv4 address allocations tend to favour US 
interests, this is being gradually made less relevant by the introduction of IPv6, which solves the 
problem of address scarcity. The ASO is not usually involved in policy relating to domain names. 
 270 
 
Principles and norms 
 
Krasner defines ‘principles’ as ‘beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude’, while ‘norms’ 
are ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.’1058 Krasner 
makes a fundamental distinction between principles and norms, which he sees as 
providing the basic characteristics of a regime, and rules and decisionmaking 
procedures, which are specific and more detailed arrangements within the context of 
the principles and norms, and which may be altered without changing the underlying 
character of the regime. 1059  
 
Principles 
 
Using Krasner’s definition, the following principles for DNS governance can be 
derived from the White Paper1060 of 1998.  
 
Principle 1 - Definition of critical Internet resources - IP addressing and the 
Domain Name System:  
 
Critical Internet resources are defined as IP addresses and domain 
names. The IP addressing system is a method for assigning unique 
numeric identifiers to each computer or device connected to the 
Internet. Such identifiers are used to distinguish that particular device 
from any other on the network and facilitate communication by 
allowing data to be forwarded to and requested from a specific target 
computer. 
 
Domain names are the familiar and easy-to-remember names for 
Internet resources (e.g., "www.microsoft.com"). They map to IP 
numbers that serve as routing addresses on the Internet. The domain 
                                                 
1058 Krasner, S. D. (1983). ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables.’ International Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 2-22. P2  
1059 Ibid, P3 
1060 United States Department of Commerce (1998). National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration Statement of Policy: “Management of Internet Names and Addresses.” ('White Paper'). 
5th June 2007. Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02. Retrieved 5 October 2008, from 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm 
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name system (DNS) translates Internet names into the IP numbers 
needed for transmission of information across the network.  
 
The domain name space is constructed as a hierarchy. It is divided into 
top-level domains (TLDs), with each TLD then divided into second-
level domains, and so on. In terms of organisation and intended use, 
TLDs are divided into two types: national, or country-code, TLDs 
(ccTLDs), and a small set of generic TLDs (gTLDs), which do not 
carry any national identifier, but denote the intended function of that 
portion of the domain space. DNS relies upon a hierarchical system of 
interconnected nameservers to which requests for name resolution are 
forwarded.  
 
Principle 2 - The Internet requires coordinated naming and numbering 
resource assignment.    
 
There can be no duplicate names or addresses on the network. 
Furthermore, the system of distributed DNS servers must point to an 
authoritative and consistent common ‘root’ to guarantee universal 
name consistency, without which data could not be routed with any 
certainty to the intended addresses. This makes necessary a mechanism 
for coordinated administration and assignment of naming and 
numbering resources. While day-to-day operational tasks, such as the 
actual operation and maintenance of the Internet root servers, can be 
dispersed, overall policy co-ordination and control of the global IP 
address pool and the DNS root should be vested in a single 
organisation. This is known as the ‘IANA function’. 
 
Below the IANA manager lies a hierarchy of organisations involved in 
redistributing naming and numbering resources downwards. With 
regards to IP addressing, large blocks of IP addresses are assigned by 
the IANA manager to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which in 
turn redistribute smaller blocks of IP addresses to large organisations 
and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). These organisations are then 
responsible for assigning individual IP addresses to ordinary users. 
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With regards to the domain name system, management of each Top 
Level Domain is delegated to a registry organisation.  
 
Coordination between all of the actors described above requires 
recognition of the authority of the central ‘IANA’ manager to set 
policy and standards pertaining to resource assignment, and to resolve 
any disputes arising from this.    
The four core dimensions of the IANA function are: 1. To set policy 
for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks; 2. To oversee the 
operation of the Internet root server system; 3. To oversee policy for 
determining the circumstances under which new top level domains 
would be added to the root system; and 4. To coordinate the 
development of other technical protocol parameters as needed to 
maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.  
Principle 3 - The Internet, and therefore critical Internet resource governance, 
are global and nonterritorial in scope.  
The Internet is essentially a borderless medium that allows data to flow 
across national boundaries. Allocation of naming and numbering 
resources (with the exception of ccTLDS) is not tied to physical 
geography. Governance of this system must therefore also be 
nonterritorial in scope and allow common standards and policies to be 
set across the global network.     
 
Principle 4 - Critical Internet resource management is a matter of technical co-
ordination rather than public policy. 
Public actors (governments) are not the appropriate governors for the 
IP addressing and DNS systems, because critical Internet resource 
management is a technical rather than political matter.  
 
Principle 5 - As the Internet becomes commercial, it becomes less appropriate 
for US research agencies to direct and fund these functions. Critical Internet 
resource governance should be managed by private actors through a 
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‘multistakeholder’ organisation (‘NewCo’) This organisation should be 
accountable to the ‘Internet community’ and represent stakeholders from all 
geographic regions. 
This belief follows on from Principle 4. As a nonterritiorial, technical 
and apolitical system, critical Internet resource governance is not suited 
to management by territorial governments. Instead, it should be placed 
in the hands of those directly involved in managing the system, and 
those directly affected by its decisions. This should include technical 
and commercial stakeholders, but also representatives of the global 
Internet using public.   
Principle 6 – ‘NewCo’ should reach decisions in a bottom-up, consensus 
driven manner. 
Critical resource governance involves collective decisionmaking by 
RIRs, registries, registrars, Internet service providers, the technical 
community, representatives of Internet end-users including business 
and private users, and other actors involved in the supply or 
consumption of critical Internet resources.  Decisions should be 
reached via ‘rough consensus’ among all participating actors, in the 
same manner as the Internet has been run by the technical community 
since its inception.    
 
Principle 7 – A mechanism is required for resolution of intellectual property 
disputes involving domain names.  
 
Principle 8 – ‘NewCo’ should promote competition in domain name 
registration.  
 
Principle 9 – Technical stability of the system is a prime consideration.   
 
As previous chapters have revealed, however, principles 3, 4, 7 and 6 have been 
challenged in reality: 
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• Principle 3 appears to have become somewhat modified, with the concept of 
geographically based gTLDs (such as .berlin), and growing recognition that 
territorial sovereign states have rights over their ccTLDs and over the 
allocation of ‘geographical identifiers’ in gTLDs. 
 
• Principle 4 has been thoroughly discredited. As shown throughout this thesis, 
ICANN is very much a public policymaker.   
 
• Principle 5 has also been challenged in practice. Although private actors play a 
crucial role in DNS governance, state actors have proved significant also, 
while the Internet-using public plays a much lesser role than appears to have 
been originally envisaged.   
 
• Principle 6 remains in place in theory, but does not describe reality. ICANN 
policymaking can in no way be said to be based on ‘consensus’ or ‘bottom-up’ 
policy coordination.   
 
Norms 
 
Like the basic principles from which they flow, the initial ICANN norms developed in 
1998 differ in important ways from the norms to which ICANN today adheres in 
practice, as shown in the following table:  
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Table 8.2: ICANN norms 
ICANN 1.0 (1998) – Norms ICANN 2.0 (ICANN of today)  
- Norms 
STABILITY  
Technical stability of the system prime 
consideration, therefore no changes can be 
made without thorough technical evaluation 
and testing 
Technical stability of the system prime 
consideration, therefore no changes can be 
made without thorough technical evaluation 
and testing 
POLICY CO-ORDINATION  
Private regulatory model; private actors make 
policy 
Public-private model; both public and 
private actors involved in policymaking 
Bottom up policymaking: Board approves or 
rejects  
Top-down policymaking: Board actively 
involved in shaping specifics 
Consensus based decisionmaking Decisionmaking based on arbitration 
between competing interests, often at Board 
level 
Broad multistakeholder policymaking. Various 
sets of interests have the right to participate in 
policymaking, including both commercial and 
non-commercial groups and the Internet using 
public 
Narrow multistakeholder policymaking 
where only a few groups (commercial and 
governmental) have real influence over 
policy 
COMPETITION  
Strong competition between registries and 
between registrars (left undecided in the White 
Paper but became a norm during ICANN’s 
first year of operation) 
Limited competition between registries in 
practice (though promotion of competition 
remains a goal and new gTLDs programme 
likely to increase competition considerably) 
Strong competition between gTLD 
registrars 
Separation of registry and registrar functions 
(left undecided in the White Paper but became 
a norm during ICANN’s first year of 
operation) 
Vertical integration of registries and 
registrars to be permitted in next round of 
new gTLDs (under current proposals)  
REPRESENTATION  
Equal representation for broad range of 
interests across all policy areas 
 
Unequal representation. A few types of 
actor are far better represented, furthermore 
the policy area under consideration 
determines which actors are most important  
At-Large Constituency main representatives of 
global public interest 
Governments through the GAC main 
representatives of global public interest 
Significant voice for global Internet using 
public 
Token voice for global Internet using public 
Significant element of global democracy: one 
third of the Board elected by global elections  
Board wholly selected by SOs + 
NOMCOM, apart from a single Director 
selected by the ALAC  
Broad geographical representation, especially 
on the Board 
Broad geographical representation, 
especially on the Board 
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ICANN 1.0 (1998) – Norms ICANN 2.0 (ICANN of today)  
- Norms 
OTHER   
Strong protection for intellectual property 
rights  
Strong protection for intellectual property 
rights 
‘A’ root server remains under ultimate 
ownership / control of US Government.  
‘A’ root server remains under ultimate 
ownership / control of US Government. 
Global, non-territorially based DNS 
governance 
gTLDs mostly treated as a global resource 
to be governed without reference to national 
borders. Some recognition that authority 
over ccTLDs is tied to territorial sovereigns, 
and that territorial governments also have 
some rights over some gTLD applications, 
particularly ‘geographical identifiers’.  
ICANN to be entirely selfregulating by 2000 Oversight body set up under AoC in 2009 
Strong, open WHOIS for gTLDs Strong, open WHOIS for gTLDs remains 
the status quo for now but has been 
challenged from various quarters 
Funding for ICANN provided from domain 
name registrations (i.e. ‘taxation’ of registries 
and registrars)  
Funding for ICANN provided from domain 
name registrations (i.e. ‘taxation’ of 
registries and registrars). ICANN’s 
expenditure greatly increased.  
Transparency and openness in policy 
development 
Transparency and openness in policy 
development remains a goal, some groups 
within ICANN less transparent than others 
Mandatory Registry Agreements for gTLD 
registries, optional for ccTLD registries 
Mandatory Registry Agreements for gTLD 
registries. Remain optional for ccTLD 
registries; this has been challenged 
(particularly regarding IDN ccTLDs) but so 
far upheld 
Registrars must be accredited by ICANN Registrars must be accredited by ICANN; 
Registrar Accreditation Agreements 
significantly strengthened 
 
 
ICANN’s rules and decisionmaking procedures are set out in the organisation’s 
Bylaws.1061 For the purposes of this chapter, however, these are less important than 
the principles and norms, which provide the basic characteristics of the regime. 
Krasner argues that changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes 
within regimes, provided that principles and norms remain unaltered. However, he 
goes on to argue that changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime 
itself.1062 According to this view, then, the ICANN regime has fundamentally changed 
since its inception, since some of its principles and norms have been modified. 
                                                 
1061 ICANN (2011). Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (As amended 
24 June 2011). Retrieved on 26th July 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
1062 Krasner, S. D., Ed. (1983). International Regimes. New York, Cornell University Press. P3 
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Nonetheless, the change has so far taken the form of evolutionary reform rather than 
revolutionary regime replacement.  
 
The following sections will draw upon various paradigms in regime theory in an 
attempt to analyse these patterns.  
 
Regime theory: ‘rationalist’ approaches 
 
The regime concept was initially developed in the context of rationalist paradigms on 
International Relations theory, and this will be the starting point for analysis of the 
ICANN regime.    
 
Overview of ‘rationalist’ regime theory 
 
‘Rationalist’ paradigms encompass realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches. 
Both begin from some similar ontological assumptions. They stress the importance of 
state actors and state power as a basis for the international system structure, and 
assume conditions of anarchy in the international system; that is, a situation in which 
there is no overall authority above and beyond that of individual sovereign states. 
However, whereas realists believe that these conditions lead inevitably to lack of trust, 
competition and conflict between state actors, with any co-operation being relatively 
short-term and tactical, neoliberal institutionalists argue that, because of mutual 
interdependence, there are incentives for actors to build long-term co-operative 
arrangements.  
 
Though realists tend to view co-operation as tactical and impermanent, they do use the 
concept of international regimes, which they explain in power-based terms. Regimes 
may be based upon a balance of power between several dominant state actors, or may 
be imposed by a single hegemonic actor, as in the model known as ‘hegemonic 
stability theory.’ 1063 Hegemonic stability theory applies concepts originated by 
scholars such as Charles Kindleberger1064 to international regimes, and explains 
                                                 
1063 Gilpin, R. (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. P86. 
1064See Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The World in Depression: 1929-1939. Berkeley, University of 
California Press 
and 
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successful regimes in terms of the imposition of order by a hegemonic state. The 
hegemon determines the basic principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures of the system; the strength and prestige of the hegemon are essential 
prerequisites for other states to accept the regimes it establishes. The hegemon 
maintains the system and makes maximum profit by exploiting those regimes; at the 
same time, the regimes provide “public goods” to other countries, and free-riders are 
tolerated by the hegemon in order to maintain the system. The stability of a regime is 
dependent upon the persistence of the existing distribution of power in the 
international system. If the hegemon’s relative capabilities decline, the regime will 
collapse.1065  
 
Neoliberal institutionalism, most closely identified with Robert Keohane and built 
upon by other scholars, starts from some similar assumptions to realism, including a 
state-centric world order characterised by anarchy. However, unlike realists, 
neoliberal institutionalists do not see these conditions as precluding the possibility of 
genuine long-term cooperation between state actors. Realists, they argue, err by 
modelling the world using the classic ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ or ‘Stag Hunt’ analogies, 
where conditions make defection a dominant strategy for actors; but these are ‘one 
shot’ scenarios, where participants do not expect to interact again in the future. In the 
real-world international system, neoliberal institutionalists argue, states interact 
continually and there are future consequences for today’s actions. Relations are 
iterative and defection from agreed arrangements is likely to scupper any chance of 
further co-operation in the future. Thus, defection is in the long run unrewarding, 
since any short term gains obtained will normally be outweighed by the 
punishment that will ensue over the long term.1066 Actors are rational enough to 
recognise this and so mostly tend to keep to their agreements. Repeated cooperative 
interactions lead to the establishment of understandings between actors, a process of 
‘convergence of expectations’, which can become crystallised into full-blown 
international regimes. Neoliberal institutionalists thus explain regime formation in 
terms of interdependence, reciprocity and convergence of interests among a number of 
states, rather than necessarily as the unilateral creation of a hegemon.  
                                                                                                                                            
Kindleberger, C. P. (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, 
Public Goods and Free Rides." International Studies Quarterly 25(2): 242-254. 
1065 Young, O. R. (1983). ‘Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes.’ International 
Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 93-113. P116 
1066 Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, Princeton University Press. P75, P103 
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As Keohane explains, cooperation does not imply an absence of conflict. Rather, it 
reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential.1067 He sees 
regimes as akin to ‘contracts’ between actors with long-term objectives, who seek to 
structure their relationships in stable and mutually beneficial ways. These 
arrangements, he asserts, do not preclude further negotiations, but function to 
establish stable mutual expectations among actors about each others’ patterns of 
behaviour, and develop working relationships that will allow the parties to cope with 
new situations;1068 regimes provide established negotiating frameworks (reducing 
transaction costs).1069 An important principle shared by most international regimes, 
Keohane argues, is ‘reciprocation’, i.e. the mutual belief among participants that, if 
one helps the other actors or fails to hurt them, even at some opportunity cost to 
oneself, they will reciprocate when the tables are turned.1070 Regimes generate the 
expectation of cooperation among members, by creating iteration and the belief that 
interaction will continue for the foreseeable future.1071  
Keohane does, however, recognise that power and hegemony may influence regime 
formation, although he argues that regimes may be also formed in the absence of a 
hegemon. He reasons that we can generally expect actors to join regimes when they 
expect the benefits of membership to outweigh the costs; disadvantaged actors may 
join regimes even when they receive fewer benefits than other members, provided that 
they still gain more than they would if they were not part of the regime.1072 He does, 
however, also acknowledge that weaker actors’ choices whether or not to join a given 
regime may be subject to constraints; powerful actors may impose constraints on 
weaker ones prior to formation of a new regime, or may threaten adverse 
consequences for refusal to join a hegemonic scheme. Thus, an actor’s decision to 
join a regime may not always be a purely ‘voluntary’ choice.1073  
 
Though neoliberal institutionalists accept that hegemons may often play an important 
role in initial regime establishment, they argue that stable regimes, once established, 
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are likely to be enduring and will not necessarily collapse simply due to a change in 
the relative power position of the hegemon.1074 Keohane argues that the pattern 
observable in reality is of regimes tending to endure even in the face of changes in the 
underlying power structure. This occurs, he argues, because mutual benefits provided 
by the regime cause actors to redefine their interests in terms of the regime; and 
because established regimes are easier to maintain than new regimes are to create.1075 
 
Krasner, though often described as a realist, is not in fundamental disagreement with 
most points of Keohane’s position. He too recognises that, in many issue-areas, the 
world is not zero-sum; i.e., in those areas, the objectives sought by states are not 
affected by the gains made by other states, and there can be opportunities for mutual 
gain. The creation of effective regimes, he acknowledges, may be the means by which 
these gains can be realised.1076 He further agrees that regimes are easier to maintain 
than to create1077, arguing that established regimes generate inertia, if only because of 
sunk costs and the absence of alternatives. As a consequence, though regimes may 
closely reflect the underlying power structure when first created, once they are 
actually in place, the relationship between power and regimes can become more 
attenuated and, over time, the underlying power structure and the regime principles 
and norms can drift apart. 1078 However, Krasner goes on to argue, this process can 
only go so far. If incongruities between regime principles and norms and the 
underlying power structure become too severe, he asserts, there is likely to be 
revolutionary change as those with the greatest power capabilities move to change 
underlying principles and norms. He uses the metaphor of ‘tectonic plates’ to describe 
this process, where ‘pressure’ builds over time through incremental changes in the 
underlying power structure, until finally there is an ‘earthquake’ that reshapes the 
regime in line with the new power realities.1079 The greater the disparity between the 
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power structure and the regime norms, the greater the probability of a sudden 
rupture.1080 
 
Krasner also goes on to suggest that, aside from lags, once regimes are established, 
they may feed back on the basic causal variables that gave rise to them in the first 
place; they may alter the distribution of power, and they may change assessments of 
interest. Thus, Krasner acknowledges, regimes “may become interactive, not simply 
intervening, variables”; i.e., they may come to have independent effects on outcomes 
and behaviour. As a result, basic causal variables may be less important for explaining 
regime persistence than for explaining regime creation.1081  
 
Keohane and Joseph Nye offer a synthesis between realist and neoliberal 
institutionalist approaches. They see realism as a starting point for analysis and 
believe that realist explanations work well under some conditions, but less so under 
conditions of ‘complex interdependence’. Both realism and complex interdependence, 
they assert, are ideal types rather than true reflections of world political reality; most 
situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes.1082 Like Krasner, they 
argue that regimes function as intermediate factors between the power structure of an 
international system and the political and economic bargaining that takes place within 
it.1083 
 
Application to ICANN 
 
A statist perspective on ICANN, such as that taken by Drezner, clearly shares 
similarities with ‘rationalist’, state based approaches to IR. Obviously, ICANN 
deviates from some assumptions of classic rationalist regime theory. While rationalist 
approaches sometimes acknowledge that private actors can play a role in regimes, 
they are usually assumed to be subordinate to states. Oran Young, for instance, argues 
that, in formal terms, the members of international regimes are always sovereign 
states, though the parties carrying out the actions governed by regimes are often 
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private entities.1084 Krasner likewise acknowledges that, in a market-oriented regime, 
states as well as private corporations can be players in the market.1085 However, he 
still sees regimes as being primarily constructed by states; the behaviour of other 
actors, including multinational corporations and international organisations, is 
conditioned and delimited by state decisions and state power.1086 This division 
between state and nonstate actors cannot be so readily applied in the case of ICANN. 
Although writers such as Drezner identify a pattern of state dominance in the ICANN 
system, the case studies have demonstrated that ICANN is in fact a regime where both 
state and nonstate actors may compete to advance their interests, with no guarantee 
that state preferences will come out on top. In the ICANN system, state and nonstate 
actors can therefore be regarded in some ways as peers to an extent not normally seen 
in most international regimes. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that rationalist regime theory has no applicability to 
the ICANN case. In light of the dominant role played by a state actor, the US, in 
creating the regime, ICANN would seem to reflect the hegemonic model to a 
considerable extent. However, this model can only take us so far. The process of 
regime establishment also involved negotiation and bargaining between various state 
and nonstate actors. Furthermore, ongoing contests and bargaining between regime 
participants have continued to reshape its fundamental principles and norms over 
time, often in directions not initially envisaged by the US. Despite the fact that 
ownership of the DNS root is still legally claimed by the US Department of 
Commerce, the US government has not, for the most part, appeared to play a greater 
role in ICANN’s operational policymaking than other major governments (with 
arguably one or two exceptions, such as the .xxx affair). The remaining vestiges of US 
control have been considerably reduced with the ending of the JPA. This reduction in 
direct US influence has not appeared to weaken the regime, and this is more readily 
explained by neoliberal institutionalist approaches than by realist hegemonic stability 
theory. 
Young identifies three distinct types of regime; spontaneous regimes, negotiated 
regimes and imposed regimes. Spontaneous regimes are defined as the product of 
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interaction without conscious design or coordination; negotiated orders are a product 
of bargaining among participants; while imposed regimes are products of the kind of 
hegemonic order discussed by realist analyses.1087 Arguably, ICANN shows features 
of all three of Young’s regime types. Some of the key underlying elements of the 
regime emerged ‘spontaneously’. For example, the fundamental organisational 
characteristics of the DNS system itself, such as the way it is split into ccTLDs and 
gTLDs, are conventions that emerged under the management of the technical 
community long before ICANN’s formal institutionalisation and indeed long before 
governmental or commercial actors were involved. While there are some underlying 
‘spontaneous’ aspects to the naming and addressing arrangements, however, ICANN 
in its specific institutional form is to a considerable extent an imposed regime. Finally, 
some aspects of the regime are negotiated, for example the original Bylaws were 
created by a process of negotiation and bargaining among key actors in the wake of 
the White Paper, and important elements such as the existence of the GAC emerged 
via negotiation.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalist models emphasising interdependence and the rationality of 
co-operation can therefore readily be applied to ICANN. All actors within the ICANN 
system, including both states and nonstate entities, have at least two important things 
in common. Each of them is required to make the system work, and each has an 
interest in maintaining a working system. The system could not function without the 
support of governments; it could not function without the registries or the registrars; it 
could not function without the ISPs or the RIRs; it could not function without the 
technical community. It requires the support of the business community in order to 
attract the investment needed to make the Internet a viable commercial proposition; 
and the intellectual property community must also be kept on board due to its 
potential ability to disrupt the regime through legal challenges or lobbying of 
governments. Therefore there is a high degree of interdependence between actors, and 
a regime to ensure all are kept on board is not only desirable, but essential. While each 
set of actors may desire to reshape the regime according to its interests, outright 
defection is not a rational choice. Each actor recognises this and redefines its interests 
in terms of the regime. Within the context of the regime, however, participants 
continue to work to advance their own interests and ideals. In doing so, they may seek 
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to reshape or modify the regime norms. This is consistent with Keohane’s view of 
regimes as frameworks for ongoing negotiation; within the regime continued conflicts 
may continue, but the regime provides a framework for their resolution.1088 It is also 
consistent with his assertion that, in view of the difficulties of constructing 
international regimes, it is rational to seek to modify existing ones, where possible, 
rather than to abandon unsatisfactory ones and attempt to start over, meaning that 
regimes tend to evolve rather than to die.1089  
 
A number of key ongoing conflicts between sets of interests can be identified, that 
have manifested themselves in more than one policy development area and that 
illustrate significant continuing pressures for regime modification from a variety of 
quarters. Examples of such conflicts include: conflict between ICANN’s efforts to 
centralise policymaking and the registries’ efforts to maintain autonomy; conflict 
between intellectual property interests aiming to restrict opportunities for 
cybersquatting by limiting the number of TLDs, and those who want to expand the 
domain name space; conflict between ICANN and national governments over control 
of ccTLDs; conflict between ICANN and national governments over control of public 
policy in the gTLD realm; conflict between principles of broad multistakeholderism / 
public participation and vested interests; conflict for resources between commercial 
and non-commercial interests; conflict between the need for centralised policy and the 
need to take into account local sensibilities on issues pertaining to language and 
culture; and conflict between trademark interests and freedom of expression / identity 
in domain names. 
 
An interesting question is whether these conflicts should be regarded as cracks in the 
regime, or just ongoing contests within the regime framework in the manner described 
by Keohane. What can be said is that some of them have proved powerful enough to 
reshape the regime norms, particularly those related to the assertion of governmental 
authority and the reduced influence of the At-Large community. If we take the view 
that this ongoing evolution of the ICANN governance arrangements in response to 
contests between regime participants is significant enough to be considered changes in 
the regime’s structure and norms, then this goes significantly beyond Keohane’s 
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model, where ongoing contests continue between actors but within a relatively stable 
regime framework. Yet it also represents a steady evolution of the regime, rather than 
the type of dramatic earthquake event predicted by Krasner.   
 
With regards to state actors, it must be acknowledged that a number of governments 
are becoming increasingly vocal on the DNS issue, as demonstrated at WSIS and the 
IGF. Some of these, such as the EU, advocate only formal decoupling of root 
authority from the US government, with little actual change to the operational 
arrangements. However, some other states that had little influence on ICANN’s initial 
design advocate much more radical change, such as China and Brazil. These powers 
are of increasing significance in terms of their growing share of the Internet-using 
global population and the increased interest of their governments in matters of Internet 
governance. It remains to be seen whether this changing power balance on the state 
side will eventually generate forces strong enough to force a fundamental shift, such 
as an abandonment of the public-private model. At present, such pressures do not 
seem powerful enough to produce a sudden ‘earthquake’ event; and despite their 
statements at venues such as WSIS, those governments calling for change in principle 
appear willing to continue to work with ICANN in practice for the time being, by, for 
example, sending representatives to the GAC. Nonetheless, WSIS arguably has played 
a role in ICANN’s evolution, ‘emboldening’ states by giving them a UN-backed 
endorsement of their authority in matters of Internet governance as representatives of 
the public interest. It is telling that the GAC chose to cite the WSIS Declaration in the 
preamble to its responses to both the new gTLDs process and the IDNs PDP. Yet the 
reason the GAC is so keen to assert and emphasise its authority could be precisely 
because it still stands on somewhat uncertain grounds. As Mueller, Mathiason and 
Klein point out, the final WSIS agenda avoided mentioning ICANN by name and 
conferred no explicit legitimacy on it.1090  
In summary, rationalist approaches to regime theory, including concepts drawn from 
both realist and neoliberal institutionalist paradigms, have revealed some important 
insights that are readily applicable to the ICANN case study. However, some aspects 
of the regime may not be handled well by rationalist theory. There is a case for 
arguing that the need for the ICANN regime was fundamentally a product of the 
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commercialisation of the Internet. Rationalist approaches to regime theory are not 
designed to deal with such economic and social forces and thus are not particularly 
helpful in exploring this very important dimension of the regime. An alternative 
approach that may reveal deeper insights into the commercial aspects of the regime 
might instead be found in those paradigms on regime theory sometimes described as 
‘neo-Marxist’.  
 
ICANN and neo-Marxist / capitalist globalisation models   
 
Overview of theory 
 
An alternative approach to regime theory is drawn from those paradigms on IR that 
emphasise the economic and social forces of capitalism as the starting point for 
understanding of global political economy and as the ultimate basis for international 
regimes and institutions. Some of these approaches are often termed ‘neo-Marxist’, 
but numerous other writers, who do not necessarily begin from ‘Marxist’ assumptions, 
also stress the importance of the capitalist system as one of the fundamental 
underpinnings of the contemporary global socio-political system.  
 
Neo-Marxist approaches focus on the organisation of production, exchange and 
property, and how governance relates to those economic relations and structures. They 
view the current global order as an integrated world political economy served by 
formal and informal governance arrangements and supported by a prevailing set of 
ideas. The main driving force in this order is the pursuit of capital accumulation, a 
system under which resources are appropriated and turned into commodities in a 
market that dictates their exchange value. Within this order, the role of both states and 
international organisations is to entrench and serve capitalist interests.1091 
 
W.H. Sewell sees capitalism as simultaneously dynamic and changeable, yet based on 
deep and unconscious ‘rules’. He identifies the core schemas of capitalism as those 
governing the conversion of ‘use value’ into ‘exchange value’, a principle that, he 
argues, is extremely transposable and knows no limits. The interconvertibility of 
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resources by means of capital makes it possible for resources not previously treated as 
commodities to enter the ‘circuit of monetised exchanges’.1092 Similarly, Wilhelm 
Peekhaus offers a model where ‘primitive accumulation motivates efforts by capital to 
enclose more and more areas of social existence.’1093 Massimo De Angelis also talks 
of a process of capitalist ‘enclosure’, whereby capital appropriates new areas of life 
and social existence in service of its accumulation priorities.1094  
 
Robert Cox, a noted neo-Marxist IR scholar, focuses upon a view of power as 
economic exploitation. He sees institutionalisation as a means of stabilising and 
perpetuating a particular order, that being, in the current historical period, the 
capitalist economic order.1095 He identifies a close connection between 
institutionalisation and hegemony, where institutions represent mechanisms for 
dealing with conflicts so as to minimise the use of force.1096 International regimes are 
generally initiated by a hegemonic state, which takes care to secure the acquiescence 
of at least some of the other states.1097 On the surface, this resembles the realist 
hegemonic approach to regime theory; the key difference is that, whereas realists take 
the sovereign state as their starting point for a discussion of hegemony, Cox takes the 
economic forces of capitalism as his. As he explains, the form of capitalism that has 
become dominant at the global level seeks to free itself from any form of state control 
or intervention through deregulation and privatisation; as a result, Cox maintains, the 
autonomous capacity of states has been reduced (although to a greater degree for 
some states than for others), and states are largely reduced to the role of adjusting 
national economies to the dynamics of an unregulated global economy.1098 States 
retain a function as enforcers of contracts and as instruments of political leverage to 
secure access to resources and markets, but the state is mostly subordinate to the 
economy.1099 International institutions provide the opportunity for dominant social 
forces to ‘buy off’ subordinate forces, thus strengthening their hold through a process 
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of consensus building1100; they also perform an ideological role by helping to define 
policy guidelines for states and legitimating particular behaviour and practices.1101  
 
Other scholars, including many recent analysts of globalisation, while not necessarily 
starting from a neo-Marxist outlook, also focus on capitalism as the key driving force 
in the contemporary global system. Some have applied this specifically to the issue-
area of Internet governance. For instance, Dan Schiller argues that the Internet 
‘comprises nothing less than the central production and control apparatus of an 
increasingly supranational market system’.1102 Similarly, Stephen J Kobrin views 
globalisation as a qualitative transformation of the world economy, including a shift 
away from national markets as meaningful economic units and the emergence of a 
‘digitally integrated’ global economy that entails ‘the migration of markets from 
geographic space to cyberspace’. 1103 
 
Given the importance of cyberspace in the globalised economic arena, it was perhaps 
inevitable that the principal identifiers on the Internet, domain names, would 
themselves become viewed as economic commodities in their own right, particularly 
considering their perceived association with trademarks and company names. 
Acknowledging this opens the way for an understanding of the ICANN regime as an 
institutional framework for capitalist exploitation of the DNS resource.      
 
Application to ICANN  
 
The influence of commercial actors can be seen at all levels of the regime. Day-to-day 
administration of the TLDs is delegated to the registries, and actual registrations to the 
registrars, mostly for-profit entities. Within the ICANN structure itself, the Board is 
recruited mostly from the business world. Of the three Supporting Organisations, two 
are dominated by for-profit entities; most (though not all) of the country-code 
registries represented on the CCNSO are private concerns, while five of the six GNSO 
constituencies represent corporate interests of various kinds, with only the NCUC 
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representing non-commercial users. Only the ASO is arguably dominated more by 
technical than commercial considerations.  
 
The policy case studies examined in this dissertation provide further evidence of the 
influence of commercial actors and interests over ICANN decisionmaking. As 
Chapter 4 revealed, the general parameters of New gTLDs policy appear to have been 
shaped largely by commercial actors, particularly those represented within the GNSO. 
Similarly, as shown in Chapter 5, IDN implementation at the second level was largely 
controlled by commercial actors; the IDN Committee was dominated by the mostly 
commercially based ‘supply side’, and the IDN Guidelines in their several 
incarnations have been largely the work of the registries. With regard to top-level 
IDNs, some of the most important significant players have also been the registries, 
though particularly with regard to the Fast Track process, the GAC has also been an 
important actor. Chapter 7 showed that the UDRP is designed to meet the needs of a 
particular set of commercial interests, the intellectual property lobby, and arguably is 
weighted in their favour to the detriment of other relevant considerations, such as 
freedom of expression. The GNSO, itself dominated by commercial interests, has not 
yet made any moves towards reform of the policy, despite some widespread 
criticisms; and the recommendations of the most recent staff report have led to 
suggestions that the intellectual property lobby also holds undue influence with 
ICANN staff. 
 
Clearly, then, commercial actors hold immense influence within ICANN, although 
equally clearly, there is no single coherent ‘commercial interest’ dominating the 
regime, but rather multiple competing sets of commercial interests. The important 
point is that principles of market capitalism form one of the fundamental cultural 
bases upon which the ICANN regime is founded, although this can and sometimes 
does come into conflict with the other fundamental principle of state sovereignty.  
 
There are strong grounds for viewing ICANN as the overseer of a system based on the 
commodification and marketisation of domain name resources. Commodification of 
the DNS was, perhaps, a predictable consequence of the Internet’s commercialisation 
and subsequent rapid expansion in the 1990s. The nature of domain names, as strings 
of text, meant that they were readily seen as corresponding to company names, 
trademarks and brand names; this also made them qualitatively different from other 
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kinds of communications identifier, such as telephone numbers. Having the right 
domain name is an important factor in marketing an online business and making it 
easy for potential customers to find. As a consequence, particular names acquired high 
desirability and therefore market value. This led to a shift away from the previous 
system, whereby domain names were registered with Stanford NIC free of charge, to 
a system where control is firmly in the hands of an institutionalised chain of private 
concerns exploiting the DNS resource for profit. The case of DNS could thus be seen 
as a prime example of how capitalism moves to ‘enclose’ new areas of social life in 
the manner described by Peekhaus, de Angelis and Sewell.  
 
Vincent Mosco emphasises the 'institutional circuit' that links, for example, a chain of 
primary producers to wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. Mosco advises that we 
examine the set of social relations organised around power or the ability to control 
people, processes and things, which requires looking at shifting forms of control 
along the production, distribution, and consumption circuit.1104 The process of 
creating exchange value draws an entire complex of social relations into the orbit of 
commodification, including labour, consumers and capital. 1105 As in Mosco’s model, 
an identifiable ‘supply chain’ for domain names has been established under the ICANN 
regime. ICANN grants to registries the right to operate TLDs and to sell SLDs under 
that namespace. These could be likened to producers in more traditional media 
industries (such as the movie industry), while registrars, which act as ‘middlemen’ 
between the registry and the end-user, could be likened to distributors or retailers. At 
each stage of the process, a markup is added to the price that the end-user pays for the 
domain name. However, whereas, for example, the movie industry is based upon 
production and distribution of a product that takes considerable effort, capital and 
expertise to create in the first place, domain names do not represent a tangible ‘product’ 
in the same way. Ultimately, ‘production’ of a domain name involves nothing more 
than adding an entry to an existing database; yet a ‘product’ that is so trivial to create 
can command a substantial market value by the time it is sold to the end-user. This 
markup in price is partly to cover administration costs, but much of it is profit. In this 
sense, the commodification of the DNS could be seen as an even more extreme example 
of the capitalist ability to create exchange value by drawing in a complex of producers, 
distributors and consumers into an institutionalised system of supply and demand.   
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To a considerable extent, therefore, the ICANN regime could be viewed merely as the 
institutional vehicle for this process of capitalist expansion as it moved to ‘enclose’ 
the DNS resource. Clearly, much of Cox’s model also appears to fit the ICANN case; 
ICANN being an institution established by the capitalist hegemonic state power with 
the acquiescence of at least some other states. Through its control of the DNS root, the 
US government was able to ensure that the neoliberal market doctrines promoted by 
the Clinton administration would become the basis for the global domain name 
regime.  
However, notwithstanding this, it is not so clear-cut as to say that ICANN, certainly in 
the beginning, was founded solely on the principles of free-market capitalism. In 
actual fact, the original vision for the organisation, as set out in the Green and White 
Papers, seems to have been somewhat fuzzy as to what ICANN’s fundamental 
‘cultural’ principles would be. On the one hand there was a desire for the DNS to be 
run on a ‘privatised’, commercial basis, yet there were also ideals about user 
representation, which led to the creation of channels for popular participation, 
particularly the ‘At-Large’ mechanism for popular election of Directors. This 
stemmed at least in part from some long-standing aspects of US political culture, but 
also reflected a culture of liberalism and democratic ideals among the pioneer Internet 
community. The incompatibility of these two principles was perhaps not seen clearly 
at the time; but in the ensuing contest, the forces of capitalism could be seen as having 
won out, with the elimination of ‘At-Large’ elections and the general watering down 
of ideals of popular representation.  
 
Neo-Marxists, of course, would find this predictable. Within states, Cox argues, the 
principles of liberal democracy are being rendered less and less relevant as the 
economic sphere is removed from political control; consequently democracy 
effectively becomes something of a sham or façade, hiding the reality that power is 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of globalised corporations.1106 The same 
process could be said to have occurred within ICANN, which continues to pay lip-
service to ideals of representation of and accountability to a global Internet-using 
public, but this has become more of a façade for public relations purposes than any 
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real check on the influence of commercial interests. De Angelis argues that, whenever 
capital seeks to ‘enclose’ a new sphere of social life, it must move to circumvent any 
opposition or barrier.1107 ICANN’s evolution could be interpreted in terms of the 
elimination over time of ‘barriers’ to unbridled capitalist control, including the ‘liberal 
democratic’ ideals and the mechanisms for popular representation incorporated into 
ICANN’s original design. In particular, Mosco interprets the elimination of elected 
Board members in 2002 as a ‘neo-liberal stroke’ designed to facilitate the unfettered 
functioning of the organisation along free market lines.1108  
 
Corporate capture models, as developed by scholars such as George Stigler and his 
successors, may help to explain how this shift towards corporate control occurred. In 
Stigler’s view, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with high 
stakes interests in policy decisions focus their resources and energies in attempting to 
gain the outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny 
individual stake in the outcome, do not possess the will, resources or organisational 
capability to effectively influence policy. 1109 This describes very well the situation 
with regards to ICANN. For entities such as registries and registrars, the domain name 
industry makes up their core business; while for many other large corporations, 
domain names represent extremely valuable brand names. These organisations 
therefore have an enormous incentive to try to gain influence over various aspects of 
ICANN policy, while the millions of globally dispersed individuals who make up the 
public ‘At-Large’ do not possess the will, the organisational or the financial resources 
to even attempt to compete. Certain groups have sometimes attempted to challenge 
corporate power in the ICANN regime, for example those freedom-of-speech activists 
who oppose the UDRP, or minority language groups pressing to be accommodated 
with IDNs. However, such groups have a limited popular base and have tended to 
have limited success at best.  
 
Despite the removal of these initial obstacles to an ICANN run along purely free-
market capitalist principles, however, another challenge to unfettered commercial 
control has arisen; the increasing willingness of governments to claim sovereign 
                                                 
1107 De Angelis, M. 2007. The beginning of history: Value struggles and global 
capital. London: Pluto. P139   
1108 Mosco, V. (2004). The Digital Sublime: Myth, power and cyberspace. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press. P163 
1109 Stigler, G. J. (1971). "The theory of economic regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 2(1): 3-21. P12 
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authority over public policy matters relating to the domain name space, mainly 
through the GAC. Though Cox and other neo-Marxists see the state system as itself 
ultimately subordinate to the forces of the underlying capitalist world order,1110 Cox 
also acknowledges that the global state system and the global political economy, 
while interdependent, have their own internal dynamics, and contradictions can arise 
in their interrelationship.1111 While the GAC has often appeared to be supportive of 
commercial interests, for example in pressing for strong intellectual property 
protections for new gTLDs, there is no guarantee that the interests of governments and 
those of corporate entities will always be in alignment, and the growing influence of 
the GAC therefore represents a potential check to unrestricted commercial control of 
the DNS.    
 
In summary, theoretical approaches drawn from Neo-Marxist and ‘capitalist 
globalisation’ models give us some useful insights into a key aspect of the ICANN 
regime. At the same time, however, ICANN cannot be understood solely in terms of 
market capitalism, any more than it can be understood in purely statist, 
intergovernmental terms.  
 
What is required is an approach that would allow these perspectives to be brought 
together into a single integrated analysis of the regime. This might be found by 
applying lessons from another approach to IR theory, namely the ‘social 
constructivism’ put forward by scholars such as David Dessler and Alexander Wendt. 
Such approaches include the concept of a global order composed of a multiplicity of 
social structures, some of which may come into conflict with each other. This concept 
fits well with the interactions between capitalist, statist and ‘liberal democratic’ 
cultures within ICANN.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1110Cox, R. W. (1981). ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory.’ Reprinted in Cox, R. and  Sinclair, T. J. (1996). Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 85-116. PP100-109 
1111 Cox, R. and  Sinclair, T. J. (1996). Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. P494-495  
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A constructivist view of ICANN   
 
This section will turn to constructivist theory in an attempt to bring together the 
previously discussed aspects of the ICANN regime, particularly interstate politics and 
commercialism. Constructivism will also be used to gain further insights into the 
mechanisms and processes by which the regime’s principles and norms have evolved 
over time.  
 
Overview of constructivist theory 
 
Constructivist approaches to International Relations challenge the ideas and 
assumptions taken for granted by other paradigms, arguing that theoretical models are 
inevitably influenced by the epistemological assumptions of the writer and do not 
represent an objective view of an independently existing reality, despite the claims of 
their proponents. Constructivism challenges the concept of an objective material base 
for the international system structure and instead explores how important aspects of 
international politics, such as structures and institutions, are based on socially 
constructed values and assumptions and developed through ongoing processes of 
discourse, social practice and interaction.     
 
There are various ‘degrees’ of constructivism, from the ‘thin’ constructivism of 
writers such as David Dessler1112 and Alexander Wendt1113, to the more radical ‘post-
modernist’ and ‘post-structuralist’ approaches offered by scholars such as Richard 
Devetak.1114 Post-modernists postulate that there is no single objective reality in 
international politics, but a multiplicity of experiences and perspectives that defy easy 
categorisation. States and other institutions are seen as merely conceptual 
constructions that conceal multiple realities and experiences lying beneath the surface. 
By contrast, Wendt and Dessler take a more moderate approach, asserting that the 
international system is partly made up of a material base and partly of ideas. For 
example, physical geography or the existence of nuclear weapons are real, objective 
material facts; however, the political structures set up to manage matters such as 
                                                 
1112 See Dessler, D. (1989). "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International 
Organisation 43(3): 441-473.  
1113 See Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
1114 See, for example, Devetak, R. (2009). ‘Post-Structuralism.’ Theories of International Relations, 
fourth edition. Scott Burchill, et al. London: Palgrave Macmillan: 183-211.   
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international trade or nuclear arms proliferation rely heavily on social conceptions, 
values and norms developed through discourse.  
 
An early proponent of a cognitive approach to regime theory was Ernst B. Haas, who 
postulated that the information-generating functions of regimes may alter actors’ 
understandings of their interests. He argued that there is no fixed ‘national interest’ 
and no ‘optimal regime’; rather, perceptions of national interest are changeable in 
response to new information or altered values. While regimes are created in response 
to converging actor perceptions of interest, once in existence they may autonomously 
feed the process of change by the information and ideas they are able to mobilise.1115 
Haas went on to develop the notion that, if a regime can evolve as its underlying 
concepts and actor expectations change, then the regime ‘structure’ may become 
synonymous with process.1116 
  
The concept of cognitive content in international regimes is acknowledged by some 
‘rationalist’ regime theorists. Krasner, for instance, acknowledges that regimes have 
considerable cognitive content; regime principles may include ‘concepts of rectitude 
and standards of behaviour’, while norms are ‘prescriptions for conduct based upon 
value judgements’. He argues that stable regimes are likely to be based on ‘consensual 
knowledge’ that provides the basis for agreement on principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making structures.1117 Norms become entrenched and behaviour that was 
once based only on calculations of self-interest becomes buttressed by these widely 
shared norms.1118 Keohane puts forward the concept of cognitive ‘learning’, based on 
the notion that, as actors interact, they become increasingly aware of the regime’s 
nuances and complexities as well as how other actors are likely to behave. As they 
learn more about the regime and each other, they adjust their behaviour 
accordingly.1119 Young likewise recognises the importance of cognitive elements in 
underpinning all three of his regime types. Though he assigns a central role to power 
and domination, he acknowledges that, even in the case of imposed regimes, there is 
                                                 
1115 Haas, E. B. (1983). ‘Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes.’ International 
Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 23-59. P57 
1116 Ibid, P58 
1117 Krasner, S. D. (1983). ‘Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables.’ 
International Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press. 355-368. P361 
1118 Krasner, S. D. (1983). ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables.’ International Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 1-21. P19 
1119 Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, Princeton University Press. P111 
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no reason to assume that dominant actors must continuously coerce subordinate actors 
to comply with regime requirements, as ‘habits of obedience’ can be cultivated, and 
imposed regimes are often increasingly accepted as legitimate with the passage of 
time. Indeed, he asserts, most forms of dependence have a strong ideational or 
cognitive component as well as some structural basis.1120 Likewise, he maintains, the 
promulgation of a negotiated order will have little effect unless its concepts and 
requirements are absorbed into the routine behaviour of the participants.1121 Young 
also agrees with Haas that international regimes are not static constructs, but undergo 
continuous transformations in response to their own inner dynamics as well as to 
changes in their political, economic, and social environments.1122 He argues that the 
way in which regimes take on a ‘life of their own’ is through ‘operative social 
conventions’.1123 
 
There is therefore a certain amount of common ground between rationalist and 
constructivist perspectives regarding the significance of cognitive elements in regime 
building and evolution. The difference is mainly one of emphasis; while rationalists, 
particularly realists, see the role of ideas as secondary to the underlying power 
structure, constructivists assign a central role to cognitive factors.   
 
Alexander Wendt explicitly tries to build bridges between rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to IR. His 'moderate' version of constructivism emphasises 
the role of ideas in constructing identities, interests and international systems, but, 
unlike more 'radical' forms of constructivism, also concedes important points to 
materialist perspectives.1124  In his seminal work Social Theory of International 
Politics, written as a response to Kenneth Waltz’s classic realist text Theory of 
International Politics,
1125 Wendt, like Waltz, offers a systems-level analysis of the 
international system that shares some key assumptions with the rationalist paradigm, 
including a state-centric international system and the existence of anarchy, defined as 
an absence of central authority. He further acknowledges that material realities form 
an important component of the system. Wendt takes issue with the postmodern 
                                                 
1120 Young, O. R. (1983). ‘Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes.’ International 
Regimes. S. D. Krasner. New York, Cornell University Press: 93-113. PP101-102 
1121 Ibid, P102 
1122 Ibid, P106 
1123 Ibid, P94 
1124 Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
P1-2 
1125 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. London, McGraw-Hill. 
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'relational theory of reference', which claims that 'objective' reality is unknowable and 
everything we take as reality is the product of our discourse. He argues that the real 
world resists certain representations: ‘…whether our discourse says so or not, pigs 
can't fly.’1126 For Wendt, the 'material base' of the international system consists of the 
physical properties without which things cannot exist: ‘…a thing cannot be an ICBM 
if it cannot fly long distances, nor a garage if it is not big enough to fit a car.’1127  
 
However, despite these concessions to materialism, Wendt also attacks a purely 
materialist ontology. He argues that the meanings of ideas, objects, and actors are all 
given by social interaction; it is only because of their interaction with ideas that 
material forces have the effects they do. Unlike Waltz, Wendt does not hold that the 
‘logic of anarchy’ leads inevitably to self-help and conflict, but sees these effects as 
socially constructed institutions based upon a particular culture of international 
relations. He argues that factors such as ‘power’ and ‘interest’ are actually largely 
formed of ideas and thus are potentially changeable. For Wendt, the meaning of the 
distribution of power in international politics is constituted in part by the distribution 
of interests, and interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas. Power and 
interest are just as important and determining as before; but power and interest have 
the effects they do because of the ideas that make them up.1128 At the same time 
Wendt acknowledges that, even if constituted by ideas, social kinds still exist and 
resist denial of that.1129 Modification of these ideas is difficult because they have 
become widely internalised. Consequently, the ideas and processes underpinning the 
social construction of identities and interests form a system structure of their own that 
impacts upon international actors.  
 
This model, Wendt argues, does not necessarily require us to discard insights from 
rationalist paradigms. He believes neoliberal institutionalists were on the right lines in 
the 1980s when they identified the fact that actors redefined their interests in terms of 
the regime.1130 Wendt asserts that ‘while most Neoliberals in IR do not use the 
concept of common knowledge as such, their analyses of international regimes 
                                                 
1126 Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
P56 
1127 Ibid, P72 
1128Ibid, P92-136 
1129 Ibid, P73-75 
1130 Ibid, P160 
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presume it.’1131 In other words, he argues that neoliberal institutionalist concepts, such 
as norms, rules, institutions, common ideologies, customs, and laws, are all ‘specific 
cultural forms’ made up of ‘common knowledge’ between the actors engaged in 
regimes. Wendt defines this common knowledge as that which concerns actors' beliefs 
about each other's strategies, preferences, and beliefs, as well as about the states’ 
world. 1132 While such ‘common knowledge’ is private to the individual actors, there 
is also a ‘collective knowledge’ that is not reducible to individual belief but is 
constructed by the group as a whole. This ‘collective knowledge’ is a “communally 
sustained” and inherently public phenomenon that forms an integral part of the system 
structure. 1133  
 
Wendt addresses one of the key discussions in IR theory, the ‘agent-structure debate’; 
i.e. the question of whether agents and their interests and interactions are shaped by 
the international socio-political structure, or the structure is shaped by the agents. 
Wendt believes that both things occur simultaneously; that agency and structure form 
a reciprocal duality. Collective meanings define the structures which govern actions, 
and actors acquire their interests and identities by participating in such collective 
meanings, with the result that the ideational structure is continually recreated and 
reinforced. Agents continually construct and sustain culture, but in turn culture 
constructs agents. Agents and structure are thus both ‘mutually constituted’ and ‘co-
determined’. Structure is an ongoing effect of process, at the same time that process is 
an effect of structure.1134  
 
In developing this view of the international system structure, Wendt acknowledges a 
debt to structuration theory as well as symbolic interactionism.1135 Anthony Giddens, 
the originator of structuration theory, conceives of ‘structure’ in social systems as 
being made up of both rules and resources, or ‘rule-resource sets’.1136  Rules, he 
maintains, have two aspects, normative elements and ‘codes of signification’. 
Resources, which are ‘things that can be used to create power’, are also of two kinds: 
‘authoritative’ resources, which derive from coordination of human agents, and 
                                                 
1131 Ibid, P160 
1132 Ibid, P160 
1133 Ibid, P160-164 
1134 Ibid, P186  
1135 Ibid, P143 
1136 Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge, Polity Press. P377 
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‘allocative’ resources, which stem from control of material products or aspects of the 
real world.1137 Like Wendt, Giddens sees structure as having a recursive relationship 
with agents, in that the structured properties of social activity are constantly recreated 
out of the very resources that constitute them.1138 W.H. Sewell, another structuration 
theorist, proposes a complex view in which “…. societies are based on practices that 
derived from many distinct structures, which exist at different levels, operate in 
different modalities, and are themselves based on widely varying types and quantities 
of resources." In Sewell’s model, structures are characterised by the intricate 
interactions and interdependencies between these layers. There are hierarchies of rules 
between these levels and actors apply rules differently in different situations.1139 
Dessler’s ‘transformational model’ is along the same lines as Wendt’s application of 
structuration theory, based around the inclusion of social forms in the makeup of 
international system structure. In this model, as with Wendt’s approach, structure 
‘both enables action and constrains its possibilities’ and also ‘is the outcome as well 
as the medium of action.’1140 All structure, he asserts, is malleable.1141 As in Sewell’s 
model, this international rule structure is stratified, with a hierarchical dependence in 
which higher-order rules presume the existence of more ‘sedimented’ (lower-order) 
ones.1142 As Dessler himself notes, this is essentially covered by Keohane, who notes 
that institutions are embedded in enduring ‘practices’ of international politics, the 
most important of which is sovereignty.1143  
Application to ICANN   
 
Wendt’s model of social structures relying partly on a material base but also drawing 
heavily upon social constructions can be readily applied to ICANN. There are some 
material realities underpinning the ICANN system, particularly the technological base 
itself, which sets limits to what is and is not possible in terms of governance. For 
example, the nature of the DNS technology requires a single centralised root, thus 
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demanding centralised governance. It would not be possible, for example, to create a 
system based on multiple autonomous roots, at least not without redesigning the 
underlying technology or sacrificing some degree of interconnectivity. Though 
material and technological realities set some limits to what is possible, however, this 
does not mean that the ICANN regime as we know it was inevitable. It rests on social 
constructs as much as, if not more than, material realities; and it has evolved, and 
continues to evolve, through the interactions of the actors participating in it. 
 
Drawing upon Sewell’s model, it is helpful to see the ICANN regime as sitting upon 
an intersection between a number of distinct social structures operating at various 
levels, each with their own ‘cultures’, norm sets and rules.  For example, distinct 
cultures and norm sets can be associated with global capitalism, with the 
intergovernmental system and with the technical community of the Internet pioneers, 
all of which intersect in the ICANN regime. The intersection of these different social 
structures, each with different fundamental values and norm-sets, produced a degree 
of dissonance around some basic concepts of how DNS governance should be 
approached and what the fundamental principles underpinning the regime would be.  
 
This was reflected in the White Paper, which on the one hand envisaged a regime 
based on free market principles, yet simultaneously promoted ‘liberal democratic’ 
ideals, such as representation of and accountability to a global Internet using public. 
Concerns that ICANN should be legitimised through principles of accountability and 
representation reflected the ideals of the Internet pioneers, but also the influence of 
long-standing ‘liberal democratic’ ideologies deeply entrenched in US political 
culture. However, such ideals were arguably not compatible with the intention to 
manage the domain name system along commercial market lines.    
 
At the same time, in line with the deregulatory, ‘reflexive government’ ideology of 
Clinton and the ‘New Democrats’, the White Paper envisaged a ‘private’ governance 
organisation with very limited governmental input. This model was arguably 
incompatible with deeply entrenched (or to use Dessler’s phrase, ‘sedimented’) norms 
in international politics concerning state sovereignty and the role of governments as 
the legitimate representatives of the public interest in matters of public policy.  
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The inherent contradictions brought about by the incompatibility of multiple 
underlying ideological bases and social structures are not necessarily unique to 
ICANN. Giddens describes the capitalist state as a ‘contradictory social form’, 
because of an inherent conflict between the needs of capital and the political demands 
for de-commodification of public services. The capitalist state is dependent upon 
taxation of private enterprise and thus has a deep interest in creating the conditions for 
private accumulation; yet it also faces strong pressure to negate the commodity form 
in many areas of public service provision.1144 Giddens sees in this inherent structural 
contradiction a likely source of conflict.1145 A similar situation could be said to exist 
within the ICANN regime. On the one hand, ICANN was intended to fulfil a free-
market vision of deregulated, private sector governance. It also depends on 
commercial entities, particularly the registries and registrars, to make the system 
work, and is entirely funded from ‘taxation’ of these companies. On the other hand, it 
faces political pressure to treat the DNS as a ‘public good’ and to make itself 
accountable to representatives of the public interest.       
 
The conflict generated by these incompatible conceptions of the regime essentially 
created a power struggle in which both ideas and practical realities mattered. In 
seeking to advance their own influence, governments potentially possessed some very 
real leverage in their potential ability to bring down the regime; but they were also 
able to appeal to the long established, ‘sedimented’ international norms of state 
sovereignty and the legitimate authority of governments. Similarly, commercial 
interests possessed real power to disrupt the regime through withdrawal of their co-
operation, but also were able to appeal to established principles and norms of 
international law. For example, intellectual property interests were able to gain 
widespread recognition that the established principle of trademark protection was 
applicable in the domain name context. By contrast, proponents of direct user 
representation possessed neither real positional power to disrupt the regime, nor well 
established pre-existing international norms and precedents to which they could 
appeal.    
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These interactions caused the regime structure to become modified over time, as 
various interest groups within it vied for influence. These contests are not merely 
internal to the regime framework, but have actually altered the framework by causing 
principles and norms to become modified. To put this in the terms used by Haas, the 
regime should not been seen so much as a static, fixed ‘structure’ as an ongoing 
‘process’. As structuration theory predicts, this process involves a reciprocal 
interaction between agents and structure. While the regime framework has been 
shaped and reshaped by the interests and actions of the actors within it, at the same 
time the actors themselves have had to redefine their interests and modify their actions 
in terms of the regime framework. One example of this would be the ways in which 
various actors and groups (such as NSI / VeriSign and various governments) redefined 
their approach to the ICANN system, so that, from initially being in opposition to the 
regime, they came to accept the need to work within it, while at the same time still 
striving to reshape some of its norms from within. This represents a significant change 
within the agents themselves (a change of perception of their interests and how these 
are best served). 
 
The continually evolving relationship between the GAC and the Board provides a 
good illustration of this process in action. The GAC’s growing influence within 
ICANN represents an important change in the regime’s principles and norms, but to a 
large extent this has stemmed from changing understandings of, and attitudes towards, 
DNS governance and the ICANN regime on the part of the GAC representatives 
themselves. Participation in the GAC has increased, as more and more governments 
have come to recognise the importance of Internet governance issues and have 
developed a perception of a national interest in such matters. The failure of WSIS to 
produce any alternative to the ICANN arrangements may have helped to convince 
some governments that working to advance their interests from within ICANN was 
the only viable way forward in the foreseeable future. At the same time, as the 
evidence from the case study chapters suggests, the GAC has seemingly become 
much bolder and more proactive in the policy development process in recent years, 
something that Weinberg believes was triggered partly by the discussions around 
WSIS but also by the GAC’s apparent success in influencing ICANN policy over 
issues such as .xxx.1146 Furthermore, as Maurer’s comments suggest, the GAC has 
                                                 
1146 Weinberg, J. (2011). "Governments, privatisation, and "privatisation"; ICANN and the GAC." 
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learned to speak with one voice; its members see themselves not only as 
representatives of their national interests but also as sharing a common interest in 
promoting the rights of governments in matters of DNS public policy.1147 Thus, the 
changing norms surrounding the GAC’s role stems directly from these shifting 
attitudes and perceptions on the part of the GAC members towards the ICANN regime 
and their own role in it, together with changed perceptions of the GAC’s proper role 
on the part of the Board and other regime participants.      
 
In summary, application of concepts drawn from Dessler and Wendt’s form of 
constructivism, including structuration theory, give us a more nuanced understanding 
of how the ICANN system has evolved, without discarding the lessons taken from 
rationalist and neo-Marxist theory. ICANN’s principles and norms have evolved and 
been reshaped by the ongoing interactions of actors within the regime, while, at the 
same time, actors have also been reshaped at a cognitive level; both their interests and 
expectations of one another have become modified through learning and interaction 
within the context of the regime. Structuration theory also helps us to recognise that 
ICANN is more than just a single system; it is, in fact, a structure based on an 
intersection between several distinct social sub-structures existing at a multiplicity of 
levels. When these distinct social structures and their individual cultures came 
together in ICANN, the resulting regime turned out to be different from what anyone 
could initially predict.  
 
On another level, the development of a hybrid public-private regime like ICANN both 
reflects and informs changing conceptions of legitimate public authority. In this 
respect ICANN is not an isolated case. Whereas public authority was once seen firmly 
as the preserve of sovereign states, numerous writers have in recent years identified an 
increasing trend towards authority wielded by private or semi-private entities, 
reflecting the fact that conventional notions about authority and governance are 
themselves socially constructed and subject to evolution and revision. Such 
developments have the potential to challenge many of the conceptual underpinnings 
of previous International Relations and regime theories. The next section will further 
explore some of these developments. 
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Private regimes and private authority 
 
Overview 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing literature focusing upon the phenomenon of 
private governance and the concept of private authority. Much of this literature both 
draws concepts from and poses challenges to existing International Relations theories. 
It identifies an increasing trend towards authoritative decisionmaking by 
nongovernmental actors at the global level, particularly in areas traditionally seen as 
lying within the jurisdiction of sovereign states.  Such a trend towards ‘privatised’ 
governance has been identified in many aspects of global political economy, 
including, for example: standards setting in areas as diverse as technical product 
specifications, social standards, and health and consumer safety standards1148; 
intellectual property1149; global environmental governance; energy supply1150; global 
financial regulation1151; and genetic resources management1152; as well as Internet 
governance.1153  
 
The rise of ‘privatised’ governance is strongly linked with the phenomenon of 
globalisation. Almost two decades ago, Susan Strange identified a shift towards the 
‘internationalisation of production’ brought about mainly through rapid technological 
advancement,1154 and predicted that this would bring about a fundamental shift in the 
economic base and the power of the state.1155 Governments would be obliged to 
bargain with corporations to an unprecedented extent, and these corporations would 
become partners (or protagonists) in a ‘trilateral system of international diplomacy’ 
                                                 
1148 Wouters, J., Marx, A., and Hachez, N. (2008). "Private Standards, Global Governance and 
Transatlantic Co-operation: The Case of Global Food Safety Governance." Leuven Centre for 
Governance Studies. Retrieved 4 February, 2011, from 
http://www.transatlantic.be/publications/wouters-marx-hachez_final.pdf P3 
1149 Sell, S. (2003). Private power, public law: the globalisation of intellectual property rights. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. PP96-120 
1150 Andreas Goldthou and Jan Martin Witte (2009).  “Back to the future or forward to the past? 
Strengthening markets and rules for effective global energy governance.” 
International Affairs 85(2): 373–390. 
1151 Backer, L. C. (2011). "Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational 
Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order." Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 18(2): 101-155.  
1152 Raustiala, K. and D. G. Victor (2004). "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources." 
International Organization 32(2): 147-154. 
1153 Mathiason, J. (2009). Internet Governance: The new frontier of global institutions. New York, 
Routledge. 
1154 Strange, S. (1994). "Wake up, Krasner! The world has changed." Review of International Political 
Economy 1(2): 209-219. P210 
1155 Ibid, P210-211 
 305 
involving interactions between governments and corporations, and between 
corporations and other corporations.1156 As a consequence, state sovereignty and 
autonomy would be challenged and fundamentally modified.1157  
 
Many scholars would argue that Strange’s predictions have been fulfilled over the 
course of the last ten to fifteen years. Jessica T. Matthews identifies a ‘power shift’ 
away from the Westphalian concentration of power in the hands of states, and towards 
a multifaceted global system where governments share power with business, 
international organisations and NGOs.1158 Like Strange, Mathews identifies the 
information technology revolution as the core engine of change, due to its ability to 
break governments’ monopoly on the collection and management of information and 
its role in reducing the significance of geographical proximity. 
 
While Keohane and Nye describe ‘globalisation’ as merely an intensification of the 
phenomenon of interdependence1159, authors such as Wolfgang Reinicke differentiate 
between the two.1160 Whereas interdependence focused upon links and cross-
dependencies between national economies, Reinicke asserts, globalisation entails their 
fusion into a single whole. This phenomenon creates a global public sphere and a 
requirement for global public policy that territorial nation states are unable to meet. 
Reinicke argues that, in the absence of a global government, the most promising 
strategy for global public policy is for policymakers to delegate tasks to actors and 
institutions in a better position to implement them, not only to intergovernmental 
organisations, but also business, labour, and NGOs.1161 
 
Some authors have focused particularly on the concept of private authority and private 
rulemaking. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker argue that private actors, 
particularly NGOs, are taking on authoritative roles and responsibilities that states no 
longer wish to bear, not only in the international economy, but also in areas such as 
establishment of standards, provision of social welfare, enforcement of contracts, and 
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maintenance of security.1162 Authority, they assert, is accruing to these NGOs on the 
basis of their technical expertise, or what Kratochwil termed ‘consensual 
knowledge’.1163 The notion that the ‘privatisation’ of some areas of public policy is 
due to an active policy of withdrawal by governments was suggested by Strange, who 
felt that the transfer of power from the US government to ‘the market’ was ‘largely 
self-inflicted’ as successive US governments worked to break down national and 
international regulatory barriers to foreign investment and capital mobility in order to 
facilitate the expansion of American capitalism.1164 Other authors, such as Cutler, 
similarly point out that the conditions for private authority were created by state 
policies of deregulation1165 while some scholars, such as Saskia Sassen, have 
suggested that a shift towards private regulation is not just an unintended consequence 
of deregulation but that governments have often actively participated in the 
construction of private actors as authoritative. 1166 Sassen identifes the formation of a 
‘hybrid’ authority that is neither fully private nor fully public, based on a ‘partial 
denationalization of what had been constructed historically as national’.1167   
 
John G. Ruggie defines the ‘new global public domain’ as ‘an institutionalized arena 
of discourse, contestation, and action organized around the production of global 
public goods’ that is constituted by interactions among non-state actors as well as 
states.1168 The effect of this global public domain, Ruggie asserts, is not to replace 
states, but ‘to embed systems of governance in broader global frameworks of social 
capacity and agency that did not previously exist.’1169 In a similar vein, Tanja Börzel 
and Thomas Risse talk of governance through transnational public-private 
partnerships, which they define as institutionalised cooperative relationships between 
public actors (both governments and international organisations) and private ones for 
‘the making and implementation of norms and rules for the provision of goods and 
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services’.1170 Similarly, Larry Catá Backer talks of the possibility of fusion between 
public and private governance systems to produce ‘co-ordinated meta-governance’ 
constituted through frameworks of institutional communication1171. Such a set of 
arrangements, he suggests, might comprise amalgamations of the most powerful states 
and private regulatory bodies asserting authority once reserved to states alone; this 
might entail the weakening of the border between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law even within 
public sector governance.1172 While nonstate governance entities possess the power to 
set rules affecting their particular community only, Backer asserts, the ‘narrowness’ of 
their authority does not detract from the effectiveness of that regulation.1173 He 
suggests that individual state entities may play a role within global public-private 
governance, but a distinctly secondary one. States working together via international 
organisations, however, play a larger role in the generation of norms that may bind 
these ‘economic selfregulators’.1174   
 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Cathleen Fogel describe an emergent, presently highly 
diffuse ‘globalising heteronomy’ in which regulatory authority is distributed among 
actors focused upon specific issues and problems.1175 This occurs in a range of forms 
on a spectrum from conventional interstate organisations that have begun to ‘bring in’ 
nonstate actors, to wholly private regulatory arrangements.1176 Similarly, Diane Stone 
identifies ‘multilevel polycentric forms of public policy’ in which a plethora of 
institutions and networks negotiate and interact, and private regimes have emerged as 
pragmatic responses in the absence of formal global governance.1177 In attempting to 
define the concept of ‘global public policy’, Stone uses the concept of the ‘agora’, a 
‘growing global public space of fluid, dynamic, and intermeshed relations of politics, 
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markets, culture, and society.’1178 The global agora, she asserts, is a domain of relative 
disorder and uncertainty where institutions are underdeveloped and political authority 
unclear, and dispersed through multiplying institutions and networks.1179  
 
This notion of governance through ‘networks’ has been increasingly utilised by 
numerous scholars. The concept of the global governance network, or global public 
policy network (GPPN) focuses on governance through decentralised and flexible 
networks of actors as opposed to traditional hierarchical modes of organisation. 
Mathews points to the telecommunications revolution as the main factor favouring the 
emergence of decentralised networks over more conventional hierarchical modes of 
organisation.1180 This development, coupled with the financial resources and expertise 
of nonstate organisations, has, she argues, resulted in multifaceted power sharing 
arrangements involving corporations, governments, international organisations and 
NGOs.1181 Similarly, Wolfgang Reinicke describes global public policy networks as 
loose alliances linking various actors such as government agencies, intergovernmental 
organisations, NGOs, professional associations and corporations. They utilise modern 
communications technology to share and disseminate information and enhance power 
and reach through their linkages. Such a network, Reinicke asserts, can enable its 
participants to sort through competing perspectives, forge a consensus, and translate 
that consensus into actions its members will be more inclined to support and 
implement.1182 
 
Petra Dobner defines GPPNs as multi-sectoral networks comprising actors from civil 
society, governmental agencies and industry, engaging in a range of activities from 
agenda setting to policy formulation, negotiation and rulemaking, coordination, 
implementation and evaluation.1183 Dobner identifies several reasons for the 
promotion of GPPNs, including a need to deal with technical complexities that go 
beyond the capacities of governments and international organisations; a better 
representation of otherwise marginalised groups; and higher efficiency in problem 
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solving, producing better policy results.1184 Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke 
and Thorsten Benner see GPPNs, which they also describe as ‘trisectoral networks’, 
as an answer to the ‘growing organisational vacuum’ at the global level.’1185 Such 
networks, they believe, seek to complement rather than replace traditional governance 
mechanisms, helping to develop standards and norms, provide global public goods 
and implement agreements.1186 They see trisectoral networks as providing a response 
to an operational gap in governance (as policymakers often lack the information, 
knowledge and resources to tackle emerging global issues) as well as a participatory 
gap (as individuals and private organisations increasingly perceive themselves as 
excluded from policy decision-making in a globalised arena).1187 The major strength 
of networks as opposed to conventional hierarchies, they assert, lies in their diversity 
and flexibility; GPPNs are ‘dynamic in both process and structure’.1188 
 
While these writers emphasise the effectiveness of governance through loose 
networks, Backer, on the other hand, argues that effective non-state regulatory 
systems are dependent upon the creation of entities (either a single aggregation or a 
group of actors) distinguished along functional lines. 1189 He seems to be describing a 
tighter, more well defined entity than the loose governance networks envisaged by 
other authors, and this appears to more closely describe the ICANN model. Such 
entities, Backer asserts, derive authority from the community they govern and, within 
their own governance area, their rules are binding; they are effectively the ‘law 
system’ of the governance community. 1190 While such rules may be ‘soft as law’, 
within their particular community, this ‘soft law’ is ‘hard’.1191 
 
Keohane and David G. Victor identify a ‘continuum’ between highly integrated and 
comprehensive international regulatory institutions on the one hand and highly 
                                                 
1184 Ibid, P607 
1185 Ibid, P176 
1186 Benner, T., W. H. Reinicke, et al. (2004). "Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards 
a Pluralistic System of Accountability." Government and Opposition 39(2): 191-210. P196 
1187 Dobner, P. (2009). "On the Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks." Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 16(2): 605-619. P178 
1188 Ibid 
1189 Backer, L. C. (2011). "Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational 
Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order." Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 18(2): 101-155. P132 
1190 Ibid 
1191 Ibid, P136 
 310 
fragmented arrangements at the other. 1192  In a similar vein, Stone draws a contrast 
between regimes and looser global public policy networks.1193 Keohane and Victor 
also identify, in the middle of the spectrum, a phenomenon they refer to as ‘nested 
regimes’ and ‘regime complexes’, which are defined as loosely coupled sets of 
specific regimes.1194 Victor and Kal Raustiala define a regime complex as ‘an array of 
partially overlapping institutions governing a particular issue-area’.1195 Similarly, 
Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier refer to ‘international regime complexity’, which 
they define as the presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international 
regimes that are not hierarchically ordered.1196 They differentiate between parallel 
regimes (where there is no formal or direct substantive overlap), overlapping regimes 
(where multiple institutions have authority over an issue, but agreements are not 
mutually exclusive or subsidiary to another) and nested regimes (where institutions 
are ‘embedded within each other in concentric circles, like Russian dolls’).1197 
  
Private authority and IR theory  
 
From a realist viewpoint, the ultimate source of legitimate authority is derived from 
state sovereignty. To constructivists, however, concepts of authority and legitimacy 
are not static, and sources of legitimate authority are dependent upon socially 
constructed norms. Hall and Biersteker define authority as ‘…the normative belief by 
an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’1198, and acknowledge that this 
consent to authority is socially constructed.1199 While the concept of legitimate 
authority has, in the Westphalian era, been exclusively linked to the state, Hall and 
Biersteker contend that trends in globalisation may demand a re-evaluation of these 
traditional conceptions of authority.1200 The state, they assert, is no longer the sole, or 
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in some instances even the principal, source of authority, in either the domestic arena 
or the international system; many locations and sources of authority have emerged or 
are emerging that are neither states, state-based, nor state-created.1201  
 
Some scholars are unconvinced by claims that power and authority are draining away 
from states, and continue to view the international sphere in essentially rationalist 
terms. Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, while acknowledging that globalisation has 
resulted in a new and intricate fabric of global governance, are sceptical of claims that 
these developments have eclipsed the power of the territorial state. 1202 Similarly, 
Keohane and Nye argue that to exchange realism for an ‘equally simple view’ of 
states being supplanted by nonterritorial actors ‘would condemn one to equally grave, 
though different, errors.’1203 Drezner, while acknowledging that the existence of 
nested and overlapping regimes creates a new style of global bargaining, maintains 
that the underlying causal determinants of international cooperation remain the 
distribution of power and interest among states.1204  Indeed, Drezner asserts, 
increasing complexity in the international sphere may mean that certainty is diluted, 
with the paradoxical result of a return to power politics, where great-power states have 
the strongest advantage.1205  
 
Hall and Biersteker suggest that more empirical data is required on the extent to which 
sovereign authority of states is being supplanted by new forms of authority.1206 
ICANN may represent one useful case study for exploring some of these questions.  
 
Public-private international regimes and ICANN  
 
The concept of a new emerging model of global governance via partnerships 
involving governmental and private actors clearly underpins interpretations of ICANN 
as a ‘public-private partnership’ as put forward by writers such as Kleinwaechter and 
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Knill and Lehmukl (see Chapter 3). These writers clearly see ICANN as an example 
of a trend towards an emerging governance system where an alliance between 
governmental and private actors is coming to complement or partially supplant the old 
approach to international governance rooted in the concept of the sovereign state.  
 
While ICANN is far more formalised and institutionalised than the public policy 
network concept, it does share some of the features of that model, particularly the use 
of communications technology to allow linkages at multiple levels between a range of 
actor types. However, in terms of Keohane and Victor’s model of a ‘continuum’ of 
regulatory regimes, ICANN would be placed towards the highly integrated end of the 
spectrum. Keohane and Victor argue that we should expect highly integrated, 
comprehensive regimes when the interests of all crucial powerful actors (states and 
non-states) are sufficiently similar, across a broad issue area, that they demand a 
singular international institution. 1207 In the case of ICANN, as discussed, while 
governmental and private actors may have a range of often competing interests, they 
all share a fundamental common interest in a working domain name system, 
something that requires a single integrated regulatory body.  
 
While this fundamental common interest is sufficient to keep both governmental and 
private actors on board, however, at the same time ICANN represents an arena where 
private authority of the type discussed by Hall and Biersteker is often in direct 
competition with traditional intergovernmental authority. Within the ICANN regime, 
governments continue to lay claim to be the ultimate source of legitimate authority 
over public policy aspects of DNS governance, a claim encapsulated in the WSIS 
Declaration repeatedly referred to by the GAC. Yet, while the Board gives some 
measure of recognition to the GAC’s claims to public policy authority, in practice the 
GAC does not have the final word on these matters. Ultimate decisionmaking power 
rests with the Board, and the GAC must compete with other stakeholders for influence 
over the Board’s final decisions; therefore, the sovereign authority of states is neither 
final nor absolute within the ICANN regime. At the same time, there is a strong case 
to be made that ICANN ultimately depends upon the consent and recognition of 
governments for its authority to govern the DNS. This is partly a matter of social 
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construction; the widely accepted norm that authority must be endorsed by states to be 
legitimate. However, it is not just a matter of formal legitimisation; in the final 
analysis, governments do potentially retain the very real power to force regime change 
if ever they chose to use it. Thus, ICANN represents a source of non-state global 
authority in one respect, but nonetheless has not completely supplanted state authority 
in another respect; ultimately its own authority is arguably underpinned by that of 
governments in the final analysis. 
 
The balance between intergovernmental and private authority in the ICANN system is 
issue-specific; as discussed, governments appear to be particularly concerned with 
ccTLDs and geographic identifiers and much less interested in areas such as the 
UDRP. Depending upon the issue area in question, various sets of private actors also 
have more or less influence and involvement. This calls to mind Keohane and Victor’s 
concept of the ‘nested regime’. Although Keohane and Victor used the concept to 
refer to rather more loosely coupled sets of regimes, ICANN, while highly 
institutionalised, is also a highly complex regime with multiple facets, to the extent 
that it could be interpreted as a set of interconnected regimes within a regime, with the 
Board acting as an overall co-ordinating umbrella. In this sense it resembles the 
‘Russian doll’ type of nested regime described by Alter and Meunier. Some of these 
‘sub-regimes’, such as the UDRP, are largely private with little governmental 
involvement. Thus, while ICANN as a whole is a part-public and part-private regime 
rather than a wholly private regime of the type discussed by scholars such as Cutler, 
some of its ‘sub-regimes’ can be interpreted effectively as privatised governance 
arrangements.  
 
The UDRP is also an excellent example of a concept explored by Cutler, that of the 
public-private legal order. Cutler argues that merchant autonomy over matters such as 
international commercial arbitration is creating a ‘highly privatised legal order’. 
ICANN’s UDRP provides an example of a ‘privatised legal order’ more autonomous 
than most, since ICANN does not need to rely on national courts for its enforcement. 
In this respect, the UDRP is also a good example of Backer’s contention that private 
‘soft’ law can be ‘hard’ in practice. Nonetheless, Cutler goes on to add that states 
remain intimately involved in the enforcement of international commercial 
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agreements, resulting in a ‘curious mix of public and private authority’.1208   The 
option to appeal UDRP decisions to national courts means that the UDRP also 
ultimately falls into this ‘public-private’ classification to some degree.  
 
Cutler explores three sets of explanations for the emergence of private regimes, 
including market-based explanations, based upon efficiency and transaction cost 
incentives; power-based explanations, focusing upon the regulatory influence of firms 
dominating markets and issue-areas; and historical explanations focusing upon the 
significance of trends like globalisation and rapid technological change.1209 All three 
of these factors could be said to have played a role in the creation of the UDRP. It can, 
in part, be explained as a response to historical trends of globalisation; the emergence 
of a single global domain naming system requires a single uniform dispute resolution 
policy at the global level. It can be partly interpreted using market-based explanations; 
the stated purpose of the policy is to provide a low-cost and rapid alternative to 
expensive and long-drawn out court proceedings. Finally, power-based explanations 
focusing upon the influence held by intellectual property interests, both with the 
United States government and within the ICANN system, are also very pertinent. 
 
While ICANN could be seen as being comprised of a nested set of sub-regimes, it also  
forms part of a wider regime complex for Internet governance that also includes 
standards setting bodies such as the IETF and IAB as well as, to some extent, the ITU 
and IGF. Other sets of intergovernmental and private organisations also partially 
overlap with the ICANN regime, such as the Arab Team for Domain Names and 
Internet Issues, or registries’ associations such as the APTLD. In the intellectual 
property area, ICANN interacts with organisations such as WIPO as well as various 
private bodies such as the International Trademark Association or the Internet 
Commerce Association. Thus, ICANN does not operate in isolation; it is part of the 
dense web of public and private regimes that has grown up in recent decades.   
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Private governance, legitimacy and democratic deficit 
 
While some writers, such as Witte, Reinicke and Benner, see innovations such as 
trisectoral networks as helping to close a participatory gap,1210 others, such as 
Lipschutz and Fogel, point out that such systems of public-private globalised 
governance, lacking democratic institutions, are not particularly representative, 
transparent, or democratic.1211  Mathews similarly believes that the shift towards 
globalised decisionmaking will exacerbate the democratic deficit, as decisionmaking 
shifts to unelected international bodies.1212 Cutler finds the normative implications of 
private authority ‘profoundly disturbing’, particularly because the legal formalism that 
associates authority with the state obscures the growing authority of private actors and 
removes it from public scrutiny and review.1213   
 
This normative concern with the legitimacy and accountability of authoritative private 
actors echoes the doubts about ICANN’s legitimacy expressed by analysts such as 
Hunter1214, Weinberg1215, Froomkin1216, Koppell1217 and Fuller1218 (see Chapter 3). 
The discussion surrounding standards by which global governance organisations may 
be considered to be legitimate or not is a significant debate in its own right and is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet the legitimacy question is relevant when 
discussing ICANN’s evolution as an organisation, simply because (some of) the actors 
in the regime have perceived it as important and consequently it has shaped how they 
have approached the regime.  
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ICANN’s founders saw it as important that the organisation be seen to be legitimate. 
The exact criteria that confer legitimacy, or the ‘right to rule’.1219  are widely debated, 
but one of the most commonly cited is accountability. Grant and Keohane identify two 
potential approaches to accountability: a ‘participation’ model (where an organisation 
is accountable to those affected by its decisions), and a ‘delegation’ model (where it is 
accountable to those who entrusted it with authority).1220 Both models were 
incorporated into the ICANN design. ‘Representation’ was expressed as one of the 
core founding principles for the organisation. This was the basis of the 
‘multistakeholder’ model, with representation for all significant stakeholders as well 
as mechanisms intended to ensure a strong element of representation of and 
accountability to a global Internet using public, particularly the system for popular 
election of ‘At-Large’ directors. At the same time, ICANN also remained accountable 
to the US Government through its contractual obligations to manage the IANA 
function and through the MoU with Commerce (though the MoU was, of course, 
always intended to be temporary). Grant and Keohane also argue that attempts to 
institute democratic accountability at the global level on the basis of an analogy with 
domestic democracy will founder on the absence of a coherent and well-defined 
global public.1221 This is precisely the problem that ICANN encountered when 
attempting to implement ‘At-Large’ elections in practice; there was no agreement on 
how to define the relevant public and qualification criteria for voting.1222  
 
Arguably, it is the failure of attempts to confer legitimacy through direct democratic 
representation that has strengthened the hand of the GAC, as governments moved to 
emphasise their own role as legitimate representatives of the public interest. As Grant 
and Keohane argue, the norm of supervisory accountability, where multilateral 
organisations are held accountable to states, is a strong one in the international 
order.1223 Arguably, the failure of the direct democracy experiment encouraged a 
return to this well-established norm. Hall and Biersteker raise an interesting 
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contention that authority might revert away from private actors back to public ones in 
the event of a ‘normative delegitimation’ of the private actor.1224 There may be an 
argument to suggest that something along these lines occurred in the ICANN case, as 
the failure of the direct democracy approach caused the original model to become 
delegitimised. 
 
 A degree of formal recognition of the role of governments in legitimating ICANN 
can be found in the Affirmation of Commitments, which emphasises the importance 
of GAC input into ICANN decisionmaking as well as giving the GAC a major role in 
the tri-annual organisational review mechanism. ICANN therefore arguably provides 
a concrete example to support a contention by Börzel and Risse, who argue that, by 
working in conjunction with public authorities, private actors can overcome any 
legitimacy deficit. They argue that public-private partnerships increase both the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance by combining the resources 
available to private actors with the legitimacy offered by public authorities.1225  
 
Ultimately, these changing conceptions about ICANN’s legitimacy and how it should 
best be achieved once again link back to constructivism and provide an example of 
how regime norms become modified through discourse, interaction and practical 
experience.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 8  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that ICANN is a (sometimes uneasy) hybrid 
between the traditional intergovernmental model and the type of private international 
regime discussed by scholars such as Cutler. The potential for governance through 
public-private arrangements has been addressed by numerous scholars, but ICANN is 
unique in its particular institutional arrangements. It is more highly formalised and 
institutionalised than many other examples of public-private governance; it also 
features a greater level of conflict than public-private models often allow for, 
                                                 
1224 Hall, R. B. and T. J. Biersteker (2007). ‘Private authority as global governance.’ The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance. R. B. Hall and T. J. Biersteker. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 203-222. P215 
1225 Börzel, T. and T. Risse. (2005). ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of 
Transnational Governance.’ Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-
first Century. E. Grande and L. W. Pauly. Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 195-216. P195 
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including conflict between governmental and private interests, and conflict between 
private interests of various kinds. 
 
Within the ICANN regime, governments and powerful private interests can be seen as 
peers to a very great extent. To a significant degree, the regime was created in the first 
instance through the hegemony of a single state, but the importance of great-power 
state hegemony in underpinning the regime appears to have greatly diminished as 
ICANN has become an established institution in its own right. Furthermore, while 
ultimately underpinned by US policy preferences, ICANN was always intended to be 
a regime controlled by private actors at an operational level. This principle has 
become very much modified and the traditional intergovernmental approach has 
become a much more significant aspect of the regime with the rising importance of 
the GAC. However, the GAC, while highly influential, must vie with private actors 
for influence over policy and must often accept compromise.  
 
These factors obviously make ICANN substantially different from the predominantly 
interstate regimes envisaged by Krasner and Keohane in the 1980s. Nonetheless, 
ICANN can usefully be understood as a regime using Krasner’s definition. It has 
identifiable principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge. Both governments and powerful commercial actors of 
various kinds have the potential to break up the regime or at least seriously disrupt its 
operation, but all are kept on board by a mutual interest in maintaining a working 
DNS. In the absence of a viable alternative, defection from the regime would not be a 
rational choice; and creating a new regime from scratch would be difficult task. It also 
seems fair to say that ICANN has become internalised by all actors as the established 
governor of the Internet’s naming and numbering systems. While all actors have 
learned to work with the regime, however, this does not mean that the regime has 
eliminated all conflicts of interest. Rather, the regime acts as an institutionalised 
framework within which conflicts of interest can be contested in a managed way. 
 
It is through these very contests and conflicts of interest that the regime has evolved, 
and continues to evolve. Lessons taken from Wendt and Dessler’s social 
constructivism and structuration theory help us to understand how this has occurred. 
ICANN’s norms and principles are being continually created and recreated, and over 
time modified, by the interactions of the regime participants. These contests, though 
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played out through individual actors within the regime, also reflect the fact that the 
regime sits on a ‘fault line’ between larger, pre-existing social structures, most 
importantly the Westphalian-style intergovernmental system and the logic of free-
market global capitalism.   
 
In the final chapter, the question will be explored of whether the patterns observed in 
the ICANN case study may have broader implications for the future of global 
governance and the continued relevance of the international regime concept.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 1, the overall purpose of this dissertation was set out as being to examine 
the hypothesis that ICANN represents a new type of hybrid political entity, one that 
both challenges established concepts in international regime theory, and that may be 
representative of emerging trends in other areas of global issue management. The aim 
was to understand ICANN’s nature as a governance organisation, how it relates to 
broader patterns in global governance, and the extent to which it represents a 
fundamentally new approach to global issue-management, or whether it can in fact be 
understood in terms of established models of global governance as represented by 
existing international regime theories. 
 
This was refined into four interconnected objectives for the project:  
 
1) To explore the extent to which ICANN has changed as an organisation 
compared to the model set out in 1998, and to explain why such change has 
occurred;  
2) To explore ICANN’s internal dynamics and how it makes policy in practice, 
and to explore whether the ‘consensus based decisionmaking’ ideal is adhered 
to in reality; 
3) To understand the extent to which ICANN diverges from conventional models 
of issue-management at the global level, as described by various paradigms on 
regime theory; 
4) To explore what lessons ICANN can offer about the continuing applicability 
of the international regime concept, and whether and in what ways regime 
theory may need to be modified to deal with emerging new models of global 
governance as exemplified by the ICANN case.   
 
This final chapter will attempt to draw together some conclusions on these questions.  
 
Summary of findings 
 
At-an-empirical-level, this dissertation-has-been-based-around-an-investigation-into 
ICANN’s history-and-three in-depth case-studies-of-its-policymaking-processes in 
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action. The findings from these investigations-were-utilised-in-an-attempt-to 
contribute-to-the-debates-around-competing-interpretations-of-ICANN’s basic nature 
and-fundamental-organisational-principles.  
 
At a theoretical level, the study has attempted to analyse ICANN from the 
perspectives offered by several approaches to international regime theory, in an effort 
to develop an understanding of how the organisation relates to broader patterns in 
global governance, to explore whether existing regime theories provide adequate 
conceptual tools to deal with the ICANN case, and also to examine whether regime 
theories could help to explain why ICANN has diverged from the original model set 
up in 1998.   
 
Chapter 2 set out the history of ICANN’s development from its inception under the 
Clinton administration to the present day. It demonstrated how ICANN has undergone 
a major shift from the original vision set out in the Green and White Papers of 1998, 
which set out a model based around governance by private stakeholders, with strong 
direct representation of the global Internet using public and an advisory role only for 
governments. Over time, and particularly during the reform process of 2002-03, that 
vision has been supplanted by a model in which the role of direct public 
representation has been very much diminished and the role of governments enhanced. 
Increased governmental participation and influence has occurred through the 
strengthening of ICANN’s own GAC; however, the intergovernmental system in the 
form of the UN has so far failed to significantly impose itself on the issue-area, 
despite discussions on the matter at WSIS and the IGF.   
 
Chapter 3 examined various interpretations of ICANN put forward by a number of 
scholars. These included the notion that ICANN is a technical caretaker only, as 
claimed by writers such as Solum; the ‘liberal democratic’ governance model put 
forward by analysts such as Weinberg, Fuller and Koppell; the view of ICANN as 
essentially a corporate animal or even as a cartel of influential commercial actors, 
taken by scholars such as Komaitis, Froomkin and Lemley; the more traditional 
statist, ‘rationalist’ view taken by writers such as Drezner and Goldsmith and Wu; and 
the intermediate position between statist and commercialist interpretations taken by 
scholars such as Kleinwaechter and Antonova, who describe ICANN as a 'public-
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private partnership' utilising important governance contributions from both states and 
nonstate actors.  
 
Chapters 4-6 explored these competing interpretations in more depth by examining 
three case studies of ICANN policy development in action, and then using the 
findings to make inferences about the organisation’s internal dynamics. These case 
studies comprised New gTLDs Policy, Internationalised Domain Names Policy and 
the Uniform Domain-Name Disputes Resolution Policy. All of these case studies 
produced some similar patterns. They showed that, while the ideal of consensus-based 
decisionmaking with fair representation for all affected parties continues to be 
promoted as the official line, it does not reflect reality. ICANN policy is created by a 
narrow set of powerful stakeholders through a process of bargaining, which often 
ultimately requires Board-level arbitration between competing interests. The ‘supply 
side’ actors, the registries and registrars, are particularly influential, and intellectual 
property interests exert considerable influence also. Other commercial influences 
include ISPs and other business interests acting through the Business Constituency. 
The exact balance between governmental and private actors, and between private 
actors of various kinds, is issue specific, with, for example, the GAC playing an 
important role in New gTLDs policy and IDNs policy but no major role in UDRP 
policy, while intellectual property interests were highly influential with regards to the 
UDRP and New gTLDs policy, but less so with regards to IDNs.  By contrast, the 
Internet-using public, despite having access to several avenues for representation, 
such as the At-Large system, public comments facilities and public meetings, do not 
appear to have much overall influence on the policymaking process. The GAC 
therefore forms the main counterweight to the influence of commercial interests, in 
contrast to the original vision for the organisation where this role would be played by 
direct representation for the global online public. The GAC tends to intervene mostly 
on particular issues identified by governments as falling within their ‘public policy’ 
remit, such as matters relating to sovereignty over ccTLDs, language, and use of 
place-names and territories as identifiers. The GAC is keen to reinforce and extend 
recognition of its ‘public policy’ authority and has had considerable success in doing 
so. However, while governments acting via the GAC carry substantial weight, they do 
not necessarily have the final word on ‘public policy’ matters, and have to bargain 
with powerful commercial interests. Ultimately, the Board acts as arbiter and is the 
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final authority within ICANN; the Board itself is made up of individuals drawn from a 
self-perpetuating elite, mostly of a technical and / or commercial background.      
 
Chapter 7 drew upon these findings to look again at the competing perspectives on 
ICANN discussed in Chapter 3. It found that the evidence refutes some of these 
interpretations of the organisation, including the notion that ICANN is an apolitical 
technical agency, and the ‘broad multistakeholder’ and ‘liberal democratic’ models 
that include meaningful influence for civil society and the general Internet using 
public. There was more evidence to support both the statist and commercial views of 
ICANN, but each of these focuses on only one dimension of the regime while 
neglecting the other. The chapter found that conceptions of ICANN as a ‘public-
private partnership’ came closest to fitting the evidence, but that this phrase was 
nonetheless not entirely satisfactory, in that it implied a wholly co-operative 
relationship, whereas in reality, the interests of governments and corporations can 
clash. ICANN is a mechanism for managing these disputes between governmental and 
private actors, and between private actors of various kinds, via a process of 
negotiation, bargaining and arbitration.     
 
Chapter 8 showed that, despite its nature as a hybrid public-private organisation, 
ICANN can be usefully understood as a regime using Krasner’s definition, since it has 
identifiable principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge. Of course, it differs in significant ways from a 
conventional ‘inter-national’ regime, in that governmental and private actors are to a 
very considerable extent peers within the organisation. Governments must compete 
with private actors for influence and there is no guarantee that governmental 
preferences will win out over private ones in any given area of policy. In terms of 
power relationships, both governmental and powerful commercial actors have similar 
amounts of underlying leverage in the sense that each type of actor ultimately 
possesses the power to break up or at least seriously disrupt the regime. If they 
became sufficiently unhappy with the ICANN regime, governments could, for 
example, work collaboratively to create a new alternative root managed by an 
intergovernmental organisation, and could potentially use their legislative power to 
force ISPs to recognise this alternative root as the authoritative one. ISPs also 
potentially possess the ability to create an alternative root, while the registries and 
registrars are responsible for actual operational management of the DNS system 
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below root level and also provide most of ICANN’s funding. Intellectual property 
interests potentially possess the ability to seriously disrupt the regime if their interests 
are not accommodated, for example through legal challenges. However, while all of 
these actor types have the potential to wreck or at least seriously damage the regime 
through withdrawal of their co-operation, the costs to each of them would be very 
high, making withdrawal an irrational option so long as the regime continues to 
accommodate the majority of their interests. Each is kept on board by a mutual 
interest in a working and stable DNS. This does not mean that there are no conflicts 
within the regime, but the regime acts as a framework within which conflicts can be 
managed through bargaining and compromise. In this sense, while not an 
intergovernmental regime per se, ICANN resembles the neoliberal institutionalist 
model based on the rationality of co-operation and bargaining between interdependent 
actors.  
 
Moreover, the interactions between the various governmental and nongovernmental 
actors, as they vie to exert and extend their influence, are not merely contained by the 
regime framework; they actually cause the framework to be modified over time 
through a process of continual creation and recreation of ICANN’s principles, norms, 
rules and decisionmaking procedures. Some examples of this phenomenon in action 
include the continually evolving relationship between the GAC and the Board via 
their interactions on policy areas such as New gTLDs; the evolution of the 
relationship between ICANN and the ccTLD registries over questions such as registry 
agreements and financial payments and whether or not these should be made 
mandatory; the evolving relationship between ICANN and the gTLD registries and 
registrars, as ICANN attempts to extend its authority over these actors, sometimes in 
the face of resistance from them; and the ongoing issue of whether to change the rules 
prohibiting vertical integration of registries and registrars, both for new gTLDs and 
for existing ones. Consideration of these continually evolving relationships and norms  
from the perspective of social constructivism and structuration theory revealed how 
ICANN is not so much a fixed, unchanging institution as an ongoing process. 
 
Thus, ICANN can be usefully understood in terms of concepts drawn both from 
traditional neoliberal institutionalist regime theory and from Dessler and Wendt’s 
social constructivism. However, insights from alternative paradigms on regime theory 
also have some applicability. The realist hegemonic approach has a strong resonance 
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when considering the role played by the United States government in creating the 
ICANN regime, while neo-Marxist type approaches offer insights into the commercial 
dimensions of the regime.  
 
Lessons for regime theory 
 
As numerous scholars have pointed out, the increasing significance of private actors 
and public-private partnerships in global governance challenges some of our 
traditional conceptions about authority and governance. When Stephen Krasner first 
put forward his definition of international regimes back in 1983, it made sense to 
envision regimes in statist terms. Even at that time, it was recognised by Krasner and 
others that private actors could become participants in some regimes, but the role they 
played was seen as being very much subordinate to the roles played by states. States, 
the basic actors in the international system, constructed the regime framework through 
multilateral agreements, and nonstate actors then operated within those parameters. 
While private actors may have played significant roles, ultimately the final authority 
lay with governments. In at least some areas of modern global politics, however, 
regimes have emerged or are emerging that do not fit this model.  
 
ICANN is at the cutting edge of the shift towards public-private governance; it is 
perhaps the most highly developed and formalised example of a hybrid global 
institution, where governments and private interests are in many ways peers. Though 
constructed largely at the behest of a hegemonic state, as the organisation has evolved, 
the US role has receded, and ICANN has become increasingly accepted as possessing 
authority in its own right to govern DNS and IP addressing resources. To some 
degree, that authority is still legitimised through governmental recognition. States play 
a role in regime oversight under the Affirmation of Commitments, and governmental 
claims to public policy authority give them considerable weight and influence within 
the regime. Furthermore, ICANN’s legal right to manage the root still rests ultimately 
on the IANA contract with Commerce; in this sense the regime is still underpinned 
ultimately by a hegemonic state. But the supreme operational authority of ICANN is 
wielded by the Board of Directors, a nongovernmental body; and the necessity to have 
the co-operation of various types of nonstate actor gives those actors leverage in some 
ways equal to that of governments.     
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Nonetheless, one of the key findings of this study is that the regime concept is still 
relevant when considering new types of governance arrangement such as ICANN. So 
long as we take ‘actors’ to include entities other than just states, Krasner’s definition 
of regimes remains useful. It still makes sense to define regimes in terms of principles, 
norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge. Of course, the hybrid nature of an organisation like ICANN means that the 
term ‘inter-national regime’ may not be entirely appropriate; ‘global governance 
regime’ would be better. Furthermore, the project has shown that some of the older 
approaches to regime theory, including those drawn from ‘rationalist’ paradigms, are 
still useful; some concepts originally developed in the context of interstate regimes 
continue to apply equally well to a complex public-private hybrid regime like 
ICANN. These include both the hegemonic model and the neoliberal institutionalist 
conceptualisation of regimes as forums for bargaining among interdependent actors.  
 
However, the study has also provided a good demonstration that, while concepts 
drawn from the traditional rationalist approach to regime theory can be a useful 
starting point, our understanding of how global governance regimes evolve can be 
deepened by the application of models taken from social constructivism and 
structuration theory. Regimes should be seen as arrangements set up to manage 
specific sets of issues that may rely partly on a ‘material base’ (such as the DNS 
technology and infrastructure itself in the case of ICANN) but which also rely heavily 
on social conceptions, values and norms developed through discourse. Furthermore, 
ICANN’s evolution bears out the social constructivist view of regimes as dynamic, 
continually evolving processes rather than static, rigid structures. Regimes evolve 
continuously through their own internal dynamics, and obviously those dynamics will 
be different depending on the nature of the issue-area and the identities of the actors. 
As the ICANN case demonstrates, even within a regime, the distribution of interests 
and power across the various actors depends on the particular policy area in hand; the 
ways in which they interact and the policy outcomes will also vary as a result.   
 
Older approaches to regime theory have tended to focus upon a single type of 
structure, such as the distribution of power among states, as in structural realism, or 
the logic of the global capitalist system, as in structural neo-Marxism. Hybrid regimes 
such as ICANN cannot be properly understood in such narrow terms. The interaction 
between the interstate system and the commercial sphere needs to be taken into 
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account to properly understand ICANN’s organisational dynamics. In this sense, 
ICANN sits on a ‘fault line’ between two approaches to governance; the traditional 
intergovernmental approach and the privatised self-regulatory approach. From a social 
constructivist point of view this can be seen as a clash between two competing 
cultures or social structures, the Westphalian state system and the logic of globalised, 
borderless capitalism. ICANN is on the one hand a demonstration of the difficulties of 
trying to apply concepts such as the sovereignty of territorial states to an issue-area 
that is inherently global and highly commercially driven, yet it also shows the 
persistence of the intergovernmental approach.  
 
This is not to say, of course, that governmental and commercial actors are invariably 
in conflict. The case study chapters have shown that, on many points of policy, the 
GAC and corporate players are often in agreement. However, sometimes their 
interests do conflict, and this then raises questions of legitimate authority. Do 
governments, as the GAC claims, have the right to the final word on matters of public 
policy, or should the private approach to governance upon which ICANN was 
founded prevail? On the one hand, therefore, ICANN demonstrates the dissonance 
between intergovernmental and private approaches to governance and thus exposes 
the fault-line between the statist and global capitalist social structures that public-
private regimes must straddle. Yet on the other hand, it also it also demonstrates that 
the gap can be bridged in practice to produce coherent policy and working 
governance, via a process of bargaining and compromise.   
 
The extent to which the model and patterns observed in the ICANN case will be 
replicated in other areas of global governance remains an open one. While the 
phenomenon of public-private governance is undoubtedly growing across a wide 
range of global issue-areas, ICANN as an institution remains fairly unique. As 
Keohane and Victor argue, we can expect public-private governance arrangements to 
take a wide range of forms, from loose networks to highly institutionalised 
organisations. ICANN may therefore represent something of a prototype of what is 
possible at the highly institutionalised end of the spectrum. However, it is unclear 
whether such highly integrated and authoritative public-private regimes can be 
constructed without the imposition of order by a hegemonic power, as was the case 
with ICANN.  
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To illustrate the difficulties of constructing a strong public-private regime, capable of 
setting authoritative global policy, in the absence of an imposed hegemonic order, it 
may be instructive to consider two other examples of issue areas involving both 
governmental and private actors; intellectual property and wireless 3G 
telecommunications standards. In the case of intellectual property, a strong and 
sophisticated regime emerged out of the lobbying efforts of private intellectual 
property interests in the context of a hegemonic power. This regime is based around 
the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1994.1226 There is 
also a UN intellectual property agency dedicated to the administration of relevant 
treaties and to promote global compliance with intellectual property rights, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).1227 As demonstrated by scholars such as 
John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos and Susan Sell, the global intellectual property regime 
was primarily imposed by great-power hegemony and particularly the US, 1228 in 
response to pressures from the IP lobby.1229 
 
A contrasting example is provided by the case of wireless 3G standards for third-
generation wide area mobile telephone and networking technology.  In October 1996, 
the ITU set out a process and a time plan for the definition of a global 3G standard, 
but this foundered in the face of conflict between US and European manufacturers 
promoting their own incompatible standards and squabbling over intellectual property 
rights.1230 In May 2000, the ITU formally adopted an initiative designated IMT-2000, 
which set forth the technical requirements for a global standard1231; but, by this time, 
continuing lack of agreement on a single standard and increasing market pressures to 
implement 3G meant that governments had already begun to allow implementation of 
                                                 
1226 WTO (1994). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Signed in Marrakesh, Morocco. 
15 April 1994. Retrieved 14th February 2011, from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm  
1227 WIPO (2011). WIPO Overview. Retrieved 8th February 2011, from 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/general/1007/wipo_pub_1007_2011.pdf   
1228 Braithwaite, J. and P. Drahos (2000). Global Business Regulation. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. PP63-80 
1229 Sell, S. (2003). Private power, public law: the globalisation of intellectual property rights. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. PP96-120 
1230 Cowhey, P., J. Aronson, and J. Richards. (2003). ‘The peculiar evolution of 3G wireless networks: 
Institutional logic, politics, and property rights.’ E. Wilson and W. Drake (eds.), Governing global 
electronic networks. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 149-186  
1231 ITU (2000). Press Release: 'ITU gives final approval to IMT-2000 radio interface specifications.' 
Retrieved 4th February 2011, from http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases/2000/10.html  
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various standards on a national and regional basis,1232 ultimately undermining the 
ITU’s efforts at global standardisation. Unlike issue-areas such as DNS and the 
intellectual property regime, in this case no hegemonic power was able to impose 
standards on all the rest; as a consequence, different bargaining positions emerged out 
of regional dynamics, resulting in not one but multiple standards. 
 
Like ICANN, these examples illustrate that the emergence of strong authoritative 
public-private regimes is aided by the existence of a hegemonic state power able and 
willing to impose an order over an issue-area. The circumstances that brought ICANN 
into being were fairly unusual and resulted from an accident of history that placed the 
US government in a position to be able to impose its own policy preferences over the 
issue-area. Therefore, we should not necessarily assume that similar regimes will or 
can appear elsewhere in the absence of such circumstances.  
 
On the other hand, neither should we assume that ICANN will remain entirely unique. 
Despite some concerns over matters such as the extent to which it meets ‘liberal 
democratic’ standards of accountability, legitimacy and representation, ICANN 
essentially ‘works’; it keeps all of the essential actors on board and it manages to 
produce coherent policy decisions out of what otherwise could be a logjam of 
competing interests. The ICANN model may therefore provide a useful template that 
could be fruitfully copied elsewhere, though perhaps with modifications to address 
accountability and legitimacy concerns. The types of issue-area that might benefit 
from an ICANN-type model would presumably share some characteristics with DNS 
governance. They would require a high degree of co-ordination and coherent 
policymaking at a global level, and would depend on the co-operation of multiple 
types of actor, both governmental and commercial, whose interests are not necessarily 
always in harmony. Of course, each issue-area will involve different sets of actors and 
interests; consequently each regime will develop its own individual characteristics as 
it evolves over time, as was the case with ICANN.   
 
If ICANN is anything to go by, however, we should not expect such regimes to be 
without conflict and inherent tensions between governmental and private actors as 
                                                 
1232See Sill, W. J. and C. L. Lin (2000). "Fence-Mending on the Frontier." Wireless Review. 29 Feb 
2000. Retrieved 5th February 2011, from 
http://connectedplanetonline.com/wireless/mag/wireless_fencemending_frontier/ P3 
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well as between competing private interests. As was the case with their interstate 
forebears, the function of public-private global governance regimes is not to eliminate 
conflict but to manage it. This lesson was perhaps not well understood in 1998 by 
some of the more optimistic of ICANN’s founders, who rather idealistically envisaged 
that the organisation could be made to operate along ‘consensus’-based lines. 
However, where competing interests are involved, there can be no consensus-based 
policy, only politics. While some of the participants and the details of the game may 
have changed, outcomes in global politics are ultimately decided by power and 
interest as much as was ever the case, and ICANN illustrates that truth well.  
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Appendix 1.1: Sample of initial contact email for potential ICANN interviewees 
 
Dear <NAME> 
 
Sorry to bother you, but I was wondering if you might be able to assist me.  
I am a PhD student at the University of Huddersfield (UK), working on a thesis based around 
ICANN's role in Internet governance in the context of international regime theory. I am 
currently looking at ICANN’s policy development process regarding <POLICY AREA> 
 I understand that you served on <NAME OF COMMITTEE / WORKING GROUP> in 
the period <DATE>. 
Would it be possible to ask you a few questions regarding this? 
The record of any email correspondence between us would be used solely for this study. 
Upon your request, your name would not be revealed. If you would prefer to discuss via 
telephone rather than email, please let me know.    
Many thanks for your time. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Paul Antony White 
PhD Student, University of Huddersfield  
 
 
 
 9 
Appendix 1.2 List of individuals from ICANN contacted / interviewed 
Name Role within ICANN Mode of 
interview 
Date of initial 
contact 
Mark Carvell UK GAC representative Email 20 May 2008 
William Dee European Commission 
GAC representative 
Telephone and 
email  
22 May 2008 
Philip Sheppard Business Constituency / 
New gTLDs Committee 
Telephone 9 February 2009 
Bruce Tonkin GNSO Council Chair / 
New gTLDs Committee 
Chair 
Email 12 February 2009 
Hiro Hotta ccNSO .jp registry 
representative / IDNC 
Working Group  
member 
Email 8 July 2009 
Patrik Faltstrom IETF /IDNs Committee 
+ IDNC Working Group 
member 
Email 7 July 2009 
John Klensin IAB Chair / IDNs 
Committee member 
Email 5 July 2009 
Cheryl Langdon-Orr Former ALAC Chair Email 5 December 2011 
Olivier Crépin-
Leblond 
ALAC Chair Email 7 January 2011 
Andrew Maurer Australian GAC 
representative 
Email 8 January 2012 
 
Vera 
Sveinbjörnsdótti 
Icelandic GAC 
representative  
Email 9 January 2012 
Maria Häll Swedish GAC 
representative  
Email 9 January 2012 
Wolf Ludwig EURALO Chair Email 13 February 2012 
 
Copies of email correspondence with the above individuals have been retained and can be 
examined on request.  
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Appendix 1.3: Sample of an email conversation with an ICANN respondent 
(Respondent – John Klensin (IDNs Committee member)  
*************************************************************************** 
PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  04 July 2009 18:45 
To: john-ietf@jck.com 
Dear John, 
Sorry to bother you, but I was wondering if you might be able to assist me. My name is Paul 
White and I am a PhD student at the University of Huddersfield (UK), working on a thesis 
based around ICANN's role in Internet governance. I am currently looking at ICANN’s 
policy development process regarding Internationalised Domain Names in the period 2000-
2009. I understand that you served on ICANN’s IDN Committee in the period 2001-2005. 
Would it be possible to ask you a few questions regarding this? 
The record of any email correspondence between us would be used solely for this study. 
Upon your request, your name would not be revealed. If you would prefer to discuss via 
telephone rather than email, please let me know.    
Many thanks for your time. 
Best regards 
Paul White 
*************************************************************************** 
Re: PhD research on IDNs 
John C Klensin [john-ietf@jck.com] 
You replied on 07/07/2009 19:35. 
Sent:  05 July 2009 10:25 
To:   
P.A.White U9502832 
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--On Saturday, July 04, 2009 18:45 +0100 "P.A.White  U9502832" 
<H9502832@hud.ac.uk> wrote: 
> Dear John, 
> 
> Sorry to bother you, but I was wondering if you might be able 
> to assist me. My name is Paul White and I am a PhD student at 
> the Univeristy of Huddersfield (UK), working on a thesis based 
> around ICANN's role in Internet governance. 
 
In what department?  And who is advising you? 
 
> I am currently 
> looking at ICANN's policy development process regarding 
> Internationalised Domain Names in the period 2000-2009. I 
> understand that you served on ICANN's IDN Committee in the 
> period 2001-2005. 
 
Yes.  And on and off before and since.  I've also advised 
several countries in that area, participate actively in regional 
working groups on Arabic and CJK languages, etc. 
 
> Would it be possible to ask you a few 
> questions regarding this? 
 
Yes, I suppose so.  How would you like to do this?  Email? 
Voice? 
 
 12 
Background, FYI.  I've been involved in what would now be called 
Internet Internationalization issues since the 80s by one way of 
counting and the early 70s by another.  I helped shape the 
policies that led up to RFC 1591 and effectively co-authored 
that document.  I was active in the original IDN definition 
work, ended up leading the effort to get the IAB's critique in 
RFC 4690 together, etc.  I was also active in the "IANA 
transition" effort that was one of the major contributors to 
ICANN's original design. 
 
My primary professional background is in international political 
communications and political and organizational behavior. 
 
Where that introduction is leading is that I'm a poor candidate 
for "sound bite" answers.  If you have well-thought-out 
questions and are interested in understanding the history and 
answers in all of their complexity, I'm happy to talk with you. 
If you are trying, as have several of your predecessors in this 
general area, to divide things into a couple of neat categories 
about which you can make sweeping statements, talking with me is 
likely to be very frustrating. 
 
       john 
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**************************************************************************
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  07 July 2009 19:35 
To:  John C Klensin [john-ietf@jck.com] 
Hi John, 
Many thanks for your reply. I'm working in the School of Human and Health Sciences, 
Division of Politics. My PhD supervisors are Graham Gibbs, John Craig and Derek Lynch. 
My academic background is in political science, but I've worked in IT (mostly network 
administration) over the last eight years, and the PhD is an attempt to fuse these two interests. 
I understand that this is a complex area and difficult to pin down to a few generalisations. 
Perhaps it would be best if I start by explaining where I’m trying to go with the PhD.  I’m 
ultimately trying to apply international regime theory to the issue-area of Internet 
governance. I very quickly realised that Internet governance as a whole is far too broad an 
area for a PhD, so I narrowed the thesis down to a study of ICANN (which is obviously still a 
huge topic). I’m basically trying to find out what ‘type’ of organisation ICANN is, and 
ultimately attempt to draw some lessons from the study for international regime theory. 
From what I’ve read of the academic literature so far, ICANN is most often analysed in 
‘liberal’ terms; i.e. debates have focused around questions such as ICANN’s legitimacy, 
whether or not it should be regarded as a public policymaker, its record in providing 
representation to various interests and so on. I’m interested in exploring these questions, but I 
also want to try to analyse ICANN in terms of alternative theoretical paradigms. For example, 
I want to look at the extent to which governments have had an influence on ICANN 
policymaking, which might lend weight to a more ‘realist’ interpretation of the organisation, 
and the extent to which ICANN is dominated by commercial interests, which might provide a 
basis for a neo-Marxian type analysis. 
In order to try to get to grips with some of these questions, I’ve tried to pick out three or four 
policy development areas to act as case studies of how the ICANN system works in practice, 
IDNs being one of these.   I’m trying to understand the relative contribution made to the 
policy development process by various types of actors in order to get some perspective on the 
ways in which each type of actor has been able to influence the policymaking process. 
Basically, I’m trying to understand if – and how – ‘multistakeholderism’ has worked in 
practice. 
Clearly your background on this is very substantial indeed, and I’d be keen to get your 
insights on some of these issues. I was thinking of corresponding by email, unless you would 
prefer to do things by phone? 
Once again, many thanks for your time. 
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Best regards, 
Paul 
 
*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on ICANN 
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
You replied on 10/07/2009 17:02. 
Sent:  07 July 2009 20:41 
To:   
P.A.White U9502832 
--On Tuesday, July 07, 2009 19:35 +0100 "P.A.White  U9502832" 
<H9502832@hud.ac.uk> wrote: 
> Hi John, 
> 
> Many thanks for your reply. I'm working in the School of Human 
> and Health Sciences, Division of Politics. My PhD supervisors 
> are Graham Gibbs, John Craig and Derek Lynch. My academic 
> background is in political science, but I've worked in IT 
> (mostly network administration) over the last eight years, and 
> the PhD is an attempt to fuse these two interests. 
 
If it makes you feel better, mine says "in Computer Applications 
in the Social and Policy Sciences" on it -- special committee 
consisting of one Architect (of the building variety, but a 
major contributor to Geographical Information Systems and their 
use in Architecture and Urban and Regional Planning), one 
meteorologist turned urban planner, two political scientists 
 15 
(one a specialist on models of political systems, the other an 
expert on political communications and the co-inventor of 
contact networks and distance measures on them as well as the 
use of content analysis as a formal analysis method (Hayward 
Alker and Ithiel de Sola Pool respectively if you have read in 
those literatures), and one cognitive psychologist turned 
computer scientist (and the godfather of the ARPANET and other 
things -- JCR Licklider).  
 
Always happy to see others in the area.  Indeed, if your 
institution uses external readers and could tolerate one with no 
present academic affiliation, we might discuss that when you are 
a bit further along. 
 
> I understand that this is a complex area and difficult to pin 
> down to a few generalisations. Perhaps it would be best if I 
> start by explaining where I'm trying to go with the PhD. 
> I'm ultimately trying to apply international regime theory 
> to the issue-area of Internet governance. I very quickly 
> realised that Internet governance as a whole is far too broad 
> an area for a PhD, so I narrowed the thesis down to a study of 
> ICANN (which is obviously still a huge topic). I'm basically 
> trying to find out what 'type' of organisation ICANN is, 
> and ultimately attempt to draw some lessons from the study for 
> international regime theory. 
 
There was a PhD completed at Syracuse about a year ago that 
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started from regime theory but that looked primarily at 
ccTLD-ICANN and ccTLD-government relationships.  It is a 
fertile, but very frustrating, area and one in which you risk 
having the proverbial rug pulled out from under you partway 
through the research work.  You will probably also want to talk 
with Paul Twomey, who considers himself a regime theory expert, 
but I suspect that is better done after he steps down from ICANN. 
 
> From what I've read of the academic literature so far, ICANN 
> is most often analysed in 'liberal' terms; i.e. debates 
> have focused around questions such as ICANN's legitimacy, 
> whether or not it should be regarded as a public policymaker, 
> its record in providing representation to various interests 
> and so on. I'm interested in exploring these questions, but 
> I also want to try to analyse ICANN in terms of alternative 
> theoretical paradigms. For example, I want to look at the 
> extent to which governments have had an influence on ICANN 
> policymaking, which might lend weight to a more 'realist' 
> interpretation of the organisation, and the extent to which 
> ICANN is dominated by commercial interests, which might 
> provide a basis for a neo-Marxian type analysis. 
 
Good.  While I have strong opinions about some of the answers, 
very little analysis has been done ("liberal" or otherwise) that 
would really stand careful and rigorous academic scrutiny. 
 
> In order to try to get to grips with some of these questions, 
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> I've tried to pick out three or four policy development 
> areas to act as case studies of how the ICANN system works in 
> practice, IDNs being one of these.   I'm trying to 
> understand the relative contribution made to the policy 
> development process by various types of actors in order to get 
> some perspective on the ways in which each type of actor has 
> been able to influence the policymaking process. Basically, 
> I'm trying to understand if – and how – 
> 'multistakeholderism' has worked in practice. 
 
Clearly a key question, if not _the_ key question.  
 
To identify my bias at this stage, the terms that are used in 
certain contexts include comments about gluttonous 
multisteakholders and references to multisnakeholders.  So, 
while I may have useful things to say, you need to be careful to 
assume that I just represent one of many perspectives on the 
situation until and unless you get enough confirmation to form 
your own opinions and conclusions.  As well as looking at how 
the interests of various constituencies play themselves out 
within ICANN, you need to try to identify the materially 
concerned or affected communities who are not represented at all 
and figure out what the implications of that are. 
 
> Clearly your background on this is very substantial indeed, 
> and I'd be keen to get your insights on some of these 
> issues. I was thinking of corresponding by email, unless you 
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> would prefer to do things by phone? 
 
Email should be fine unless one of us decides we need a more 
conversational interaction mode.  Let's deal with that if and 
when we get to it. 
 
Please use the email address from which this message comes -- it 
reaches me more quickly and reliably, while the other one risks 
getting tied up with the considerable IETF noise. 
 
> Once again, many thanks for your time. 
 
This should be fun.  And potentially very useful to the 
community. 
 
best regards, 
   john 
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*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  10 July 2009 16:59 
To:   
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
Hello John, 
 
Thanks again, I appreciate your interest. We don't have a formal system of external readers at 
Huddersfield, but I ran the suggestion past my supervisors yesterday and they thought it was 
a great idea - so if you are willing to have a read through my thesis at some stage, that would 
be much appreciated and potentially very useful. 
 
I realise that this is a fast moving area and that there is always a danger of the 'rug being 
pulled' - but i suppose that's an inherent risk of working in this area! 
 
I wasn't aware that Paul Twomey had expertise in regime theory - that's useful to know. I was 
planning to contact him (and also Vint Cerf) at some stage but as you say, that's probably best 
left until he steps down. 
 
As you suggest, one of the first steps in my analysis needs to be to work out who the main 
players are, but also which potentially affected parties are excluded from the policymaking 
process. I get the feeling that this may be dependent on the particular policy area under 
dscussion? However, I also get the overall impression that ICANN seems to be dominated by 
the 'supply' side of the industry, with the registries carrying a huge amount of weight in most 
policy discussions (I believe that the registries and registrars constituencies carry double 
votes in the GNSO?) I'm also trying to explore the roles played by the technical communities 
within ICANN. Obviously, the techies are the people who are ultimately called upon to make 
any solution work, but what seems less clear is the extent to which the technical communities 
have 'interests' of their own, what those interests might be, and how this plays out within the 
ICANN system. 
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I think another key question is the extent to which the kind of issues dealt with by ICANN are 
resolvable by consensus. I understand that the IETF works by 'rough consensus', but it seems 
to me that this is made possible by the more purely technical nature of the IETF's work, 
whereas ICANN, despite all the claims of it being a technical co-ordinator only, seems in 
many instances to be dealing with public policy issues, in that it arbitrates between competing 
claims of right - and I'm not sure that resolution by consensus is possible in such cases. 
With regard to IDNs, I've gained a fairly good grasp of the major events and chronology from 
the documentation available on the ICANN website, but I've initially identified a number of 
questions / issues that I want to explore further.  
My first impressions of the IDNs policy development area are that it seems both more 
complex and arguably more 'multistakeholder' than New gTLDs policy (the only other policy 
development area I've looked at in any depth to date). Whereas New gTLDs policy seems to 
have been mostly the remit of the GNSO, IDNs policy seems to have involved most of the 
major ICANN organs together with outside agencies. Partly, I suppose, this is due to IDNs 
involving new technology, and ICANN has had to depend on other agencies such as the IETF 
to develop a standard, software manufacturers to supply IDN-compatible applications, 
organisations such as UNESCO to supply linguistic expertise and so on. However, I also 
wondered if the inclusion of a broader range of parties and the much greater complexity of 
the issue was partly due to the potentially politically sensitive nature of a policy development 
area that deals with recognition and codification of languages and scripts. 
Certainly I've noticed that GAC has appeared to play a very pro-active role with IDNs, 
particularly (in conjunction with the ccNSO) in initiating the Fast Track process. I'm trying to 
figure out what the main drivers were for getting the fast track process underway. I 
understand that the process is intended to move forward IDN ccTLD implementation in 
'unproblematic' cases, as opposed to all progress becoming stalled because of the 'problem' 
cases, but I'm not quite clear as to whether the difficult cases were problematic due to mainly 
technical, linguistic or political reasons. I also wondered if the pressure to move forward with 
fast track tended to come from mainly from governments and ccTLD managers (as might be 
suggested by the fact that the ccNSO and GAC were instrumental in getting the process 
underway) or whether there might be other factors involved - perhaps even the discussions at 
the IGF? (I note that ICANN has been involved in several IDN-related meetings and 
workshops at the IGF). 
I understand that IDN second-level domains are currently supported in 350 languages, out of 
something like 6000 currently recognised by UNESCO. This raises the question of why these 
particular languages? I was wondering if this was simply due to the difficulties involved in 
even getting a language defined and drawing up relevant Unicode tables etc, or whether 
commercial factors may have also played a part. Obviously, since the registries are 
commercial companies, it would make sense to suggest that they would be most interested in 
supporting the profitable languages, i.e. the ones that would return a decent amount of 
registrations, but would be less interested in supporting languages for which there is no big 
market. I was wondering whether this might prove an interesting 'test' of the ICANN system 
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as to whether the market ultimately decides, or whether smaller noncommercial groups such 
as minority language communities will be able to press their interests strongly enough within 
the ICANN system to ensure that their needs are met also.      
With regards to the IDN Guidelines, I get the impression that some of the registries, 
particularly Verisign, initially resisted centralisation of IDN policy in a single set of 
Guidelines. Is this just a symptom of a wider contest / power struggle being played out, 
particularly in ICANN's early days, between ICANN's efforts to establish its authority and 
Verisign's determination to retain as much autonomy as possible? Also, I wondered to what 
extent the registries are still interpreting the Guidelines differently, and whether they are still 
doing independent policy setting beyond that contained in the Guidelines.  
Anyway, these are some of my initial thoughts, though no doubt there will be many other 
questions as I get deeper into the issue-area. Would be interested in any thoughts you have on 
any of these points. 
I'll be away over the next few days and won't have Internet access, but I should be back on 
Tuesday. 
Best regards, 
Paul 
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*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
You replied on 16/07/2009 19:49. 
Sent:  13 July 2009 12:55 
To:   
P.A.White U9502832 
 
--On Friday, July 10, 2009 16:59 +0100 "P.A.White  U9502832" 
<H9502832@hud.ac.uk> wrote: 
> Hello John, 
> 
> Thanks again, I appreciate your interest. We don't have a 
> formal system of external readers at Huddersfield, but I ran 
> the suggestion past my supervisors yesterday and they thought 
> it was a great idea - so if you are willing to have a read 
> through my thesis at some stage, that would be much 
> appreciated and potentially very useful. 
> 
> I realise that this is a fast moving area and that there is 
> always a danger of the 'rug being pulled' - but i suppose 
> that's an inherent risk of working in this area! 
 
Yes.  Tradeoff between timeliness and good perspective. 
 
> I wasn't aware that Paul Twomey had expertise in regime theory 
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> - that's useful to know. 
 
I don't know how much expertise he actually has, but he does 
talk in those terms and has clearly read into at least some of 
the literature. 
 
> As you suggest, one of the first steps in my analysis needs to 
> be to work out who the main players are, but also which 
> potentially affected parties are excluded from the 
> policymaking process. I get the feeling that this may be 
> dependent on the particular policy area under dscussion? 
 
Somewhat, although I believe there are some general patterns. 
For example, ICANN processes tend to drag out through many 
meetings and other interactions.  The costs of that are high, so 
the greatest participation tends to come from those who can and 
will make large investments and, at the other extreme, those who 
(to paraphrase a staff member) have too much time on their hands 
and who may be able to find subsidies.  To the extent to which 
you can identify populations who fit into neither group, you 
will find that they are consistently underrepresented or not 
represented at all.  
 
The situation is also clouded somewhat by ICANN's having a 
surplus of folks who are willing to claim to speak for 
constituencies with whom they have no actual contact: speakers 
of obscure minority languages, future users of the Internet, the 
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occasional Martian or Klingon,... 
 
> However, I also get the overall impression that ICANN seems to 
> be dominated by the 'supply' side of the industry, with the 
> registries carrying a huge amount of weight in most policy 
> discussions (I believe that the registries and registrars 
> constituencies carry double votes in the GNSO?) 
 
This may or may not be separate from my comments about resources 
above.  If one's livelihood depends on ICANN decisions, then 
investments in representation and participation at ICANN can 
easily be justified in bottom-line terms.   There are also 
overlaps in constituencies.  For example, on many issues, 
"business" and "intellectual property" interests have overlapped 
enough, sometimes being represented by the same people, that 
they are another voting block. 
 
> I'm also 
> trying to explore the roles played by the technical 
> communities within ICANN. Obviously, the techies are the 
> people who are ultimately called upon to make any solution 
> work, but what seems less clear is the extent to which the 
> technical communities have 'interests' of their own, what 
> those interests might be, and how this plays out within the 
> ICANN system. 
 
My biases, and experience, on that subject are strong enough 
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that I should let you get to the point of asking specific 
questions before burying you in opinions.  
 
> I think another key question is the extent to which the kind 
> of issues dealt with by ICANN are resolvable by consensus. I 
> understand that the IETF works by 'rough consensus', but it 
> seems to me that this is made possible by the more purely 
> technical nature of the IETF's work, whereas ICANN, despite 
> all the claims of it being a technical co-ordinator only, 
> seems in many instances to be dealing with public policy 
> issues, in that it arbitrates between competing claims of 
> right - and I'm not sure that resolution by consensus is 
> possible in such cases. 
 
Yes.  A different way to put it is that there is consensus in 
the IETF community about general objectives and how to measure 
success.  Arguably, without that, one cannot have even a good 
debate, much less meaningful consensus.   ICANN doesn't have 
that advantage. 
 
> With regard to IDNs, I've gained a fairly good grasp of the 
> major events and chronology from the documentation available 
> on the ICANN website, but I've initially identified a number 
> of questions / issues that I want to explore further. 
 
The material on the ICANN website is reasonably good as far as 
it goes.  It is also highly biased toward ICANN concerns and 
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ignores the issues that ICANN doesn't want to deal with or hear 
about. 
 
> My first impressions of the IDNs policy development area are 
> that it seems both more complex and arguably more 
> 'multistakeholder' than New gTLDs policy (the only other 
> policy development area I've looked at in any depth to date). 
> Whereas New gTLDs policy seems to have been mostly the remit 
> of the GNSO, IDNs policy seems to have involved most of the 
> major ICANN organs together with outside agencies. Partly, I 
> suppose, this is due to IDNs involving new technology, and 
> ICANN has had to depend on other agencies such as the IETF to 
> develop a standard, software manufacturers to supply 
> IDN-compatible applications, organisations such as UNESCO to 
> supply linguistic expertise and so on. 
 
UNESCO has not been involved except to occasionally pop up, say 
something that most people know already or explain how important 
language preservation is, and then claim credit. 
 
> However, I also 
> wondered if the inclusion of a broader range of parties and 
> the much greater complexity of the issue was partly due to the 
> potentially politically sensitive nature of a policy 
> development area that deals with recognition and codification 
> of languages and scripts. 
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Yes.   Other pieces of that puzzle may be relevant: 
 
(1) Passions run very high around language and culture, 
including issues of making the Internet more accessible to 
populations with low familiarity with Latin-based scripts 
generally and English in particular.  IDNs have, several times, 
become a vehicle for expressing frustrations with the US Govt 
that cannot be as safely expressed in other contexts. 
 
(2) While they will make formal statements, most of the GAC 
doesn't really care about most issues that affect gTLDs only. 
Partially for the reasons above, they care a lot about IDNs. 
 
(3) When I was working on food composition databases, we 
discovered that the number of people who had opinions on the 
subject was roughly equal to the number of people who eat food. 
Expertise not required -- if one is food consumer, one feels 
entitled to opinions on relatively complex questions about food 
identification, classification, health concerns, etc.  IDNs are 
like that too -- immensely complex problems complicated by 
equally complex coding issues (e.g., Unicode is good for many 
things, but several aspects of its design come close to pessimal 
for IDN purposes) -- but everyone has an opinion.  And many of 
those opinions would make sense if one were trying to write 
novels in DNS labels... but that is not possible and many of the 
issues it motivates are not interesting. 
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> Certainly I've noticed that GAC has appeared to play a very 
> pro-active role with IDNs, particularly (in conjunction with 
> the ccNSO) in initiating the Fast Track process. I'm trying to 
> figure out what the main drivers were for getting the fast 
> track process underway. I understand that the process is 
> intended to move forward IDN ccTLD implementation in 
> 'unproblematic' cases, as opposed to all progress becoming 
> stalled because of the 'problem' cases, but I'm not quite 
> clear as to whether the difficult cases were problematic due 
> to mainly technical, linguistic or political reasons. 
 
Also test the "greed" hypothesis, note that some of the ccTLD 
operators have tense relationships with the associated 
governments, and note too that the "fast track" gives additional 
domains to the established operators rather than letting others 
propose to compete in-country. 
 
> I also 
> wondered if the pressure to move forward with fast track 
> tended to come from mainly from governments and ccTLD managers 
> (as might be suggested by the fact that the ccNSO and GAC were 
> instrumental in getting the process underway) or whether there 
> might be other factors involved - perhaps even the discussions 
> at the IGF? (I note that ICANN has been involved in several 
> IDN-related meetings and workshops at the IGF). 
 
See above.  Also note that some of the IGF discussions have been 
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characterized by "IDNs as excuse", e.g., "we don't have good 
Internet penetration in our country despite significant 
investment because we don't have IDNs (or, more recently, 
top-level IDNs).  Note that both China and Brazil have made 
essentially that claim, despite China's simultaneous claim that 
they have more Internet users than anyone else and a huge number 
of domain registrations and Brazil's lack of interest in 
indigenous languages (Portuguese doesn't need IDNs much more 
than English does). 
 
> I understand that IDN second-level domains are currently 
> supported in 350 languages, out of something like 6000 
> currently recognised by UNESCO. This raises the question of 
> why these particular languages? I was wondering if this was 
> simply due to the difficulties involved in even getting a 
> language defined and drawing up relevant Unicode tables etc, 
> or whether commercial factors may have also played a part. 
 
Multiply those 350 (and I'm surprised the number is that high) 
by the number of primary-language speakers for each, add them 
up, and then compare the number you get to the world's literate 
population and you will have most of your answer.   If you use 
the population that is both literate and who, for economic or 
technological reasons, have reasonable odds of being able to be 
connected as the denominator, you will get an even more 
interesting number.   Contrary to some of the claims at IGF and 
elsewhere, having or not having IDNs doesn't connect people to 
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the Internet or make them able to deal with systems based on 
written text.   And, if they can connect but not read and write, 
the solutions they need don't have a lot to do with IDNs. 
 
> Obviously, since the registries are commercial companies, 
 
Some, perhaps many, of the ccTLD registries are not.  And some 
of the ccTLD registries have been slow about deploying IDNs at 
the second level to give them more leverage on getting TLDs. 
 
> it 
> would make sense to suggest that they would be most interested 
> in supporting the profitable languages, i.e. the ones that 
> would return a decent amount of registrations, but would be 
> less interested in supporting languages for which there is no 
> big market. I was wondering whether this might prove an 
> interesting 'test' of the ICANN system as to whether the 
> market ultimately decides, or whether smaller noncommercial 
> groups such as minority language communities will be able to 
> press their interests strongly enough within the ICANN system 
> to ensure that their needs are met also. 
 
If they need TLDs, the USD 185K (and rising) application fee 
will be more than enough to keep them out.  That topic has been 
discussed extensively in ICANN; you might learn a good deal 
about how the politics actually work by looking at the alignment 
of interests around either reduced fees for minority language 
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groups or national applications for them.    There will probably 
be IDN TLDs for "minority" languages in, e.g., India, but the 
only "minority" ones that are getting any attention are 
constitutionally mandated and hence really don't count that way. 
 
> With regards to the IDN Guidelines, I get the impression that 
> some of the registries, particularly Verisign, initially 
> resisted centralisation of IDN policy in a single set of 
> Guidelines. 
 
Yes.  More generally, Verisign's initial position was that they 
weren't required to do anything the protocol didn't specify, 
i.e., that ICANN could not impose registration or other rules. 
That really stopped only after it because clear that someone 
would hold   them responsible for registrations that went 
outside accepted best practices and encouraged phishing and 
other crimes... and that the enforcer would more likely be 
courts in the US than ICANN.  
 
> Is this just a symptom of a wider contest / power 
> struggle being played out, particularly in ICANN's early days, 
> between ICANN's efforts to establish its authority and 
> Verisign's determination to retain as much autonomy as 
> possible? 
 
In large part, probably yes. 
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> Also, I wondered to what extent the registries are 
> still interpreting the Guidelines differently, and whether 
> they are still doing independent policy setting beyond that 
> contained in the Guidelines. 
 
Long story.   You've also got to consider ICANN's track record 
for enforcing their Guidelines and other policies.  An 
interesting case to look at involves those gTLDs who can in with 
particular proposals and models on application, were awarded the 
TLDs on that basis, discovered that they couldn't meet financial 
target expectations, and came back to ICANN looking for 
permission for entirely different models --models that almost 
certainly would not have gotten them the domains if asked for 
initially-- and got that permission.   NAME and PRO are the two 
best examples, with TRAVEL probably not a lot behind. 
 
> Anyway, these are some of my initial thoughts, though no doubt 
> there will be many other questions as I get deeper into the 
> issue-area. Would be interested in any thoughts you have on 
> any of these points. 
> 
> I'll be away over the next few days and won't have Internet 
> access, but I should be back on Tuesday. 
 
I'm intermittent for the rest of the summer (gone the rest of 
today and tomorrow), at IETF most of the last two weeks of the 
month, in China late August), but will respond to whatever you 
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have as quickly as possible. 
 
best, 
   john 
  
*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  16 July 2009 19:49 
To:   
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
Hello John, 
Thanks, that’s very illuminating stuff. 
I’m currently assembling my data on IDNs into some sort of coherent writeup, so I expect 
further questions to arise as I go along. I realise you’re a busy man and I really appreciate 
your finding the time to help me out with this.  
Just a few quick thoughts for now: 
From what you’re saying, it sounds like the principle of representation within ICANN doesn’t 
apply particularly well in practice, at least not if we’re talking about broader representation 
than just industry insiders and governments. 
In terms of excluded groups, the biggest and most obvious ones that spring to mind are the 
ordinary users and domain name owners (though plainly these aren’t single homogenous 
groups with one common set of interests as far as I can see). I’m aware of the experiment 
with ‘At-Large’ elections for the ICANN Board back in the early days, and some of the 
reasons why it was deemed a failure. I get the impression that the elections were widely seen 
at the time as one of the main keys to legitimising ICANN by transforming the organisation 
into something akin to a global democracy (at least by some idealists).  After the failure of 
the elections, the ideal of making ICANN directly accountable to the global Internet-using 
public seems to have largely fallen by the wayside? I know the ALAC provides one channel 
for input, and that public comments are usually invited at numerous stages in any policy 
development process, but from what I’ve seen of the public comments boards, the only 
people who tend to comment are usually industry insiders. 
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I’m not saying that direct accountability to the global public is necessary feasible given the 
problems that have been experienced, but what I’m wondering is whether the failure of the 
direct democracy approach makes it more desirable for governments to have a greater role in 
ICANN’s governance, since governments can at least claim to represent their citizens 
indirectly. I’m wondering if that could be used as a justification for moving towards a more 
traditional intergovernmental approach, and whether ICANN could be evolving in that 
direction with the apparently growing role of the GAC – which would lend weight to a more 
realist theoretical interpretation. On the other hand, though, again I get the feeling that this 
could be issue specific, since you suggest that the GAC isn’t particularly interested in gTLD 
issues – so my initial feeling that ICANN is evolving towards an intergovernmentalist model 
could be far too simplistic / only true in certain issue areas?   
On a (sort of) related note, I was actually wondering just how representatives are chosen for 
the GNSO constituencies? If, for example, the business constituency is supposed to represent 
the interests of ‘business’ worldwide (obviously a pretty impossible task anyway), it would 
suggest there should be some mechanism for large and small corporate entities worldwide to 
have some voice in choosing their representatives. I suspect there is no such arrangement? 
In terms of the interplay between IDN issues and wider political forces (such as frustration 
with the US government), I can see me having something of a dilemma on how to handle this 
when I come to write up. On the one hand, to keep the PhD from becoming too broad and 
unfocused, I want to focus specifically on ICANN without getting too deeply involved in 
wider political issues, but I’m also coming to appreciate that ICANN politics can’t really be 
studied in isolation from the broader political arena. I’m not quite sure how I’ll handle that at 
this stage, but it’s clearly an important thing to keep in mind.    
Anyway, thanks again. 
Best regards, 
 
Paul 
 
*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
You replied on 26/08/2009 17:31. 
Sent:  17 July 2009 17:16 
To:   
P.A.White U9502832 
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--On Thursday, July 16, 2009 19:49 +0100 "P.A.White  U9502832" 
<H9502832@hud.ac.uk> wrote: 
 
> Hello John, 
> 
> Thanks, that's very illuminating stuff. 
 
> I'm currently assembling my data on IDNs into some sort of 
> coherent writeup, so I expect further questions to arise as I 
> go along. I realise you're a busy man and I really 
> appreciate your finding the time to help me out with this. 
> 
> Just a few quick thoughts for now: 
> 
> From what you're saying, it sounds like the principle of 
> representation within ICANN doesn't apply particularly well 
> in practice, at least not if we're talking about broader 
> representation than just industry insiders and governments. 
 
Opinions differ on this, but I don't think it is working. 
  
> In terms of excluded groups, the biggest and most obvious ones 
> that spring to mind are the ordinary users and domain name 
> owners (though plainly these aren't single homogenous groups 
> with one common set of interests as far as I can see). 
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Right.  And many of the domain name owners are represented via 
GNSO constituencies.  Of course, the largest population of 
domain name owners --by domain count on any given day-- are the 
spammers and phishers, but there is a case to be made that the 
registrars represent their interests rather effectively. 
 
> I'm 
> aware of the experiment with 'At-Large' elections for the 
> ICANN Board back in the early days, and some of the reasons 
> why it was deemed a failure. I get the impression that the 
> elections were widely seen at the time as one of the main keys 
> to legitimising ICANN by transforming the organisation into 
> something akin to a global democracy (at least by some 
> idealists). 
 
Some idealists and a bunch of folks who were happy to present 
themselves as representatives of the world's users, who were not 
consulted in the matter (in large measure because they have 
never heard of ICANN and wouldn't want to). 
 
>  After the failure of the elections, the ideal of 
> making ICANN directly accountable to the global Internet-using 
> public seems to have largely fallen by the wayside? I know the 
> ALAC provides one channel for input, and that public comments 
> are usually invited at numerous stages in any policy 
> development process, but from what I've seen of the public 
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> comments boards, the only people who tend to comment are 
> usually industry insiders. 
 
Yes.  And the ALAC is more of the above --some utopian idealists 
and a lot of folks who like the travel, fine lunches and 
dinners, academic reputations, attention, perceived power... or 
who just have too much time on their hands. 
 
> I'm not saying that direct accountability to the global 
> public is necessary feasible given the problems that have been 
> experienced, but what I'm wondering is whether the failure 
> of the direct democracy approach makes it more desirable for 
> governments to have a greater role in ICANN's governance, 
> since governments can at least claim to represent their 
> citizens indirectly. I'm wondering if that could be used as 
> a justification for moving towards a more traditional 
> intergovernmental approach, 
 
certainly that argument has been made.  
 
> and whether ICANN could be 
> evolving in that direction with the apparently growing role of 
> the GAC – which would lend weight to a more realist 
> theoretical interpretation. On the other hand, though, again I 
> get the feeling that this could be issue specific, since you 
> suggest that the GAC isn't particularly interested in gTLD 
> issues – so my initial feeling that ICANN is evolving 
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> towards an intergovernmentalist model could be far too 
> simplistic / only true in certain issue areas? 
 
Probably. 
 
> On a (sort of) related note, I was actually wondering just how 
> representatives are chosen for the GNSO constituencies? If, 
> for example, the business constituency is supposed to 
> represent the interests of 'business' worldwide (obviously 
> a pretty impossible task anyway), it would suggest there 
> should be some mechanism for large and small corporate 
> entities worldwide to have some voice in choosing their 
> representatives. I suspect there is no such arrangement? 
 
The GNSO Council representatives are chosen by the participants 
in the relevant constituency at ICANN.  The constituencies make 
their own rules for who can become a member and, of course, 
there is a meta-rule associated with having, and being willing 
to invest, the resources needed to participate by attending 
ICANN meetings, interim constituency meetings, and any other 
barriers the leaders and incumbent members of the constituency 
choose to set up.  
 
That has become the primary mechanism for capture: some group of 
people who are typically _very_ homogeneous define themselves as 
a constituency and write a charter for it that, in one way or 
another, includes their friends and supporters and excludes 
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everyone else.  They then give the constituency a sufficiently 
broad name and sweeping definition of who they are representing 
to prevent people from the same general community who disagree 
with them (or constitute a different point of view) from either 
having a significant voice in "their" constituency or forming a 
separate one.   So we have something called a "Business 
Constituency" that is really the "Joe Bloggs and Friends" 
constituency but that, since it succeeded in being called the 
"Business Constituency", manages to exclude most of those "large 
and small corporate entities worldwide" from participation or at 
least from an effective vote and voice in policy development and 
GNSO Council representation. 
 
That strategy is pervasive -- the so-called Non-commercial 
Domain Names constituency is arguably even more guilty of it 
than the Business one. 
 
It may also be instructive for you to look at the new 
constituency proposals.  Most of them are from narrow lobbying 
groups for specific interests -- City TLDs, non-ASCII TLDs, etc. 
 
> In terms of the interplay between IDN issues and wider 
> political forces (such as frustration with the US government), 
> I can see me having something of a dilemma on how to handle 
> this when I come to write up. On the one hand, to keep the PhD 
> from becoming too broad and unfocused, I want to focus 
> specifically on ICANN without getting too deeply involved in 
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> wider political issues, but I'm also coming to appreciate 
> that ICANN politics can't really be studied in isolation 
> from the broader political arena. 
 
That is correct.  I hope things will get better over time, but 
the distinction was particularly difficult under the former US 
administration where "bash ICANN" was a useful, and very safe, 
surrogate for "bash the US Govt". 
 
> I'm not quite sure how 
> I'll handle that at this stage, but it's clearly an 
> important thing to keep in mind. 
 
Yes. 
  
best, 
   john 
 
*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  26 August 2009 17:27 
To:   
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
Hello John,  
Hope you are well. Sorry I haven’t been in touch for a while, had an unplanned last-minute 
holiday over the last couple of weeks. Are you still over in China? 
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I’ve put together a rough draft of my IDNs chapter and wanted to run past you a very brief 
summary / outline of the  major points of the story as I understand them (I’m aware this is a 
massive simplification): 
•       Initially, ICANN seems to have been quite slow to take any action on IDNs. The early 
development work and initial testbeds were set up by ccTLD registries and Verisign, with 
little official input from ICANN. (Maybe that says something about the weakness of the 
ICANN system, at least in the early days).  However, these early multilingual testbeds proved 
the technical feasibility of IDNs and put the issue on the agenda. The Verisign testbed and the 
controversy it generated seems to have been the spark that motivated ICANN to begin study 
of the issue, principally by the IDN WG and later the IDN Committee. However, there was 
still no concrete policymaking at this stage. 
 
•       The publication of the IETF’s IDNA standard in 2003 put pressure on ICANN to begin 
implementing IDNs, and this was the catalyst for the creation of the IDN Guidelines version 
1.0. The initial Guidelines were created by the IDN Committee, which on the surface 
appeared to be a multistakeholder body, but in reality the registries were mostly responsible 
for producing the Guidelines. The creation of the Guidelines allowed the implementation of 
second-level IDNs for those registries that wished to apply to operate them. The Guidelines 
themselves were fairly minimalist in nature, stating that registries must: comply with RFCs 
3490, 3491, and 3492; identify permissible Unicode code points and block non-compliant 
registrations; associate registration with one or more languages and employ language-specific 
registration rules (e.g., reservation of domain names associated with character variants); and 
provide informational resources and services in all languages for which they offer IDN 
registrations. Later revisions to the Guidelines restricted the mixing of visually confusable 
characters from different scripts in a single set of code points, due to concerns over spoofing. 
 
•       There was initial resistance from Verisign to adoption of the Guidelines. Verisign 
argued that ICANN had no authority to add additional rules and restrictions beyond those 
specified in the relevant RFCs. Verisign eventually conceded, but received (what could be 
interpreted as) concessions, particularly the transfer of their ‘testbed’ registrations to the 
permanent IDN environment. Although all the registries have adopted the Guidelines, both 
gTLD and (especially) ccTLD registries have continued to emphasise their links with local 
language groups and sought maximum freedom of action. In many ways ICANN’s role has 
been more that of a co-ordinator allowing the registries to agree a minimum set of rules 
among themselves.  
 
•       Revision of the Guidelines (versions 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2) was carried out solely by the 
registries. At this stage ccTLD and gTLD registries worked collaboratively, although there 
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were some rumblings from some of the ccTLD registries that they should not be bound by the 
same rules as the gTLD registries. 
 
•       The issue of IDN TLDs came to the fore from around 2005 onwards and ultimately 
resulted in a split between the gTLD and ccTLD IDN tracks with the emergence of the ‘Fast 
Track’ for IDN ccTLDs. IDN gTLDs became part of the New gTLDs programme. The Fast 
Track was the result of an alliance between the CCNSO and GAC and was prompted by the 
likelihood of the whole process otherwise becoming indefinitely stalled due to almost 
insurmountable problems with some languages (sometimes technical or linguistic, but often 
political). Creation of language tables is a highly complex matter and requires intimate 
knowledge of a particular language. Particular difficulties are likely to arise when there is no 
agreement on how to define a language (especially for cross-border languages) and no clear 
or uncontested orthographic authority to produce a definitive codification for that language. 
 
•       Some commentators have asserted that the pressure for Fast Track came largely from 
language communities at the local level, and that the ccNSO and GAC were acting simply as 
conduits for advancing those interests within ICANN in a ‘bottom-up’ model.  However, this 
view ignores other likely motives.  For the cc registries, there was the prospect of acquiring 
additional TLDs, and for many, commercial gain. For the states represented on the GAC, 
despite their claims to merely be representing the claims of local language communities, 
IDNs were often a pawn in a wider political game, particularly in the context of perceived US 
hegemony over the Internet. 
 
•       The IDNs case study has revealed a quite different pattern to the policy development 
process compared with new gTLDs. This is partly the result of the fact that gTLDs, unlike 
IDNs, can be added easily using known technology, and therefore ICANN has had only 
public policy issues, not technical ones, to deal with when considering TLD expansion. By 
contrast, IDN implementation has been uncharted territory, both in terms of technology and 
public policy. ICANN has found itself heavily reliant on other organisations in developing 
IDN technology. It has relied on the IETF for a standard, ISO and the Unicode Consortium 
for character tables, and software developers such as Microsoft and the Mozilla Foundation to 
provide IDNA compatible applications. Nonetheless, as with gTLDs, it has been the public 
policy issues, not the technical ones, that have seemed the most difficult to solve. 
 
•       The study has shown that IDNs, like gTLDs, are very much a public policy issue, in 
spite of ICANN’s claim to co-ordinate technical issues only. Overall, the appearance of a 
multistakeholder approach to IDNs is an illusion. While a wide variety of groups have had 
the opportunity to have a voice through IDN workshops, public comments etc, the actual 
policymaking has really been the preserve of the registries. The main forces shaping IDNs 
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policy have been commercial (particularly the gTLD and some ccTLD registries) and 
political (the GAC and some of the ccTLD registries). ‘Political’ factors have been more 
evident here than some other policy development areas (such as new gTLDs). The GAC’s 
influence in IDNs, particularly with regard to the ccTLD Fast track, both gives an indication 
of their real priorities and shows that they are a major force in ICANN on the issues they 
choose to be involved in. The case study produces clues that, as far as governments are 
concerned, ICANN politics cannot be regarded as isolated from the wider global political 
arena. 
As I say, I know this is a huge simplification, but is there anything I’ve fundamentally 
misunderstood here? 
There are various other pieces of the puzzle I’m still trying to understand and interpret. 
With regard to intellectual property issues, I note that, at several workshops and public 
comments periods, representatives of intellectual property interests have proposed measures 
such as sunrise periods or modification of the UDRP to give additional IP protection for 
IDNs. Since these were not implemented, it seems like this could be interpreted as a defeat 
for the intellectual property lobby, and an indication that they failed to significantly influence 
the IDN process? I also get the impression that the UDRP is widely regarded within ICANN 
as a complete solution to the intellectual property issue and that further ‘concessions’ to the 
IP lobby are seen as unnecessary. I want to explore this further in my next chapter, which will 
be specifically on the UDRP. 
 
Turning to issues surrounding the creation of language tables, I’m struggling to get to grips 
with the detailed politics and complexities of all this, and how the issue is being tackled on 
the ground. Are the registries effectively being left to their own devices to create their own 
language tables, in co-ordination with whatever groups they see fit? I also came across 
RFC4690, (September 2006), which I understand was a framework for the discussions 
leading to revision of Unicode to version 5.0. I interpreted this RFC as mandating that 
decisions on acceptable code points would in future be made by the IETF and therefore 
effectively be taken out of the hands of ICANN and the registries. However, this doesn’t 
seem to be the case? 
 
I’m also unsure as to the extent to which Fast Track represents a split between gTLD and 
ccTLD IDN policy. Are there likely to be two sets of Guidelines? Also, is it the case that only 
the existing ccTLD registries will get the opportunity to apply for an IDN ccTLD?  If so, that 
seems to have implications for competition, given that IDN gTLDs look as though they could 
be delayed. Also, I’m wondering if there is any potential for governments to object to IDN 
gTLDs in ‘their’ languages being allocated to foreign companies, or are they less worried 
about this provided they have ‘sovereignty’ over their ccTLDs?  
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Looking at IDNs has also prompted some broader questions about ICANN’s authority and 
‘confidence’ in itself as an institution, and the extent to which it is propped up by the US. 
You mentioned that Verisign’s decision to comply with the IDN Guidelines was likely more 
due to fear of the US courts than fear of ICANN. This suggests that ICANN’s own authority 
was relatively weak and propped up by the US legal system rather than standing on its own. 
Has respect for ICANN’s authority grown since that time among the registries? (I realise that 
this is a somewhat subjective question). I know that certain registrars have had their ICANN 
accreditation revoked, but I’m unsure whether ICANN can (or would be willing to) use 
similar sanctions against registries?  
 
I’m aware of course that the issue of ICANN’s relationship with the US is about to come to 
the fore again with the JPA renewal due next month. I’m intrigued to see how this will turn 
out. I’ve come across articles that suggest the Obama administration might be looking to ‘re-
nationalise’ the DNS (and that there is also pressure from a strong lobby within Congress to 
do this), while the EU wants to take things the opposite way – I note that the European 
Commission issued a statement in May advocating full ICANN privatisation under the 
oversight of a G12 style council of states. I’m also wondering how ICANN itself would react 
to any ‘re-nationalisation’ attempt and whether we could end up seeing a standoff of some 
kind between ICANN and the US government. It will be fascinating to see how this is going 
to develop and of course it could have major implications for my work….. 
 
Anyway, would be interested to hear your thoughts when you get a chance – I know you’re a 
busy man. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Paul  
 
***************************************************************************
  
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
You replied on 08/09/2009 19:33. 
Sent:  26 August 2009 21:05 
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To:   
P.A.White U9502832 
Hi.  Yes, I'm still in China --leaving later today (Beijing 
"today").   I'll try to get back to you on this as soon as I get 
back but, if you don't hear from me by early next week, please 
remind me. 
 
   John 
 
*************************************************************************** 
RE: PhD research on IDNs 
P.A.White U9502832 
Sent:  08 September 2009 19:31 
To:   
John C Klensin [klensin@jck.com] 
Hi John, 
 
Hope you are well. Just wondered if you'd yet had a chance to look at the stuff I sent you the 
other week - you asked me to remind you if I didn't hear from you. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Paul 
________________________________________ 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
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Appendix 4.1 The .xxx affair - summary  
The 2003 gTLD application round saw the beginning of the long-running saga surrounding the 
proposed .xxx domain. A .xxx TLD for ‘adult’ material had initially been proposed during the first 
new TLDs round in 2000 by ICM Registry Inc. The proposal had generated some controversy on that 
occasion, gaining support from some major online safety groups such as the Internet Content Rating 
Association1 Wired Safety2 and Wired Kids3  on the grounds that it would make it easier for 
authorities and parents to police the Internet, by placing adult content under a single TLD.  However, 
critics argued that it would legitimise pornography and make it even easier to find. The proposal was 
also opposed by some operators of pornographic Web sites, who felt that the domain would segregate 
adult content and lead to governmental regulation. If the use of .xxx names for porn was made 
mandatory, there would be a likelihood of legal conflicts, for example over the definition of ‘sexually 
explicit’ and jurisdiction. 4   
In the event, the .xxx proposal was not accepted as one of the seven new TLDs approved in 2000. 
With the announcement of a second round of new TLDs in October 2003, ICM Registry renewed its 
application to operate .xxx. After protracted deliberations, the Board accepted the application in 
principle on 1 June 2005, authorising the President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations 
relating to proposed commercial and technical terms.5  
The Board’s provisional approval of a .xxx TLD also brought governments into the debate, 
most significantly the US Department of Commerce.  In August 2005, Michael Gallagher, 
Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary for Communications & Information, wrote to 
ICANN President Vint Cerf, urging ICANN to delay final approval of the contract with ICM 
to allow for an extensive global consultation. Gallagher stated that the DoC had received 
6,000 complaints over the proposed .xxx TLD.6 
The matter was taken up by the GAC in its March 2006 meeting. The subsequent GAC 
Communiqué stated that the ICM application was flawed, and also that several member 
governments were ‘emphatically opposed’ to a .xxx domain on public policy grounds.7 
Though the GAC did not disclose which of its members took this line, reported comments by 
ICANN CEO Paul Twomey suggest they included the US, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Brazil 
                                                          
1 Attwell, M (2005). ‘Support for .xxx’. Email from Meredith Attwell (NTIA),  to Cathy Handley; Robin 
Layton; Suzanne Sene. 16 June 2005. Released under FOIA. Retrieved 10 September 2005, from 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/xxx-foiapage.pdf. p7  
2 Wired Safety (2000), . ‘xxx White Paper.’ Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.wiredsafety.org/resources/documents/xxx_whitepaper.doc P29 
3 Attwell, M (2005). ‘Support for .xxx’. Email from Meredith Attwell (NTIA),  to Cathy Handley; Robin 
Layton; Suzanne Sene. 16 June 2005. Released under FOIA. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/xxx-foiapage.pdf.  p7   
4 For examples of the debates, see comments posted at ICANN Public Comments Forums on .xxx and on the 
,xxx-icm-agreement. Available at http://forum.icann.org/lists/xxx-comments/mail34.html and 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/xxx-icm-agreement/ Accessed 10 September 2010.   
5  ICANN (2005). Minutes of Special Meeting of the Board. 1 June 2005. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-01jun05.htm 
6 Gallagher, M.D. (2005). Letter from Michael D. Gallagher, Assistant Secretary for Communications and 
Information, US Department of Commerce, to Vint Cerf, Chair of ICANN Board, 15 August 2005. Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from http://www.icann.org/correspondence/gallagher-to-cerf-15aug05.pdf  
7 ICANN (2006) GAC Communiqué XXVIII - Wellington, New Zealand, 28 March 2006. Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/communique-28mar06.pdf  
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and Australia.8 Besides the correspondence already noted from the US Department of 
Commerce, it is a matter of record that the governments of Sweden9 and Australia10 later 
went on to state their opposition to .xxx in formal correspondence with ICANN. The UK 
government also addressed formal correspondence to ICANN on the matter, in which it did 
not express outright opposition, and recognised ICANN’s authority to authorise such a 
domain, but urged careful safeguards and compliance monitoring in the agreement with 
ICM.11 
The .xxx proposal also generated an unprecedented amount of public comment, with over 
1300 separate comments received in the public comment forums, including 946 comments 
against the establishment of .xxx.12 These fell into two categories: comments that considered 
the domain would see an increase in adult content on the Internet, and those contending that 
there was little support for the creation of the domain amongst the sponsoring community. 
However, there were also comments in favour. 13 In addition, some 200,000 emails had been 
received by ICANN regarding the matter. 14   
On May 10 2006, the Board voted 9 to 5 to reject ICM’s proposed version of the .xxx 
Registry Agreement.15 On March 30, 2007, a revised application was rejected by the Board 
by nine votes to five with one abstention. The resolution stated that ICM's application and the 
revised agreement had failed to meet, among other things, the sponsored community criteria 
of the RFP specification. However, it also stated that approval of the ICM application was not 
appropriate in the light of the GAC’s public policy concerns.16  
Following the vote, ICM Registry, among other commentators, claimed that the real cause for the 
                                                          
8 Waters, R. (2006). 'Dispute over porn domain name veto'. Financial Times, May 12, 2006. Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/91eab4dc-e13e-11da-90ad-0000779e2340.html  
9 Bjelfvenstam, J (2005). Letter from Jonas Bjelfvenstam, Swedish State Secretary for Communications and 
Regional Policy, to Paul Twomey, ICANN CEO, 23 November 2005. Retrieved 11 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/bjelfvenstam-to-twomey-23nov05.htm  
10 Coonan, H. (2007). Letter from Helen Coonan, Australian Minister for Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts, to Vint Cerf, Chair of ICANN Board, 28 February 2007. Retrieved 10 September 
2010, from http://www.icann.org/correspondence/coonan-to-cerf-28feb2007.pdf      
11 Boyle, M (2006). Letter from Martin Boyle, UK Representative to GAC, to Vint Cerf, Chair of ICANN 
Board, 9 May 2006. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from http://www.icann.org/correspondence/boyle-to-cerf-
09may06.htm  
12 ICANN (2007). Quoted by John Jeffrey and Kurt Pritz at meeting of the ICANN Board. Minutes of special 
meeting of the Board, 13th March 2007.  Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-13mar07.htm  
13 Ibid 
14 ICANN (2007). Quoted by John Jeffrey at meeting of the ICANN Board, 13th March 2007. Minutes of special 
meeting of the Board, 13th March 2007.  Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-13mar07.htm  
15 ICANN (2006) Minutes of special meeting of the Board. 10 May 2006.  
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-10may06.htm  
16
 ICANN (2007). Transcript of special meeting of the Board. 30 March 2007. 
http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/lisbon/transcript-board-30mar07.htm   
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decision’s reversal was political pressure from the US Government.17 There is some evidence to 
support this charge. ICANN Board member Susan Crawford, who voted in favour of .xxx, suggested 
both in her blog18 and in her statement at the Board meeting19 that ICANN had in fact given in to 
governmental pressure. Other Board members, however, resisted the suggestion that their decision 
was swayed by governmental pressure, including Raimundo Beca, Vanda Scartezini, Demi Getshko 
and Alejandro Pisanty.20 A spokesman for European Commissioner Viviane Reding also accused the 
US government of interfering in the matter21 22; however ICANN CEO Paul Twomey rejected this 
accusation as completely ill-founded.23 
ICM subsequently made public emails (obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request) 
between members of the Department of Commerce, various other branches of the federal government 
and ICANN. ICM claimed these emails showed that the DoC was subjected in mid-2005 to intense 
pressure to intervene on behalf of lobbying organisations, including the Family Research Council and 
Focus on the Family. These included letters and emails to ICANN protesting the .xxx domain, 
followed by meetings between ICANN and concerned groups.24 ICM argued that these documents 
show how the DoC’s position was altered by the lobbying pressures it found itself under, and that the 
DoC’s opposition, communicated to ICANN both informally and through formal letters, influenced 
the Board’s decision to reverse its approval for .xxx.25 
The Board’s decision to reverse its previous approval for .xxx thus raised questions over the extent to 
which the US government continued to exert influence over ICANN policy from behind the scenes; 
though the objections raised by the GAC and in public comment mean that the US government was 
far from the only actor applying pressure on ICANN over the issue. Whether or not the DoC’s 
intervention influenced the outcome, it seems clear from discussion at the Board meeting and the 
resultant Board resolution, that pressure from the GAC played a key part in deciding the matter. The 
                                                          
17
 Geist, M (2006). ‘The rights and wrongs of .xxx’. BBC News, 22 May 2006. Retrieved 11 September 2010, 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/5003920.stm   
18
 Crawford, S (2006). ‘Why I voted for .xxx’. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/why_i_voted_for_xxx/  
19
 ICANN (2007). Transcript of regular meeting of the Board. 30 March 2007. Retrieved 10 September 2010, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/lisbon/transcript-board-30mar07.htm  
20
 Ibid 
21 Waters, R. (2006).  'Dispute over porn domain name veto', Financial Times, May 12, 2006.  Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/91eab4dc-e13e-11da-90ad-0000779e2340.html  
22 ' Geist, M (2006). ‘The rights and wrongs of .xxx’. BBC News, 22 May 2006. Retrieved 11 September 2010, 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/5003920.stm 
23 Waters, R. (2006).  'Dispute over porn domain name veto', Financial Times, May 12, 2006.  Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/91eab4dc-e13e-11da-90ad-0000779e2340.html 
24 Documents released by ICM Registry pertaining to .xxx TLD application, obtained from US Department of 
Commerce under Freedom of Information Act, May 19, 2006. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/xxx-foiapage.pdf  
25 Lawley, S. (2009).  Witness Statement of Stuart Lawley.In the matter of an independent review process before 
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution. ICM Registry, LLC, v Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers. 14th June 2009. ICDR Case no. 50 117 T 00224 08. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icmregistry.com/irp/StuartLawley.pdf P37 
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specific opposition of the Brazilian, Australian and US governments was also discussed at the 
meeting.26   
However, this was far from being the end of the matter. Following the decision, ICM exercised its 
right under Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws27 to request arbitration of the decision by an 
Independent Review Process. The International Center for Dispute Resolution acted as arbiter, with 
the case being considered by a panel consisting of three retired judges. The panel delivered its verdict 
in February 2010, ruling in favour of ICM, on the grounds that application for the .xxx sTLD met the 
required sponsorship criteria, and that the Board’s reconsideration of that finding was ‘not consistent 
with the application of neutral, objective and fair documented policy’.28 
In June 2010, the Board passed a resolution accepting the review panel’s verdict and 
directing ICANN staff to proceed into draft contract negotiations with ICM for a revised .xxx 
Registry Agreement.29 On 5 August 2010, the Board directed staff, upon receipt of ICM’s 
application documentation, to post ICM’s supporting documents and proposed registry 
agreement for public comment.30 Once again, the public comments period generated 
significant controversy, with both opposition and support being expressed.31 Again, critics 
included those opposed to pornography on moral and religious grounds, as well as some adult 
webmasters who feared that the .xxx domain might be made mandatory for their sites.  
On 16 March 2011, the GAC forwarded a letter of the Board stating that there was no active GAC 
support for the ICM application and that some GAC members opposed it on public policy grounds.32 
It also stated that there had been no clarification regarding the GAC’s concerns as to whether the 
application met sponsorship criteria; and expressed concern that ICANN could be moving into a 
content regulation role. 33 On 17 March, the Board and the GAC completed a formal Bylaws 
consultation on the matter; the details of this meeting are not on public record.   
 
                                                          
26 ICANN (2007). Transcript of regular meeting of the Board. 30 March 2007. Retrieved 10 September 2010, 
from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/lisbon/transcript-board-30mar07.htm  
27 Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, as amended 20 March 2009. Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-20mar09.htm  
28 IDCR (2010). Panel Declaration, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08. In the Matter of an Independent Review 
Process: ICM REGISTRY, LLC, Claimant, v. INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND 
NUMBERS (“ICANN”). 19 February 2010. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/irp/icm-v-icann/irp-panel-declaration-19feb10-en.pdf  
29 ICANN  (2010). Adopted Board Resolutions. 25 June 2010. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-25jun10-en.htm#5  
30 ICANN (2010) Adopted Board Resolutions, 5 August 2010. Retrieved 10 September 2010, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-05aug10-en.htm#9.  
31 For examples, see ICANN Public Comments Forum on ..xxx –Revised ICM Agreement. Retrieved 10 
September 2010, from http://forum.icann.org/lists/xxx-revised-icm-agreement/     
32Dryden, H (2011). Letter from Heather Dryden, Chair, GAC, to Peter Dengate Thrush, Chair, ICANN Board 
of Directors. 16 March 2011. Retrieved August 5 2011, from   
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540116/20110316+GAC+Advice+on+.xxx.pdf?version=2&m
odificationDate=1312469527000  
33Ibid 
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On March 18, 2011, ICANN's board approved the execution of the registry agreement with ICM for 
the .xxx sponsored top level domain. The resolution was passed by nine votes to four, with three 
abstentions.34 As the Board and GAC had not reached agreement on all aspects of the application, the 
Board also set forth a Rationale providing reasons why the GAC advice was not followed, pursuant to 
ICANN Bylaws, Article XI, Section 2.k. 35 
Overall, the .xxx affair has, in its own right, proved an interesting case study of various aspects of the 
ICANN regime. It has raised questions over the extent of US governmental influence in ICANN 
policymaking; it has seen the appeals process invoked under Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN 
Bylaws; and it has ultimately resulted in one of the rare occasions where the Board has been prepared 
to reject GAC advice.  
                                                          
34 ICANN (2011). Minutes of Regular Meeting of the Board. 18 March 2011. Retrieved August 5 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-18mar11-en.htm  
35 Ibid  
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Appendix 4.2: GNSO New gTLDs Committee – Membership 
(Source: P9, GNSO new TLDs Committee Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains Part B: 
Final Report. 18 June 2007. Retrieved 5 September 2010, from http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/pdp-
dec05-fr-b-18jun07.pdf)  
Commercial and Business Users’ Constituency  
Marilyn Cade 
Philip Sheppard 
Alistair Dixon 
Grant Forsyth 
 
ISPs Constituency 
Tony Holmes 
 Tony Harris 
Greg Ruth 
Mark McFadden 
 
Intellectual Property Constituency 
Lucy Nichols 
Ute Decker 
Kiyoshi Tsuru 
Steve Metalitz 
Maggie Mansourkia 
 
Non-Commercial Users Constituency 
Robin Gross 
Mawaki Chango 
Norbert Klein 
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Registrars Constituency  
Bruce Tonkin (Chair) 
Ross Rader 
Tom Keller 
 
Registries Constituency  
 Cary Karp 
 Ken Stubbs 
 June Seo 
 
Nominating Committee 
 Avri Doria 
 Sophia Bekele 
 Maureen Cubberley 
 
ALAC 
Bret Fausett 
 
GAC 
Suzanne Sene 
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Appendix 4.3: GAC Principles regarding New gTLDs. March 28, 2007 
 
(Source:  Retrieved 26 September 2011, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540128/gTLD_principles_0.pdf?version=1
&modificationDate=1312358178000)   
 
 
GAC PRINCIPLES REGARDING NEW gTLDs 
Presented by the Govemmental Advisory Committee 
March 28, 2007 
1. Preamble 
1.1 The purpose of this document is to identify a set of general public policy principles related to the 
introduction, delegation and operation of new generic top level domains (gTLDs). They are intended 
to inform the ICANN Board of the views of the GAC regarding public policy issues concerning new 
gTLDs and to respond to the provisions of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
process, in particular "the need for farther development of and strengthened cooperation among, 
stakeholders for public policies for generic top-level domains (gTLDs) " and those related to the 
management of Internet resources and enunciated in the Geneva and Tunis phases of the WSIS. 
 
1.2 These principles shall not prejudice the application of the principle of national sovereignty. The 
GAC has previously adopted the general principle that the Intemet naming system is a public resource 
in the sense that its functions must be administered in the public or common interest. The WSIS 
Declaration of December 2003 also states that ‘policy authority for Internet—related public policy 
issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-
related public policy issues.” 
 
1.3 A gTLD is a top level domain which is not based on the ISO 3166 two—letter country code list. 
For the purposes and scope of this document, new gTLDs are defined as any gTLDs added to the Top 
Level Domain name space after the date of the adoption of these principles by the GAC.  
 
1.4 In setting out the following principles, the GAC recalls lCANN’s stated core values as set out in 
its by-laws: 
 
 a. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global 
interoperability of the Internet. 
 
 b. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the 
Internet by limiting ICANN Cs activities to those matters within ICANN s mission requiring 
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or significantly benefiting from global coordination. 
 
c. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing 
the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties. 
 
d. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, 
and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision—
making. 
 
e. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a 
competitive environment. 
 
f Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where 
practicable and beneficial in the public interest. 
 
g. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that i) promote well-
informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected 
can assist in the policy development process. 
 
h. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity 
and fairness. 
 
i. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the 
decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected. 
 
j. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance 
ICANN ’s effectiveness. 
 
k. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public 
authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or 
public authorities’ recommendations. 
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2. Public Policy Aspects related to new gTLDs 
 
When considering the introduction, delegation and operation of new gTLDs, the following public 
policy principles need to be respected: 
 
Introduction of new gTLDs 
 
2.1 New gTLDs should respect: 
 
a) The provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsil which seek to affirm 'fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women". 
 
b) The sensitivities regarding terms with national, cultural, geographic and religious significance. 
 
2.2 ICANN should avoid country, territory or place names, and country, territory or regional language 
or people descriptions, unless in agreement with the relevant governments or public authorities. 
 
2.3 The process for introducing new gTLDs must make proper allowance for prior third party rights, 
in particular trademark rights as well as rights in the names and acronyms of inter—governmental 
organizations (IGOs). 
 
2.4 In the interests of consumer confidence and security, new gTLDs should not be confusingly 
similar to existing TLDs. To avoid confusion with country-code Top Level Domains no two letter 
gTLDs should be introduced. 
 
Delegation of new gTLDs 
 
2.5 The evaluation and selection procedure for new gTLD registries should respect the principles of 
fairness, transparency and non—discrimination. All applicants for a new gTLD registry should 
therefore be evaluated against transparent and predictable criteria, fully available to the applicants 
prior to the initiation of the process. Normally, therefore, no subsequent additional selection criteria 
should be used in the selection process. 
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2.6 It is important that the selection process for new gTLDs ensures the security, reliability, global 
interoperability and stability of the Domain Name System (DNS) and promotes competition, 
consumer choice, geographical and service-provider diversity. 
 
2.7 Applicant registries for new gTLDs should pledge to: 
 
a) Adopt, before the new gTLD is introduced, appropriate procedures for blocking, at no cost and 
upon demand of governments, public authorities or IGOs, names with national or geographic 
significance at the second level of any new gTLD. 
 
b) Ensure procedures to allow governments, public authorities or IGOs to challenge abuses of names 
with national or geographic significance at the second level of any new gTLD. 
 
2.8 Applicants should publicly document any support they claim to enjoy from specific communities. 
 
2.9 Applicants should identify how they will limit the need for defensive registrations and minimise 
cyber—squatting that can result from bad—faith registrations and other abuses of the registration 
system 
 
Operation of new gTLDs 
 
2.10 A new gTLD operator/registry should undertake to implement practices that ensure an 
appropriate level of security and stability both for the TLD itself and for the DNS as a whole, 
including the development of best practices to ensure the accuracy, integrity and validity of registry 
information. 
 
2.11 ICANN and a new gTLD operator/registry should establish clear continuity plans for 
maintaining the resolution of names in the DNS in the event of registry failure. These plans should be 
established in coordination with any contingency measures adopted for ICANN as a whole. 
 
2.12 ICANN should continue to ensure that registrants and registrars in new gTLDs have access to an 
independent appeals process in relation to registry decisions related to pricing changes, renewal 
procedures, service levels, or the unilateral and significant change of contract conditions. 
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2.13 ICANN should ensure that any material changes to the new gTLD operations, policies or 
contract obligations be made in an open and transparent manner allowing for adequate public 
comment. 
 
2.14 The GAC WHOIS principles are relevant to new gTLDs. 
 
3. Implementation of these Public Policy Principles 
 
3.1 The GAC recalls Article XI, section 2, no. 1 h) of the ICANN Bylaws, which state that the 
ICANN Board shall notify the Chair ofthe Governmental Advisory Committee in a timely manner of 
any proposal raising public policy issues. Insofar, therefore, as these principles provide guidance on 
GAC views on the implementation of new gTLDs, they are not intended to substitute for the normal 
requirement for the ICANN Board to notify the GAC of any proposals for new gTLDs which raise 
public policy issues. 
 
3.2 ICANN should consult the GAC, as appropriate, regarding any questions pertaining to the 
interpretation of these principles.  
 
3.3 If individual GAC members or other governments express formal concerns about 
any issues related to new gTLDs, the ICANN Board should fully consider those concerns and clearly 
explain how it will address them. 
 
3.4 The evaluation procedures and criteria for introduction, delegation and operation of new TLDs 
should be developed and implemented with the participation of all stakeholders. 
 
NB. The public policy priorities for GAC members in relation to the introduction of Internationalised 
Domain Name TLDs (IDN TLDs} will be addressed separately by the GAC. 
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Appendix 4.4 Draft Application process for New gTLDs (as set out in Draft Applicant 
Guidebook version 1)  
 
(Source: ICANN (2008). PP 1.1-1.23, New gTLD Program. Draft Applicant Guidebook (Draft RFP). 
24tth October 2008. Retrieved 25 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-
gtlds/draft-rfp-24oct08-en.pdf)   
Applications will be submitted in rounds or application submission periods. Applications are to be 
submitted electronically through ICANN’s online application system. An evaluation fee of $185,000 
is payable on submission.  
Once submitted to ICANN, the application will undergo several stages in processing: 
 
 
The administrative completeness check is intended to ensure all required information and 
documentation have been submitted as well as fees paid. This will be followed by an initial 
evaluation, including string reviews (concerning the applied-for gTLD string); and applicant reviews 
(concerning the entity applying for the gTLD and its proposed registry services). Panels of 
‘independent evaluators’ will perform these reviews (no information given on how these panellists 
will be selected). The string review will check the applied-for TLD name (string) to ascertain whether 
the applied-for gTLD string is similar to others and would cause user confusion; whether the applied-
for gTLD string might disrupt DNS security or stability; and whether requisite government approval 
is given in the case of certain geographical names. The applicant review focuses on whether the 
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applicant has the requisite technical and financial capability; and whether the registry services offered 
by the applicant might adversely affect DNS security or stability. 
Formal objections to applications can be filed on any of four enumerated grounds by parties with 
standing to object. The objection filing period will open after ICANN posts the list of complete 
applications. Objectors will file directly with dispute resolution service providers (DRSPs). The 
objection filing phase will close following the end of the Initial Evaluation period. Objections that 
have been filed during the objection filing phase will be addressed in the dispute resolution phase. 
Applicants failing certain elements of the Initial Evaluation can request an Extended Evaluation. If the 
applicant does not expressly request an Extended Evaluation, the application will proceed no further. 
The Extended Evaluation period allows for one additional round of questions and answers between 
the applicant and evaluators to clarify information contained in the application. 
Dispute resolution applies only to applicants that are the subject of a formal objection. Dispute 
resolution service providers (DSRPs) provide the fora to adjudicate the proceedings based on the 
subject matter and the needed expertise. As a result of the proceeding, either the applicant will prevail 
(in which case the application can proceed to the next stage), or the objector will prevail (in which 
case either the application will proceed no further or the application will be bound to a contention 
resolution procedure). A fee will be levied to file a dispute resolution proceeding, estimated to be 
between $1000 - $5000 per party per proceeding. A further fee will be payable to the applicable 
dispute resolution service provider in accordance with that provider’s procedures and schedule of 
costs. ICANN estimates that the total cost of a proceeding may be anything up to $122,000.  
String contention applies only when there is more than one qualified applicant for the same or similar 
gTLD strings. String contention refers to the scenario in which there is more than one qualified 
applicant for the same gTLD or for gTLDs that are deemed to be so similar that they create a 
probability of detrimental user confusion if more than one is delegated. ICANN will resolve cases of 
string contention either through comparative evaluation or through an ‘alternative mechanism for 
efficient resolution of string contention’ (not specified). Applicants prevailing in a string contention 
resolution procedure will proceed toward delegation of applied-for gTLD strings. A fee (amount 
unspecified) is payable to the provider appointed to handle comparative evaluations, in the event that 
the applicant participates in a comparative evaluation. 
Applicants that successfully complete all relevant stages are required to carry out a series of 
concluding steps before delegation of the applied-for gTLD string into the root zone. These steps 
include execution of a registry agreement with ICANN and completion of a pre-delegation technical 
test to validate information provided in the application. Following execution of a registry agreement, 
the prospective registry operator must complete technical setup and satisfactory performance on 
technical checks before delegation of the gTLD into the root zone. An annual renewal fee will be 
levied on each new registry.  
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Appendix 4.5: Summary of initial GNSO Constituency statements on New gTLDs.  
 
(For original documents, see ‘Input received on the policy development process on new 
gTLDs’, available at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/new-gtld-pdp-input.htm. 
Accessed 12 July 2011.)   
 
Term of Reference 1: Whether to introduce new TLDs 
None of the constituencies opposed outright the principle of adding further gTLDs to the 
root. However, the BC36 and IPC37 stated a preference that new gTLDs be limited to 
sponsored and IDN TLDs, while the ISPCP also stated that any new TLDs should be 
sponsored.38 
Some constituencies showed a certain amount of caution about the programme at this point. The BC 
advocated further analysis on the need and demand for new TLDs, including evaluation of the 
previous rounds of gTLD introduction39, while the IPC claimed there was no evidence to substantiate 
a pressing need for new gTLDs and pointed to statistics suggesting 80% of registrations in the 
previously introduced new open gTLDs were defensive registrations. 40 The IPC41 further 
recommended that any new gTLD programme be carried out in a slow and controlled manner, while 
the Registrars42 advocated an upper limit on the total amount of TLDs to be introduced (though they 
still envisaged a programme that might result in hundreds or possibly thousands of new TLDs, but not 
tens of thousands or millions). The Registries were strongly in favour of new gTLDs, arguing that the 
previous application rounds had adequately validated that there was ample demand to operate a 
TLD.43 The NCUC was also strongly in favour of new gTLDs.44 
                                                          
36 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from  http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P1  
37 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf 
PP 2-4 
38 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
39 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P2  
40 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf 
P1 
41 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf  
P2 
42 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf PP2-3 
43 ICANN (2006). gTLD Registry Constituency Comments regarding terms of reference for new gTLDs.30 
January 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/gtld-registry-
constituency-01feb06.pdf P3 
44 ICANN (2006). Noncommercial Constituency comments submitted to the GNSO in response to the call for 
comments on the terms of reference for new gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ncuc-01feb06.pdf  
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A related issue concerned whether new TLD introductions should take place in ‘rounds’ as in the past, 
or on a continuing basis with no fixed application windows. The ISPCP45 and the Registrars46 
favoured a rounds-based approach while the registries favoured a continuous application process. The 
BC47, IPC48 and ISPCP49 all recognised that there was a growing need and demand for IDN TLDs.  
 
Term of Reference 2: Selection criteria for new TLDs  
With regard to selection criteria, the BC50, ISPCP51and the IPC52 all recommended that any new TLDs 
should be clearly differentiated from existing TLDs rather than trying to duplicate what already 
existed, and the BC53 cautioned that strings should not be accepted that were confusingly similar to 
existing TLDs. The NCUC, however, argued that ICANN's only role in the acceptance process should 
be to determine whether a gTLD application meets the minimal technical and operational criteria.54 
The Registries similarly stated that selection criteria should be consistent with ICANN’s ‘limited 
technical coordination mission’, but also stated that they should encourage differentiation.55 The 
Registrars advocated a move away from ‘generic TLDs with no purpose’ to ‘chartered’ TLDs, but 
opposed regional specificity in proposals.56  The BC57 and ISPCP58 warned of a need to guard against 
                                                          
45 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
46ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf P4 
47 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf  P1 
48ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf 
P4  
49 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
50 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf  P5 
51 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
52 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf  
P2 
53ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new generic 
top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/CBUC-
09mar06.pdf  P5 
54 ICANN (2006). Noncommercial Constituency comments submitted to the GNSO in response to the call for 
comments on the terms of reference for new gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ncuc-01feb06.pdf  P3 
55 ICANN (2006). gTLD Registry Constituency Comments regarding terms of reference for new gTLDs.30 
January 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/gtld-registry-
constituency-01feb06.pdf P3  
56 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf  PP2-3 
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creating opportunities for ‘bad faith entities’ (such as cybersquatters or fraudsters) to misuse TLDs. 
The BC59 and IPC60 advocated that applicants for new TLDs should be required to provide 
documentation of sufficient financial and administrative resources to ensure the stable operation of the 
TLD. The BC also recommended that applicants for ‘community’ TLDs should have ‘broad and 
documented support from the community who would register in the new domain space’61, while the 
registrars stated that a ‘demonstration of community interest’ would be sufficient with no need for 
‘proven support’ of the relevant community.62  
 
Term of Reference 3: Allocation criteria for new TLDs  
On the question of allocation methods, various constituencies differed significantly. All constituencies 
stated need for a contention resolution mechanism, but differed on what that should be. The BC63 & 
IPC64 favoured comparative evaluations; the NCUC65 favoured lotteries or auctions; the Registrars66 
favoured mixture of ballots, auctions and lottery; while the ISPCP67 proposed that domain names for 
single companies should be auctioned, and those involving general and/or noncommercial 
communities should be distributed by lottery. The Registries68 did not specify a preference for a 
particular method, except to say that comparative evaluation of applications should be minimised and 
only in cases where applicants propose duplicate or confusingly similar TLDs should special 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
57 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P5 
58 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
59 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P6 
60 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf  
P3 
61 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf  P6 
62 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf P3 
63ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new generic 
top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/CBUC-
09mar06.pdf  P3 
64 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf  
PP4-5 
65 ICANN (2006). Noncommercial Constituency comments submitted to the GNSO in response to the call for 
comments on the terms of reference for new gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ncuc-01feb06.pdf  P4 
66 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf  P4 
67 ICANN (2006). ISPCP Position on New gTLD Expansion. 1 February 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ispcp-01feb06.txt  P1 
68 ICANN (2006). gTLD Registry Constituency Comments regarding terms of reference for new gTLDs.30 
January 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/gtld-registry-
constituency-01feb06.pdf P6 
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allocation methods come into play. The Registrars and BC also differed over the issue of application 
fees to run a TLD, with the Registrars69 advocating large application fees to ensure the financial 
capability of the applicant and the BC70 wishing to keep application fees as low as possible to avoid 
stifling competition.  
 
Term of Reference  4: Contractual conditions for new TLD operators. 
On the issue of contractual conditions, the NCUC71, the Registries72 and the Registrars73 advocated a 
single standardised contract for all new registries. The IPC74 argued for strong intellectual property 
protection mechanisms, and the IPC75 and the Registrars76 both favoured a strong WHOIS model. The 
BC advocated contractual conditions that would ensure ‘fair’ treatment and equal obligations among 
registries, and also limit the ability of registries to extend their monopoly.77 The ISPCP made no 
specific comments on contractural conditions. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
69 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf  P3 
70 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new 
generic top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-
gtlds/CBUC-09mar06.pdf P3 
71 ICANN (2006). Noncommercial Constituency comments submitted to the GNSO in response to the call for 
comments on the terms of reference for new gTLDs. January 31 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from 
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ncuc-01feb06.pdf P5 
72 http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/gtld-registry-constituency-01feb06.pdfP8 
73 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf PP4-5 
74 ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf 
PP5-6 
75ICANN (2006). Comments of the Intellectual Property Constituency: Terms of Reference for New gTLDs. 
January 31, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/ipc-01feb06.pdf 
PP5-6 
76 ICANN (2006). Registrar Statement on GNSO New gTLD Terms of Reference. January 31, 2006. Revised 
March 2, 2006. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/registrars-
02mar06.pdf PP4-5 
77
 ICANN (2006). Business Constituency Position: The 2006 GNSO policy development process for new generic 
top-level domain names. Retrieved 15 September 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/CBUC-
09mar06.pdf P4 
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Appendix 4.6: Comparison between recommendations of GNSO Final Report – Introduction of 
New Generic Top-Level Domains
78
 and Initial Constituency Statements
79
  
Principles  
Principle (Final Report) Proposed by (initial 
constituency statements 
of) 
Opposed by (initial 
constituency statements 
of) 
A New generic top-level 
domains (gTLDs) must be 
introduced in an orderly, timely 
and predictable way. 
 
 
All constituencies favoured 
some form of new TLD 
programme.  Registries and 
NCUC spoke of the need for 
order and predictability 
BC supported all new 
gTLDs being IDN TLDs 
or sTLDs at this time. IPC 
also wanted focus to be 
on sTLDs with strict 
controls, and IDN TLDs. 
ISPCP also said any new 
TLD should be 
sponsored.  
B Some new generic top-
level domains should be 
internationalised domain names 
(IDNs) subject to the approval of 
IDNs being available in the root. 
Need for IDN TLDs 
expressed by Business 
Constituency, Registries, 
IPC, ISPCP 
 
C The reasons for 
introducing new top-level 
domains include that there is 
demand from potential applicants 
for new top-level domains in both 
ASCII and IDN formats.  In 
addition the introduction of new 
top-level domain application 
process has the potential to 
promote competition in the 
provision of registry services, to 
add to consumer choice, market 
differentiation and geographical 
and service-provider diversity.  
BC, IPC noted demand for 
IDN TLDs. Registries, BC, 
IPC, Registrars stated that 
new TLDs could increase 
competition. ISPCP, BC, 
IPC, NCUC emphasised 
need for new TLDs to be 
differentiated from existing 
ones. Registries also 
believed new TLDs would 
add market differentiation.   
IPC questioned whether 
demand for new ASCII 
TLDs had been 
demonstrated. BC also 
advocated further study of 
the need for new TLDs.  
ISPCP felt that 
competition was already 
flourishing, but that new 
differentiated TLDs 
would add value.  
                                                          
78 ICANN (2007). GNSO Final Report: Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains. Part A. 8 August 
2007. Retrieved 14 July 2010, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm  
 
79 ICANN (2006).’ Input received on the policy development process on new gTLDs’. Retrieved 15 July 2010, 
from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/new-gtld-pdp-input.htm  
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D A set of technical criteria 
must be used for assessing a new 
gTLD registry applicant to 
minimise the risk of harming the 
operational stability, security and 
global interoperability of the 
Internet.  
BC NCUC Registries 
Registrars   
 
E A set of capability criteria 
for a new gTLD registry applicant 
must be used to provide an 
assurance that an applicant has 
the capability to meets its 
obligations under the terms of 
ICANN's registry agreement. 
BC, IPC stated need to 
ensure applicants had 
sufficient financial and 
administrative resources to 
run a gTLD 
 
F A set of operational 
criteria must be set out in 
contractual conditions in the 
registry agreement to ensure 
compliance with ICANN policies. 
BC IPC NCUC Registries 
Registrars 
 
G The string evaluation 
process must not infringe the 
applicant's freedom of expression 
rights that are protected under 
internationally recognized 
principles of law.   
 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
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Recommendations 
 
Recommendation Proposed by (initial 
constituency statements 
of) 
Opposed by (initial 
constituency 
statements of) 
1 ICANN must implement a 
process that allows the introduction of 
new top-level domains.  
The evaluation and selection 
procedure for new gTLD registries 
should respect the principles of 
fairness, transparency and non-
discrimination. 
All applicants for a new gTLD 
registry should therefore be evaluated 
against transparent and predictable 
criteria, fully available to the 
applicants prior to the initiation of the 
process. Normally, therefore, no 
subsequent additional selection 
criteria should be used in the selection 
process.  
All constituencies 
favoured some form of 
new TLD programme. 
All suggested a set of 
objective criteria to be 
established prior to the 
start of the process.  
NCUC and IPC 
emphasised need for 
transparency and fairness. 
Registries emphasised 
need for predictability.  
  
 
2 Strings must not be 
confusingly similar to an existing top-
level domain or a Reserved Name. 
  
 
 
 
Registries, ISPCP and BC 
stated that strings 
confusingly similar to 
existing ones should be 
avoided. 
Registries argued that, in 
the event of confusingly 
similar strings being 
proposed, special 
allocation procedures 
should come into play. 
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3 Strings must not infringe the 
existing legal rights of others that are 
recognized or enforceable under 
generally accepted and internationally 
recognized principles of law.  
Examples of these legal rights that are 
internationally recognized include, but 
are not limited to, rights defined in the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industry Property (in particular 
trademark rights), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) (in particular freedom of 
expression rights). 
 
BC, IPC, Registrars, 
ISPCP  
 
4 Strings must not cause any 
technical instability. 
No constituency statement 
mentioned possibility of 
technical instability caused 
by the string itself; 
however all talked of the 
need for technical stability 
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5 Strings must not be a Reserved 
Word 
 
  
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions; 
however this was part of 
past application criteria, 
which BC and IPC argued 
should form the basis of 
future application criteria 
 
6* Strings must not be contrary to 
generally accepted legal norms 
relating to morality and public order 
that are recognized under international 
principles of law.  
Examples of such principles of law 
include, but are not limited to, the 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
intellectual property treaties 
administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) and the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS).   
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
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7 Applicants must be able to 
demonstrate their technical capability 
to run a registry operation for the 
purpose that the applicant sets out. 
BC NCUC Registries 
Registrars   
 
 
8 Applicants must be able to 
demonstrate their financial and 
organisational operational capability. 
  
 
 
 
 
Registrars argued that 
process should seek large 
application fees to ensure 
registries can meet 
financial requirements. BC 
stated that documented 
financial capability must 
be a requirement. 
 
9 There must be a clear and pre-
published application process using 
objective and measurable criteria. 
All constituency 
statements 
 
10 There must be a base contract 
provided to applicants at the 
beginning of the application process. 
 
 
NCUC, Registries, 
Registrars 
Registrars stated that there 
was a great need for 
standardisation of 
contracts. 
 
 
 
11 [Replaced with 
Recommendation 20 and 
Implementation Guideline P and 
inserted into Term of Reference 3 
Allocation Methods section]  
  
12 Dispute resolution and 
challenge processes must be 
established prior to the start of the 
process. 
IPC ISPCP NCUC 
Registries Registrars  
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13 Applications must initially be 
assessed in rounds until the scale of 
demand is clear. 
 
ISPCP, Registrars   Registries argued that 
the process should be 
ongoing.    
14 The initial registry agreement 
term must be of a commercially 
reasonable length. 
 
BC advocated five-yearly 
review.  
 
15 There must be renewal 
expectancy. 
 
 
 
Registries argued for 
presumptive right of 
renewal. BC advocated 
five-yearly review.  
 
BC advocated five-
yearly review based on 
the question “should 
the existing registry 
continue to run the 
gTLD?”   
16 Registries must apply existing 
Consensus Policies and adopt new 
Consensus Policies as they are 
approved. 
 
Appeared to be suggested 
by BC, Registries, NCUC 
 
 
 
7 A clear compliance and 
sanctions process must be set out in 
the base contract which could lead to 
contract termination. 
 
Registries stated that a 
compliance process 
needed to be established 
but did not mention 
specific sanctions.  BC 
mentioned similar.  
 
18 If an applicant offers an IDN 
service, then ICANN's IDN guidelines 
must be followed. 
Registries  
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19 Registries must use only 
ICANN accredited registrars in 
registering domain names and may 
not discriminate among such 
accredited registrars. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
 
20* An application will be rejected 
if an expert panel determines that 
there is substantial opposition to it 
from a significant portion of the 
community to which the string may be 
explicitly or implicitly targeted.  
BC, IPC 
 
Registrars said there 
should be a 
demonstration of 
community interest but 
no need for ‘proven 
support’ of the 
community  
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Implementation guidelines  
Guideline  Proposed by (initial 
constituency statements of) 
Opposed by (initial 
constituency statements of) 
IG A The application 
process will provide a pre-
defined roadmap for 
applicants that encourages 
the submission of 
applications for new top-
level domains. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions, 
but all submissions proposed 
to put a well-defined process 
in place before accepting 
admissions   
 
IG B Application fees will 
be designed to ensure that 
adequate resources exist to 
cover the total cost to 
administer the new gTLD 
process.  Application fees 
may differ for applicants. 
The BC ‘supports a managed 
approach to allocation that 
has a cost-plus recovery 
approach on the fees charged 
to the applicants and urges 
that costs are kept as low as 
possible so not to divert 
funds from start-up 
innovation.’ Did not 
specifically mention 
differentiated fees.  
  
Registrars argued that the 
process should seek large 
application fees as the norm 
to ensure registries can meet 
financial requirements. 
IG C ICANN will provide 
frequent communications 
with applicants and the 
public including comment 
forums. 
BC recommended refinement 
of the public portion of the 
consultation. 
 
IG D A first come first 
served processing schedule 
within the application round 
will be implemented and will 
continue for an ongoing 
process, if necessary.  
Applications will be time and 
date stamped on receipt. 
Rounds proposed by ISPCP, 
Registrars. Ongoing 
application process proposed 
by Registries.  
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 IG E The application 
submission date will be at 
least four months after the 
issue of the Request for 
Proposal and ICANN will 
promote the opening of the 
application round. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
 
IG F* If there is contention 
for strings, applicants 
may[29]: 
i)                    resolve 
contention between them 
within a pre-established 
timeframe 
ii)                 if there is no 
mutual agreement, a claim to 
support a community by one 
party will be a reason to 
award priority to that 
application. If there is no 
such claim, and no mutual 
agreement a process will be 
put in place to enable 
efficient resolution of 
contention and; 
iii) the ICANN Board 
may be used to 
make a final 
decision, using 
advice from staff 
and expert panels. 
 
 
 
 
 
All constituencies stated need 
for a contention resolution 
mechanism:  
-BC & IPC favoured 
comparative evaluations 
-Registries did not specify a 
preference  
-NCUC favoured ballots 
-Registrars favoured mixture 
of ballots, auctions and 
lottery  
-ISPCP proposed that domain 
names for single companies 
should be auctioned, and 
those involving general 
and/or noncommercial 
communities should be 
distributed by lottery. 
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IG H* Where an applicant 
lays any claim that the TLD 
is intended to support a 
particular community such as 
a sponsored TLD, or any 
other TLD intended for a 
specified community, that 
claim will be taken on trust 
with the following 
exceptions: 
 (i)  the claim relates to a 
string that is also subject to 
another application and the 
claim to support a 
community is being used to 
gain priority for the 
application; and 
 (ii) a formal objection 
process is initiated.   
 Under these exceptions, 
Staff Evaluators will devise 
criteria and procedures to 
investigate the claim.   
IPC, Registries asserted that 
there should be demonstrable 
and documented support 
from the relevant community 
 
 
 
IG H External dispute 
providers will give decisions 
on objections. 
 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
 
IG I An applicant granted 
a TLD string must use it 
within a fixed timeframe 
which will be specified in the 
application process. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
 
IG J The base contract 
should balance market 
certainty and flexibility for 
ICANN to accommodate a 
rapidly changing market 
place. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
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IG K ICANN should take a 
consistent approach to the 
establishment of registry 
fees. 
 
The BC ‘supports a managed 
approach to allocation that 
has a cost-plus recovery 
approach on the fees charged 
to the applicants and urges 
that costs are kept as low as 
possible so not to divert 
funds from start-up 
innovation.’ 
Registrars seemed to suggest 
consistently high fees to 
ensure financial capability of 
applicant  
 
IG L The use of personal 
data must be limited to the 
purpose for which it is 
collected. 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
 
IG M ICANN may establish 
a capacity building and 
support mechanism aiming at 
facilitating effective 
communication on important 
and technical Internet 
governance functions in a 
way that no longer requires 
all participants in the 
conversation to be able to 
read and write English. 
Registries stated need for 
local language support 
 
IG N ICANN may put in 
place a fee reduction scheme 
for gTLD applicants from 
economies classified by the 
UN as least developed.  
 
 The ISPCP argued that 
“Regional specificity in 
proposals is inappropriate. 
Assistance for developing 
countries and other special 
interest programs can be 
accomodated through other 
means.” 
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IG O ICANN may put in 
place systems that could 
provide information about 
the gTLD process in major 
languages other than English, 
for example, in the six 
working languages of the 
United Nations. 
Registries stated need for 
local language support  
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Guideline  Proposed by (initial 
constituency statements of) 
Opposed by (initial 
constituency statements of) 
IG P The following 
process, definitions and 
guidelines refer to 
Recommendation 20.  
Process  
Opposition must be objection 
based.  
Determination will be made 
by a dispute resolution panel 
constituted for the purpose.  
The objector must provide 
verifiable evidence that it is 
an established institution of 
the community (perhaps like 
the RSTEP pool of panelists 
from which a small panel 
would be constituted for each 
objection). 
Guidelines 
 The task of the panel is the 
determination of substantial 
opposition. 
 
Not directly stated in 
constituency submissions 
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Appendix 4.7 Significant outstanding points of contention between GNSO 
Constituencies re. New gTLDs Policy (June 2007) 
(As expressed in Constituency Impact Statements included in GNSO New TLDs Committee 
Final Report on the Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, Part B).   
 
The IPC continued to express reservations on the very principle of a new gTLDs programme, 
arguing there was little empirical evidence that the introduction of new gTLDs had, in fact, 
promoted competition, or added to consumer choice or market differentiation, and warning 
that the addition of new gTLDs will likely result in numerous defensive registrations of 
otherwise unnecessary domain names by trademark owners.80 It went on to reiterate that 
many of these concerns may be minimized by limiting any new gTLDs to those that offer a 
clearly differentiated domain name space with mechanisms in place to ensure compliance 
with the purposes of a chartered or sponsored TLD.81 
While the BC did not express opposition to the principle of new gTLDs in overt terms, it 
warned that a new gTLDs programme had the potential to produce either beneficial effects 
(‘healthy competition and good faith’) or negative ones (‘increased opportunity for abusive 
competitive practises and fraud’).82 It went on to recommend that measures be taken to 
control abusive competitive practices as well as opportunities for consumer and business 
fraud such as cybersquatting, typo-squatting, phishing and other forms of bad faith activity, 
including: graduated sanctions for contract compliance by Registries and Registrars; avoiding 
confusingly similar domain names; avoiding infringement of third party prior rights 
especially trade mark rights; clear, quick and low-cost procedures for dispute resolution and 
the removal of bad faith registrations; measures to prevent abuse of personal data or other 
commercially-valuable data.83 
The ISPCP opposed the proposal to offer reduced application fees for some applicants, 
arguing that such a policy’ paves the way for hasty, last minute me-too applications, that have 
not really developed a solid project, and are simply trying their luck in getting a string’.84   
The NCUC opposed the MAPO provisions contained in Recommendation 6, arguing that this 
went beyond ICANN’s technical mandate.85 It also opposed Recommendation 20, that that 
would allow the showing of a “substantial opposition” to entirely reject an application, 
arguing that this provision ‘swallows up any attempt to limit string criteria to technical, 
operational, and financial evaluations…..violates internationally recognized freedom of 
                                                          
80 ICANN (2007). GNSO New TLDs Committee Final Report on the Introduction of New Generic Top-Level 
Domains, Part B). June 2007. Retrieved 19 July 2011, from http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-fr-b-
18jun07.pdf  PP23-24  
81 Ibid, PP23-24 
82 Ibid, P21 
83 Ibid, P21 
84 Ibid, P32 
85 Ibid, P35  
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expression guarantees and insures that no controversial string application will ever be 
granted.’86 
The NCUC also continued to reject Recommendation 11 and an expanded role of ICANN 
staff and outside expert panels to evaluate string criteria that were ‘not technical, financial, 
nor operational’.87 It also described Recommendations 2 and 3 and potentially providing 
overbroad protections for trademark holders.88 With regard to Recommendation 5, the NCUC 
opposed any attempts to create lists of reserved names.89 
The Registries Constituency did not express any significant opposition to the 
recommendations of the Final Report.90 The Registrars do not appear to have provided an 
impact statement.  
 
                                                          
86 Ibid, P35 
87 Ibid, P36 
88 Ibid, PP36-37 
89Ibid, P38 
90Ibid,  PP71-77  
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Appendix 4.8: Comparison of GNSO  constituency comments on Draft Applicant 
Guidebooks to policy changes in subsequent versions of the DAG 
Comparison of GNSO Constituency comments on DAG v.1 to policy changes in DAG v.2 
 
Proposal / issue Raised by Addressed in DAG v.2? 
New gTLD Annual Fees are too high. Registrars, 
NCUC 
Yes - Annual registry fee 
reduced  
All fees too high NCUC Application fee remained at 
$185,000 
Estimates of dispute resolution 
fees unchanged  
Comparative evaluation fee is 
now structured as a deposit and 
returned if criteria are met 
Added credit for qualified 2000 
round applicants: added refund 
structure; reduced annual 
registry fees   
Clearer distinction and explanation required between 
an open and community based TLD.   
Registrars, 
IPC, 
NCUC 
Yes - DAG v2 Added 
clarification on community vs. 
open and why these terms are 
used; added language on intent 
of community-based category 
and under what circumstances 
community claims are evaluated 
It should be made clear at the outset that a party filing 
an LRO objection is not barred from challenging in 
court ICANN’s decision regarding the application 
that is objected to.   
IPC No 
LRO procedure should provide the option for a three-
member panel rather than a single panelist.   
 
IPC Yes - DAG v2 added option for 
more than one panelist at 
parties' option for legal rights 
objections (p68) 
ICANN should consider providing an appeal 
procedure from decisions of the LRO panel. 
 
IPC No 
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Under current proposals, if there are multiple 
applications for a TLD string that will detrimentally 
impact a single trademark (or family of closely 
related marks), the mark owner must file (and pay 
for) a separate objection proceeding for each 
application, even though the evidence will be almost 
the same in each case.  Consolidation in a single 
proceeding (for a single fee) should be permitted in 
such circumstances 
IPC No  
Because multiple objections may well be filed (in 
some cases by the same objector) against the same 
application on more than one of the grounds provided 
for (e.g., LRO, community objection, morality/public 
order), problems of case management will arise.  If 
an application is ultimately disqualified based on one 
ground, it may be inefficient to require parties to 
expend resources on a separate objection that may 
never be heard.  ICANN should consider requiring all 
objections to be filed via a common portal, and 
empowering a case manager to sequence the 
consideration of various objections to a single 
application in order to avoid wasted effort.   
IPC No 
A successful objection in the LRO procedure should 
have some preclusive, or at least precedential, effect 
on future applications for the same or a highly similar 
character string. 
IPC No 
The DAG is ambiguous about the whether the 
decision of an LRO (or other dispute resolution) 
panel will be considered binding.  On page 3-10 the 
decision is described as something to be “considered 
by ICANN in making a final decision.”  However, 
the chart following page 3-15 suggests that a panel 
decision for or against an application is dispositive in 
the objection phase. This should be clarified.  
IPC Language altered but remains 
somewhat ambiguous as to 
whether panel decision will be 
considered binding:  ‘The 
findings of the panel will be 
considered an expert 
determination and advice that 
ICANN will accept withinthe 
dispute resolution process.’ 
(P70)  
Pre-launch mechanisms are required to prevent 
abusive registrations 
IPC No – but trademark protection 
referred to IRT as one of the 
‘overarching issues’ 
Stronger protections are required against abusive 
registrations post-launch 
IPC No – but trademark prtotection 
referred to IRT as one of the 
‘overarching issues’ 
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Publication of a revised, more detailed schedule of 
events/milestones prior to application opening is 
required 
IPC No 
Publication of a timeline showing each of the phases 
post-submission is required,  for example, indicating 
when the Objection Period opens and closes and how 
that relates to Initial Evaluation 
IPC Some changes - Clarified that 
the objection filing period 
closes after Independent 
Evaluation results are posted 
(P9)  
Need clarification on how expert panels will be 
formed, including the Geographical Names Panel and 
the Registry Services Technical Evaluation Panel. 
Need clarification as to who will sit on these panels 
and how their performance will be monitored.  
IPC No 
Need to clarify the “Open” vs. “Community-based” 
question by publishing further examples of types of 
organizations that would fit in both categories – and 
then explaining the process of selection if there is 
string contention between Open and a Community-
based applicants.  
IPC No  
Need to clarify whether a business application (e.g., 
an application to run a gTLD for the exclusive use of 
a single company) could ever be categorised as a 
Community-based application, and if so, under what 
circumstances?   Similarly, under what circumstances 
could a corporation qualify as an “established 
institution” with standing to pursue a Community 
Objection?  
 
IPC No – definition of a community 
based application altered but 
new definition could still 
potentially apply to a corporate 
application:  “For purposes of 
this Applicant Guidebook, a 
community based gTLD is a 
gTLD that is operated for the 
benefit of a defined community 
consisting of a restricted 
population.” (P17) 
Need to provide more clarity on “String Contention”: 
will semantic confusion (confusingly similar 
meanings) be a factor that the String Similarity 
Examiners take into consideration, or would this only 
occur at the objection phase?  For instance, would 
.voyage trigger string contention with .travel?   
Will the Evaluators take into consideration the 
purpose of an application? Is “Content Contention” 
of concern to ICANN? Would ICANN accept two 
applications with dissimilar character strings but 
identical purposes? 
 
IPC No 
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Auctions should not be used as a mechanism for 
awarding new gTLDs 
IPC Auctions confirmed as ‘method 
of last resort’ for resolving 
string contention in DAG2 
(P90) 
Need to examine whether an applicant who invests in 
the process but loses a String Contention should be 
afforded the opportunity of selecting (or proposing) 
another character string that is not part of a 
contention set? 
IPC No 
While the draft base agreement with new registries 
requires that ICANN be notified of changes of 
ownership or control of the registry, it does not 
otherwise restrict the ability of a successful applicant 
to “flip” the registry to a buyer unvetted by ICANN, 
even immediately after delegation. This needs to be 
addressed.   
IPC No 
The proposed MAPO standards open the door to 
unacceptable forms of content regulation by ICANN 
and provide the ability for a “heckler’s veto” over 
legitimate possible domains 
NCUC No 
The recommendations for "communities" favour 
entrenched institutions at the expense of innovators 
and start-ups.  There needs to be a  working 
definition of "community" in the context of who will 
have standing to lodge an objection. 
 
NCUC No  
Trademarks and domain names are not the same 
thing and, under existing and traditional trademark 
law principles, domain names neither can nor should 
be equated to trademarks. 
NCUC No 
Issue of who has standing to object needs to be 
resolved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCUC No 
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Term 6 of the Terms and Conditions is unacceptable 
and should be removed.  
 (“Applicant agrees not to challenge, in court or in 
any other judicial fora, any final decision made by 
ICANN with respect to the application, and 
irrevocably waives any right to sue or proceed on the 
basis of any other legal claim against ICANN and 
ICANN affiliated parties with respect to the 
application. Applicant acknowledges and accepts that 
applicant’s non ntitlement to pursue any rights, 
remedies,  or legal claims against ICANN or the 
ICANN affiliated parties with respect to the 
application shall mean that applicant will forego any 
recovery of any application fees, monies invested in 
business infrastructure or other start-up costs and any 
and all profits that applicant may expect to realize 
from the application of a registry for the TLD.”)  
 
NCUC 
 
 
 
No 
After the panel makes a decision on the objection 
proceedings, it is still open to ICANN to approve or 
deny the domain in question. It is not clear whether 
such discretion can be based on disagreement with 
the panel’s findings. 
NCUC Still unclear in DAGv2 
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Comparison of GNSO Constituency comments on DAG v.2 to policy changes in DAG v.3 
 
Proposal / issue Raised by Addressed in DAG v.3 
The provisions that applicants must agree to release 
ICANN from liability for any acts or omissions in 
any way connected with its consideration of the 
application are unacceptable and should be 
removed.  
Registries No  
 ICANN’s assertion of the unilateral right to change 
the terms and conditions of the registry agreement 
is unacceptable and should be removed.  
Registries No 
Recommation for the following definition of a 
Community-based TLD: “The term “community-
based” TLD shall mean a TLD that is operated for 
the benefit of a defined existing community 
consisting of a restricted population which self-
identify as members of the community.  The 
following shall not be deemed to be a community: 
(i) a subscriber or customer base; (ii) a business 
and its affiliated entities; (iii) a country or other 
region that is represented by a ccTLD; or (iv) a 
language except in cases where the TLD directly 
relates to a UNESCO recognized  language.”  
 
Registries No – some changes to the 
definition were made but this 
proposed definition was not 
adopted.  
New definition (DAG v3 p23): 
For purposes of this Applicant 
Guidebook, a community based 
gTLD is a gTLD that is 
operated for the benefit of a 
clearly delineated community. 
Designation or non-designation 
of anapplication as community-
based is entirely at the 
discretion of the applicant. Any 
applicant may designate its 
application as community-
based; however, each applicant 
making this designation 
designating its application as 
community-based is asked 
tosubstantiate its status as 
representative of the community 
it names in the application.  
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The following requirement as applied to IDN 
gTLDs should allow for exceptions in Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean scripts:  “Policy 
Requirements for Generic Top-Level Domains – 
Applied-for strings must be composed of three or 
more visually distinct letters or characters in the 
script, as appropriate. 
Registries No – but question referred for 
further study 
The continued rejection of the formation of joint 
ventures seems unreasonable, especially in cases 
where there are no material changes in applications 
or need for re-evaluation. 
Registries No  
Publication required of a revised, more detailed 
schedule of events/milestones prior to application 
opening. 
IPC No 
Publication required of a timeline showing each of 
the phases post-submission: for example, indicating 
when the Objection Period opens and closes and 
how that relates to Initial Evaluation 
IPC Yes 
Publication required of the ICANN policy for 
evaluators, other contractors and DRSP’s,  making 
it clear that no person or organisation supplying 
consultancy services to ICANN during any part of 
the process can be involved in an application in any 
way; and providing a means for applicants to learn 
who will be evaluating their application and to 
challenge them for cause shown. 
 
IPC No 
Clarification required on how expert panels will be 
formed, including the Geographical Names Panel. 
Need clarification on who will sit on these panels 
and how their performance will be monitored.  
IPC Partially - some coverage of 
how panels will be formed + 
qualifications required. No 
coverage of how their 
performance will be monitored.  
Publication required of a complete table of fees 
including details of refunds as soon as possible. 
IPC Yes 
Clarification required of the  “Open” vs. 
“Community-based” question by publishing further 
examples of types of organizations that would fit in 
both categories – and then explaining the process of 
selection if there is string contention between Open 
and a Community-based applicants 
IPC No 
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Auctions should be avoided as a mechanism for 
awarding new gTLDs 
IPC No 
Need to examine whether applicant who invests in 
the process but loses a String Contention should be 
afforded the opportunity of selecting (or proposing) 
another character string that is not part of a 
contention set 
IPC No  
While the draft base agreement with new registries 
requires that ICANN be notified of changes of 
ownership or control of the registry, it does not 
otherwise restrict the ability of a successful 
applicant to “flip” the registry to a buyer unvetted 
by ICANN, even immediately after delegation.  
This should be addressed.  
IPC No 
The fees in general are exorbitant for a process that 
is designed to be more or less automatic and online 
with hardly any need for much human intervention, 
except for the dispute resolution, which is 
outsourced and separately paid for by the 
applicants/objectors. 
NCUC No 
Credit of $86000 for past failed applicants should 
be scrapped.  
If ICANN feels that those past applicants rightly 
deserve to be re-funded, then they should be 
refunded outright rather than given “credit” in this 
unrelated round.   
 
NCUC No (p40) 
Section 1.2.2.1 (regarding community based 
names) might give rise to inconsistencies and can 
overlap with the category of strings considered as 
geographical names (2.1.1.4.1) This can create a 
great deal of confusion in the whole process and 
oppose long-standing and traditional international 
principles. ICANN should add a separate section in 
the eligibility for the community-based objection 
section adding “the applicant needs to demonstrate 
that the community is not opposing and does not 
contravene accepted principles of international 
law”. 
 
NCUC No 
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2.1.1.1 String Confusion Objection:  The GNSO 
IDN Working Group ( 2 years ago ) after much 
discussion and debate unanimously concluded in a 
100+ page report that ONLY visual could lead to 
string confusion instead of one arising out of 
"phonetic or aural or sound" similarity or 
"meaning" similarity. It was one of the few things 
that the Report had strong consensus on. This view 
was further confirmed by the then chairs of ccNSO, 
gNSO and senior ICANN leadership in different 
open-mike minuted ICANN meetings. Therefore, 
the continuing efforts to obfuscate the agreed-to 
distinctions now in the applicant guidebook 
through vague wording is very troubling. 
 
 
 
 
NCUC Unsure this is a correct 
statement – DAG v.2 stated: 
The examiners’ task is to 
identify visual string 
similarities that would create a 
probability of detrimental user 
confusion. String confusion 
exists where a string so nearly 
resembles another visually that 
it is likely to deceive or cause 
confusion. (P36) 
 
DAG v3 states:  The String 
Similarity Panel’s task is to 
identify visual string 
similarities that would create a 
probability of user confusion.  
(P51) 
String confusion exists wherea 
string so nearly resembles 
another visually that it is likely 
to deceive or cause confusion. 
(P54) 
2.1.1.3.2 String requirements: There are many 
scripts, like Chinese, Japanese and Korean that use 
ideographs and pictographs that are information-
rich descriptors and not low-information alphabets 
and restricting strings to 3 or more characters 
amounts to insisting that only short sentences can 
be top level domains. 
 
The GNSO IDN working Group Report considered 
this issue at length and came to more or less 
unanimous agreement (taken together with the 
Reserved Names Working Group) that for IDN 
TLDs, there should be no arbitrary restriction at all 
- i.e. the smallest IDN TLD can be a single 
character. The first version of the guidebook  
ignored this strong recommendation. This must be 
remedied.  
 
NCUC No 
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2.1.1.4.1 and 2.1.1.4.2 Geopolitical Names: It 
might be reasonable to require applicants of names 
of countries (either official or widely understood or 
short forms) and possibly larger regional (like 
continent names) or capital or largest/larger cities 
to produce non-objection or simple support letters 
from appropriate authorities. However it is going 
way too far to make the same requirement for 
names of any place within a country in any country 
etc 
NCUC Yes (p62) 
NCUC generally believes that the criteria set for 
the legal rights objection (3.4.2) fail to adhere to 
the legal particularities, structure and principles of 
trademark law and neither account for the 
promotion of a rights-balanced approach. 
 
ICANN’s new gTLD proposal opposes both the 
Paris Convention and the principle of 
‘territoriality’. The Domain Name System (DNS) is 
international in nature, thereby assigning 
automatically international rights over the 
uniqueness of the domain name. No such automatic 
registration system exists for trademarks. What will 
then be the case if two valid and legitimate 
trademark owners apply for the same string? 
NCUC No 
NCUC believes that the suggested ‘string 
contention’ procedures (Module 4) do not answer 
to this particular problem and believes that the 
proposed ‘auction mechanism’ (4.3), which 
ICANN considers as a ‘last resort’ will take place 
more often than not. Considering the nature of the 
mechanism, NCUC fears that trademark owners 
with stronger financial basis will prevail over other 
legitimate mark owners.  
NCUC No 
RE: 3.1.3  The language of the DAG is 
inconsistent, and leaves too much room for 
multiple interpretation as to what role the expert 
panels play in the dispute resolution process. Need 
clarification as to  what weight does the expert 
panel decision carry?  Is it a final decision on the 
objection, or merely advice that ICANN may 
accept or reject? 
NCUC No 
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Implementation recommendations for 
"communities" favour entrenched institutions at the 
expense of innovators and start-ups.  Still no 
definition of "community".  
NCUC Slight change in community 
definition but remains vague –  
(DAG v3 p23): “For purposes 
of this Applicant Guidebook, a 
community based gTLD is a 
gTLD that is operated for the 
benefit of a clearly delineated 
community. Designation or 
non-designation of an 
application as community-based 
is entirely at the discretion of 
the applicant. Any applicant 
may designate its application as 
community-based; however, 
each applicant making this 
designationdesignating its 
application as community-based 
is asked to substantiate its status 
as representative of the 
community it names in the 
application.”  
However – removal of 
limitations on who may file 
MAPO  objections – apart from 
a “quick look” designed for 
early conclusion of frivolous 
objections.  
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3.1.1 In the case of IDN string confusion across 
languages/scripts the current process could lead to 
a nightmare scenario. As currently specified (see 
criticisms to 3.4.1 below) an existing ASCII ccTLD 
operator can successfully block an IDN application 
for a "similar meaning" and thus in effect own 
ICANN rights to that meaning in every language.  
NCUC No – no changes to 3.4.1  
Clause 6 of the Terms and Conditions is 
unacceptable and should be changed. 
(“Applicant agrees not to challenge, in court or in 
any other judicial fora, any final decision made by 
ICANN with respect to the application, and 
irrevocably waives any right to sue or proceed on 
the basis of any other legal claim against ICANN 
and ICANN affiliated parties with respect to the 
application. Applicant acknowledges and accepts 
that applicant’s non ntitlement to pursue any rights, 
remedies,  or legal claims against ICANN or the 
ICANN affiliated parties with respect to the 
application shall mean that applicant will forego 
any recovery of any application fees, monies 
invested in business infrastructure or other start-up 
costs and any and all profits that applicant may 
expect to realize from the application of a registry 
for the TLD.”)  
NCUC  No – unchanged 
Required fees are substantially too high NCUC No – fees unchanged 
The MAPO objection should be available to 
anyone that can show a legitimate interest and harm 
or potential harm concerning the applied-for string. 
NCUC Yes  – removal of limitations on 
who may file MAPO  
objections – apart from a “quick 
look” designed for early 
conclusion of frivolous 
objections. 
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Comparison of GNSO Constituency comments on DAG v.3 to policy changes in DAG v.4 
 
Proposal / issue Raised by Addressed in next DAG?  
In DAG2 the RyC recommended that “DRSPs 
should be strongly encouraged if not required to 
allow for consolidation of objections where 
possible and to thereby minimize expenses for 
applicants and objectors”.  In DAG3 some minor 
improvements were made but the decision is still 
at the discretion of the DRSP.  We recommend 
that DRSPs be required to consolidate objections 
where feasible.  
 
Registries 
Constituency 
No – remains at discretion of 
DRSP 
Definition of community - recommend that the 
criteria should ensure 1) a mere customer or 
subscriber base is not deemed to be a community 
and 2) to qualify as a community-based gTLD, 
an applicant must demonstrate that community 
members would likely self-identify themselves as 
a member of the community  
 
Registries 
Constituency 
No 
The estimate of USD 50,000 for registry services 
evaluation seems excessive.  It would be helpful 
to see a cost build-up of this estimate. 
Registries 
Constituency 
No 
The following requirement as applied to IDN 
gTLDs should allow for exceptions in Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean scripts:  “Policy 
Requirements for Generic Top-Level Domains – 
Applied-for strings must be composed of three or 
more visually distinct letters or characters in the 
script, as appropriate.” 
Registries 
Constituency 
Yes -2 character IDN strings 
permitted in DAG v4 
Domain names should be  registered only 
through ICANN accredited registrars.  
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
N/A (p244) 
ICANN should maintain the current structural 
separation requirements  between the registry and 
registrar functions  
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
No change (p244) 
ICANN should maintain the current requirement 
that registry operators not  
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
No change(p244) 
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discriminate amongst registrars. 
 
Group 
ICANN should not prohibit affiliates of ICANN-
accredited registrars to apply to be a New TLD 
registry operator. 
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
No 
ICANN should not strictly prohibit registrars 
from selling registrations for TLDs of an 
affiliated registry operator. 
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
No 
 ICANN should not prohibit affiliates of ICANN-
accredited registrars to provide any types of 
services to registry operators. 
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
No 
Included in an attachment to Module 5 of DAG 
V3 is the proposed New gTLD Registry 
Agreement ("Registry Agreement"). The RSG is 
very troubled by and is strongly opposed to 
provisions contained in "Article 7" regarding 
contract  amendments to the Registry Agreement.  
This section, as it is currently drafted, provides 
ICANN with overbroad power to unilaterally 
amend the Registry Agreement without the 
consent of the registry operator. 
Registrar 
Stakeholder 
Group 
Original article 7 removed. New 
article 7 states ICANN must 
give 2 –year notice as opposed 
to 90 days in the previous DAG 
of any amendments, which must 
be approved by the Board. 
(p257)   
The rule that an objector that fully satisfies all 
other criteria for standing does not benefit from 
any presumption that granting the gTLD string to 
the applicant to which it objects constitutes 
detriment. It  fails to give adequate weight to the 
harm to the community that may result from 
granting another party exclusivity in the proposed 
string. 
IPC No (p282) 
The “complete defense” provided for an 
applicant who could hypothetically satisfy the 
standing requirements is biased much too 
strongly toward granting the gTLD. 
IPC No 
Using auctions as an allocation mechanism is 
likely to result in strings being awarded to the 
applicant with the most cash on hand, not 
necessarily the applicant likely to best operate the 
registry. 
IPC No 
URS should be mandatory rather than a best 
practice  
BC Yes – p237 
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Trade Mark Clearinghouse: 
1. Sunrise processes must be standardised 
and mandatory. 
2. The definition of identical match should: 
a. At least be the same as IRT; 
b. should also take into account singular 
and plural of the Mark; and 
c. take into account typographical 
variations (for typosquatting) 
BC 1. The registry operator 
must implement, at a 
minimum, either a 
Sunrise Period or a 
Trademark Claims 
service (P237) 
2. No change to ‘identical 
match’ definition 
(p310) 
Trademark  notices (IP claims)  must be 
mandatory. 
 
 
BC Yes – p310 “New gTLD 
registries must provide Sunrise 
or Trademark Claims services 
for all trademarks in the 
Trademark Clearinghouse” 
Rejection of the Globally Protected Marks List 
(GPML) leaves open the issue of defensive 
registrations without any solution being made 
available to address or remedy this problem 
related to the launch of new gTLDs. 
BC No 
The limitations in scope and effectiveness of the 
Post Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure 
when compared to the IRT Report 
recommendation raise much concern  
 
BC No 
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Comparison of GNSO Constituency comments on DAG v.4 to policy changes in DAG v.5 
 
Comment Raised by Addressed in next DAG?  
No changes were made to the possible fees 
for use of the RSEP Process.  A 3-person 
RSEP panel is estimated to cost $50,000. 
Costs could be higher for a 5-person panel or 
for other complexities.This cost estimate 
seems extremely high. 
Registries 
stakeholder group 
No change in RSEP fee (p45) 
Strings that may be judged to be similar but 
in a non-detrimental way should not be 
eliminated in Initial Evaluation, but in case 
that does happen, the opportunity for 
correcting the possible error should be 
provided.  The focus should be on a good 
user experience; it is very possible that two 
strings could be similar but not create 
confusion and instead provide for a better 
user experience. 
Registries 
stakeholder group 
No 
The number of panelists for both String 
Confusion and Community disputes is still 
restricted to one. There is an option for three 
panelists for Existing Legal Rights disputes 
and a requirement for three panelists for a 
Morality & Public Order objection. Three 
panelists should be available for all disputes 
if requested; additional costs could be 
covered by the party requesting three 
panelists. 
 
Registries 
stakeholder group 
No change (p178)  
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Comparison of GNSO Constituency comments on DAG v.5 to policy changes in DAG v.6 
Comment Raised by Addressed in next DAG?  
The URS is not a rapid process and takes nearly 
as long as using the UDRP with a higher burden 
of proof. The URS provides little certainty: Even 
if the trademark owner wins by default, 
Registrant can seek de novo review up to 2 years 
after suspension. The suspension is temporary 
and only takes place for “balance of registration” 
period with option to extend for one year at 
commercial rates. The URS places brand owners 
in a perpetual monitoring situation with no 
permanent ability to transfer the domain name. 
With a 5,000 word limit, the URS winds up being 
a lengthy process with little certainty for brand 
owners. 
BC No (323)  
Trademark Clearinghouse is not a real “remedy” 
but is essentially just a database. A sunrise Period 
will encourage defensive registrations at high 
prices,especially because ICANN fails to impose 
any price cap on sunrise fees. The optional 
Trademark Claims service provides a warning 
notice to a potential domain name registrant, but 
applies only to “identical marks” so the value of 
the warning is limited. The service does not 
notify based on broader matching requirements 
called for by the BC. Because this service is 
entirely optional, it is unknown how many new 
registries would offer any warning service. 
Moreover, trademark owners wind up bearing all 
costs associated with the clearinghouse. 
BC No (p305) 
The Trademark Post Delegation Dispute 
Procedure contains unrealistically high burdens 
of proof at both the first and second level. The 
levels of proof actually exceed showing bad faith 
(must show “specific bad faith”) and a pattern or 
practice of bad faith (must prove “substantial 
pattern and practice” by clear and convincing 
evidence. Even if a complainant wins, there are 
no sanctions against a registry and no 
corresponding duty by ICANN to investigate or 
sanction the Registry. 
BC No (p335) 
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The Guidebook has moved to 'proposed-final' 
form before delivery of an Economic Study of 
costs and benefits. This study is required as one 
of the acknowledged ‘overarching issues’ for the 
introduction of new gTLDs. The Guidebook 
should not be finalised until study results have 
been adequately considered and commented upon 
by stakeholders. 
BC No further studies beyond those 
previously conducted 
There should be a fee reduction for additional 
versions of the applied-for string in IDN scripts 
and other languages. 
BC No 
String Contention Sets shall not include similar 
strings requested by a single applicant seeking 
linguistic variations of the applicant's other 
applied-for string. 
BC No change 
Subject to approval from relevant national 
governments, a single-registrant ('dot brand') 
TLD should be allowed to register both two-letter 
abbreviations and full country and regional 
names at the second level. 
BC 3 characters remains minimum 
string length for ASCII TLDs 
In situations where a single-registrant (dot-brand) 
owns or controls all second level domains, an 
expiration or termination of the Registry 
Agreement may lead to the closure of the gTLD 
or transfer to a new entity by a bankruptcy court 
or administrator instead of transition to a new 
operator. In these circumstances, the registry 
operator has reason to deny transition or transfer 
of registry data to a new operator designated by 
ICANN. 
 
BC Yes: New Clause 6 added to 
Registry Operator Code of 
Conduct:  
“Notwithstanding anything set 
forth in the foregoing, this Code of 
Conduct shall not apply to Registry 
Operator if (i) Registry Operator 
maintains all registrations in the 
TLD for its own use and (ii) 
Registry Operator does not sell, 
distribute or otherwise make 
available to any unaffiliated third 
party any registrations in the TLD. 
[*Note: This draft Section 6 of the 
Registry Operator Code of Conduct 
has been added in response to 
comments received that suggested 
that the Code was not necessary for 
registries in which a single 
registrant uses the TLD solely for 
its own operations and does not sell 
registrations to third parties (e.g. a 
dot-BRAND)]” 
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The Code of Conduct should not restrict dot-
brands from using an owned or closely affiliated 
registrar to register and manage names that it 
controls. (e.g., for divisions, product lines, 
locations, customers, affiliates, etc. ) 
BC Yes: New Clause 6 added to 
Registry Operator Code of Conduct 
(see above) 
Single registrant gTLDs should not be required to 
allow unaffiliated registrants to hold registrations 
in a branded gTLD. Third-party registrations in a 
single registrant gTLD could cause consumer 
confusion and in extreme cases be a vehicle for 
fraud. 
BC Yes: New Clause 6 added to 
Registry Operator Code of Conduct 
(see above) 
 
Brand owners will be kept away from the new 
gTLD process because of the lack of a co-
existence mechanism for brands expressed in the 
top level. The current definition of “similar” is 
ambiguous and provides no guidance to brand 
owners who share close brands with other brand 
owners, all without consumer confusion, e.g. 
UPS and UBS. Due to the uncertainty, brand 
owners will be more likely to resolve their 
problem through the courts rather than 
participating in the ICANN new gTLD process. 
 
IPC Partially – see changes to Registry 
Operator Code of Conduct  
Brand owners will be kept away from the new 
gTLD process because the PAG does not contain 
mechanisms for winding down <.brand> 
registries and focuses on a mandatory transition. 
In the case of brand owners, the risk that its 
<.brand> registry will be transferred to a third-
party presents an unacceptable level of risk for 
loss of trademark control and corresponding 
trademark rights. As a result, the current 
transition contained in the PAG will pose a 
“chilling” effect on the number of brand owners 
who are willing to apply for <.brand> registries. 
 
 
 
 
 
IPC Partially – see changes to Registry 
Operator Code of Conduct 
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The Trademark PDDRP is inadequate in light of 
elimination of vertical separation. ICANN has 
attempted to address the issue of vertical 
integration in PDDRP section of the AGB by 
adding language in Section 6 stating that a 
registry operator is defined to include “entities 
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or 
under common control with a registry operator...” 
However, a further clarification must be added 
that such entities include (but are not limited to) 
any registrar(s) that may be vertically integrated 
with the registry operator in order to specify that 
vertically integrated registries may not attempt to 
shift blame for second-level bad faith actions to 
the registrar. 
IPC No – no significant changes to this 
section 
In most cases, the Trademark Clearinghouse 
should build upon the examination undertaken by 
national trademark offices that evaluate 
trademark applications and issue registrations. 
The United States is alone or nearly alone in 
examining trademark applications for evidence of 
use of the mark, so requiring for a URS 
proceeding (URS § 1.2(f)(i)) or for inclusion in 
the Trademark Clearinghouse 
(Trademark Clearinghouse § 7.3, 7.4) that the 
Complainant prove ownership of a registration 
that has been subjected to substantive evaluation 
for proof of use excludes registrations from 
essentially all other jurisdictions.  
IPC No – while there have been some 
changes to this section, proof of 
use requirement stands  
The malicious conduct measures remain 
insufficient. 
Solution: Develop new mechanisms and improve 
upon existing provisions in the PAG to minimize 
the ability of malicious actors to exploit the DNS 
for illicit purpose and financial gain. 
We urge ICANN to revise the PAG so that 
information about the protections against 
maliciousconduct proposed by the new gTLD 
applicant is explained in enough detail in the 
application process so the community can 
comment appropriately on these measures. 
 
IPC No 
 102 
The PAG fails to adequately address searchable 
WHOIS. 
IPC Debateable. Requirement for 
searchable WHOIS explicitly 
added (A-20) but ‘adequacy’ of 
this provision is subjective.  
Independent Objector (IO) process is ripe for 
abuse and harmful to the global public interest. 
The IO was a staff created policy that was never 
discussed let alone approved by the GNSO. 
NCUC IO provisions stand. However, 
qualification added: “In light of the 
public interest goal noted above, 
the IO shall not object to an 
application unless at least one 
comment in opposition to the 
application is made in the public 
sphere.”  
Important safeguards to prevent abuse and 
“gaming” are lacking from the current IO design.  
For example, there is no requirement that an 
objection  brought by the IO be tied to at least 
one specific party who claims it will be  harmed 
if the TLD goes forward.  Such a requirement is 
necessary to achieve accountability in the new 
TLD process.   
NCUC Yes - qualification added: “In light 
of the public interest goal noted 
above, the IO shall not object to an 
application unless at least one 
comment in opposition to the 
application is made in the public 
sphere.”  
Another feature missing from the IO is 
transparency.  ICANN staff has explained a 
number of times that the IO is intended to 
provide a secret means for governments and 
others to object to a TLD string without having to 
do so  publicly.  For a public governance 
organisation with transparency requirements, 
such a proposal for secret objections cannot 
stand.   
NCUC Yes – see above 
According the explanatory memo on so-called 
Morality and Public Order objections, one of the 
purposes of the IO is “risk mitigation” to ICANN  
We do not support staff’s introduction of “risk 
mitigation strategy” as ICANN’s primary policy 
objective.  
NCUC No 
The IO lacks true independence.  The IO is 
employed by ICANN; likewise the third party 
contracted to select the experts who will 
determine the objection  is also hired by ICANN, 
so there is a lack of neutrality on the part of the 
expert panel. 
NCUC No 
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Latest DAG sees elimination of sufficient time in 
which to respond to URS complaints in the latest 
DAG.  Re-working the negotiated community 
consensus from 21 to 14 days as a timeframe in 
which to respond is concerning as it provides 
inadequate protection to registrants, who may be 
on holidays and unable to find an attorney and 
respond in a reasonable period of time. 
 
NCUC No- response time remains at 14 
days  
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Appendix 4.9: Summary of Public Comments Periods on New gTLDS 
 
PCP 1: First public comments period (8th December 2005 - 3rd February 2006.) 
(For full details of all submitted comments, see http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtlds-pdp-comments/)  
The initial Public Comments Period solicited comment on the Issues Report. 38 public comments 
were received during the PCP period. Of these, eight were off-topic. The rest of the comments 
represented the views of sixteen individual persons or organisations (some posted multiple 
comments).  Additionally, some individuals belonged to more than one organisational group; for 
example, Ross Rader posted some comments as part of a group of registrar constituency members, 
and some comments in his capacity as director of Tucows Inc.  
Appendix 4.9A summarises the key points put forward in the PCP. In this first round of public 
comments, there do not appear to have been any discernible interest blocs; instead, a range of views 
was expressed by commentators from a variety of backgrounds. On the fundamental question of 
whether or not new gTLDs should be introduced, only two of the commentators were clearly opposed 
(George Kirikos and Paul Tattersfield, both of whom represented Internet related businesses / domain 
name owners). Most of those in favour of new gTLDs seemed to envisage a larger scale process than 
the limited TLD introductions seen in 2000 and 2003. However, Caroline G Chicone (IPC) and Ross 
Rader (representing a group of Registrar Constituency members) proposed that new gTLDs should be 
introduced in limited numbers only, while a submission from the former DNSO General Assembly 
advocated further research to ascertain the level of demand for new TLDs before proceeding. Chicone 
also reiterated the IPC position that any new gTLDs should be sponsored and must be clearly 
differentiated from existing TLDs. Ross Rader, Werner Staub (Internet Council of Registrars) and Jeff 
Williams (Information Network Engineers) proposed an open-ended rather than ‘rounds’ based 
application process.       
On the question of selection criteria for the new namespaces, most comments seemed to 
favour these being limited mainly to technical criteria. However, Danny Younger (a 
technology writer and former Chair of the DNSO General Assembly) did imply that certain 
strings ought to be reserved when he conceded that certain namespaces, such as .gay or .god, 
might create more controversy than they were worth.  Younger, Rader and Chicone all raised 
the need to examine the issue of intellectual property rights in TLD strings. Staub argued that 
TLD applicants should be backed by a sizeable community, while Rader and Lowenhaupt 
believed any community TLDs should be backed by clear and demonstrable support from the 
relevant community.      
 
With regards to allocation methods, there was little support for some of the possible systems 
mooted in the Issues Report (auctions, lotteries, ballots, first-come-first-served and 
comparative evaluations). Several comments argued against lotteries or auctions as 
mechanism for deciding between contending applicants. Elmar Knipp (online business 
owner), Caroline Chicone and Werner Staub (Internet Council of Registrars) argued in favour 
of comparative evaluations. George Kirikos proposed a rather complex ‘ascension allocation 
method’ whereby a prospective new TLD would have to ‘prove’ itself as a second-level 
domain before being ‘promoted’, but this did not attract any support from the other posters. 
Thomas Lowenhaupt (potential new TLD applicant) and Ross Rader favoured applicants 
being subject to financial checks to ensure ability to run a registry.    
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On the issue of contractual conditions, Edward Hasbrouck (online business owner) argued that TLD 
operators had consistently failed to respect contractual limitations on their delegated 
authority. He commented that experience from the previous rounds of TLD expansion 
demonstrated the need to make rules explicit; for ICANN to exercise better oversight over 
compliance with these rules; and to establish mechanisms for resolution of complaints of 
non-compliance. Along similar lines, Ross Rader identified a great need for standardisation 
of registry contracts; however, Werner Staub argued in favour of differentiated treatment of 
TLDs with regard to application of ICANN policies. Rader also advocated mandatory data 
escrow and operational continuity provisions be included in the contract, as a safeguard 
against business failure of a registry. Danny Younger argued against sunrise periods for new 
TLDS and was supported in this by Karl Auerbach (former ICANN At-Large Director) and 
‘kidsearch’ (online business owner).   
 
PCP 2: Second public comments period (20th February - 13th March 2006) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtlds-pdp-initial-
report/.) 
A second Public Comments period was opened between 20th February and 13th March 2006 to solicit 
comments on the Draft Initial Report, to which 7 responses were submitted by 7 individual posters.  
Seven comments were received. Of the the seven commentators, Matthias Jungbauer (TLD 
Consultant), Mike Norton (CEO, Plumb Technologies, Inc.), Fuad Firudinbayli (AzHINet" Co. Ltd) 
and Stephen Castle (Decision Systems Plus Inc.) represented Internet-related businesses. The 
backgrounds of Alex Osipov, Danna Humphreys and ‘JHBX’ could not be ascertained. Only two of 
the comments submitted really appeared meaningful to the debate. Of the other five, Alex Osipov 
merely made a few suggestions for new TLDs he would like to see, such as .dog and .sex;  Fuad 
Firudinbayli enquired  about the possibilities of securing .inaz; Danna Humphreys suggested allowing 
new top-level domain names based upon the 3 letter city codes used for airports; JHBX posted a 
mostly incomprehensible rant that seemed to be demanding .rs for the ‘Republic of Srpska’, a quasi-
state entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Stephen Castle posted a comment regarding the litigation over 
Verisign’s continued control over the .com registry, which was not relevant to this issue. 
Matthias Jungbauer argued that registration fees for names under the new TLDs should not be higher 
during any sunrise period. Mike Norton argued that there was no need for a host of new domain 
names such as .ibm as these were perfectly well catered for as second-level domains.  
There were no really comprehensive responses to the issues covered in the Draft Initial Report.  
 
 
 
 
 106 
PCP 3: Third Public Comments Period: 9th-29thAugust 2006  
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/newgtlds-comments/)  
 
Another public comments period was held between 9th and 29th August 2006, following publication of 
the finalised Initial Report in July. 12 public comments were submitted during this period by 10 
individual posters, although a further two were submitted just before the start of the official comments 
period on 7th August 2006.  
Appendix 4.9B summarises the main points raised in the PCP. Once again, the positions taken by 
commentators do not seem to divide up into distinct blocs based on their backgrounds, though some 
of their proposals were predictable, such as the IPC’s backing for trademark protections. There was no 
outright opposition to new gTLDs, but still considerable debate on how to proceed. Philip Sheppard of 
the Business Constituency argued that all new gTLDs should be chartered or sponsored; he also 
favoured IDN TLDs, along with Paul Tattersfield of GPM Group, an IT consultancy company. Dirk 
Krischenowski, another potential gTLD applicant, did not oppose IDN gTLDs in principle but warned 
against allowing the new gTLD PDP to be delayed by waiting for the outcome of the IDN process.  
Three commentators, including a potential gTLD applicant, argued that large application fees should 
be levied in order to ensure the financial capability of the applicant, but this was opposed by 
‘namecritic’ (Chris McElroy of the Kidsearch Network, another potential gTLD applicant).  Michael 
Heltzer (IPC) and Philip Sheppard supported the Initial Report’s proposal that applicants should be 
required to demonstrate their financial capability to operate a TLD, while ‘namecritic’ felt that 
selection criteria should be limited to technical criteria only.  Heltzer, Sheppard and Ray Fassett (no 
stated affiliation) supported the Initial Report’s recommendation that new TLDs must offer a clearly 
differentiated namespace from existing TLDs; however this was opposed by Bhavin Turakhia (CEO 
of a Web products company) and the ALAC representatives. Only two commentators mentioned the 
possible allocation methods discussed in the Report; Krischenowski favoured auctions or lotteries, 
while Heltzer argued for comparative evaluations. Krischenowski, Heltzer and Tattersfield 
encouraged formation of TLDs for communities, a concept which the GNSO’s Report had expressed 
interest in.     
Danny Younger was highly critical of the whole PDP and expressed a belief that public comments 
were not being taken properly into account. Similarly, Jeff Williams stated that there was no real 
open, bottom up representation in ICANN or the GNSO, leaving no method of determining if there 
was any real consensus.  
PCP 4: Public Comments Period on the Final Report (10th - 30th August 2007)  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtldfinalreport-
2007/mail2.html)  
 
A Public Comments Period on the Final Report was held between the 9th and the 29th of 
August 2007. 65 comments were submitted to the public comment forum during this period 
by 60 individual posters. 19 further comments were submitted after the official end of the 
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PCP. A synopsis of these public comments, authored by Public Participation Manager Kieren 
McCarthy, was released to the Committee for consideration. 
 
Appendix 4.9C summarises the major points raised in the PCP. Only one commentator opposed the 
principle of new gTLDs outright. However, the majority of the comments submitted this time around 
were critical of at least some of the Recommendations in the Final Report. 23 posts, all entitled 
"ICANN should confine itself to technical and operational matters", contained identical text. This post 
argued that ICANN should not try to regulate morality and public order on the Internet (referring to 
Recommendation 6) and that the proposed policy would apply trademark law “in ways that are 
completely unprecedented in any national law or international treaty” (referring to Recommendation 
20). Several other comments were submitted with different headings but very similar text, again 
referring to Recommendations 6 and 20. This large number very similar of critical comments appear 
to have been the result of a campaign by www.keep-the-net-neutral.org, and therefore the comments 
board appears skewed towards critical comment at first glance.  
Nonetheless, some other posters, including some who had been commenting on the process in 
earlier PCPs, were likewise critical of the recommendations and also of the policymaking 
process itself.  R.J. Glass of the US At-Large group opposed an unlimited number of new 
TLDs that, he felt, would do little more than replicate the service already available in existing 
TLDs; he argued that ICANN should go back to the drawing board and identify what types of 
new namespaces were really necessary. Karl Auerbach, a former ICANN director, criticised 
the proposals for going beyond ICANN’s technical mandate; he argued that the sole criteria 
for approving a TLD applicant should be whether that applicant was willing and able to abide 
by broadly accepted and practiced written technical standards and practices for domain name 
servers. Dan Krimm (an IT professional of no stated affiliation) similarly believed that 
ICANN had no jurisdiction to make policy over non-technical matters such as morality and 
public order. On the other hand, there was also some praise; for example, Dirk 
Krischenowski of dotberlin, a potential TLD applicant, who had been commenting on the 
process from the beginning, expressed his satisfaction with the proposals of the Final Report 
 
Appendix 4.11 compares the main recommendations of the Final Report to the views expressed in the 
PCP. There was neither overwhelming support nor strong opposition for most of the 
recommendations; however, the morality and public order (MAPO) provisions were opposed by ten 
individuals (as well as the 41 people who submitted the ‘standard’ email from keep-the-net-
neutral.org). The issue of intellectual property rights protections also aroused significant discussion, 
with six commentators (including IPC and BC representatives) arguing in favour of stronger 
trademark proections and four others (three of whom represented online free speech organisations) 
opposing this.  
 
In summary, this public comments period shows a mixed reaction to the Final Report, with the main 
criticisms revolving around ICANN’s proposals to include ‘non-technical’ selection criteria, 
particularly ‘morality’ and trademark related criteria as well as business plans, and also the proposed 
trademark challenge procedure. Some of the most scathing criticisms, however, came not from 
directly interested stakeholders but from ‘civil society’ figures such as Auerbach and Glass. 
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PCP 5: Public comments period on DAG v1 (24 October – 15 December 2008) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments-
en.htm)  
The Public Comments Period  on the first iteration of the Draft Applicant Guidebook attracted 
considerably more interest than any of the previous PCPs. 180 comments were submitted by 146 
individual posters.  
Of these, 31 posters opposed the concept of new gTLDs outright. Although this represents only 21% 
of the total posters, it undermines the claim that there was a ‘consensus’ in favour of new gTLDs. A 
further four posters recommended that new TLDs should be introduced in strictly limited numbers 
only. Those opposing new gTLDs mostly represented trademark owners, trademark lawyers or 
organisations set up to represent intellectual property interests. Additionally, 41 posters (again mostly 
representing trademark interests) called for stronger trademark protection mechanisms before any new 
gTLDs were introduced.  
Appendix 4.9D summarises some of the key arguments and proposals raised in the PCP. One of the 
most strongly supported proposals was the call for a reserved names list upon which trademark 
owners could register their marks, rendering these unavailable for registration as TLD strings; this 
was backed by 28 posters, again mostly trademark interests (and opposed by one poster). Another 
fairly controversial issue was the proposed level of fees, which 25 posters argued were too high (and 
one poster supported). Those opposing high fees represented a range of interests, including current 
and prospective registries, registrars, an Arab League technical task force, the NCUC, an EU 
politician and several Internet related businesses and business organisations.  A few other posters 
advocated reduced fees for particular types of organisation, such as community applications (four 
supporters) and ‘closed’ corporate TLDs (one supporter).  The issue of whether price caps for second-
level registrations should be included in new registry contracts also generated significant discussion, 
with 17 posters from a range of (mostly commercial) backgrounds favouring price caps for all 
registries and a further two favouring price caps for larger registries. 15 posters, again from a range of 
(mostly commercial) backgrounds argued in favour of a ‘thick WHOIS’ model being specified in 
registry contracts. 
As Appendix 4.9D shows, many of the points raised in this PCP were not resolved in DAG v2, but a 
few were. Nine posters had argued that what constitutes a ‘community’ needed to be better defined; 
the next iteration of the DAG saw some modification on the definitions and purpose of community as 
opposed to open TLDs. There was some change to the fee structure, with credit towards the 
application fee given for qualified 2000 round applicants and reduced annual registry fees. Nine 
posters had argued that the standard for String Confusion should not be limited to “visually” similar; 
the next DAG added more language to distinguish when different similarity checks are made (visual, 
aural, meaning); clarified the relationship between string confusion objections and contention between 
similar strings; and described improvements to the algorithm for testing visual similarity. Another 
point that was addressed in the next version of the DAG concerned the status of dispute resolution 
panel decisions; eight commentators had argued that these should be binding rather than advisory on 
ICANN. In the next draft of the DAG ICANN explained that it will “accept” the determination and 
advice of the panel (though some commentators still found this wording ambiguous). Finally, six 
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people asserted in this PCP that three member panels should be an option for LRO disputes; this 
became the case in DAG v2.   
Furthermore, following this PCP, ICANN staff identified a set of four ‘overarching issues’ for further 
study, including: trademark protection; TLD demand and economic analysis; security, stability and 
root zone scaling; and potential for malicious conduct.This was endorsed by the Board, which set up 
the Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT) to examine trademark issues in particular.91 
PCP 6: Public comments period on DAG v2  (18 February – 13 April 2009) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/2gtld-guide/)  
The PCP on the second iteration of the DAG attracted 126 comments submitted by 99 individual 
posters.  
21 posters, just over a fifth of the total, opposed the concept of new gTLDs outright. A further seven 
posters recommended that new TLDs should be introduced in strictly limited numbers only. As in the 
previous PCP, those opposing new gTLDs mostly represented trademark owners, trademark lawyers 
or organisations set up to represent intellectual property interests. In addition, 30 posters (again 
mostly representing trademark interests) called for stronger trademark protection mechanisms before 
any new gTLDs were introduced.  
Again, there were also number of other proposals / arguments about the specifics of the DAG that 
were backed by a significant number of posters (see Appendix 4.9E). As in the previous PCP, there 
was considerable support for a reserved trademark names list, a proposal backed by 21 posters, again 
mostly trademark interests (and opposed by one poster). The proposed level of fees was again 
somewhat controversial; 18 posters argued they were too high. Again, those arguing for lower 
application fees came from a range of backgrounds, including the ALAC, the ITA, current and 
prospective registries, registrars and several Internet related businesses and business organisations.  
The issue of whether price caps for second-level registrations should be included in new registry 
contracts again generated significant discussion, with 10 posters from a range of (mostly commercial) 
backgrounds favouring price caps. 14 posters, again from a range of (mostly commercial) 
backgrounds argued in favour of a ‘thick WHOIS’ model being specified in registry contracts.  
Again, a few of the points raised in the PCP were addressed in the following version of the DAG, 
though as Appendix 4.9E shows, the majority were not. The subsequent DAG made significant 
concessions to the trademark lobby including the URS, PDDRP and strong WHOIS, while the 
trademark clearinghouse proposal was passed to the GNSO for consideration. 8 people in this PDP 
had called specifically for a notice and takedown procedure for abusive domains, a function the URS 
was intended to fulfil. Another point that found some degree of resolution in the next DAG concerned 
variable pricing for second-level domain name registrations; 10 people had opposed this in this PCP, 
and the subsequent DAG stipulated that registry operators ‘shall offer all domain registration renewals 
at the same price, unless the registrant agrees to a higher price at the time of the initial registration of 
the domain name following clear and conspicuous disclosure of such renewal price by Registry 
Operator.’ 
 
                                                          
91 http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-06mar09.htm  
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PCP 7: Public comments period on DAG v3  (4 October – 24 November 2009)  
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/3gtld-guide/)  
The PCP on DAG v3 attracted 156 comments submitted by 131 distinct posters.  
11 posters, or 8 % of the total, opposed new TLDs outright, a substantially reduced percentage 
compared to PCPs on earlier versions of the DAG. 7 posters called for a limited number of new 
gTLDs only. Again, most of the opposition to new gTLDs came from trademark holders and / or their 
representatives. Despite the concessions to trademark protection in DAG 3, such as the trademark 
clearinghouse and strong WHOIS, 21 posters still  claimed that trademark protection was inadequate; 
again, these mostly represented the trademark lobby.   
Conversely, 53 posters called for the new gTLDs programme to go forward as soon as possible. 
However, examination of these posts shows that the wording used was very similar in most cases, 
suggesting that a large number of them were either ‘template’ posts sent as part of an online 
campaign, or else created by a single individual (or small group of individuals) with multiple ‘sock 
puppet’ ICANN public comment accounts.   
As shown in Appendix 4.9F, various other issues attracted significant discussion. 14 posters argued 
that the trademark clearinghouse did not represent a proper reserved trademarks list, and called for a 
true reserved trademarks list to be implemented. Again, these were mostly trademark holders.  
Some of the issues that attracted significant discussion in previous PCPs, however, appear to have 
been mostly resolved. Only four posters argued that the proposed level of fees was too high, 
significantly less than the number who raised this issue in previous DAGs. Section 2.10 of DAG3 
appeared to satisfy most of those who had been calling for price caps for second-level domain 
registrations; in this PCP only three posters argued that this provision did not go far enough and that 
‘hard’ caps were still required.  
As with the previous PCP, most of the points raised in this PCP were not resolved in the subsequent 
issue of the DAG, but several were. Two people in this PCP argued in favour of sunrise periods; the 
subsequent DAG stipulated that the registry operator must implement, at a minimum, either a Sunrise 
period or a Trademark Claims service during the start-up phases for registration in the TLD.  6 people 
in this PDP felt that the URS should be compulsory, not just a ‘best practice’; this was implemented in 
DAG v4. Five posters argued that the objection filing period should be extended; in the subsequent 
DAG it was increased to 5½  months. There were some further concessions for those asking for 
stronger trademark protections, particularly the introduction of the trademark clearinghouse, and also 
a ‘thick WHOIS’ model which was specifically requested by 14 people in this PDP. DAG v4 also 
permitted a limited degree of cross-ownership between registries and registrars, which had been 
supported by two posters (and opposed by one) in this PDP. The subsequent DAG also provided more 
clarification on how ‘expert panels’ would be formed, which was requested by three people in this 
PDP.  
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PCP 8: Public comments period on DAG v.4 (28 May-21 July 2010) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/4gtld-guide/) 
The PCP on DAG v4 produced 130 comments from 111 individual posters.  
As shown in Appendix 4.9G, in this PCP, the opposition to new gTLDs appears to have largely 
melted away; only 6 posters, or 5% of the total, opposed new TLDs outright, with two others calling 
for a limited introduction only. However, 20 posters still claimed that trademark protection was 
inadequate; again, these mostly consisted of trademark owners and their representatives. Conversely, 
no posters called for the new gTLDs programme to go forward as soon as possible, compared to 53 
making the same demand in the last PCP; this further supports the suspicion that the apparent surge in 
support for the early introduction of new TLDs in the previous PCP was artificially engineered.  
12 posters argued that the trademark clearinghouse did not represent a proper reserved trademarks list, 
and called for a true reserved trademarks list to be implemented. Again, these were mostly trademark 
holders. In addition, 15 posters, again mostly representing the trademark lobby, called for the Uniform 
Rapid Suspension mechanism for abusive domains to be strengthened. 
As with the last PCP, some of the other issues that attracted substantial comment in earlier versions of 
the DAG appear to have largely been settled. Only four posters on this occasion believed that the 
proposed level of fees was too high (with a further four proposing differentiated fees for different 
application types). Similarly, in this PCP only one posters argued in favour of  ‘hard’ price caps for 
second level domain registrations (and one other opposed this view).   
Only a few of the points raised in this PCP were resolved in the subsequent issue of the DAG. Five 
people had argued that preventing any ICANN-accredited registrar from providing assistance of any 
kind to prospective new gTLD applicants goes too far would unfairly exclude applicants intending to 
use registrar expertise to help them build their application; this was resolved in DAG v5, which 
allowed ICANN accredited registrars to apply for a gTLD.  Finally, four people had objected in this 
PCP to the proposal to conduct background checks in this area of terrorism, which was argued to be 
unacceptable without any definition of what constituted terrorism. In the subsequent DAG the term 
‘terrorism’ was removed from the relevant section.  
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PCP 9: Public comments period on DAG  v.5 (12 November 2010-15 January 2011) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/)  
 
The PCP on version 5 of the DAG saw 145 mails submitted by 96 individual posters.  
As shown in Appendix 4.9H, 13 posters opposed new TLDs outright, an increase compared to the 
previous PCPs but still representing only 14% of the total, down from approximately one-fifth of 
posters opposing new TLDs in the PCPs on DAGs v1 and v2. Additionally 2 posters called for a 
limited number of new gTLDs only, while 11 posters called for new gTLDs to go ahead as soon as 
possible. As in previous PCPs, most of the opposition to new gTLDs came from trademark holders 
and / or their representatives. 28 posters still claimed that trademark protection was inadequate; again, 
these mostly represented the trademark lobby.  Regarding some of the specifics of trademark 
protection, this time around no posters argued that the trademark clearinghouse did not represent a 
proper reserved trademarks list. 5 posters called for reinstatement of strong WHOS, which was 
included in DAGs v3 and v4 but dropped for DAG v5. 8 posters called for modification / 
strengthening of the URS.  
On this occasion, no posters argued that the proposed level of fees was too high or called for ‘hard’ 
caps on second-level domain name registrations. 7 posters criticised ICANN for its u-turn on registry / 
registrar vertical integration, a decision they found to be arbitrary and lacking in transparency.  
 
PCP 10: Public comments period on DAG v.6  (15 April 2011-15 May 2011)   
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/)  
 
This PCP attracted 69 posts submitted by 65 posters.  
 
As shown in Appendix 4.9I, only three posters continued to oppose the principle of new TLDs 
outright, while 8 argued in favour of introducing only a limited number of new TLDs. 19 posters 
continued to argue that trademark protections were inadequate. 8 posters argued in favour of 
launching the application process without further delay, while 8 others opposed this.  
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Appendix 4.9A: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (8
th 
December 2005 - 3
rd
 February 
2006.) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments, see http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtlds-pdp-comments/)  
 
Comment / proposal  Proposed / supported by Opposed by  
Outright opposition to new 
gTLDs  
Paul Tattersfield 
(gpmgroup.com) (implied but 
not specifically stated) 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith 
Financial Services)  
Implicitly opposed by all those 
who made proposals for new 
gTLDs policy. Explicit 
arguments in favour of new 
gTLDs made by: 
Thomas Lowenhaupt 
Ross Rader (Registrar 
constituency members / Tucows 
Inc.) 
Werner Staub (CORE Internet 
Council of Registrars) 
Elmar Knipp (Knipp  Medien 
und Kommunikation GmbH) 
 
‘kidsearch’(Kidsearch Network)  
 
Matthias Jungbauer (Top Level 
Domain Consulting) 
New gTLDs should be 
introduced in limited numbers 
only 
Ross Rader (Registrar 
constituency members) 
(supports possibly hundreds of 
TLDs but not tens of thousands) 
Caroline G. Chicoine (IPC) 
‘kidsearch’(Kidsearch Network) 
 
Application process should be 
ongoing as opposed to ‘rounds’ 
based 
Ross Rader (Tucows Inc.) 
Werner Staub (CORE Internet 
Council of Registrars)   
Jeff Williams 
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Support for sunrise periods  Ross Rader (Tucows Inc.) 
Jeff Williams 
‘kidsearch’ (Kidsearch 
Network) 
Support for auctions as a 
method of resolving string 
contention 
Ross Rader / Registrar 
constituency members 
Ross Rader (Tucows Inc.) 
Caroline G. Chicoine (IPC) 
Elmar Knipp (Knipp  Medien 
und Kommunikation GmbH) 
 
Danny Younger 
 
Jeff Williams 
Support for comparative 
evaluation as a method of 
resolving string contention 
Werner Staub (CORE Internet 
Council of Registrars)   
Caroline G. Chicoine (IPC) 
Elmar Knipp (Knipp  Medien 
und Kommunikation GmbH) 
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Appendix 4.9B: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (9
th
-29
th
August 2006)  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/newgtlds-comments/)  
 Proposal / comment Proposed / supported by Opposed by  
Large application fees should be 
levied in order to ensure 
financial capability of applicant 
Bhavin Turakhia (Directi) 
(states fees should be 
sufficiently high to ‘ensure that 
the applicant is serious about 
the registry business’) 
Dirk Krischenowski 
(dotBERLIN GmbH) 
Paul Tattersfield 
‘namecritic’ (Chris McElroy, 
Kidsearch Network) 
 
New gTLDs should be clearly 
differentiated from existing 
gTLDs 
Michael Heltzer (IPC)  
Philip Sheppard (BC) 
Ray Fassett 
Bhavin Turakhia (Directi) 
Wendy Seltzer and John 
Levine (North American 
Representatives to the 
Interim ALAC) 
The formation of TLDs for 
communities  should be 
encouraged 
Dirk Krischenowski 
(dotBERLIN GmbH) 
Michael Heltzer (IPC)  
Paul Tattersfield 
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Appendix 4.9C: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (10
th
 - 30
th
 August 2007)  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtldfinalreport-
2007/mail2.html)  
Proposal / comment Proposed/ supported by Opposed by 
Standard email or variation 
thereof drawn from keep-the-
net-neutral.org, opposing 
Recommendations 6 and 20 
Joshua Kish  
Antony Schofield  
Kelly Garbato  
Zachary S. Parsons  
Shane Page  
Tracy Sanford  
Richard Jones  
David Marcus  
Warren Vinzant  
William L Landahl III  
Janine Meunier  
Susan Stuart  
Benjamin Gemmill 
Brian O'Kelley  
Keith Weng 
Meinrad Nell 
Ken Lohento 
Marc Manthey 
Marco Barreno   
Jesse Faught  
Jeff Flack  
Carl Stewart  
Michael Keller  
Johan Johansen  
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Tom Rossen  
Phillip Cripps  
Mike Gustine 
Charles Hall   
Fabrizio Colaianni  
Ian Marshall  
Kenan Dalley  
Renee Piraino  
John Piotrowski  
Joshua D. Auter  
Steven Dale  
Patrick Coulson  
Paul Yates  
'Andy'  
Walter Moczygemba   
Kevin Henry 
John Chandler Meline   
 
MAPO provisions should be 
removed 
Dan Krimm 
Robin Gross (IP Justice) 
Kimberley Heitman (Electronic 
Frontiers Australia Inc) 
Tapani Tarvainen (Electronic 
Frontier Finland) 
Bo Register 
Marjorie Heins (Free 
Expression Policy Project)   
Dave Lindbergh (Hooke 
Laboratories, Inc.)    
Aaron Woolf 
 
 118 
 
Milton L Mueller   
(Plus the 41 people who sent in 
the standard email from keEp-
the-net-neutral.org) 
 
 
Criteria should be limited to 
technical and operational 
matters only. Current proposals 
are too extensive and stray into 
areas beyond ICANN’s remit.  
Dan Krimm 
Karl Auerbach 
Bo Register 
 
Werner Staub   
Intellectual property rights 
protections are inadequate and 
need to be strengthened 
Mike Rodenbaugh (BC) 
Michael D. Palage 
Seth Finkelstein 
Judith Lammers (BITKOM) 
Steve Metalitz 
Cyril Chua (IPC). 
 
Robin Gross (IP Justice)   
Kimberley Heitman (Electronic 
Frontiers Australia Inc) 
Tapani Tarvainen (Electronic 
Frontier Finland) 
Dan Krimm 
Application fees should be high 
to deter frivolous applications  
Judith Lammers (BITKOM) Thomas Lowenhaupt 
Milton L Mueller 
Requirement that only ICANN-
accredited registrars be used 
should be removed 
Michael D. Palage 
北京IDC网 BeijingIDC.com 
李光皓/ Guanghao Li 
Vittorio Bertola (assuming 
registry-registrar separation is 
maintained) 
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Appendix 4.9D: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (24 October – 15 December 2008) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments-
en.htm)  
Comment / proposal  Proposed by (Poster name / 
affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster name / 
affiliation)  
Outright opposition to new TLDs – 
programme should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed to allow 
more time for study of issues 
Emilie Dessens, Domainoo 
society 
Oscar A. Robles-Garay, NIC 
Mexico (ccTLD registry) 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
 
Jonathan Robinson, Netnames  
David Fares, News Corporation 
Robert Fernandez  
Olive Gretchen, Corporation 
Service Company (CSC) 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
Autumn Lotze, Retail Industry 
Leaders Association 
Paul Tattersfield, Grange Project 
Management Group 
Jolene A Neby, Ameriprise 
Financial 
Mark Bohannon, Software & 
Information Industry Association 
(SIIA) 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Philip Lodico, Fairwinds Partners 
(Internet strategy consultants)  
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc. 
(corporate domain name registrar) 
Implicitly opposed by those 
comments that did not 
express any opposition to 
new gTLDs in principle. 
Explicit arguments in favour 
of the principle of new 
gTLDs put forward by:  
Richard Tindal, Demand 
Media 
Mike O'Connor, haven2.com  
Neal Krawetz, Hacker Factor 
Solutions 
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Kevin Rupy, USTelecom 
Gretchen Lohmann, National 
Cable & Telecommunications 
Association 
Natasha, Lipkina, HP.com 
Dan Jaffe, Association of 
National Advertisers 
Jonathan Robinson, NetNames 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
(European Association of Trade  
Mark Owners) 
Aimee Nolan, W.W. Grainger, 
Inc 
Thomas M. Blasey, ITT 
Corporation 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America  Corporation 
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Denise Yee (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc. 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
Furrer Urs, economiesuisse 
Enoch Kim, contessa.com 
Ray Robertson , Tyndall Federal 
Credit Union (but apparently 
submitted in a personal capacity) 
Abdulaziz Al-Zoman, SaudiNIC   
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If new gTLDs go ahead, it should be 
only in limited numbers 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency  
Peter Ford, Microsoft 
(recommends slow, phased 
deployment) 
Marc-Anthony Signorino   
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
 
Community based applications should 
go forward ahead of other types 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency  
Claudio Digangi  
Gayle C. Sullivan, AT&T 
Marc-Anthony Signorino  
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
David Klein DHK Enterprises, 
Inc. 
Asociación PuntoGal (Gallic 
community group / prospective 
registrar for .gal TLD) 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
 
What constitutes a ‘community’ needs 
to be better defined  
Christopher G. Martin, United 
States Council for International 
Business 
Steven  Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
Sanjiv Sarwate, Pattishall 
McAuliffe (IP lawyers) 
David Daugherty, Software & 
Information Industry Association 
(SIIA) 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA) 
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Werner Staub, CORE 
‘oueichek’ Arab Team for 
Domain Names and Internet 
Issues (Intergovernmental / Arab 
League team)  
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
Milton L Mueller, 
Noncommercial Users 
Constituency (NCUC) 
Trademark protections are inadequate  Jonathan Robinson, Netnames 
Olive Gretchen, Corporation 
Service Company (CSC) 
Gayle Sullivan, AT&T 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, 
National Association of 
Manufacturers (Formerly the 
American Electronics 
Association) 
P McGrady, GT Law (on behalf 
of an ‘undisclosed client’)   
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
Heidi C.Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
Claudio Di Gangi, International 
Trademark Association  
Steven Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
Autumn Lotze, Retail Industry 
Leaders Association  
Paul Smocer, BITS (financial 
services) 
Sanjiv Sarwate, Pattishall 
McAuliffe (IP lawyers)  
Jolene A Neby, Ameriprise 
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Financial 
Daniel A Nooger, The Hearst 
Media Corporation  
David Daugherty, Software & 
Information Industry Association 
(SIIA) 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc.  
David Taylor, Lovells LLP 
Kevin Rupy, USTelecom 
Gretchen Lohmann, National 
Cable & Telecommunications 
Association 
Lori Cordell 
Steven Metalitz, IPC 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Michael Palage 
Jonathan Robinson, NetNames 
Nick Wood, MARQUES, the 
European Association of Trade 
Mark Owners 
Brian Hedquist, Cyveillance, Inc. 
Diane Hamer, BBC   
Thomas M. Blasey, ITT 
Corporation 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT  
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
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Dara Jeffries 
Yolanda Busse, Oehen Mendes & 
Assoc. 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara).Visa Inc 
Dan Poliak, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
Furrer Urs, economiesuisse 
Edwin van Staden, GE Money  
Andy Coombs, International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. 
Ken Abbott, Gemalto 
Jim Bikoff, Silverberg, Goldman 
& Bikoff, LLP (On behalf of 
International Olympic 
Committee)  
Robert S Raines, Chevron 
Corporation 
Anne-Mette Holm Madsen , 
LEGO Juris AS 
Wendy Chan 
Aimee Nolan W.W. Grainger, 
Inc 
 
Proposal for ‘reserved trademarks’ list 
on which trademark owners can 
register their marks, rendering these 
unavailable as TLD strings MOD 3  
Jonathan Robinson, Netnames 
(Registrar)  
David Fares, News Corporation 
Susan Kawaguchi, eBay 
Olive Gretchen, Corporation 
Service Company (CSC) 
Phil Corwin Internet 
Commerce Association (says 
it would go well beyond 
existing trademark law)  
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Claudio Digangi (no stated  
affiliation) 
Gayle C. Sullivan, AT&T 
Fabrici Vayra, Time Warner 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
Steven  Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
Sanjiv Sarwate, Pattishall 
McAuliffe (IP lawyers) 
Christian  Merida, US Chamber 
of Commerce 
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc. 
(corporate domain name registrar) 
Kevin Rupy, USTelecom 
Lori  Cordell (no stated 
affiliation) 
Michael Palage (no stated 
affiliation) 
Thomas M. Blasey, ITT 
Corporation 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
Denise Yee (Kuwabara), Visa Inc 
Andy Coombs, International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
Anne-Mette Holm Madsen, 
LEGO Juris AS 
Wendy Chan, Nike 
McGradyP, GT Law (on behalf of 
an ‘undisclosed client’)   
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Jolene A Neby, Ameriprise 
Financial 
Philip Lodico, Fairwinds Partners 
(Internet strategy consultants) 
Steven Metalitz, Intellectual 
Property Consituency 
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith 
Financial Services)  
Application, evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal fees are too 
high, not justified and represent a 
barrier to entry for some groups   
Oscar A. Robles-Garay, NIC 
Mexico(ccTLD registry)  
 
Patrick Vande Walle   
 
Richard Tindal, Demand 
Media(renewal fees only)  
P McGrady, GT Law (on behalf 
of an ‘undisclosed client’)   
Claudio Digangi (no stated 
affiliation) 
Clarke D. Walton, Registrar 
constituency 
Jeff Neuman, Neustar Inc. 
Daniel A Nooger, The Hearst 
Corporation 
Antony Van Couvering, 
Names@Work 
Taylor, David Lovells LLP 
Thomas Lowenhaupt, 
Connecting.nyc Inc 
Thomas Lenz, .köln 
‘oueichek;, Arab Team for 
Domain Names and Internet 
Issues (Intergovernmental / Arab 
League team) 
 
Watson, Tom -Legal Bank 
of America Corporation *re 
application fee only -argues 
application fee should be at 
least $500,000 to deter 
‘frivolous’ applications. 
However, also believes fee 
for filing an objection should 
be very low 
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Milton L Mueller, 
Noncommercial Users 
Constituency 
Mike O'Connor, haven2.com  
Dr. Neal Krawetz, Hacker Factor 
Solutions 
Dan Schindler (no stated 
affiliation) 
Dirk Krischenowski, dotcities / 
dotBerlin 
Susan Santaniello, City of New 
York 
Sara Medi / Jill Evans MEP, Plaid 
Cymru   
Roelof Meijer, Stichting Internet 
Domeinregistratie Nederland 
(SIDN) 
Oscar A. Robles Garay, NIC 
Mexico 
Tony Harris, eECOM-LAC, the 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Federation of Internet and  
Electronic Commerce 
Robert S Raines, Chevron 
Corporation 
Vittorio Bertola, bertola.eu 
Fees should be lowered particularly for 
community groups 
David Hutchison, DotSCO 
(Prospective new registry for 
Scots cultural group) 
Aran Jones, dotCYM 
(Prospective new registry for 
Scots cultural group) 
Asociación PuntoGal 
(Prospective new registry for 
Gallic cultural group) 
Vittorio Bertola, bertola.eu 
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Many scripts, like Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean, use ideographs and 
pictographs that are information-rich 
descriptors and not low-information 
alphabets.  This is quite different from 
English, where a single or two 
characters are unlikely to have any 
meaning. Restricting strings to 3 or 
more characters unfairly disadvantages 
these scripts and therefore the 3-
character minimum string rule should 
be removed for these scripts.  
James Seng, APTLD 
Wil Tan, Zodiac 
Yu Yang, China Organizational 
Name Administration Center 
(CONAC) 
Yao Jiankang, Chinese Domain 
Name Consortium 
 
Standard for String Confusion should 
not be limited to “visually” similar.   
 
Claudio Digangi (no stated 
affiliation) 
Paul Smocer BITS (financial 
services) 
Sanjiv Sarwate, Pattishall 
McAuliffe (IP lawyers) 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA) 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
David W. Maher, .org public 
interest registry 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
Vittorio Bertola, bertola.eu 
Mike Rodenbaugh, 
Rodenbaugh Law / Business 
Constituency   
Richard Tindal, Demand 
Media (both argue against 
synonyms, e.g. .car and .auto, 
being covered by string 
similarity rules) 
 
 
The use of string similarity algorithms 
should be accompanied by manual 
reviews  
 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA)   
 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
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Association 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
Mark Davis, Unicode Technical 
Committee (UTC) 
Opposition to auctions as a ‘last resort’ 
method for resolving string contention.  
 
David Fares, News Corporation 
Claudio Digangi  
 ‘oueichek’, Arab Team for 
Domain Names and Internet 
Issues (Intergovernmental / Arab 
League team) 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
Roelof Meijer SIDN (Stichting 
Internet Domeinregistratie 
Nederland) 
Richard Tindal, Demand 
Media 
Multiple objectors to the same 
application should be allowed 
consolidate into a single proceeding 
(for a single fee) (p3-5?) 
David Fares, News Corporation 
Susan Kawaguchi, eBay 
Fabricio  Vayra, Time Warner 
Wendy Chan, Nike 
. 
The decisions of a dispute resolution 
panel from a dispute resolution service 
provider should be binding rather than 
advisory on ICANN 
David Fares, News Corporation 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency  
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
McGradyP, GT Law (on behalf of 
an ‘undisclosed client’)   
Christopher G. Martin, United 
States Council for International 
Business 
Olive Gretchen Corporation 
Service Company (CSC) 
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Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Thomas M. Blasey, ITT 
Corporation 
Trademark sunrise periods required Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
McGradyP, GT Law (on behalf of 
an ‘undisclosed client’)  
Sanjiv Sarwate, Pattishall 
McAuliffe (IP lawyers) 
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT 
Jonathan Robinson Netnames 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank 
of America Corporation 
Notice and takedown procedure for 
abusive domains required  
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency  
Kevin Rupy, USTelecom 
Steven  Metalitz, Intellectual 
Property Constituency 
Andy Coombs, International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. 
. 
Three member panels should be an 
option for LRO disputes  
Susan  Kawaguchi, eBay 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
David Daugherty, Software & 
Information Industry Association 
(SIIA) 
Steven Metalitz, Intellectual 
Property Constituency 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Diane Hamer, BBC   
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Prevailing party in dispute resolution 
should have fee refunded / losing party 
should bear costs 
 
 
 
 
Claudio Digangi (no stated 
affiliation)  
Diane Hamer, BBC    
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT  
Andy Coombs, International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. 
 
MAPO provisions should be scrapped  Richard Tindal, Demand Media 
Phil Corwin, Internet Commerce 
Association (unless ‘narrow and 
clearly articulated criteria for 
such objections’ can be 
established)  
 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
oueichek The Arab team for 
Domain Names and Internet 
Issues 
 
Jonathan Shea, Asia Pacific Top 
Level Domain Organisation 
 
Milton L Mueller, 
Noncommercial Users 
Constituency 
 
 
Objections on trademark grounds 
should not carry a fee 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc. 
(corporate domain name registrar) 
Aimee Nolan, W.W. Grainger, 
Inc 
David Klein, DHK 
Enterprises, Inc. (argues 
objectors should bear the full 
costs both for themselves and 
the applicant, as ‘It is unfair 
to make the applicant the 
subject of a financial war 
during the dispute mediation 
phase’.) 
Applicants should be allowed to apply 
for a ‘family of marks’ and not have to 
pay multiple application fees for each 
one. 
Paul D. McGrady, Greenberg 
Traurig, LLP (on behalf of 
‘undisclosed client)  
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If multiple applicants apply for the 
same string, or similarly infringing 
strings, trademark owners should not 
have to object separately to each 
application  
Nick Wood, MARQUES, the 
European Association of Trade 
Mark Owners 
Dara Jeffries (no stated 
affiliation) 
Yolanda Busse, Oehen Mendes & 
Assoc. 
 
Support for joint ventures as a method 
of resolving string contention 
Richard Tindal, Demand Media 
Susan Kawaguchi, eBay 
Tom Watson, Legal Bank of 
America Corporation 
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT 
Dan Schindler (no stated 
affiliation) 
Rosette, Kristina (no stated 
affiliation) 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency 
 
Setting of variable prices for domain 
names should not be permit ed /price 
caps should be maintained in the new 
TLD registry contracts  
Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh 
Law / Business Constituency  
Charles Christopher (no stated 
affiliation)  
Jonathon Nevett, Network 
Solutions LLC (only if a registry 
has ‘market power’)  
URL Names 
Mike O'Connor, haven2.com  
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
‘Tom’ 
Katherine Pilna, Special Design 
Services Inc. 
Jeremy Sprout (no stated 
affiliation) 
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Dale Craig (no stated affiliation) 
Max Menius, Menius Enterprises, 
Inc.   
Gregory Boulter, Vertical 
Research Corp 
Tom, Kingsnames 
Kevin Ohashi, Ohashi.Info 
Katy Smith (no stated affiliation) 
Michael Castello, Cities Internet 
Network, Inc. 
Kelly Pitts (no stated affiliation) 
 
Thick WHOIS model required Jonathan Robinson, Netnames 
Susan Kawaguchi, eBay 
Olive Gretchen, Corporation 
Service Company (CSC) 
Gayle C. Sullivan, AT&T 
Heidi C. Salow, Internet 
Commerce Coalition 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
David Daugherty, Software & 
Information Industry Association 
(SIIA) 
Christian Merida, US Chamber of 
Commerce 
Margie Milam, MarkMonitor Inc. 
(corporate domain name registrar) 
David Taylor,  Lovells LLP 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
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Jonathan Robinson, NetNames 
Thomas M. Blasey, ITT 
Corporation 
Denise Yee (Kuwabara), Visa Inc 
Andy Coombs, International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
ICANN should not be able to modify 
the registry contract at will  
Jeff Neuman, Neustar Inc. 
David Hutchison, DotSCO 
(Prospective new registry)    
Antony Van Couvering, 
Names@Work 
Dan Schindler (no stated 
affiliation) 
Oscar A. Robles Garay, NIC 
Mexico 
Vittorio Bertola, bertola.eu 
 
Price caps for larger registries only Jeff Neuman, Neustar Inc.  
Ivan Vachovsky, Aplus.Net a.k.a. 
Abacus (registrar)   
 
The Guidebook currently holds a 
provision that an “applicant agrees not 
to challenge, in Court or in any other 
judicial entity, any final decision made 
by ICANN with respect to the 
application, and irrevocably waives 
any right to sue or proceed on the basis 
of any other legal claim against 
ICANN and ICANN affiliated parties 
with respect to the application.” 
ICANN should not be given such 
broad immunity, and applicants should 
not be asked to waive their rights to 
challenge ICANN’s decision in court.  
Autumn Lotze, Retail Industry 
Leaders Association 
Metalitz, Steven, Intellectual 
Property Constituency 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Nick Wood, MARQUES, the 
European Association of Trade 
ark Owners (believes this is not 
ICANN’s intention but the 
wording should be changed) 
Milton L Mueller, 
Noncommercial Users 
Constituency 
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Ryan Foster, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets 
Association 
David W. Maher, Registries 
Constituency 
Robin Gross (no stated affiliation) 
Ownership of a registrar by a registry 
is permissible, but functions should be 
kept separate 
 
Richard Tindal, Demand Media  
Jonathon  Nevett, Network 
Solutions LLC 
Bruce Tonkin, Melbourne IT 
(only in case of single owner 
TLDS, or maybe for small 
registries with a cap of 50,000 
names to be sold total)  
 
Phil Corwin Internet 
Commerce Association 
(exceptions may be 
permissible in some cases) 
Raines, Robert S, Chevron 
Corporation 
Any interested party should have the 
right to object on morality and public 
order grounds. 
Claudio Digangi (no stated 
affiliation) 
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Appendix 4.9E: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (18 February – 13 April 2009) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/2gtld-guide/  
 
Comment / proposal  Proposed / supported  by 
(Poster name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster name / 
affiliation)  
Outright opposition to new TLDs – 
programme should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed to 
allow more time for further study 
Hope D Mehlman, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
Robert D MacDonald, 3M 
David A.Lieber , National 
Business Coalition on E-
Commerce and Privacy 
John Burden, Commerce Garden 
Inc 
Yvette Wojciechowski The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA) 
Paul Smocer, BITS 
Scott Roberts, Khamma Group, 
LLC 
Patrick Martin Flaherty,  
(Padraic), Verizon Corporate 
Resources Group LLC 
Michele Cantley, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
James Crowne, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Claude Gélinas 
Sandra Aistars, Time Warner 
‘Tom’,  Kingsnames 
Ken Ryan 
Ron Jackson 
James M. Bladel, GODADDY 
eCOM-LAC 
Andrew Mack, AMGlobal 
Consulting 
Michele Neylon 
 Blacknight 
Stéphane Van Gelder
 INDOM 
(Presumably also implicitly 
opposed by all those who did 
not argue against new gTLDs) 
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Yee, Denise (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc 
Pochylá Monika, Ministry of 
Industry and Trade of the Czech 
Republic 
Max Menius, Menius 
Enterprises, Inc. 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
Phillip V. Marano,  International 
Olympic Committee 
‘go2ao’ 
Derick Harris 
Gayle Sullivan, AT&T 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, The 
Coalition for Online Trademark 
Protection 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Mike Housman, DomainWeb 
US 
Andrew Allemann 
Jorgen Abild Andersen, 
Ministry of Science Technology 
and Innovation, National IT and 
Telecom Agency, Denmark 
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If new gTLDs go ahead, it should be 
only in limited numbers  
Gayle Sullivan, AT&T 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, The 
Coalition for Online Trademark 
Protection 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Mike Housman, DomainWeb 
US www.DomainWeb.US 
Andrew Allemann 
Jorgen Abild Andersen, 
Ministry of  
Science Technology and 
Innovation, National IT and 
Telecom Agency, Denmark 
 
New gTLDs process should be 
completed and new TLDs launched 
as quickly as possible 
Anthony Harris eCOM-LAC 
(prospective new registrar) 
 
Andrew Mack AMGlobal 
Consulting 
‘dotgal’, Asociación PuntoGal  
James M. Bladel, GODADDY 
eCOM-LAC 
Andrew Mack, AMGlobal 
Consulting 
Michele Neylon, Blacknight 
Stéphane Van Gelder, INDOM 
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Application, evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal fees are too 
high, not justified and represent a 
barrier to entry for some groups   
ALAC 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Roger Castillo, NIC Mexico 
Michael Palage 
David Taylor, Lovells LLP 
Ron Andruff, RNA Partners, 
Inc.   
Katherine Winningham,  City of 
New York 
PuntuEus Elkartea, dotEus 
Konstantinos Komaitis NCUC 
Thomas Lenz, dotKoeln 
‘dotgal’, Asociación PuntoGal  
Thomas Lowenhaupt, 
Connecting.nyc Inc. 
Sophia B 
Thomas Rickert eco, e.V. 
(www.eco.de) 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated  
Sharon Aguayo, International 
Trademark Association 
Jan Barnes, European-American 
Business Council  
Dirk Krischenowski, 
dotBERLIN 
Patrick Vande Walle, ALAC 
(but posting in personal 
capacity) 
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Proposal for ‘reserved trademarks’ 
list on which trademark owners can 
register their marks, rendering these 
unavailable as TLD strings 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Hope D Mehlman. Regions 
Financial Corporation 
Michael Palage 
Andy Coombs International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
Gayle Sullivan,  AT&T 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, The 
Coalition for Online Trademark 
Protection 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA) 
Flaherty, Patrick Martin 
(Padraic) , Verizon Corporate 
Resources Group LLC 
Phil Corwin, Internet Commerce 
Association 
Michele Cantley, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds + 
Machines 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
Daniel A  Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Yee, Denise (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc 
Elisa Cooper, MarkMonitor Inc. 
Phillip V. Marano,  International 
Olympic Committee 
Sharon Aguayo , International 
Richard Tindal, Demand 
Media Inc 
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Trademark Association 
Anne-Mette Holm Madsen, 
LEGO 
Jan Barnes, European-American 
Business Council 
 
Trademark ‘sunrise’ periods required 
in new TLDs 
Hope D Mehlman, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
Michele Cantley and Hope 
Mehlman, Regions Financial 
Corporation 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds + 
Machines 
Daniel A  Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara),Visa 
Inc 
Jan Barnes, European-American 
Business Council 
Richard Tindal,  Demand 
Media Inc 
Many scripts, like Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean, use ideographs and 
pictographs that are information-rich 
descriptors and not low-information 
alphabets.  This is quite different 
from 
English, where a single or two 
characters are unlikely to have any 
meaning. Restricting strings to 3 or 
more characters unfairly 
disadvantages these scripts and 
therefore the 3-character minimum 
string rule should be removed for 
these scripts.  
刘昕, Internet Society of China 
Wil Tan 
Konstantinos Komaitis NCUC 
James Seng 
李光皓 China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC) 
Yang Yu, China Organizational 
Name Administration Center 
(CONAC) 
 
Synonyms are not confusing and 
should be allowed 
 
 
 
Patrick Martin Flaherty, 
(Padraic),   Verizon Corporate 
Resources Group LLC 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds 
+ Machines   
Ron Andruff, RNA Partners, 
Inc. 
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Opposition to auctions as a ‘last 
resort’ method for resolving string 
contention.  
 
Werner Staub 
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
James Crowne, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Sharon Aguayo,  International 
Trademark Association 
Patrick Vande Walle, ALAC  
(but posting in personal 
capacity) 
Matt Mansell, Mesh Digital Ltd 
 
Support for mandatory comparative 
evaluation as a method for resolving 
string contention, including non-
community TLDs 
James Crowne American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Steven Metalitz, IPC 
Werner Staub 
 
 
 
Notice and takedown procedure for 
abusive domains required  
Michael Palage 
Mark Bohannon , Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
David Taylor,Lovells LLP 
Antony Van Couvering Minds + 
Machines 
Richard Tindal, Demand Media 
Inc 
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
James Crowne, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
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Support for joint ventures as a 
method of resolving string 
contention 
Susan Kawaguchi, eBay Inc. 
David W. Maher, Registries 
Constituency 
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
 
Setting of variable prices for domain 
names should not be permit ed /price 
caps should be maintained in the 
new TLD registry contracts  
Patrick Martin Flaherty 
(Padraic), Verizon Corporate 
Resources Group LLC 
Phil Corwin, Internet Commerce 
Association (argues exceptions 
are permissible for a carefully 
circumscribed group of “closed” 
registries subject  
to strict numerical registration 
limits) 
‘Tee’ 
‘Tom’, Kingsnames 
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc 
‘Tom’,  Kingsnames 
 
Sharon Aguayo,  International 
Trademark Association 
Mike Housman, 
DomainWeb.US 
Andrew Allemann 
 
Ownership of a registrar by a 
registry is permissible, but functions 
should be kept separate 
 
Michael Palage (Permissible 
only under narrow conditions,  
must be rigidly policed)  
Katrin Ohlmer, DOTZON 
GmbH (Only for single-user 
TLDs) 
 
 
Michele Neylon, Blacknight 
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Categorisation of applications into 
open and community based is 
inadequate. More sophisticated 
categorisation is required, and 
different categories should be treated 
differently re application process and 
/ or contractual conditions. 
ALAC 
Roelof Meijer, SIDN (.nl 
registry)  
Matthieu CrÃdou, pointbzh.com  
Elisa Cooper , MarkMonitor Inc. 
Stéphane Van Gelder,  INDOM 
 
Morality and public order objections 
should be scrapped.  
ALAC 
Phil Corwin, Internet Commerce 
Association 
Andrew Allemann 
 
Multiple objectors to a single 
application should be allowed to 
combine their objections into a joint 
one 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Daniel A  Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Denise Yee (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc 
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Thick WHOIS model required Kawaguchi Susan, eBay Inc. 
Andy Coombs 
Gayle Sullivan,  AT&T  
Mark Bohannon , Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
David A. Lieber, National 
Business Coalition on E-
Commerce and Privacy 
David Taylor, Lovells LLP 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, The 
Coalition for Online Trademark 
Protection 
J. Scott Evans, Yahoo! Inc. 
James Crowne, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
Michele Neylon, Blacknight 
Mike O'Connor, haven2.com 
Denise Yee (Kuwabara),Visa 
Inc 
Elisa Cooper, MarkMonitor Inc. 
 
Need clarification on how ‘expert 
panels’ will be formed and who will 
be on them 
Steve Metalitz,  
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
Daniel A  Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
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Trademark protections are 
inadequate  
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Hope D Mehlman, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
Michael Palage 
Kawaguchi Susan eBay 
Inc.  
Andy Coombs International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
Gayle C Sullivan, AT&T 
Mark Bohannon , Software & 
Information Industry 
Association  (SIIA) 
David A. Lieber, National 
Business Coalition on E-
Commerce and Privacy 
Marc-Anthony Signorino, The 
Coalition for Online Trademark 
Protection 
Yvette Wojciechowski The 
Coalition Against Domain Name 
Abuse (CADNA) 
Paul Smocer, BITS 
Patrick Martin Flaherty, 
(Padraic)   Verizon 
Corporate Resources Group 
LLC 
Michele Cantley, Regions 
Financial Corporation 
J. Scott Evans Yahoo! Inc.  
Richard Tindal Demand Media 
Inc 
Fred Krueger, Dot Eco LLC's 
Steve Metalitz, IPC  
James Crowne, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
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Association 
Nick Wood, MARQUES 
Nooger, Daniel A   Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Sandra Aistars, Time Warner  
Michael H. Berkens, Worldwide 
Media, Inc. 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara), Visa 
Inc 
Elisa Cooper, MarkMonitor Inc. 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated 
‘Intern1’ 
Phillip V. Marano,  International 
Olympic Committee 
Sharon Aguayo , International 
Trademark Association 
Anne-Mette Holm Madsen, 
LEGO 
Peter Taylor,  Bradford & 
Bingley 
Jan Barnes, European-American 
Business Council 
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Appendix 4.9F: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (4 October – 24 November 2009)  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/3gtld-guide/)  
Comment / proposal  Proposed / supported by 
(Poster name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster name 
/ affiliation)  
Outright opposition to new TLDs – 
programme should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed to 
allow more time for study of issues 
Diane Hamer BBC and BBC 
Worldwide Limited. 
Phillip Marano, International 
Olympic Committee  
Frederick Felman, 
Markmonitor 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
Lise Fuhr, Danish Internet 
Forum  
Anne-Laure, joint comments 
of ECTA (European 
Communities Trade Mark 
Association) and MARQUES 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
Mitchell Stabbe, National 
Cable & Telecommunications 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara), 
VISA 
Michael H. Berkens, Esq, 
Worldwide Media Inc. 
Megan Ferraro Ferraro 
Strategy Group 
Adam Toronto 
Kenneth Nahigian  
Patrick A. Jacxsens, 
MADC Partners 
Martha Lopez,  Martha 
Elena & Fela's Shop 
Amy M. McKinlay, R. 
Chris Harbold & Associates 
‘press’, 
AmericaSpeakOn.org  
Doug Motley, Energy 
Consulting, Inc. 
Keith  Nahigian, Nahigian 
Strategies, LLC 
Allyson Bell  
John Poelman  
Rob Seidel 
Geoff Hale 
Courtney Daly 
Dirk Krischenowski, 
dotberlin 
Adina Reichard, dotbayern 
Drew McNeill 
Paul Couture 
Mary Boese 
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MÃller, Martina, pr-ide 
GbR |  PR & Industrial 
Design 
Markus Tofote  
Gabriele Werner, Dumrath 
& Fassnacht KG (GmbH & 
Co.) 
Frank Haegele, Berlin 
Plaza Hotel 
Sean Storan 
Markus Erbach 
Robert Gerstemeier 
Matt  Crow  
Elizabeth Letchworth 
Richard Wein 
Carter Livingston 
John C. Kalitka 
Julie G Addington  
Nicole Carosella 
Lutz Treutler. CBXNET 
GmbH 
Andrea Peters, media.net  
Greg Houston  
Matthew M. Barnes 
Francisco Salamero, 
ELZABURU  
Courtney Perrone 
Thomas Lenz, dotkoln 
Bastian Tippkemper , Top-
level-Domain .spe 
‘GA’ IH&RA 
Asociación PuntoGal, 
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Asociación PuntoGal 
Jean-Philippe Clément,City 
of Paris 
Fabien Betremieux, 
(AFNIC) 
Oliver J. Süme, .hamburg 
Stéphane Van Gelder, 
indom 
Clark Landry, Dot Eco 
LLC 
Caspar von Veltheim,  
Bayern Connect 
Jean Christophe Vignes, 
EuroDNS SA 
(Presumably also implicitly 
opposed by all those who 
did not argue against new 
gTLDs) 
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If new gTLDs go ahead,  it should 
be in limited numbers only  
Daniel A Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
(suggests this should be the 
case until remaining issues are 
ironed out) 
Doug Johnson, American 
Bankers Association 
(advocates ‘incremental’ 
approach)  
Michael H. Berkens, Esq, 
Worldwide M edia Inc. (wants 
‘closed’ TLDs only, no 
requirement for more ‘open’ 
TLDs) 
Scott Roberts, Khamma 
Group, LLC 
Russell Pangborn,  Microsoft   
Paula Guibault, Coca-Cola 
Company 
Uwe Stache, BB-ONE.net Ltd. 
 
Community based applications 
should go forward ahead of other 
types 
Daniel A Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
(suggests this should be the 
case until remaining issues are 
ironed out) 
Werner Staub 
Antony Van Couvering, 
Minds + Machines  
New TLDs programme should go 
forward ASAP 
Megan Ferraro, Ferraro 
Strategy Group 
Adam Toronto 
Kenneth Nahigian  
Patrick A. Jacxsens, MADC 
Partners 
Martha Lopez,  Martha Elena 
& Fela's Shop 
Amy M. McKinlay, R. Chris 
Harbold & Associates  
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‘press’, AmericaSpeakOn.org  
Doug Motley, Energy 
Consulting, Inc. 
Keith  Nahigian, Nahigian 
Strategies, LLC 
Allyson Bell 
John Poelman  
Rob Seidel 
Geoff Hale 
Courtney Daly 
Dirk Krischenowski, dotberlin 
Adina Reichard, dotbayern 
Drew McNeill 
Paul Couture 
Mary Boese 
MÃller, Martina, pr-ide GbR |  
PR & Industrial Design 
Markus Tofote  
Gabriele Werner, Dumrath & 
Fassnacht KG (GmbH & Co.) 
Frank Haegele, Berlin Plaza 
Hotel 
Sean Storan 
Markus Erbach 
Robert Gerstemeier 
Matt  Crow  
Elizabeth Letchworth 
Richard Wein 
Carter Livingston 
John C. Kalitka 
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Julie G Addington  
Nicole Carosella 
Lutz Treutler. CBXNET 
GmbH 
Andrea Peters, media.net  
Greg Houston  
Matthew M. Barnes 
Francisco Salamero, 
ELZABURU  
Courtney Perrone 
Thomas Lenz, dotkoln 
Bastian Tippkemper , Top-
Level-Domain .spe 
‘GA’ IH&RA 
Asociación PuntoGal, 
Asociación PuntoGal 
Jean-Philippe Clément, City 
of Paris 
Fabien Betremieux, (AFNIC) 
Oliver J. Süme, .hamburg 
Stéphane Van Gelder, indom 
Clark Landry, Dot Eco LLC 
Caspar von Veltheim,  Bayern 
Connect 
Jean Christophe Vignes, 
EuroDNS SA 
Application, evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal fees are too 
high, not justified and represent a 
barrier to entry for some groups   
David W. Maher,  Registries 
Stakeholder Group 
Paul Smocer, BITS 
Michele Neylon, Blacknight   
David Allen 
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Opposition to auctions as a ‘last 
resort’ method for resolving string 
contention.  
 
Claudio Di Gangi International 
Trademark Association 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) 
Mark Bohannon, Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
 
Section 2.10 "Registry Operator 
shall offer all domain registration  
renewals at the same price, unless 
the registrant agrees to a higher 
price at  the time of the initial 
registration of the domain name 
following clear and conspicuous 
disclosure of such renewal price by 
Registry Operator." This is still not 
enough, as the registries will 
simply have everyone agree that 
they could change the price at any 
time in their agreements that no 
one  ever reads. Hard caps are still 
required.  
George Kirikos, Leap of Fith 
Financial Services 
Max Menius, Menius 
Enterprises, Inc. 
Michael H. Berkens, Esq, 
Worldwide Media Inc. 
 
ICANN should not be able to 
modify the registry contract at will  
 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds 
+ Machines 
Clarke D. Walton Registrar 
Stakeholder Group 
Rnulf Storm, Norwegian GAC 
Representative 
Jeff Eckhaus, Demand Media 
 
Ownership of a registrar by a 
registry is permissible, but 
functions should be kept separate 
 
Clarke D. Walton, Registrar 
Stakeholder Group 
Drazek, Keith, Neustar 
Jeff Eckhaus, Demand Media 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association (wants 
complete separation) 
ICANN should avoid country, 
territory or place names, as these 
blur the distinction between 
ccTLDs and gTLDs.   
 
 
 
Chris Disspain, ccNSO 
Annebeth Lange, UNINETT  
James M. Blade, GoDaddy 
Rnulf Storm, Norwegian GAC 
Representative 
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Post Delegation Dispute Resolution 
Process should be based on 
ICANN’s involvement in contract 
enforcement, instead of passing 
responsibility on to the registry   
Neuman, Jeff Neustar, Inc. 
(posting in a personal 
capacity) 
Diane Hamer BBC and BBC 
Worldwide Limited. 
Taylor, David Lovells LLP 
Jeff Eckhaus Demand 
media 
Antony Van Couvering Minds 
+ Machines 
Roger Castillo NIC Mexico 
 
‘Trademark clearinghouse’ 
database does not represent a 
proper globally reserved marks list. 
Proper reserved list is required. 
Daniel A Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Phillip Marano, International 
Olympic Committee 
Frederick Felman, 
Markmonitor 
Claudio Di Gangi,  
International Trademark 
Association 
Craig Shea, Adobe systems  
Anne-Laure, joint comments 
of ECTA (European 
Communities 
Trade Mark Association) and 
MARQUES 
Leonora Hoicka,  IBM 
Corporation 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse 
Denise Yee, (Kuwabara), 
VISA  
Michael H. Berkens, Esq, 
Worldwide Media Inc. 
Antony Van Couvering 
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Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
James B. Lake, Thomas  
Locicero + Bralow 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Business 
Constituency   
Paula Guibault, Coca-Cola 
Company 
URS should be compulsory, not 
just a ‘best practice’  
Anne-Laure joint 
comments of ECTA (European 
Communities Trade Mark 
Association) and MARQUES 
Roelof Meijer SIDN 
James B. Lake, Thomas 
Locicero + Bralow 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Business 
Constituency   
Paula Guibault, Coca-Cola 
Company 
 
Objection filing period should be 
extended 
Paul Smocer BITS 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
Mark Bohannon , Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Paula Guibault, Coca-Cola 
Company 
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Trademark protections inadequate Daniel A Nooger, Hearst 
Communications, Inc. 
Francisco Salamero, 
ELZABURU 
Phillip Marano, International 
Olympic Committee 
Sandra Aistars, Time Warner 
Frederick Felman, 
Markmonitor 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
Craig Shea, Adobe systems  
Anne-Laure, joint comments 
of ECTA (European  
Communities Trade Mark 
Association) and MARQUES 
Vincent Garlock, American 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) 
Leonora Hoicka , IBM 
Corporation 
Jarkko Ruuska, Nokia  
Paul Smocer, BITS 
Doug Johnson, American 
Bankers Association  
Mitchell  Stabbe, National 
Cable & Telecommunications 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition for 
online accountability  
David Taylor, Lovells LLP 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse 
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Denise Yee, (Kuwabara), 
VISA  
J. Scott Evans,Yahoo! Inc. 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft  
James B. Lake, Thomas 
Locicero + Bralow 
Mike Rodenbaugh, Business 
Constituency   
Paula Guibault, Coca-Cola 
Company 
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Appendix 4.9G: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs 28 May-21 July 2010 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/4gtld-guide/) 
Comment / proposal  Proposed / supported by 
(Poster name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster name / 
affiliation)  
Outright opposition to new TLDs – 
programme should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed to 
allow more time for study of issues 
George Kirikos, Leap of Faith 
Financial Services 
Jakob Balling, Arla 
Søren Ingemann Larsen, 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Charlotte Munck,Solveig 
Hove-Christensen 
Phillip Marano,  International 
Olympic Committee 
Susan Payne, BBC 
(Presumably implicitly opposed by 
all those who did not argue against 
new gTLDs) 
 
New TLDs should go forward ASAP Dirk Krischenowski, 
dotBERLIN 
Markus Bahmann, .bayern 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds 
and Machines 
Fabien Betrremieux, AFNIC 
 
Application, evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal fees are too 
high, not justified and represent a 
barrier to entry for some groups   
Lisa Salazar,  Paralegal 
曹华平, Internet Society of 
China 
Ibaa Oueichek, Arab Team for 
Domain Names and Internet 
Issues 
David Taylor, Hogan Lovells 
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Different fee models should be 
adopted for different application 
types 
谭亚凌 ,CNNIC 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds 
and Machines 
Abdulaziz Al-Zoman, 
Communications 
and Information Technology 
Commission (CITC) 
Amber Sterling, Association of 
American Medical Colleges 
 
‘Trademark clearinghouse’ database 
does not represent a proper globally 
reserved marks list. Proper reserved 
list is required. 
Mette M. Andersen, LEGO 
Juris A/S 
Vibeke Aagaard Sørensen, 
VKR Holding A/S  
Charlotte Munck, Solveig 
Hove-Christensen  
Lisbeth Rahbek , Coloplast 
A/S 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
Clare Speed, Reckitt 
Benckiser Group plcbirgit . 
schnell Red Bull GmbH 
Andrew Mills, MARQUES, 
the Association of European 
Trade Mark Owners and  
ECTA, the European 
Communities Trade Mark 
Association  
Nick Wood, Com Laude 
Caroline Perriard, Nestec S.A. 
Martin Sutton, HSBC 
DJCulkar Comerica Bank / 
MarkMonitor 
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URS system needs to be beefed 
up.Should be truly rapid and offer 
more than short-term suspension. 
Need loser pays mechanism / no 
significant cost to trademark owner.  
Mette M. Andersen, LEGO 
Juris A/S 
Jakob  Balling, Arla 
Katja Grabienski, JONAS 
Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft 
gmbH 
Vibeke Aagaard Sørensen, 
VKR Holding A/S 
Charlotte Munck. Solveig 
Hove-Christensen 
Lisbeth Rahbek, Coloplast A/S 
Nick Wood, Com Laude 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
Clare Speed,Reckitt Benckiser 
Group plc 
Birgit  Schnell, Red Bull 
GmbH 
Andrew Mills, MARQUES, the 
Association of European Trade 
Mark Owners and ECTA, the 
European Communities Trade 
Mark Association  
David Taylor, Hogan Lovells 
Caroline Perriard, Nestec S.A. 
Alex Gakuru  
DJCulkar , Comerica Bank / 
Markmonitor 
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Preventing any ICANN-accredited 
registrar from providing assistance 
of any kind to prospective new 
gTLD applicants goes too far. Would 
unfairly exclude applicants intending  
to use registrar expertise to help 
them build their application. 
Stéphane Van Gelder, 
indom.com  
Abdulaziz Al-Zoman, 
Communications and 
Information Technology 
Commission (CITC) 
Ibaa Oueichek, Arab Team for 
Domain names and Internet 
issues 
 
Volker Greimann, Key-
Systems GmbH 
Thomas Rickert Association of 
the German  
Internet Industry  
 
Background checks in the area of 
‘terrorism’, as it is presented in the 
DAG 4, without any definition, is 
unacceptable. 
 
 
LM Fattal, The Multilingual 
Internet Group 
Abdulaziz Al-Zoman, 
Communications and 
Information Technology 
Commission (CITC) 
Mary Wong, Pierce Law   
Thomas Rickert, Association 
of the German Internet 
Industry  
 
Morality and public order provisions 
should be scrapped 
Jacob Malthouse, Big Room 
Inc 
曹华平, Internet Society of 
China 
Alex Gakuru 
Mary Wong, Pierce Law 
Konstantinos Komaitis, 
University of Strathclyde 
Antony Van Couvering, , 
Minds and Machines 
Katrin Ohlmer, dotBERLIN 
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Trademark rights protection 
mechanisms are inadequate 
Mail, Arbiter, WIPO 
Jakob  Balling,  Arla 
Søren Ingemann Larsen, 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Katja Grabienski, JONAS 
Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft 
mbH 
Charlotte Munck, Solveig 
Hove-Christensen 
Marianne Frank Simonsen, 
Vestas Wind Systems A/S 
Lisbeth Rahbek , Coloplast 
A/S 
Andrea  Whetzel, Akerman 
Senterfitt LLP 
Clare Speed,  Reckitt 
Benckiser Group plc 
Birgit Schnell, Red Bull 
GmbH 
Andrew Mills, MARQUES, 
the Association of European 
Trade Mark Owners and  
ECTA, the European 
Communities Trade Mark 
Association  
Oliver Süme, Initiative 
dotHAMBURG e.V 
Nick Wood, Com Laude 
Celia Ullmann, Philip Morris 
International Management 
S.A. 
Brian Beckham, WIPO 
David Taylor, Hogan Lovells 
Caroline Perriard, Nestec S.A. 
Phillip Marano, International 
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Olympic Committee 
Susan Payne BBC 
Martin Sutton,  HSBC 
DJCulkar, Comerica Bank / 
Markmonitor 
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Appendix 4.9H: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (12 November 2010-15 January 
2011) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/) 
 Comment / proposal  Proposed / supported  by 
(Poster name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster name / 
affiliation)  
Outright opposition to new 
TLDs at least insofar as the 
programme is currently 
conceived– programme 
should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed 
to allow more time for study 
of issues 
George Kirikos, Leap of 
Faith Financial Services  
Phillip Marano,  International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) 
Coalition for Online 
Accountability 
Kristin Jordan Harkins, 
Trademark Internet 
Committee 
Marc Salvatierra  
US Chamber of Commerce 
Paul Tattersfield 
Robert Fernandez 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Adam Scoville, RE/MAX, 
LLC 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated 
Søren Ingemann Larsen, 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
Vayra, Fabricio, Time 
Warner Inc. 
Paul Foody 
Fred Krueger 
Daniel Schindler  
Elaine Pruis, VP Client Services 
Manuel Vilas, Asociación Puntogal 
dotEUS Association,  dotEUS 
Association 
Elliot Noss, Tucows Inc. 
Statton Hammock, Network Solutions 
Robin Gross, NCUC 
Marc Salvatierra, DotConnectAfrica 
Annalisa Roger, dotgreen 
(Presumably also implicitly opposed 
by all those who did not argue against 
new gTLDs) 
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New TLDs application 
process should go ahead 
ASAP 
Daniel Schindler  
Elaine Pruis, VP Client 
Services 
Manuel Vilas, Asociación 
Puntogal 
dotEUS Association,  
dotEUS Association 
Elliot Noss, Tucows Inc. 
Statton Hammock, Network 
Solutions 
Robin Gross, NCUC 
Marc Salvatierra, 
DotConnectAfrica 
Annalisa Roger, dotgreen 
 
 
Initial limited introduction/  
fast track process for ‘safe’ 
community TLDs  
Davie Hutchison, Dot Scot  
Davie Hutchison, European 
Cultural and Linguistic Top 
Level Internet Domain 
working group 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
 
Antony Van Couvering, Minds + 
Machines 
Opposition to auctions as a 
‘last resort’ method for 
resolving string contention.  
 
Deb Hughes,  American 
Red Cross  
‘NONPROFITICANN’, 
proposed Not-for-Profit 
Organisations Constituency 
(NPOC) 
Constantine G. Roussos, 
dotMusic (.music) Domain 
Initiative 
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ICANN’s U-turn on vertical 
integration (removing all 
restrictions on registry / 
registrar cros-ownership) 
lacks transparency 
Coalition for Online 
Accountability 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
Fiona Alexander,  NTIA 
Sharon Aguayo , INTA 
Vayra, Fabricio,  Time 
Warner 
Paul Tattersfield, GPM 
Group   
Marc Salvatierra, IPC 
 
Thick WHOIS should be 
reinstated 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Sharon Aguayo , INTA 
Andrew Coombs, IACC 
J. Scott Evans, IPC 
Yvette Wojciechowski The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Susan Payne, BBC 
Isobelle C Fabian, Telstra 
Corporation Ltd 
 
Need loser pays model in 
URS 
Sharon Aguayo , INTA 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
J. Scott Evans IPC 
Cathy van Vuuren,  ECTA 
(European Communities 
Trade Mark Association) 
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URS needs to be 
strengthened 
Andrew Coombs, IACC 
David Taylor, Hogan 
Lovells 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
Mitchell Stabbe 
Cathy van Vuuren,  ECTA 
(European Communities 
Trade Mark Association) 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
 
Denying an entity the 
opportunity to operate a 
gTLD because of 3 adverse 
UDRP decisions is an 
extremely broad standard 
that will unintentionally 
disqualify otherwise 
qualified applicants. 
Jeff Eckhaus, Demand Media 
Phil Corwin, Internet 
Commerce Association 
Michael H. Berkens, 
Worldwide Media, Inc. 
 
Trademark rights protection 
mechanisms are inadequate 
 
Janet O'Callaghan,  News 
Corporation 
Phillip Marano, International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) 
 
Brian Beckham, WIPO 
 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition 
for Online Accountability 
 
Kristin Jordan Harkins 
 
Steve DelBianco, Business 
Constituency (BC) 
 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft   
 
Sharon Aguayo, INTA 
 
Marc Salvatierra, US 
Chamber of Commerce 
 
Andrew Coombs, IACC 
 
David Taylor, Hogan Lovells 
Jeff Eckhaus, Demand Media  
 
Jon Nevett, Domain Dimensions 
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Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
 
Frederick Felman, 
MarkMonitor 
J. Scott Evans, IPC 
 
Mitchell Stabbe, comments 
on behalf of autotrader.com 
 
Cathy van Vuuren, ECTA 
(European Communities 
Trade Mark Association) 
 
Yvette Wojciechowski, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Susan Payne, BBC 
Adam Scoville, RE/MAX, 
LLC 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated 
Isobelle C Fabian, Telstra 
Corporation Ltd 
Mette M. Andersen,  LEGO 
Juris A/S 
Marianne Frank Simonsen,  
Vestas Wind Systems A/S 
Jakob Balling, Arla Foods  
Victoria Sheckler,  
Recording Industry 
Association of America 
Vibeke Aagaard Bendtsen, 
VKR Holding A/S 
Jacob Williams,UrbanBrain 
Inc. 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
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If new gTLD applicants are 
to be judged for their 
compliance with UDRP 
law, they should be judged 
equally for findings of 
cybersquatting and of 
reverse domain-name 
hijacking. 
Wendy Seltzer 
Michael H. Berkens,  
Worldwide Media, Inc. 
Phil Corwin, Internet 
Commerce Association 
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Appendix 4.9I: Summary of comments / proposals attracting support or opposition of three or 
more individuals in Public Comments Period on New gTLDs (15 April 2011-15 May 2011)   
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/)  
Comment / proposal Proposed / supported by Opposed by 
Outright opposition to new TLDs at 
least insofar as the programme is 
currently conceived– programme should 
be cancelled altogether or at least 
delayed to allow more time for study of 
issues 
George Kirikos,  Leap 
of Faith Financial Services 
Kristin Jordan Harkins, 
American Intellectual Property 
Law Association 
Søren Ingemann Larsen, 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Richard Tindal, Donuts Inc. 
Thomas Lenz, dotkoln 
Jon Nevett, Domain 
Dimensions 
Elliot Noss Tucows Inc.  
Caspar Veltheim, Bayern 
Connect 
Elaine Pruis, Minds + 
Machines   
Annalisa Roger , dotgreen 
Manuel Vila, Asociación 
Puntogal   
(Presumably also implicitly 
opposed by all those who 
did not argue against new 
gTLDs) 
New TLDs should go ahead, but only in 
limited numbers 
Elisa Cooper, MarkMonitor  
David Taylor,  Hogan 
Lovells 
Kathleen McCarthy, Coca-
Cola Company 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
Lise Fuhr, Dansk Internet 
Forum 
Claudio Di Gangi, INTA 
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
Mark Partridge,  Partridge IP 
Law 
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The Board should finalise the 
application procedure and launch the 
programme  without further delay 
Richard Tindal, Donuts Inc. 
Thomas Lenz, dotkoln 
Jon Nevett, Domain 
Dimensions 
Elliot Noss, Tucows Inc.  
Caspar Veltheim, Bayern 
Connect 
Elaine Pruis, Minds + 
Machines   
Annalisa Roger , dotgreen 
Manuel Vila, Asociación 
Puntogal   
George Kirikos, Leap of 
Faith Financial Services 
Søren Ingemann Larsen, 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Scott Bain, The Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition 
for Online Accountability 
Russell Pangborn, 
Microsoft 
Janet O'Callaghan, News 
Corporation 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems 
Elizabeth Cummings,  The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Kristin Jordan Harkins, 
American Intellectual 
Property Law Association 
Trademark rights protection 
mechanisms are inadequate 
 
Brian Winterfeldt, IPC 
Scott Bain, The Software & 
Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
Kathleen McCarthy,Coca-Cola 
company 
Steven Metalitz, Coalition for 
Online Accountability 
Andy Coombs International 
anticounterfeiting coalition 
Phillip Marano, IOC 
Andrew Mills, ECTA 
/MARQUES   
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Claudio Di Gangi, INTA 
Richard Tindal, Donuts Inc. 
Jon Nevett, Domain 
Dimensions 
Krista Papac, AusRegistry 
International 
Elliot Noss, Tucows Inc.  
 
 173 
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
Mark Partridge, Partridge IP 
Law 
Janet O'Callaghan, News 
Corporation  
Ruby J. Haddock, United 
States Olympic Committee 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems   
Elizabeth Cummings, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Kristin Jordan Harkins, 
American Intellectual Property 
Law Association   
Brian  Beckham, WIPO 
Arbitration and Mediation 
Sarah Hayward , Valideus Ltd 
Søren Ingemann Larsen 
H.Lundbeck A/S 
Two-character ASCII TLDs should be 
permitted.  
Constantine G. Roussos, 
.MUSIC Initiative 
Thomas Lenz, dotkoln 
Katrin Ohlmer DOTZON 
Dirk Krischenowski,.berlin 
 
Expand the Trademark Claims and 
Sunrise period services beyond the 
exact match of the registered trademark 
filed with the Clearinghouse. 
Amber Sterling, Association of 
American Medical Colleges 
Phillip Marano, IOC 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
Janet O'Callaghan, News 
Corporation  
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Reduce the requirements for the limited 
loser pays model from the currently 
stated 26 or more disputed domain 
names.  The threshold of 26 or more is 
exceptionally high for the standard of 
complaint set by the URS. 
Amber Sterling, Association of 
American Medical Colleges 
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
Kristin Jordan Harkins, 
American Intellectual Property 
Law Association 
 
URS needs to be strengthened Brian Winterfeldt, IPC 
McCarthy, Kathleen Coca-
Cola company 
Andy Coombs International 
Anticounterfeiting Coalition 
Mills, Andrew ECTA 
/MARQUES 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Craig Shea, Adobe Systems  
Leonora Hoicka , IBM 
Elizabeth Cummings, The 
Coalition Against Domain 
Name Abuse (CADNA) 
Sarah Hayward, Valideus Ltd 
Max Menius, Menius 
Enterprises 
 
PDDRP needs to be strengthened Brian Winterfeldt, IPC 
Andy Coombs, International 
Anticounterfeiting Coalition 
Russell Pangborn, Microsoft 
Claudio Di Gangi, 
International Trademark 
Association 
 
Searchable WHOIS should be 
mandatory 
Russell Pangborn,  Microsoft 
Fabricio Vayra, Time Warner 
Janet O'Callaghan ,News 
Corporation  
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APPENDIX 4.10:  Summary of patterns across all Public Comments Periods on New gTLDs 
 
 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Total number of 
comments 
38 7 12 65 180 126 156 130 145 69 928 
Number of 
individual 
posters 
16   7 10 60 146 99 131  111 96 65 741  
Number of 
posts opposed 
to new gTLDs 
2 
 
0 0 1 31 21 11 6 13 3 88 
Number of 
posts calling for 
all new gTLDs 
to be sTLDs or 
IDN TLDs  
1 0 1 0 0  0  0  0  0 
 
0 2 
Number of 
posts 
advocating  an 
unlimited 
number of new 
gTLDs 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
posts 
supporting new 
gTLDs but 
opposing an 
unlimited 
number   
2 0 0 1 4 7 7 2 2 8 33 
Number  of 
posts 
supporting an 
ongoing as 
opposed to 
‘rounds’ based 
process 
 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
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 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
large 
application fees 
1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Number of 
posts opposing 
large 
application fees  
0 0 1 3 25 18 4 4 0 0 55 
Number of 
posts calling for 
financial / 
business plan 
checks on TLD 
applicants 
 
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Number of 
posts opposing 
financial / 
business plan 
checks 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of 
posts calling for 
selection 
criteria to be 
limited to 
technical 
criteria only 
1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Number of 
posts opposed 
to MAPO 
provisions 
0 0 0 50  6 3 1 6 1 0 67 
Number of 
posts calling for 
stronger 
trademark 
protection 
3 0 2 6 47 30 21 21 28 19 177 
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 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts opposing 
proposed 
trademark 
protections  
0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0  4 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
auctions as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Number of 
posts opposing 
auctions as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
4 0 1 0 6 6 3 1 3 0 24 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
ballots as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
posts opposing 
ballots as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
lotteries as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts opposing 
lotteries as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
comparative 
evaluation as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
3 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 8 
Number of 
posts opposing 
comparative 
evaluation as a 
method of 
resolving string 
contention 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
sunrise periods 
0 0 0 1 5 7 2 0 0 7 22 
Number of 
posts opposing 
sunrise periods 
3 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 8 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
strong WHOIS 
1 0 1 1 15 14 0 
 
0 5  3 40 
Number of 
posts opposing 
strong WHOIS 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
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 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
reserved 
trademarks list 
0 0 0 0 28 21 14 12 2 2 79 
Number of 
posts opposing 
reserved 
trademarks list 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
vertical 
integration of 
registries / 
registrars 
0 0 0 1 3 2 3 0 0 0 9 
Number of 
posts opposing 
vertical 
integration of 
registries / 
registrars 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 
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 PCP 1  
8/12/05 - 
3/2/06 
PCP 2 
20/2-06 – 
13/3/06 
PCP 3 
9/8/06 -
29/8/06 
PCP 4 
10/8/07 –
30/8/07 
PCP 5 
24/10/08-
15-12/08 
 
PCP 6  
18/2/09  -
13/04/09 
PCP 7 
04/10/09 
24/11/09 
PCP 8 
28/5/10-
21/7/10 
PCP 9 
12/11/10-
15/1/11 
PCP 10 
15/4/11-
15/5/11 
TOTAL 
Number of 
posts opposing 
requirement 
that only 
ICANN-
accredited 
registrars be 
used  
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Number of 
posts 
supporting 
requirement 
that only 
ICANN-
accredited 
registrars be 
used 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Number of 
posts 
advocating that 
government 
should have 
final decision 
on geographic 
identifiers 
 
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Number of 
posts 
advocating that 
government 
should not have 
final decision 
on geographic 
identifiers 
0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
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Appendix 4.11: Comparison of public comments to subsequent policy outcomes 
This appendix summarises the key points addressed by three or more posters in each of the Public 
Comments Periods on new gTLDs, together with an indication of the outcome in the subsequent 
policy document. Points that were addressed by only one or two individual posters in a given PCP are 
not listed.    
PCP 1: First public comments period (8th December 2005 - 3rd February 2006.)  
(For full details of all submitted comments, see http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtlds-pdp-comments/)  
Comment / proposal Proposed / 
supported by 
Opposed by  Addressed in Draft 
Initial Report?  
Outright opposition to new 
gTLDs 
2 posters 
 
Implicitly opposed by 
those who did not 
argue against new 
gTLDs. Specific 
arguments in favour 
of new gTLDs put 
forward by 6 posters 
Report proposed to go ahead 
with a new gTLDs 
programme  
Future gTLD addition 
should be on an open-
ended basis rather than a 
‘rounds’ based approach 
3 posters 0 posters Issue left open 
Issues of intellectual 
property rights need to be 
examined 
3 posters 1 poster Issue left open 
Support for sunrise periods 
for new gTLDs 
0 posters 3 posters Issue left open 
Support for auctions as 
allocation method 
0 posters 3 posters Issue left open 
Support for comparative 
evaluations as allocation 
method 
4 posters  0 posters Issue left open  
Need for standardised 
registry contracts with 
explicit and clearly stated 
rules 
2 posters 1 poster  Recommendation 6 notes 
that ‘There is general 
agreement that standardized 
contractual conditions for 
registry operations should be 
published prior to any 
agreement being signed’.   
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PCP 2: Second public comments period (20th February - 13th March 2006) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtlds-pdp-initial-
report/.) 
There were only seven responses to this PCP, none of which comprehensively addressed the issues. 
There were no points on which three or more posters agreed.  
PCP 3: Third Public Comments Period: 9th-29thAugust 2006  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/newgtlds-comments/)   
Comment / proposal Proposed / 
supported by 
Opposed by  Addressed in Final 
Report?  
Outright opposition to new 
gTLDs 
0 posters Implicitly opposed by 
those who did not 
argue against new 
gTLD. Specific 
arguments in favour of 
new gTLDs put 
forward by 3 posters 
Recommended that a 
new gTLDs 
programme should go 
ahead 
Large application fees 
should be levied in order to 
ensure the financial 
capability of the applicant 
3 posters 1 poster Partly – 
Implementation 
Guideline B stated that 
‘Application fees will 
be designed to ensure 
that adequate resources 
exist to cover the total 
cost to administer the 
new gTLD process.’ 
Applicants should be 
required to demonstrate their 
financial capability to 
operate a TLD 
 
2 posters 1 poster Yes – 
Recommendation 8 
stated ‘Applicants must 
be able to demonstrate 
their financial and 
organisational 
operational capability’. 
New TLDs must offer a 
clearly differentiated 
namespace from existing 
TLDs 
3 posters 1 poster Not explicitly 
recommended that this 
must be the case 
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PCP 4: Public Comments Period on the Final Report (10th - 30th August 2007)  
(For full details of submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtldfinalreport-
2007/mail2.html)  
Comment / proposal Proposed/ supported 
by 
Opposed by  Addressed in Board 
Report?  
Outright opposition to 
new gTLDs 
1 poster Implicitly opposed by 
all those who did not 
argue against new 
gTLDs. Specific 
arguments / 
endorsements in 
favour of new gTLDs 
put forward by 4 
posters 
Recommended that a 
new gTLDs programme 
should go ahead 
MAPO provisions 
should be removed 
10 posters  
(Plus the 41 people who 
sent in the standard 
email from keep-the-
net-neutral.org) 
0 posters No – MAPO provisions 
retained  
Criteria should be 
limited to technical 
and operational 
matters only. Current 
proposals are too 
extensive and stray 
into areas beyond 
ICANN’s remit.  
3 posters 
 
1 poster   No – ‘public policy’ 
criteria were retained 
Intellectual property 
rights protections are 
inadequate and need 
to be strengthened 
6 posters 4 posters Recommendations 
remain same as in Final 
Report 
Application fees 
should be high to deter 
frivolous applications  
1 poster 3 posters Recommendations 
remain same as in Final 
Report 
Requirement that only 
ICANN-accredited 
registrars be used 
should be removed 
3 posters 1 poster Recommendations 
remain same as in Final 
Report 
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PCP 5: Public comments period on DAG v1 (24 October – 15 December 2008) 
 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments-
en.htm)  
 
Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
Outright opposition to 
new TLDs – 
programme should be 
cancelled altogether or 
at least delayed to 
allow more time for 
study of issues 
31 posters 
 
Implicitly opposed 
by those comments 
that did not express 
any opposition to 
new gTLDs in 
principle. Explicit 
arguments in favour 
of the principle of 
new gTLDs put 
forward by 3 posters 
No – but TLD demand and 
economic analysis were 
among the four 
‘overarching issues’ 
identified by the Board as 
requiring further analysis.  
Community based 
applications should go 
forward ahead of other 
types 
8 posters 0 posters No 
What constitutes a 
‘community’ needs to 
be better defined  
9 posters 
 
 
0 posters Some modification / 
clarification on community 
vs. open and why these 
terms are used; added 
language on intent of 
community-based category 
and under what 
circumstances community 
claims are evaluated 
Trademark protections 
are inadequate  
 
 
 
 
 
47 posters 
 
 
 
 
 
0 posters No major changes; however 
trademark protection was 
among the four 
‘overarching issues’ 
identified by the Board as 
requiring further analysis.  
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
Proposal for ‘reserved 
trademarks’ list on 
which trademark 
owners can register 
their marks, rendering 
these unavailable as 
TLD strings  
28 posters 
 
 
 
  
1 poster  No. However, intellectual 
property rights was 
identified as one of the four 
‘overarching issues’ 
requiring further discussion 
and study  
 
Application, 
evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal 
fees are too high, not 
justified and represent 
a barrier to entry for 
some groups   
25 posters 
 
 
1 poster Application fees unchanged 
at $185,000. However, 
more details on amount of 
fee that may be returned if 
the application is 
withdrawn at various stages 
of the process.  
Added credit for qualified 
2000 round applicants. 
Reduced annual registry 
fees  
Community application 
comparative evaluation fee 
now estimated at $10,000 
(no figure given in previous 
DAG). Furthermore it is 
now structured as a deposit 
and returned if criteria are 
met 
Other evaluation and 
dispute resolution fees still 
not specified.  
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
Fees should be 
lowered particularly 
for community groups 
4 posters 0 posters No change; application fees 
remain £185,000 for all 
types of applications. 
However, Community 
application comparative 
evaluation fee now 
estimated at $10,000 (no 
figure given in previous 
DAG). Furthermore it is 
now structured as a deposit 
and returned if criteria are 
met.  
 
Many scripts, like 
Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean, use 
ideographs and 
pictographs that are 
information-rich 
descriptors and not 
low-information 
alphabets.  This is 
quite different from 
English, where a 
single or two 
characters are unlikely 
to have any meaning. 
Restricting strings to 3 
or more characters 
unfairly disadvantages 
these scripts and 
therefore the 3-
character minimum 
string rule should be 
removed for these 
scripts.  
 
 
 
4 posters 0 posters No 
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
Standard for String 
Confusion should not 
be limited to 
“visually” similar.   
 
9 posters 2 posters 
 
Yes - - added more 
language to distinguish 
when different similarity 
checks are made (visual, 
aural, meaning); clarified 
relationship between string 
confusion objections and 
contention between similar 
strings; described 
improvements to the 
algorithm for testing visual 
similarity. 
The use of string 
similarity algorithms 
should be 
accompanied by 
manual reviews  
5 posters  0 posters No 
Opposition to auctions 
as a ‘last resort’ 
method for resolving 
string contention.  
6 posters 1 poster No – auctions confirmed as 
‘last resort’ method for 
resolving string contention 
Multiple objectors to 
the same application 
should be allowed 
consolidate into a 
single proceeding (for 
a single fee)  
4 posters . 0 posters No 
The decisions of a 
dispute resolution 
panel from a dispute 
resolution service 
provider should be 
binding rather than 
advisory on ICANN 
 
 
 
 
8 posters 0 posters In the Second Draft, 
ICANN explained that it 
will “accept” the 
determination and advice of 
the panel. However some 
commentators still found 
this wording ambiguous.  
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
Trademark sunrise 
periods required 
5 posters 3 posters No 
Notice and takedown 
procedure for abusive 
domains required  
4 posters 0 posters No 
Three member panels 
should be an option 
for LRO disputes  
6 posters  0 posters 
 
Yes - 3 member panels 
made an option for LRO 
disputes 
Prevailing party in 
dispute resolution 
should have fee 
refunded / losing party 
should bear costs 
 
 
 
 
4 posters 0 posters DAGv2 P29 “The 
prevailing party in a dispute 
resolution proceeding will 
have its advance payment 
refunded, while the non-
prevailing party will not 
receive a refund and thus 
will bear the cost of the 
proceeding.” 
 
-however, this provision 
was already present in 
DAGv1!  
 
No additional provision 
made.   
MAPO provisions 
should be scrapped 
5 posters  0 posters No 
Objections on 
trademark grounds 
should not carry a fee 
 
 
 
 
 
3 posters 1 poster No 
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
If multiple applicants 
apply for the same 
string, or similarly 
infringing strings, 
trademark owners 
should not have to 
object separately to 
each application  
4 posters 0 posters No 
Support for joint 
ventures as a method 
of resolving string 
contention 
7 posters 0 posters No 
Setting of variable 
prices for domain 
names should not be 
permitted /price caps 
should be maintained 
in the new TLD 
registry contracts  
17 posters 0 posters No 
Thick WHOIS model 
required 
15 posters 0 posters No  
ICANN should not be 
able to modify the 
registry contract at 
will  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 posters 0 posters No 
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Comment / proposal Number of posters 
in favour 
Number of posters 
opposing 
Implemented in DAG v2? 
The Guidebook 
currently holds a 
provision that an 
“applicant agrees not 
to challenge, in Court 
or in any other judicial 
entity, any final 
decision made by 
ICANN with respect 
to the application, and 
irrevocably waives 
any right to sue or 
proceed on the basis 
of any other legal 
claim against ICANN 
and ICANN affiliated 
parties with respect to 
the application.” 
ICANN should not be 
given such broad 
immunity, and 
applicants should not 
be asked to waive 
their rights to 
challenge ICANN’s 
decision in court.  
8 posters 0 posters No 
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PCP 6: Public comments period on DAG v2  (18 February – 13 April 2009) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/2gtld-guide/)  
Comment / 
proposal  
Number of posters 
supporting 
Number of 
posters opposing  
Addressed in DAG v3? 
Outright opposition 
to new TLDs – 
programme should 
be cancelled 
altogether or at least 
delayed to allow 
more time for study 
of issues 
21 posters 
 
Implicitly 
opposed by all 
those who did not 
argue against new 
gTLDs. Explicit 
arguments in 
favour of new 
gTLDs made by 5 
posters  
Programme continues to 
go forward 
New TLDs should 
go ahead, but only 
in limited numbers  
6 posters 0 posters No 
New gTLDs 
preocess should be 
completed and new 
TLDs launched as 
quickly as possible 
3 posters 21 posters No 
Application, 
evaluation, dispute 
resolution and 
renewal fees are too 
high, not justified 
and represent a 
barrier to entry for 
some groups   
17 posters 0 posters No changes to most fees. 
Community priority 
evaluation fee now 
estimated at $10,000 (no 
figure given in previous 
DAG) 
Proposal for 
‘reserved 
trademarks’ list on 
which trademark 
owners can register 
their marks, 
rendering these 
unavailable as TLD 
strings 
21 posters 
 
1 poster No – though trademark 
clearinghouse proposals 
passed to GNSO for 
consideration 
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Comment / 
proposal  
Number of posters 
supporting 
Number of 
posters opposing  
Addressed in DAG v3? 
Trademark ‘sunrise’ 
periods required in 
new TLDs 
7 posters 1 poster No – but was ultimately 
addressed in DAG v.4, 
which stipulated that the 
registry operator must 
implement, at a minimum, 
either a Sunrise period or a 
Trademark Claims service 
during the start-up phases 
for registration in the 
TLD. 
Many scripts, like 
Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean, use 
ideographs and 
pictographs that are 
information-rich 
descriptors and not 
low-information 
alphabets.  This is 
quite different from 
English, where a 
single or two 
characters are 
unlikely to have any 
meaning. Restricting 
strings to 3 or more 
characters unfairly 
disadvantages these 
scripts and therefore 
the 3-character 
minimum string rule 
should be removed 
for these scripts.  
6 posters 0 posters No 
Opposition to 
auctions as a ‘last 
resort’ method for 
resolving string 
contention.  
 
6 posters 
 
0 posters No 
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Comment / 
proposal  
Number of posters 
supporting 
Number of 
posters opposing  
Addressed in DAG v3? 
Notice & takedown 
procedure required 
for abusive domains  
8 posters 
 
0 posters 
 
URS implemented in 
DAG3 
Support for joint 
ventures as a 
method of resolving 
string contention 
3 posters 0 posters No   
Setting of variable 
prices for domain 
names should not be 
permitted /price caps 
should be 
maintained in the 
new TLD registry 
contracts  
10 posters 
 
0 posters Partially – Section 2.10 of 
DAG v3 states "Registry 
Operator shall offer all 
domain registration  
renewals at the same price, 
unless the registrant agrees 
to a higher price at  
the time of the initial 
registration of the domain 
name following clear and  
conspicuous disclosure of 
such renewal price by 
Registry Operator."  
Ownership of a 
registrar by a 
registry is 
permissible, but 
functions should be 
kept separate 
3 posters 1 poster Limited cross-ownership 
permitted in DAG3 
Categorisation of 
applications into 
open and 
community based is 
inadequate. More 
sophisticated 
categorisation is 
required, and 
different categories 
should be treated 
differently re 
application process 
and / or contractual 
conditions. 
4 posters 0 posters No 
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Comment / 
proposal  
Number of posters 
supporting 
Number of 
posters opposing  
Addressed in DAG v3? 
Morality and public 
order objections 
should be scrapped.  
3 posters 0 posters No 
Multiple objectors to 
a single application 
should be allowed to 
combine their 
objections into a 
joint one 
3 posters 0 posters No 
Thick WHOIS 
model required 
14 posters 0 posters Yes- Section 1.1.2 of 
Specification 4 attached to 
the Revised Proposed 
Draft New  
Registry Agreement 
mandates the Registry 
operator to provide the 
full detail of  
a registrant's information. 
 
 
 
 
Need clarification 
on how ‘expert 
panels’ will be 
formed and who will 
be on them 
3 posters 0 posters Yes – more detail 
supplied on these issues 
Trademark 
protections are 
inadequate  
31 posters 
 
0 posters Additional protections 
implemented including: 
URS,PDDRP,Strong 
WHOIS 
Trademark clearinghouse 
passed to GNSO for 
consideration 
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PCP 7: Public comments period on DAG v3  (4 October – 24 November 2009)  
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/3gtld-guide/)  
Comment / 
proposal  
Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v4? 
Outright opposition 
to new TLDs – 
programme should 
be cancelled 
altogether or at least 
delayed to allow 
more time for study 
of issues 
11 posters Implicitly opposed 
by all those who did 
not argue against 
new gTLDs. Explicit 
arguments in favour 
of new gTLDs made 
by 1 poster 
No 
New TLDs should 
go ahead, but only 
in limited numbers  
6 posters 0 posters No 
Community based 
applications should 
go forward ahead of 
other types 
2 posters 1 poster  No 
New TLDs 
programme should 
go forward ASAP 
52 posters 0 posters No 
Application, 
evaluation, dispute 
resolution and 
renewal fees are too 
high, not justified 
and represent a 
barrier to entry for 
some groups   
4 posters 0 posters No change, except to 
state that applicants 
who are eliminated 
as a result of a 
community priority 
evaluation are 
eligible for a partial 
refund of the gTLD 
evaluation fee 
(p204) 
Opposition to 
auctions as a ‘last 
resort’ method for 
resolving string 
contention.  
3 posters 0 posters No 
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Comment / 
proposal  
Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v4? 
Section 2.10 states: 
"Registry Operator 
shall offer all 
domain registration  
renewals at the same 
price, unless the 
registrant agrees to a 
higher price at  
the time of the initial 
registration of the 
domain name 
following clear and  
conspicuous 
disclosure of such 
renewal price by 
Registry Operator." 
This is still not 
enough. Hard caps 
are still required.  
3 posters  0 posters No 
ICANN should not 
be able to modify 
the registry contract 
at will  
4 posters 0 posters No 
Ownership of a 
registrar by a 
registry is 
permissible, but 
functions should be 
kept separate 
3 posters 1 poster Limited cross-
ownership already 
permitted in DAG3 
and carried over to 
DAG4 
ICANN should 
avoid country, 
territory or place 
names, as these blur 
the distinction 
between ccTLDs 
and gTLDs.   
4 posters 0 posters No change 
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Comment / 
proposal  
Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v4? 
Post Delegation 
Dispute Resolution 
Process should be 
based on ICANN’s 
involvement in 
contract 
enforcement, instead 
of passing 
responsibility on to 
the registry   
6 posters 0 posters No change – DAG 
V3 and v4 state that 
registry operators are 
required to comply 
with 
and implement 
decisions made 
according to the 
Trademark Post-
Delegation Dispute 
Resolution Policy 
(PDDRP), but no 
mention of 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
‘Trademark 
clearinghouse’ 
database does not 
represent a proper 
globally reserved 
marks list. Proper 
reserved list is 
required. 
14 posters  1 poster  Trademark 
clearinghouse 
adopted substantially 
unaltered 
URS should be 
compulsory, not just 
a ‘best practice’  
5 posters 
 
0 posters Yes - . The registry 
operator is required 
to implement 
decisions made under 
the URS procedure, 
including suspension 
of specific domain 
names within the 
registry. 
Objection filing 
period should be 
extended 
5 posters 0 posters Yes – extended to 5 
½  months   
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Trademark 
protections 
inadequate 
21 posters  0 posters Some changes, 
particularly 
introduction of 
trademark 
clearinghouse 
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PCP 8: Public comments period on DAG v4 (28 May-21 July 2010) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/4gtld-guide/) 
Comment / proposal  Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v5? 
Outright opposition to 
new TLDs – 
programme should be 
cancelled altogether or 
at least delayed to 
allow more time for 
study of issues 
6 posters 0 posters No 
New TLDs should go 
forward ASAP 
4 posters 
 
0 posters Partly – DAG5 was 
intended to be the 
‘proposed final 
applicant guidebook’  
Application, 
evaluation, dispute 
resolution and renewal 
fees are too high, not 
justified and represent 
a barrier to entry for 
some groups   
4 posters 0 posters No 
Different fee models 
should be adopted for 
different application 
types 
4 posters 0 posters No 
‘Trademark 
clearinghouse’ database 
does not represent a 
proper globally reserved 
marks list. Proper 
reserved list is required. 
12 posters 
 
 
0 posters No change to 
trademark 
clearinghouse 
URS system needs to be 
beefed up.Should be 
truly rapid and offer 
more than short-term 
suspension. Need loser 
pays mechanism / no 
significant cost to 
trademark owner.  
14 posters 
 
0 posters No 
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Comment / proposal  Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v5? 
Preventing any ICANN-
accredited registrar 
from providing 
assistance of any kind  
to prospective new 
gTLD applicants goes 
too far. would unfairly 
exclude applicants 
intending  
to use registrar expertise 
to help them build their 
application. (mod 1) 
5 posters 
 
 
0 posters ICANN accredited 
registrars now are 
allowed to apply for a 
gTLD 
background checks in 
this area of terrorism, as 
 
it is presented in the 
DAG 4, without any 
definition, is 
unacceptable 
 
 
4 posters 0 posters Yes – term ‘terrorism’ 
removed from the 
relevant section 
Morality and public 
order provisions should 
be scrapped 
6 posters 1 poster No 
Trademark rights 
protection mechanisms 
are inadequate 
21 posters  
 
0 posters No change to 
trademark protections 
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PCP 9: Public comments period on DAG v.5 (12 November 2010-15 January 2011) 
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/)  
Comment / proposal  Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v6? 
Outright opposition to 
new TLDs at least 
insofar as the 
programme is 
currently conceived– 
programme should be 
cancelled altogether or 
at least delayed to 
allow more time for 
study of issues 
13 posters 
 
Implicitly opposed by 
all those who did not 
argue against new 
gTLDs. Explicit 
arguments in favour of 
new gTLDs made by 3 
posters 
 
No 
New TLDs application 
process should go 
ahead ASAP 
11 posters 0 posters Partly - DAG v6 
proved to be the 
penultimate version 
and gave way to final / 
approved version 
within weeks 
Initial limited 
introduction/  fast 
track process for ‘safe’ 
community TLDs  
3 posters  
 
 
1 poster No 
Opposition to auctions 
as a ‘last resort’ 
method for resolving 
string contention.  
3 posters 0 posters No 
ICANN’s U-turn on 
vertical integration 
(removing all 
restrictions on registry 
/ registrar cros-
ownership) lacks 
transparency 
7 posters 0 posters No 
Thick WHOIS should 
be reinstated 
7 posters 0 posters Some strengthening 
to WHOIS 
requirements 
including 
requirement for 
searchable WHOIS. 
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Comment / proposal  Proposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation) 
Opposed by (Poster 
name / affiliation)  
Addressed in DAG 
v6? 
Need ‘loser pays’ 
model in URS 
3 posters 0 posters Limited ‘loser pays’ 
model adopted for 
complaints listing 26 
or more domain 
names.  
URS needs to be 
strengthened 
 
 
6 posters 0 posters Yes, to some degree 
– See modifications 
to URS appended to 
DAG V.6 
Denying an entity the 
opportunity to operate 
a gTLD because of 3 
adverse 
UDRP decisions is an 
extremely broad 
standard that will 
unintentionally 
disqualify 
otherwise qualified 
applicants. 
 
3 posters. 0 posters No 
Trademark rights 
protection mechanisms 
are inadequate 
 
28 posters 
 
 
 
2 posters 
 
 
 
Some changes 
including 
strengthened WHOIS 
+ URS. Revisions to 
Trademark 
Clearinghouse,  
PDDRP and sunrise 
requirements.  
If new gTLD 
applicants are to be 
judged for their 
compliance with 
UDRP law, they 
should be judged 
equally for findings of 
cybersquatting and of 
reverse domain-name 
hijacking. 
3 posters 0 posters No 
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PCP 10: Public comments period on DAGv6  (15 April 2011-15 May 2011)   
(For full details of all submitted comments see http://forum.icann.org/lists/6gtld-guide/)  
Comment / proposal Proposed / 
supported by 
Opposed by Addressed in Final 
Applicant 
Guidebook?  
Outright opposition to new TLDs 
at least insofar as the programme 
is currently conceived– 
programme should be cancelled 
altogether or at least delayed to 
allow more time for study of 
issues 
4 posters Implicitly opposed 
by all those who 
did not argue 
against new 
gTLDs.  
Programme 
continues to go 
forward 
New TLDs should go ahead, but 
only in limited numbers 
8 posters 0 posters No – though 
commitment to a 
review of impact 
after first 
application round 
closes 
The Board should finalise the 
application procedure and launch 
the programme  without further 
delay 
8 posters  7 posters   Yes – final 
approval given for 
next version of 
DAG on 20th June 
2011  
Trademark rights protection 
mechanisms are inadequate 
19 posters  4 posters No significant 
change 
Proper global reserved marks list 
needed 
2 posters 1 poster No 
Two-character ASCII TLDs 
should be permitted.  
4 posters 0 posters No  
Expand the Trademark Claims 
and Sunrise period services 
beyond the exact match of the 
registered trademark filed with 
the Clearinghouse. 
4 posters 0 posters No  
Reduce the requirements for the 
limited loser pays model from the 
currently stated 26 or more 
disputed domain names.   
 
3 posters 0 posters No 
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Comment / proposal Proposed / 
supported by 
Opposed by Addressed in Final 
Applicant 
Guidebook?  
URS needs to be strengthened 10 posters 
 
0 posters No significant 
change to URS 
PDDRP needs to be strengthened 4 posters 0 posters No significant 
changes to PDDRP 
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Appendix 4.12: Comparison between GAC Principles regarding Public Policy Aspects 
related to new gTLDs
92
 and GNSO Final Report: Introduction of New Generic Top-
Level Domains
93
 
 
GAC Principle Cross-reference to GNSO Final Report 
2.1   New gTLDs should respect: 
a) The provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which seek to 
affirm "fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the equal rights of men and women". 
b) The sensitivities regarding terms with 
national, cultural, geographic and religious 
significance. 
Covered by Principle G and 
Recommendation 3 in the Final Report.  
 
2.2  ICANN should avoid country, territory 
or place names, and country, territory or 
regional language or people descriptions, 
unless in agreement with the relevant 
governments or public authorities.  
 
Not addressed by the Final Report and went 
on to become a significant point of 
contention between the GAC and the GNSO.  
 
2.3  The process for introducing new gTLDs 
must make proper allowance for prior third 
party rights, in particular trademark rights as 
well as rights in the names and acronyms of 
inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). 
Covered by Recommendation 3 in the Final 
Report.  
 
2.4  In the interests of consumer confidence 
and security, new gTLDs should not be 
confusingly similar to existing TLDs. To 
avoid confusion with country-code Top 
Level Domains no two letter gTLDs should 
be introduced. 
The reference to ‘confusingly similar’ gTLD 
strings  is covered by Recommendation 2 in 
the Final Report. The issue of two-character 
gTLDs is not addressed in the report though 
the matter was discussed by the GNSO  
 
                                                          
92 ICANN (2007). GAC Principles regarding New gTLDs, Presented by the Governmental Advisory 
Committee. Section 2: Public Policy Aspects related to new gTLDs.  March 28 2007. Retrieved 5 February 
2009, from http://gac.icann.org/web/home/gTLD_principles.pdf  
93 ICANN (2007). GNSO Final Report: Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains. 8 August 2007. 
Retrieved 14 July 2010, from http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm 
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GAC Principle Cross-reference to GNSO Final Report 
2.5  The evaluation and selection procedure 
for new gTLD registries should respect the 
principles of fairness, transparency and non-
discrimination. All applicants for a new 
gTLD registry should therefore be evaluated 
against transparent and predictable criteria, 
fully available to the applicants prior to the 
initiation of the process. Normally, therefore, 
no subsequent additional selection criteria 
should be used in the selection process. 
Covered by Recommendation 1 in the Final 
Report.  
2.6  It is important that the selection process 
for new gTLDs ensures the security, 
reliability, global interoperability and 
stability of the Domain Name System (DNS) 
and promotes competition, consumer choice, 
geographical and service-provider diversity. 
Covered by Principle C, D and 
Recommendation 4 in the Final Report.  
 
2.7  Applicant registries for new gTLDs 
should pledge to: 
a) Adopt, before the new gTLD is 
introduced, appropriate procedures for 
blocking, at no cost and upon demand of 
governments, public authorities or IGOs, 
names with national or geographic 
significance at the second level of any new 
gTLD. 
b) Ensure procedures to allow governments, 
public authorities or IGOs to 
challenge abuses of names with national or 
geographic significance at the second level of 
any new gTLD. 
This is not addressed by the Final Report. 
2.8   Applicants should publicly document 
any support they claim to enjoy from 
specific communities. 
 
 
Partially addressed by Implementation 
Guideline IG H, however this states that 
applications claiming to represent a 
community will be taken on trust unless there 
is a clear objection.  
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GAC Principle Cross-reference to GNSO Final Report 
2.9   Applicants should identify how they 
will limit the need for defensive registrations 
and minimise cyber-squatting that can result 
from bad-faith registrations and other abuses 
of the registration system 
Principle F and Recommendation 6 require 
compliance with ICANN policies on matters 
such as cybersquatting and dispute resolution 
policies.  
 
2.10   A new gTLD operator/registry should 
undertake to implement practices that ensure 
an appropriate level of security and stability 
both for the TLD itself and for the DNS as a 
whole, including the development of best 
practices to ensure the accuracy, integrity and 
validity of registry information. 
Addressed by Principle C in the Final Report.  
 
2.11  ICANN and a new gTLD 
operator/registry should establish clear 
continuity plans for maintaining the 
resolution of names in the DNS in the event 
of registry failure. 
This is not addressed by the Final Report, 
however ICANN did release a gTLD 
Registry Failover Plan in July 2008.  
2.12   ICANN should continue to ensure that 
registrants and registrars in new gTLDs have 
access to an independent appeals process in 
relation to registry decisions related to 
pricing changes, renewal procedures, service 
levels, or the unilateral and significant 
change of contract conditions. 
This is not addressed by the Final Report, 
however it is established practice for existing 
gTLDs and presumably is likely to be applied 
to new ones also.   
 
2.13   ICANN should ensure that any 
material changes to the new gTLD 
operations, policies or contract obligations be 
made in an open and transparent manner 
allowing for adequate public comment. 
This is not addressed by the Final Report. 
2.14  The GAC WHOIS principles are 
relevant to new gTLDs. 
 
This is not addressed by the Final Report.  
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Appendix 4.13: Comparison between GAC indicative ‘scorecard’ on new gTLD 
outstanding issues
94
 and Board response
95
 
 
Issue GAC advice
96
  Board response
97
  
1. The objection procedures 
including the requirements for 
governments to pay fees 
The GAC advises the ICANN 
Board to instruct ICANN staff to 
delete the procedures related to 
“Limited Public Interest 
Objections”in Module 3. 
The Board stated an intention to 
retain the “Limited Public Interest 
Objection” process for entities 
other than GAC members and other 
governments, instead of the original 
GAC recommendation that the 
entire section be deleted.  
GAC and individual governments 
to be provided with a separate 
procedure for objections based on 
public policy concerns. 
2. Procedures for the review of 
sensitive strings 
The GAC advises the ICANN 
Board to instruct ICANN staff to 
amend the provisions and 
procedures contained in Modules 1 
and 3 to clarify the following: 
1. “Community-based strings” 
include those that purport to 
represent or that embody a 
particular group of people or 
interests based on historical, 
cultural or social components of 
identity, such as nationality, race or 
ethnicity, religion, belief, culture or 
particular social origin or group, 
political opinion, membership of a 
2.1.1: String Evaluation and 
Objections: While the Board has 
accepted the core component of the 
GAC’s recommendation that 
governments will use the GAC as a 
platform to raise objections 
2.1.2: The Board has rejected the 
recommendation that GAC advice 
during the Initial Evaluation could 
also suggest measures to mitigate 
concerns, on the basis that this 
approach introduces subjective 
assessments into the evaluation 
process. 
2.1.3: The Board has accepted the 
                                                          
94 ICANN (2011). GAC indicative scorecard on new gTLD outstanding issues listed in the GAC Cartagena 
Communiqué. 23 February 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-
scorecard-23feb11-en.pdf 
95 ICANN (2011). GAC comments on the Board response to the GAC indicative scorecard on new gTLD 
outstanding issues. Retrieved 17 July 2011, from 
http://gac.icann.org/system/files/20110412_GAC_comments_on_the_Board_response_to_the_GAC_scorecard_
0.pdf  
96 ICANN (2011). GAC indicative scorecard on new gTLD outstanding issues listed in the GAC Cartagena 
Communiqué. 23 February 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-
scorecard-23feb11-en.pdf 
97 ICANN (2011). GAC comments on the Board response to the GAC indicative scorecard on new gTLD 
outstanding issues. Retrieved 17 July 2011, from 
http://gac.icann.org/system/files/20110412_GAC_comments_on_the_Board_response_to_the_GAC_scorecard_
0.pdf  
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national minority, disability, age, 
and/or a language or linguistic 
group (non exhaustive). In addition, 
those strings that refer to particular 
sectors, such as those subject to 
national regulation (such as .bank, 
.pharmacy) or those that describe or 
are targeted to a population or 
industry that is vulnerable to online 
fraud or abuse, should also be 
considered “community-based” 
strings. 
2. Applicants seeking such strings 
should be required to affirmatively 
identify them as “community-based 
strings” and must demonstrate their 
affiliation with the affected 
community, the specific purpose of 
the proposed TLD, and –when 
opportune-evidence of support or 
non-objection from the relevant 
authority/ies that the applicant is 
the appropriate or agreed entity for 
purposes of managing the TLD. 
3. In the event the proposed string 
is either too broad to effectively 
identify a single entity as the 
relevant authority or appropriate 
manager, or is sufficiently 
contentious that an appropriate 
manager cannot be identified and/or 
agreed, the application should be 
rejected. 
4. The requirement that objectors 
must demonstrate “material 
detriment to the broader Internet 
community” should be amended to 
reflect simply “material detriment”, 
as the former represents an 
extremely vague standard that may 
prove impossible to satisfy. 
5. Individual governments that 
choose to file objections to any 
proposed “community-based” 
string should not be required to pay 
GAC’s advice that it must provide a 
rationale for decisions in the event 
that the Board determines to take an 
action that is inconsistent with 
GAC advice. 
2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3: Expand 
Categories of Community-Based 
Strings: The Board has 
categorically rejected the core 
components of the GAC’s advice, 
and is substituting a Community 
objections procedure for the more 
proactive and preventative 
mechanism that would require an 
affirmative demonstration of 
Community support. 
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fees. 
3. Root Zone Scaling 1. The Board should continue 
implementing a monitoring and 
alerting system and ensure a) that 
ICANN can react predictably and 
quickly when there are indicators 
that new additions and changes are 
straining the root zone system, and 
b) that the processes and possible 
resulting restorative measures that 
flow from its results are fully 
described in the Application 
Guidebook before the start of the 
first application round. 
2. The Board commits to defer the 
launch of a second round or batch 
of applications unless an evaluation 
shows that there are indications 
from monitoring the root system 
etc. that a first (limited) round did 
not in any way jeopardize the 
security and stability of the root 
zone system. 
3. The Board commits to make the 
second round or batch of 
applications contingent on a clean 
sheet from full technical and 
administrative assessment of impact 
of the first round with 
recommendations which should go 
out to public comment for approval. 
4. The Board commits to avoid the 
possibility that other activities will 
be impacted by the possible 
diversion of resources to processing 
new gTLD applications. 
5. The Board should ensure that 
ICANN can effectively address the 
specific needs of applicants from 
different, perhaps non- 
English speaking cultures, and with 
different legal environments. 
6. The Board should monitor the 
Root zone monitoring systems are 
currently in place. ICANN will 
work with root zone operators to 
identify relevant reporting metrics 
and to stablish a process for 
reporting such metrics to the GAC 
and the Internet community. 
Furthermore, a process will be 
implemented that enables the 
delegation of TLDs to be slowed or 
stopped in the event that there is a 
strain on the root zone system. 
ICANN also commits to review the 
effects of the new gTLD program 
on the operations of the root zone 
system, and to defer delegations in 
a second round until it is 
determined that the delegations in 
the first round have not jeopardized 
the root zone system’s security or 
stability. 
 
ICANN commits that the operation 
of the IANA functions and 
ICANN's coordination of the root 
zone system will not be negatively 
affected. 
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pace and effectiveness of ICANN’s 
management of contract 
negotiations for new gTLDs in a 
potential situation of 200 to 300 
simultaneous applications and 
evaluations. 
7. The Board is confident that all 
relevant actors (IANA, root server 
operators, etc) are sufficiently 
informed about what is expected 
from them in terms of work 
loadings and resources in order to 
fulfil their respective roles, in 
particular the pre delegation 
checking, approvals, 
implementation of potentially 200 
to 300 root zone changes a year and 
expected postdelegation changes. 
4. Market and Economic 
Impacts 
1. Criteria to facilitate the weighing 
of the potential costs and benefits to 
the public in the evaluation and 
award of new gTLDs. 
2. A requirement that new gTLD 
applicants provide information on 
the expected benefits of the 
proposed gTLD, as well as 
information and proposed operating 
terms to eliminate or minimize 
costs to registrants and consumers. 
3. Due diligence or other operating 
restrictions to ensure that 
Community-based gTLDs will in 
fact serve their targeted 
communities and will not broaden 
their operations in a manner that 
makes it more likely for the 
registries to impose costs 
on existing domain owners in other 
TLDs. 
1. It is not planned that information 
gathered as part of the application 
will be used to predict the net 
benefit of the prospective TLD – 
that would be too speculative to be 
of real value. 
However, during the discussions 
between the GAC and the Board in 
Brussels, the GAC indicated that 
the weighing of costs and benefits 
should instead take place as part of 
the new gTLD program review as 
specified in section 9.3 of the 
Affirmation of Commitments. 
 
2. As clarified through the 
discussions with the GAC in 
Brussels, ICANN will continue to 
explore 
with the GAC during the ICANN 
Public meeting in March 2011what 
data might be included 
in the application to provide useful 
input to later economic studies and 
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community analysis. 
 
3. The Board has accepted the 
GAC’s advice that due diligence or 
other operating 
restrictions to ensure that 
Community-based TLDs will in 
fact serve the targeted 
communities and will not broaden 
their operations in a manner that 
makes it more likely for 
registries to impose costs on 
existing domain owners in other 
TLDs. 
5. Registry – Registrar 
Separation 
 
The GAC advises the ICANN 
Board to instruct ICANN staff to 
amend the proposed new registry 
agreement to restrict 
crossownership between registries 
and registrars, in those cases where 
it can be determined that the 
registry does have, or is likely to 
obtain, market power. The GAC 
further advises the ICANN Board 
that it considers the absence of a 
thorough and reasoned explanation 
of its decision in November 2010 to 
reverse its earlier decision of March 
2010 to maintain " strict separation 
of entities offering registry services 
and those acting as registrars" 
Board rejected the GAC proposal.  
6. Protection of Rights Owners 
and consumer protection issue 
1. Rights Protection: Trademark 
Clearing House (TC) 
GAC Advice 
The GAC proposes the following 
refining changes that significantly 
improve the operation and achieve 
the maximum impact of the 
TC: 
 The TC should be permitted to 
1.ICANN agrees that the registry 
operator must assist appropriately 
in law enforcement investigations. 
There might be a difference 
between local and International law 
enforcement agencies. There is a 
question about whether this 
requirement would be stronger than 
what is already required by law. 
Changes to the Guidebook will be 
made after consideration of those 
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accept all types of intellectual 
property rights that are recognized 
under the national law of the 
country or countries under which 
the registry is organized or has its 
principal place of business. The 
only mandatory requirement for 
new registry operators will be to 
recognize national and 
supranational trademark 
registrations issued before June 26, 
2008 and court-validated common 
law trademarks. 
 Sunrise services and IP claims 
should both be mandatory for 
registry operators because they 
serve different functions with IP 
claims serving a useful notice 
function beyond the introductory 
phase. 
IP claims services and sunrise 
services should go beyond exact 
matches to include exact match plus 
key terms associated with goods or 
services identified by the mark ) 
e.g. “Kodakonlineshop”) and 
typographical variations identified 
by the rights holder. 
All trademark registrations of 
national and supranational effect, 
regardless of whether examined on 
substantive or relative grounds, 
must be eligible to participate in the 
pre-launch sunrise mechanisms. 
Protections afforded to 
trademark registrations do not 
extend to applications for 
registrations, marks within any 
opposition period or registered 
marks that were the subject of 
successful invalidation, cancellation 
or rectification proceedings. 
The IP claims service should 
notify the potential domain name 
issues. 
 
2. Board agrees to augment 
ICANN's contractual compliance 
function with additional resources 
to support the program of contracts 
between ICANN and the registries 
and registrars. 
3. ICANN has requested 
clarification from the GAC of the 
intended meaning of "generally 
regulated industries", but generally 
believes that a priori categorization 
of strings is inherently problematic. 
 
4. ICANN accepts the principle that 
screening should be as effective as 
possible. ICANN is willing to meet 
with law enforcement and other 
experts to ensure that all available 
expertise is focused on this issue. 
(ICANN notes however that there is 
no consistent definition of criminal 
behavior across multiple 
jurisdictions, and the existing 
proposed Applicant Guidebook 
consciously targets "crimes of 
trust".) 
 
5. ICANN could consider providing 
extra points in some aspects of the 
qualification evaluation scoring 
process. (ICANN notes however 
that a priori categorization of 
strings is inherently problematic.) 
 
6. ICANN accepts the principle that 
screening should be as effective as 
possible. ICANN is willing to meet 
with law enforcement and other 
experts to ensure that all available 
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registrant of the rights holder’s 
claim and also notify the rights 
holder of the registrant’s 
application for the domain name. 
 The TC should continue after 
the initial launch of each gTLD. 
Rights holders, registries and 
registrars should all contribute to 
the cost of the TC because they all 
benefit from it. 
 
2. Rights Protection: Uniform 
Rapid Suspension (URS): 
GAC Advice: 
Significantly reduce the 
timescales. See attached table for 
proposed changes. 
The URS processes should be 
streamlined as follows: 
o The complaint should be 
simplified by replacing the 5,000 
word free text limit + unlimited 
attachments [para 1.2] with a 
simple pro forma standardised 
wording with the opportunity fro 
not more than 500 words of 
freeform text and limit the 
attachments to copies of the 
offending website. 
o Decisions should be taken by a 
suitably qualified ‘Examiner’ and 
not require panel appointments.. 
o Where the complaint is based 
upon a valid registration, the 
requirement that the jurisdiction of 
registration incorporate substantive 
examination (paras 1.2f (i) and 
8.1a) should be removed. 
o If, as is expected in the majority 
expertise is focused on this issue. 
(ICANN is mindful that this 
particular recommendation could 
lead applicants to locate in certain 
regions in order to gain the depth of 
domestic screening. International 
screening is likely to include the 
reports of local agencies and could 
therefore be duplicative.)  
7. ICANN accepts the principle that 
screening should be as effective as 
possible. ICANN is willing to meet 
with law enforcement and other 
experts to ensure that all available 
expertise is focused on this issue. 
(ICANN notes that there is no 
consistent definition of criminal 
behavior across multiple 
jurisdictions, and the existing 
proposed Applicant Guidebook 
already addresses serious crimes of 
trust.) 
8. ICANN will explore possible 
ways to make results public, but is 
concerned that posting such 
information poses concerns about 
privacy that should be explored 
further. 
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of cases, there is no response from 
the registrant, the default should be 
in favour of the complainant and 
the website locked. The 
examination of possible defences in 
default cases according to para 
8.4(2) would otherwise give an 
unjustified privilege to the non-
cooperating defendant. 
o The standard of proof (para 8.2) 
should be lowered from “clear and 
convincing evidence” to a 
preponderance of evidence”. 
 The “bad faith” requirement in 
paras 1.2f), 1.2g) and 8.1c) is not 
acceptable. Complainants will in 
only rare cases prevail in 
URS proceedings if the standards to 
be fulfilled by registrants are lax. 
Correspondingly, the factors listed 
in paras 5.7a) (“bona fide”) and b) 
“been commonly known by the 
domain name”) can hardly allow a 
domain name owner to prevail over 
the holders of colliding trademarks. 
A ‘loser pays’ mechanism 
should be added. In addition, 
registrants who have lost five or 
more URS proceedings should be 
deemed to have waived the 
opportunity to respond to future 
URS complaints (this amendment 
corresponds to the “two strikes” 
provision which applies to rights 
holders). 
However, there should be a 
clear rationale for appeal by the 
complainant. The time for filing an 
appeal in default cases must be 
reduced from 2 years to not more 
than 6 months. In addition, the 
examination of possible defences in 
default cases according to para 
8.4(2) means an unjustified 
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privilege of the non-cooperating 
defendant. 
 The URS filing fee should be 
US$200-US$300 and minor 
administrative deficiencies should 
not result in dismissal of the URS 
complaint. 
A successful complainant 
should have the right of first refusal 
for transfer of the disputed domain 
name after the suspension period so 
that the complainant is not forced to 
pursue a UDRP proceeding to 
secure a transfer. 
The URS should go beyond 
‘exact’ matches and should at least 
include exact + goods/other generic 
words e.g. 
“Kodakonlineshop” 
3. Rights Protection: Post-
delegation Dispute Resolution 
Procedure (PDDRP) 
GAC Advice: 
The GAC recommends that: 
The standard of proof be 
changed from “clear and 
convincing evidence” to a 
“preponderance of evidence”. 
The second level registrations 
that form the underlying basis of a 
successful PDDRP complaint 
should be deleted. 
The requirement of “substantive 
examination” in para 9.2.1(i) 
should be deleted. 
A new para 6.1 a) be added: 
“being identical to the 
complainant’s mark in relation to 
goods and services which are 
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identical to 
those for which the complainant’s 
mark is registered. This would not 
apply if the registrant has a better 
right to the mark. In particular the 
registrant will in normal 
circumstances have a better right if 
the mark has been registered prior 
to the registration of the 
complainant’s mark.” 
 Regarding the second level 
(para 6.2), the registrant operator 
should be liable if he/she acts in 
bad faith or is grosslky negligent in 
relation to the circumstances listed 
in para 6.a)-d). 
The requirement in para 7.2.3 
lit.d) that the complainant has to 
notify the registry operator at least 
30 days prior to filing a 
complaint is burdensome and 
should be reduced to 10 days if not 
deleted entirely. 
Para 19.5 should be amended as 
follows: “In cases where the Expert 
Determination decides that a 
registry operator is liable under the 
standards of the Trademark 
PDDRP, ICANN will impose 
appropriate remedies that are in line 
with the Determination. 
Explanation and Argument These 
changes would ensure that the 
PDDRP is consistent with the 
requirements in a civil action for 
contributory trademark 
infringement action or unfair 
competition and that the abusive 
second level registrations are 
deleted after a successful PDDRP 
complaint. 
The GAC believes that the liability 
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criteria in the Applicant Guidebook 
are too lax. In particular, according 
to para 6, the liability of the registry 
operator is only triggered by 
behaviours such as “taking unfair 
advantage”, “unjustifiable 
impairment of the distinctive 
character of the reputation of the 
complainant’s mark” or 
“impermissible likelihood of 
confusion with the complainant’s 
mark”. The proposed changes to 
para 6 are therefore intended to 
strengthen the criteria. 
The GAC considers that para 19.5 
grants ICANN too much discretion 
in choosing the remedies it imposes 
on the registry operators and 
recommends that the remedies be 
consistent with the Expert 
Determination. 
Ensuring full and effective 
compliance with the rules is a 
crucial issue post-delegation. The 
GAC believes therefore that 
ICANN needs to deploy a 
sufficiently large team for this 
purpose with an appropriate budget 
allocation. 
4. Consumer Protection 
Recommended GAC Advice: 
Points of Contact for Abuse: The 
GAC proposes the following 
amendment to the "Maintain an 
abuse point of contact" paragraph 
in the DAG to include government 
agencies which address consumer 
protection: 
A registry operator must assist law 
enforcement, government agencies 
and agencies endorsed by 
governments with their enquiries 
about abuse complaints concerning 
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all names registered in the TLD, 
including taking timely action, as 
required, to resolve abuse issues. 
Effective Contract Compliance: 
The GAC advises the Board to 
ensure that ICANN’s contract 
compliance function is adequately 
resourced to build confidence in 
ICANN’s ability to enforce 
agreements between ICANN and 
registries and registrars 
Vetting of certain strings 
The GAC proposes that gTLD 
strings which relate to any 
generally regulated industry (e.g. 
.bank, .dentist, .law) should be 
subject to more intensive vetting 
than other non-geographical 
gTLDs. 
 
7. Post-Delegation Disputes 
 
The GAC advises the ICANN 
Board to instruct ICANN staff to 
amend the Applicant Guidebook in 
the following way: 
1. Change the wording in the 
sample letter of Government 
support in AG back to the wording 
in DAGv4 and keeping the new 
paragraph 7.13 of the new gTLD 
registry agreement with the 
changed wording from “may 
implement” to “will comply”. E.g 
change the wording from “may 
implement” back to “will comply” 
with a legally binding decision in 
the relevant jurisdiction. 
2. In addition describe in the AG 
that ICANN will comply with a 
legally binding decision in the 
relevant jurisdiction where there 
has been a dispute between the 
relevant government or public 
7.1 ICANN will modify the 
suggested wording of the letter of 
support or non-objection, and make 
clear its commitments to 
governments in additional text of 
the Applicant Guidebook. 
However, the registry agreement 
will continue to indicate that 
ICANN “may implement” instead 
of “will comply” with such 
decisions for legal reasons. As 
discussed previously with the GAC, 
ICANN’s commitment to comply 
with legally binding decisions is 
made to governments, not to 
registries. Therefore, it is not 
necessarily in the interest of 
ICANN, or of governments, to 
place that obligation in registry 
agreements, giving registry 
operators the ability, and perhaps 
duty, to force ICANN to implement 
decisions in every case. (ICANN 
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authority and registry operator. has a mechanism to enforce its 
contracts with registry operators.) 
 
7.2 The suggestion to change “court 
decision” to “legally binding 
decision” requires further 
discussion as it may in some cases 
amount to a redelegation request. 
Also, there could be multiple 
jurisdictions that have given their 
support to one application (e.g., 
multiple “Springfield”s), thus it 
may not be appropriate to 
implement a particular action based 
on one such decision. 
8. Use of geographic names: 1. Definition of geographic names 
Recommended GAC Advice: 
The GAC asks ICANN to ensure 
that the criteria for community 
objections are implemented in a 
way that appropriately enables 
governments to use this instrument 
to protect their legal interest. 
ICANN refers to detailed 
explanations given in the “Final 
Draft Applicant Guidebook”. 
The GAC is of the view that the 
criteria for community objections 
do still not meet these 
requirements. The problem could 
be solved, if a free of charge 
objection mechanism would allow 
governments to protect their 
interest and to define names that are 
to be considered geographic names. 
This implies that ICANN will 
exclude an applied for string from 
entering the new gTLD process 
when the government formally 
states that this string is considered 
to be a name for which this country 
is commonly known as. 
8.1.1.1 
ICANN will investigate a 
mechanism for the forthcoming 
round under which GAC members 
could be exempted from paying 
fees for objections in some 
circumstances (subject to 
constraints imposed by budget and 
other considerations). 
8.1.1.2 
The process relies on pre-existing 
lists of geographic names for 
determining which strings require 
the support or non-objection of a 
government. Governments and 
other representatives of 
communities will continue to be 
able to utilize the community 
objection process to address 
attempted misappropriation of 
community labels. ICANN will 
continue to explore the possibility 
of pre-identifying using additional 
authoritative lists of geographic 
identifiers that are published by 
recognized global organizations. 
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The GAC considers that the 
provisions in DAG4 in relation to 
city names carry the danger that an 
applicant could seek to avoid the 
safeguard of government support or 
non-objection if the applicant 
simply states that the intended use 
of the name is for non-community 
purposes. 
The GAC asks ICANN to review 
the proposal in the DAG in order to 
ensure that this potential does not 
arise. 
ICANN states that applicants are 
required to provide a  
escription/purpose for the TLD, and 
to adhere to the terms and condition 
of submitting an application 
including confirming that all 
statements and representations 
contained in the application are true 
and accurate. 
The GAC is of the view that this 
statement does not reflect fully its 
concerns and asks for further 
explanations. The problem could be 
solved, if a free objection 
mechanism would allow 
governments to protect their 
interest. 
The GAC reminds the Board that 
governments need time to consult 
internally before deciding on  
whether or not to deliver a letter of 
approval or non-objection. 
ICANN explains that it has not 
been decided how long the 
application period will be open 
from the launching of the gTLD 
program and recalls that there will 
be a four months communications 
campaign prior to the launch. 
No further action required by now. 
8.1.2ICANN will continue to rely 
on pre-existing lists of geographic 
names for determining which 
strings require the support or non-
objection of a government. This is 
in the interest of providing a 
transparent and predictable process 
for all parties. 
 
8.1.3  
There are post-delegation 
mechanisms to address this 
situation. In addition, the "early 
warning" opportunity will offer an 
additional means to indicate 
community objections. 
 
8.1.4 (1B) ICANN will investigate 
a mechanism for the forthcoming 
round under which GAC members 
could be exempted from paying 
fees for objections in some 
circumstances (subject to 
constraints imposed by budget and 
other considerations). 
 
8.2.1 This principle is agreed, and 
this can be clarified in the 
Guidebook. ICANN invites 
governments to identify appropriate 
points of contact on this issue. 
 
 
8.2.2 ICANN will continue to 
suspend processing of applications 
with inconsistent/conflicting 
support, but will allow multiple 
applicants all endorsed by the same 
authority to go forward, when 
requested by the government. 
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The GAC reiterates its position that 
governments should not be required 
to pay a fee for raising objections to 
new gTLD applications. 
It is the view of the ICANN Board 
that governments that file 
objections should be required to 
cover costs of the objection process 
just like any other objector. 
The problem could be solved, if a 
free objection mechanism would 
allow governments to protect their 
interest. 
2. Further requirements regarding 
geographic names 
The GAC clarifies that it is a 
question of national sovereignty to 
decide which level of government 
or which administration is 
responsible for the filing of letters 
of support or non-objection. There 
may be countries that require that 
such documentation has to be filed 
by the central government - also for 
regional geoTLDs; in other 
countries the responsibility for 
filing letters of support may rest 
with sub-national level 
administrations even if the name of 
the capital is concerned. GAC 
requests some clarification on this 
in the next version of the 
Applicants Guidebook. 
According to the current DAG 
applications will be suspended 
(pending resolution by the 
applicants), if there is more than 
one application for a string 
representing a certain geographic 
name, and the applications have 
requisite government approvals. 
The GAC understands such a 
position for applications that have 
support of different administrations 
 223 
or governmental entities. In such 
circumstances it is not considered 
appropriate for ICANN to 
determine the most relevant 
governmental entity; the same 
applies, if one string represents 
different geographic regions or 
cities. Some governments, 
however, may prefer not to select 
amongst applicants and support 
every application that fulfils certain 
requirements. Such a policy may 
facilitate decisions in some 
administrations and avoid time-
consuming calls for tenders. GAC 
encourages ICANN to process 
those applications as other 
competing applications that apply 
for the same string. 
 
9. Legal Recourse for 
Applications: 
The GAC reiterates its concern that 
excluding the possibility of legal 
recourse might raise severe legal 
problems. GAC therefore urges the 
ICANN Board to seek legal advice 
in major jurisdiction whether such a 
provision might cause legal  
conflicts – in particular but not 
limited to US and European 
competition laws. If ICANN 
explains that it has already 
examined these legal questions 
carefully and considering the 
results of these examinations still 
adheres to that provision, GAC will 
no longer insist on its position. 
However, the GAC expects that 
ICANN will continue to adhere to 
the rule of law and follow broad 
principles of natural justice. For 
example, if 
ICANN deviates from its agreed 
processes in coming to a decision, 
the GAC expects that ICANN will 
provide an appropriate mechanism 
As discussed with the GAC, 
ICANN has examined these legal 
questions carefully and considering 
the results of these examinations 
still adheres to this provision. 
ICANN will clarify in the 
Applicant Guidebook that: if 
ICANN deviates from its agreed 
processes in coming to a decision, 
ICANN's internal accountability 
mechanisms will allow complaints 
to be heard. 
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for any complaints to be heard. 
 
10. Providing opportunities for 
all stakeholders including those 
from developing countries 
Main issues 
1. Cost Considerations 
“ GAC urged ICANN to set 
technical and other requirements, 
including cost considerations, at a 
reasonable and proportionate level 
in order not to exclude stakeholders 
from developing countries from 
participating in the new gTLD 
process.” 
GAC: new gTLD applications from 
municipalities and local 
governments in developing 
countries 
2. Language diversity 
Key documents produced by 
ICANN must be available in all UN 
languages within a reasonable 
period in advance of the launch of 
the gTLD round. The GAC strongly 
recommends that the 
communications strategy for the 
new gTLD round be developed 
with this issue of inclusiveness as a 
key priority”. 
3. Technical and logistics support 
4. Outreach – as per Joint AC/SO 
recommendations 
5. Joint AC/SO Working Group on 
support for new gTLD applicants. 
On 10th December 2010 the GAC 
through its Cartagena GAC 
communiqué stated as follows: 
“The GAC welcomed an update on 
the work of the Joint AC/SO 
Working Group on support, and 
encourages the Working Group to 
continue their efforts, particularly 
1. TBD ICANN’s Board recognised 
the importance of an inclusive New 
gTLD Program and issued a 
Resolution forming a Joint 
Working Group (JAS WG) which is 
underway. ICANN would like to 
receive the report of the JAS WG as 
soon as possible. JAS WG is 
requested to provide a possible 
deadline for this work during the 
ICANN meeting in SFO allowing 
the Board to act. 
 
It is noted that one of the challenges 
in developing support mechanisms 
for applicants is to ensure that such 
support is actually received by 
those applicants with the most 
need, rather than being used 
advantageously by other 
participants. This issue has also 
been taken into account in the work 
of the JAS WG. 
 
2. Some documents are already 
available in the 6 UN languages. 
The Final Application Guidebook 
will be also in due course, and the 
web site will be organized to find 
easily all the documents available 
in each language. 
 
3. ICANN has agreed to provide 
certain mechanisms for technical 
and logistical support, such as 
assisting with matching needs to 
providers. ICANN is also 
considering setting up regional help 
desks to provide more responsive 
and relevant technical support to 
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with regard to further outreach with 
developing countries” further, the 
GAC urged ICANN to adopt 
recommendations of the Joint 
AC/SO Working Group. 
Recommendations of the Joint 
AC/SO Working Group: 
Who should receive Support? 
 Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), civil society 
and not-for-profit organizations 
Limited Community based 
applications such as cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic 
Applications in languages 
whose presence on the web is 
limited 
Local entrepreneurs, in those 
markets where market constraints 
make normal business operations 
more difficult 
Applicants located in emerging 
economies 
Type of support: 
Cost Reduction Support 
Sponsorship and other funding 
support 
Modifications to the financial 
continued operation instrument 
obligation 
Technical support 
Logistical support 
Obligation Technical support 
for applicants in operating or 
qualifying to operate a gTLD 
gTLD Exception to the rules 
requiring separation of the Registry 
new gTLD applicants in developing 
countries.  
 
4. Concurrence of views between 
the Board and GAC on 
the critical need for outreach to 
developing countries 
 
5. TBD This item from the GAC 
Scorecard appears to reflect the 
interim report of the JAS WG. 
ICANN is awaiting their final 
report. (ICANN would like to 
receive the report of the JAS WG as 
soon as possible.)   
 
6. TBD This set of issues overlaps 
with and is addressed in the other 
items in 
this section. 
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and Registrar function 
6. Applications from Governments 
or National authorities (especially 
municipal councils and provincial 
authorities) – 
special consideration for 
applications from developing 
countries 
GAC communiqué’s on the issue: 
i. Brussels Communiqué 
Commitments. It therefore urged 
ICANN to set technical and other 
requirements, including cost 
considerations, at a 
reasonable and proportionate level 
in order not to exclude developing 
country stakeholders from 
participating in the new 
gTLD-process. Key documents 
should be available in all UN 
languages. The GAC urges that the 
communications and 
outreach strategy for the new gTLD 
round be developed with this issue 
of inclusiveness as a key priority. 
ii. Nairobi Communiqué 
The GAC believed that instead of 
the then proposal of single-fee 
requirement, a cost-based structure 
of fees appropriate to each category 
of TLD would: 
a) prevent cross subsidization and 
b) better reflect the project scale, 
This would improve logistical 
requirements and financial position 
of local community and developing 
country stakeholders who should 
not be disenfranchised from the 
new TLD round. 
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Further the board believes that : 
a. New gTLD process is developed 
on a cost recovery model. 
b. Experience gained from first 
round will inform decisions on fee 
levels, and the scope for discounts 
and subsidies in subsequent rounds. 
c. Non-financial means of support 
are being made available to 
deserving cases. 
i. Proposed that the following be 
entertained to achieve cost 
reduction: 
 Waiving the cost of Program 
Development ($26k). 
Waiving the Risk/Contingency 
cost ($60k). 
Lowering the application cost 
($100k) 
Waiving the Registry fixed fees 
($25k per calendar year), and 
charge the Registry- Level 
Transaction Fee only 
($0.25 per domain name 
registration or renewal). 
ii. Proposed that the reduced cost be 
paid incrementally, which will give 
the applicants/communities from 
developing 
countries more time to raise money, 
and investors will be more 
encouraged to fund an application 
that passes the initial 
evaluation. 
iii. Believe that communities from 
developing countries apply for new 
gTLDs according to an appropriate 
business model 
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taking into consideration the 
realities of their regions. ICANN’s 
commitment towards supporting 
gTLD applicants in communities 
from developing countries will be a 
milestone to the development of the 
overall Internet community in 
Africa and other developing 
regions. 
 
A. Other Developing world 
Community comments 
Rolling out new gTLD and IDNs 
was done in a hurry and without 
basis on a careful feasibility study 
on the impact that this rollout will 
have on developing countries. For 
some representatives, this is a 
massive roll out of gTLDs and 
IDNs that will find many 
developing countries unprepared 
and unable to absorb it. There is the 
fear that there might be serious 
consequence in terms of economic 
impact to developing countries. 
 
11. Law enforcement due 
diligence recommendations to 
amend the Registrar 
Accreditation 
Agreement as noted in the 
Brussels Communiqué 
 
The GAC advises the ICANN 
Board to instruct ICANN staff to 
amend the final Draft Applicant 
Guidebook as follows: 
Module 1: 
1. Include other criminal 
convictions as criteria for 
disqualification, such as Internet-
related crimes (felony or 
misdemeanor) or drugs. 
2. Assign higher weight to 
applicants offering the highest 
levels of security to minimize the 
potential for malicious activity, 
particularly for those strings that 
present a higher risk of serving as 
11.1 ICANN accepts the principle 
that screening should be as 
effective as possible. ICANN is 
willing to meet with law 
enforcement and other experts to 
ensure that all available expertise is 
focused on this issue. (ICANN 
notes however that there is no 
consistent definition of criminal 
behavior across multiple 
jurisdictions, and the existing 
proposed Applicant Guidebook 
consciously targets "crimes of 
trust".) 
11. 2 . 1 ICANN could consider 
providing extra points in some 
aspects of the qualification 
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venues for criminal, fraudulent or 
illegal conduct (e.g. such as those 
related to children, health-care, 
financial services, etc.) 
Module 2: 
1. Add domestic screening services, 
local to the applicant, to the 
international screening services. 
2. Add criminal background checks 
to the Initial Evaluation. 
3. Amend the statement that the 
results of due diligence efforts will 
not be posted to a positive 
commitment to make such results 
publicly available 
4. Maintain requirements that 
WHOIS data be accurate and 
publicly available. 
evaluation scoring process. 
(ICANN notes however that a priori 
categorization of strings is 
inherently problematic.) 
 
11.3 ICANN accepts the principle 
that screening should be as 
effective as possible. ICANN is 
willing to meet with law 
enforcement and other experts to 
ensure that all available expertise is 
focused on this issue. (ICANN is 
mindful that this particular 
recommendation could lead 
applicants to locate in certain 
regions in order to game the depth 
of domestic screening. International 
screening is likely to include the 
reports of local agencies and could 
therefore be duplicative.) 
 
11.4 ICANN accepts the principle 
that screening should be as 
effective as possible. ICANN is 
willing to meet with law 
enforcement and other experts to 
ensure that all available expertise is 
focused on this issue. (ICANN 
notes that there is no consistent 
definition of criminal behavior 
across multiple jurisdictions, and 
the existing proposed Applicant 
Guidebook already addresses 
serious crimes of trust.) 
 
11.5 ICANN will explore possible 
ways to make results public, but is 
concernedthat posting such 
information poses concerns about 
privacy that should be explored 
further. 
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11.6 From the Affirmation of 
Commitments: "ICANN 
additionally commits to enforcing 
its existing policy relating to 
WHOIS, subject to applicable laws. 
Such existing policy requires that 
ICANN implement measures to 
maintain timely, unrestricted and 
public access to accurate and 
complete WHOIS information, 
including registrant, technical, 
billing, and administrative contact 
information." 
 
12. The need for an early 
warning to applicants whether a 
proposed string would be 
considered controversial or to 
raise sensitivities (including 
geographical names) 
 
In conjunction with the GAC’s 
proposed amendments to the 
Objections Procedures, to 
Community-based strings, and 
Geographic Names, the GAC 
advises ICANN to reconsider its 
objection to an “early warning” 
opportunity for governments to 
review potential new gTLD strings 
and to advise applicants whether 
their proposed strings would be 
considered controversial or to raise 
national sensitivities. 
The principle of an early warning is 
already included in the Guidebook. 
The exact process needs to be 
discussed further – please see the 
Board’s notes above with respect to 
the GAC’s advice on “Procedures 
for the review of sensitive strings.”  
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Appendix 5.1.A: Initial GAC statement on IDN public policy areas  
The GAC made its first formal statement on IDNs in its Melbourne communiqué (March 
2001)98: 
With regard to international domain names (IDNs), the GAC confirms the importance and 
interests of this development to the benefit of Internet users worldwide. Further, regarding 
IDNs, including testbed initiatives, the GAC considers that three key public policy areas need 
to be kept at the forefront of the considerations of ICANN, its Supporting Organisations and 
the broader Internet community. These are: 
• the essential importance of interoperability of the present and future Internet;  
• the prevention of cybersquatting and resolution of disputes in the IDNs 
environments should be addressed by appropriate means and processes such as 
an appropriate dispute resolution policy and implementation of sunrise 
periods; and  
• the application of competition and market access, consumer protection and 
intellectual property principles.  
Specifically, the GAC states that: 
Anti-cybersquatting principles and mechanisms should translate from the current ASCII 
character set environment to any non-ASCII character set environments, and that 
technological implementation should appropriately keep pace with any developments in this 
area. 
Preserving the universal connectivity and accessibility domain name system is vital to the 
continuance of the Internet as a global network. While various technical experimentation may 
need to be investigated in the pursuit of unified standards, ultimately, a unified or 
interoperable standards for multilingual domain names should be achieved, with the ability of 
systems to work ubiquitously across the Internet. 
IDNs registration in top level domains should benefit from effective and fair conditions of 
competition, at appropriate levels and scale of activity. ICANN should take steps to 
communicate to operators of IDNs testbeds that they should note any legal obligation they 
have to inform consumers regarding both the status and operation of their testbeds, including 
the status of their registrations within that testbed, particularly in circumstances where 
registrations are taken prior to full system implementation.  
 
                                                          
98 ICANN. (2001).  GAC Communiqué VIII – Melbourne, 10 March 2001.   Retrieved January 6, 2009, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/communique-10mar01.htm  
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Appendix 5.1.B: Initial GAC Principles on the IDN testbeds  
The GAC stated its nine principles in its Stockholm Communiqué (June 2001)99: 
(1) The testbed process will not be used to undermine the universal interoperability of the 
Internet. 
 (2) Testbeds should be appropriately coordinated within a community-based framework such 
as ICANN and/or the IETF. 
(3) ICANN should issue information regarding testbed operations for participants interested 
in implementing preliminary standards, with a view to encouraging widespread participation 
at varied levels of scale and scope of operations. 
(4) Experimental and testing environments should contain a clearly articulated statement of 
operational scope, goals, milestones, and, to the extent foreseeable, implementation timelines. 
(5) All testbed undertakings should be clearly labeled and communicated to the public as 
experiments. Operators should be required to implement measures that ensure that users are 
fully informed of any limitations arising from testbed participation and operation. 
(6) It should be well understood by testbed operators and users that testing environments may 
end without establishing any prior claims on future standards or operational directions. 
(7) Testbed operators should adapt to consensus-based standards when they emerge through 
the ICANN process or other community-based processes such as the IETF 
(8) Appropriate mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of disputes that may arise from 
the testbed environment should be implemented as part of operational tests to the extent 
possible. 
(9) While operational testing in a "live" commercial environment may be necessary, the scale 
and scope of such operations should be consistent with the notion of the undertaking as a 
"testbed" endeavor, rather than a market launch.   
 
                                                          
99 ICANN (2001). GAC Principles on Internationalised Domain Names , as stated in GAC Communiqué IX – 
Stockholm, 2 June 2001. Retrieved 3 August 2009, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540197/GAC_09_Stockholm_Communique.pdf?version=1&
modificationDate=1312230827000  
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Appendix 5.2 IDN Guidelines   
Appendix 5.2.A: IDN Guidelines version 1.0 (20 June 2003) 
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-20jun03.htm  
1. Top-level domain registries that implement internationalized domain name capabilities will 
do so in strict compliance with the technical requirements described in RFCs 3490, 3491, and 
3492 (collectively, the "IDN standards"). 
2. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will employ an "inclusion-
based" approach (meaning that code points that are not explicitly permitted by the registry are 
prohibited) for identifying permissible code points from among the full Unicode repertoire. 
3. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will (a) associate each 
registered internationalized domain name with one language or set of languages, (b) employ 
language-specific registration and administration rules that are documented and publicly 
available, such as the reservation of all domain names with equivalent character variants in 
the languages associated with the registered domain name, and, (c) where the registry finds 
that the registration and administration rules for a given language would benefit from a 
character variants table, allow registrations in that language only when an appropriate table is 
available. 
4. Registries will work collaboratively with relevant and interested stakeholders to develop 
language-specific registration policies (including, where the registry determines appropriate, 
character variant tables), with the objective of achieving consistent approaches to IDN 
implementation for the benefit of DNS users worldwide. Registries will work collaboratively 
with each other to address common issues, through, for example, ad hoc groups, regional 
groups, and global fora, such as the ICANN IDN Registry Implementation Committee. 
5. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries should, at least initially, 
limit any given domain label (such as a second-level domain name) to the characters 
associated with one language or set of languages only. 
6. Top-level domain registries (and registrars) should provide informational resources and 
services in all languages for which they offer internationalized domain name registrations. 
Notes 
Note to Guideline 1 for Registries Having Agreements with ICANN: Registries with 
sponsorship agreements or registry agreements with ICANN must also comply with the 
format requirements for Registered Names in their sponsorship or registry agreements. In one 
way or another, the agreements state that all Registered Names (including ACE names) will 
comply with the following syntax in augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as described in 
RFC 2234: 
dot = %x2E ; "." 
dash = %x2D ; "-" 
alpha = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z 
digit = %x30-39 ; 0-9 
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ldh = alpha / digit / dash 
id-prefix = alpha / digit 
label = id-prefix [*61ldh id-prefix] 
sldn = label dot label 
hostname = *(label dot) sldn 
In addition, length limitations should be observed. 
To meet these requirements, the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag described in RFC 3490 should be 
set when in performing ToASCII conversions to produce ACE names, and the resulting 
format restriction should be interpreted as above. 
Note to Guideline 2: Except where a registry determines that an exception is appropriate, 
permissible code points will not include: (a) line symbol-drawing characters, (b) symbols and 
icons that are neither alphanumeric nor ideographic language characters, such as 
typographical and pictographic dingbats, (c) punctuation characters, and (d) spacing 
characters. The Prohibited Output profile of Section 5 of RFC 3491 also prohibits certain 
code points, such as spacing characters. In addition, the IDN standards have additional 
prohibitions that are checked outside that profile. In accord with Guideline 1, a registry may 
not by exception permit code points that are prohibited by the IDN standards. 
Note to Guideline 3: Under Guideline 3, every internationalized-domain-name registration 
will be associated with a language or set of languages for the purpose of identifying a 
registry-established set of registration and administration rules (a “registration ruleset”) that 
applies to the registration. Registration rulesets will be associated with languages or set of 
languages. For example, a registry might specify one registration ruleset for 
internationalized-domain-name registrations that have been designated as “German” and 
another registration ruleset for internationalized-domain-name registrations that have been 
designated “Chinese-Japanese-Korean”. The mapping of particular languages to particular 
rulesets will be specified by the registry. Registrars (and ultimately registrants) will be able to 
specify the language or set of languages of a registration, which will determine which of the 
registry-established registration ruleset will be applied. 
Registries will make the language-to-ruleset mapping, as well as the details of the rulesets 
themselves, publicly available on their websites. Thirty days notice to registrars (which may 
be given by public notice) will ordinarily be given of the establishment or revision of rulesets. 
See also Guideline 4 concerning consultation in the establishment of rulesets. 
Appropriate topics for rulesets may, but will not necessarily, include: permissible Unicode 
code points, character variant tables, and prohibited Unicode strings, as well as other policies 
as the registry operator determines are appropriate. Permissible Unicode code points for 
different rulesets may be overlapping or even congruent. 
Note to Guideline 3 Concerning Unsponsored gTLDs: Rulesets must not interfere with the 
equivalent access to Registry Operator's Registry Services by all ICANN-Accredited 
Registrars that have Registry-Registrar Agreements in effect. Registry operators of 
unsponsored TLDs will ordinarily give thirty days notice to ICANN and accredited, 
authorized registrars of the establishment or revision of rulesets. (In urgent situations, the 
registry operator and ICANN may agree in writing on a shorter time.) 
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Appendix 5.2.B Draft IDN Guidelines version 2.0 (20 September 2005)  
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-20sep05.htm  
1. Top-level domain registries that implement internationalized domain name capabilities will 
do so in strict compliance with the technical requirements described in RFCs 3454, 3490, 
3491, and 3492 (collectively, the "IDN standards").  
2. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will employ an "inclusion-
based" approach (meaning that code points which are not explicitly permitted by the registry 
are prohibited) for identifying permissible sets of code points from among the full Unicode 
repertoire, as described below.  
3. (a) In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will associate each 
label in a registered internationalized domain name, as it appears in their registry, with a 
single language or a single script using accepted designators for both. The restriction, in 
either case, is intended to limit the set of permitted characters within a label. If greater 
specificity is desired, the association may be made by combining both a language designator 
and a script designator. Alternatively, a label may be associated with a set of languages, or 
with more than one designator under the conditions described below. Language designators 
are illustrated in RFC 3066 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3066.txt). Script designators are 
illustrated in ISO 15924 and Unicode Technical Report #23 
(http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr23/). (b) A registry will publish the aggregate set of code 
points that it makes available in clearly identified IDN-specific character tables, and must 
define equivalent character variants if registration policies are established on their basis. Any 
such table must be designated in a manner that indicates the language(s) and/or script(s) it is 
intended to support. (c) All code points in a single label must be taken from the same script as 
determined by the Unicode character properties (UTR#23). Exception to this is permissible 
for languages with established orthographies and conventions that require the commingled 
use of multiple scripts. Visually confusable characters from different scripts must not appear 
in a single label unless there are overriding legitimate linguistic reasons for doing so. Each 
such situation must be associated with a specific language and a corresponding character 
table must be available before registration of such names can be accepted. (d) All registry 
policies based on these considerations must be documented and publicly available, including 
a character table for each permissible set of code points, before the registration of any IDN 
associated with such an aggregate may be accepted.  
4. Permissible code points will not include: (a) line symbol-drawing characters (as those in 
the Unicode Box Drawing block), (b) symbols and icons that are neither alphanumeric nor 
ideographic language characters, such as typographical and pictographic dingbats, (c) 
punctuation characters that lack grammatical significance in the language with which the IDN 
registration is associated (with necessary punctuation including characters such as the 
ETHIOPIC WORDSPACE in Amharic and the MIDDLE DOT in Catalan), and (d) other 
characters with well-established functions as protocol elements. When a registry determines 
that an exception to any of these rules is appropriate, as discussed in Guideline #3, the basis 
for that decision must be documented in the IANA Registry for IDN Tables or otherwise 
made readily available online. A registry may not even by exception permit code points that 
are prohibited by the IDN standards.  
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5. A registry must define the scope of an IDN registration in terms of both its Unicode and 
ASCII-encoded representations. The availability of a given Unicode sequence is currently 
determined by its encodability into the scheme defined in RFC 3491, and changes to that 
component of the IDN standard can have disruptive consequences for the operability of a 
Unicode name. For this reason an IDN registry should treat the ASCII-encoded form as the 
primary registered name, and include in its documentation a description of the factors that 
determine the way that sequence appears at the user interface.  
6. Top-level domain registries will work collaboratively with relevant and interested 
stakeholders to develop IDN-specific registration policies, with the objective of achieving 
consistent approaches to IDN implementation for the benefit of DNS users worldwide. Top-
level domain registries will work collaboratively with each other to address common issues, 
for example by forming or appointing a consortium to coordinate contact with external 
communities, elicit the assistance of support groups, and establish global fora. 
7. Top-level domain registries (and registrars) must make definitions of what constitutes an 
IDN registration and associated registration rules available to the <IANA Registry for IDN 
Tables>. If material fundamental to the understanding of a registry’s IDN policies is not 
published by the IANA, it must otherwise be made readily available online by the registry.  
8. The top-level domain registries should provide resources containing information about the 
sources and references that were used in the formation of the corresponding IDN registration 
policies for all languages and scripts in which they offer IDN registrations. 
Administrative details  
For Registries Having Agreements with ICANN: Registries with sponsorship agreements or 
registry agreements with ICANN must also comply with the format requirements for 
Registered Names in their sponsorship or registry agreements. In one way or another, the 
agreements state that all Registered Names (including ACE names) will comply with the 
following syntax in augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as described in RFC 2234:  
dot = %x2E ; "." 
dash = %x2D ; "-" 
alpha = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z 
digit = %x30-39 ; 0-9 
ldh = alpha / digit / dash 
id-prefix = alpha / digit 
label = id-prefix [*61ldh id-prefix] 
sldn = label dot label 
hostname = *(label dot) sldn  
In addition, length limitations should be observed.  
To meet these requirements, the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag described in RFC 3490 should be 
set when in performing ToASCII conversions to produce ACE names, and the resulting 
format restriction should be interpreted as above. 
For Unsponsored gTLDs: Rulesets based on these Guidelines must not interfere with the 
equivalent access to Registry Operator's Registry Services by all ICANN-Accredited 
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Registrars that have Registry-Registrar Agreements in effect. Registry operators of 
unsponsored TLDs will ordinarily give thirty days notice to ICANN and accredited, 
authorized registrars of the establishment or revision of rulesets. In urgent situations, the 
registry operator and ICANN may agree in writing on a shorter time. Special terms may also 
be attached to the release of time-sensitive information, for example, in situations where land 
rush effects are anticipated.  
Additional remarks 
The deceptive use of visually confusable characters from different scripts is discussed in 
detail in the Unicode Technical Report #36 on ‘Unicode Security Conditions’ at 
http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr36/. Limitations to the character repertoire available for 
IDNs are suggested there in tables presented under the heading “Data files”.  
The list of languages in ISO 639-2 is currently being revised in preparation for ISO 639-3, 
which is in an advanced draft (as of the date of the present Guidelines). The normative 
reference to BCP47 made in the terms for the IANA IDN Language Table Registry will 
require modification when ISO 639-3 is finalized, and it should also be noted that the IETF is 
currently dealing with the final draft of a successor document to that BCP. This will provide 
expanded means for specifying languages, including designations for script and orthographic 
authority as components of a language tag. That revision is being prepared by the IETF 
Language Tag Registry Update working group (ltru). As its work acquires formal normative 
status, the results may require further modification to the IDN Guidelines.  
The aggregation of languages on the basis of their shared use of a single script (such as Latin-
script African or European languages) may ease the development of focused IDN policies in 
technical and other regards, thus reducing potential for confusion. Unless there is need to 
associate individual labels in an IDN with different scripts, even where script-based policies 
are otherwise applied, the least confusing way to designate an IDN will often be by 
association with a single language. However, the current restriction of top-level labels to the 
26-letter basic Latin alphabet will frequently necessitate that the language attributes of an 
IDN be determined without consideration of the top-level label. The discussion that is in 
progress about permitting a more extensive character repertoire in top-level labels can result 
in a change to this condition, as well as raising need for further guidelines specific to the new 
situation. 
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Appendix 5.2.C Finalised IDN Guidelines version 2.0 (7 November 2005) 
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-14nov05.htm  
1. Top-level domain registries that implement internationalized domain name capabilities will 
do so in strict compliance with the technical requirements described in RFCs 3454, 3490, 
3491, and 3492 (collectively, the "IDN standards"). 
2. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will employ an "inclusion-
based" approach (meaning that code points which are not explicitly permitted by the registry 
are prohibited) for identifying permissible sets of code points from among the full Unicode 
repertoire, as described below. 
3. (a) In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will associate each 
label in a registered internationalized domain name, as it appears in their registry with a 
single script This restriction is intended to limit the set of permitted characters within a label. 
If greater specificity is needed, the association may be made by combining descriptors for 
both language and script. Alternatively, a label may be associated with a set of languages, or 
with more than one designator under the conditions described below. (b) A registry will 
publish the aggregate set of code points that it makes available in clearly identified IDN-
specific character tables, and will define equivalent character variants if registration policies 
are established on their basis. Any such table will be designated in a manner that indicates the 
script(s) and/or language(s) it is intended to support. (c) All code points in a single label will 
be taken from the same script as determined by the Unicode Standard Annex #24: Script 
Names at http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr24. Exception to this is permissible for languages 
with established orthographies and conventions that require the commingled use of multiple 
scripts. In such cases, visually confusable characters from different scripts will not be 
allowed to co-exist in a single set of permissible codepoints unless a corresponding policy 
and character table is clearly defined. (d) All registry policies based on these considerations 
will be documented and publicly available, including a character table for each permissible 
set of code points, before the registration of any IDN associated with such an aggregate may 
be accepted. 
4. Permissible code points will not include: (a) line symbol-drawing characters (as those in 
the Unicode Box Drawing block), (b) symbols and icons that are neither alphanumeric nor 
ideographic language characters, such as typographic and pictographic dingbats, (c) 
characters with well-established functions as protocol elements, (d) punctuation marks used 
solely to indicate the structure of sentences. (e) Punctuation marks that are used within words 
may only be permitted if they are not excluded by any of the preceding points, are essential to 
the language of the IDN registration, and are associated with explicit prescriptive rules about 
the context in which they may be used. (f) Under corresponding conditions, a single specified 
character may be used as a separator within a label, either by allowing the hyphen-minus to 
appear together with non-Latin scripts, or by designating a functionally equivalent 
punctuation mark from within the script. 
When a pre-existing registered name requires a registry to make transitional exception to any 
of these rules, the terms of that action will be made readily available online. A registry may 
not even by exception permit code points that are prohibited by the IDN standards. 
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5. A registry will define an IDN registration in terms of both its Unicode and ASCII-encoded 
representations. The availability of a given Unicode sequence is currently determined by its 
encodability into the scheme defined in RFC 3491, and changes to that component of the IDN 
standard can have disruptive consequences for the operability of a Unicode name. Since the 
appearance of hyphens in the third and fourth positions of a label indicates an encoding 
scheme, the registration of any label containing hyphens in these positions must not be 
permitted unless the hyphens follow a two-letter designator for a sanctioned scheme and the 
label conforms to the corresponding specifications. 
6. Top-level domain registries will work collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to develop 
IDN-specific registration policies, with the objective of achieving consistent approaches to 
IDN implementation for the benefit of DNS users worldwide. Top-level domain registries 
will work collaboratively with each other to address common issues, for example by forming 
or appointing a consortium to coordinate contact with external communities, elicit the 
assistance of support groups, and establish global fora. 
7. Top-level domain registries will make definitions of what constitutes an IDN registration 
and associated registration rules available to the IANA Registry for IDN Tables. If material 
fundamental to the understanding of a registry’s IDN policies is not published by the IANA, 
it will otherwise be made readily available online by the registry, which should also ensure 
that its registrars call the attention of prospective holders of IDN names to it. 
8. The top-level domain registries should provide resources containing information about the 
sources and references that were used in the formation of the corresponding IDN registration 
policies for all languages and scripts in which they offer IDN registrations. 
Additional remarks 
The deceptive use of visually confusable characters from different scripts is discussed in 
detail in the Unicode Technical Report #36 on ‘Unicode Security Conditions’ at 
http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr36/ and in a draft Unicode Technical Report #39 at 
http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/. Limitations to the character repertoire available for 
IDNs are suggested in UTR#36 in tables presented under the heading “Data files”. 
The current restriction of top-level labels to the 26-letter basic Latin alphabet makes it 
necessary to determine the language attributes of an IDN without consideration of the top-
level label. The discussion that is in progress about permitting a more extensive character 
repertoire in top-level labels may change this, as well as raise need for guidelines specific to 
the new condition.  
 241 
 
 
Appendix 5.2.D Finalised IDN Guidelines version 2.1 (22 February 2006) 
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-22feb06.htm  
1. Top-level domain registries that implement internationalized domain name capabilities will 
do so in strict compliance with the technical requirements described in RFCs 3454, 3490, 
3491, and 3492 (collectively, the "IDN standards"). 
2. In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will employ an "inclusion-
based" approach (meaning that code points which are not explicitly permitted by the registry 
are prohibited) for identifying permissible sets of code points from among the full Unicode 
repertoire, as described below. 
3. (a) In implementing the IDN standards, top-level domain registries will associate each 
label in a registered internationalized domain name, as it appears in their registry with a 
single script This restriction is intended to limit the set of permitted characters within a label. 
If greater specificity is needed, the association may be made by combining descriptors for 
both language and script. Alternatively, a label may be associated with a set of languages, or 
with more than one designator under the conditions described below. (b) A registry will 
publish the aggregate set of code points that it makes available in clearly identified IDN-
specific character tables, and will define equivalent character variants if registration policies 
are established on their basis. Any such table will be designated in a manner that indicates the 
script(s) and/or language(s) it is intended to support. (c) All code points in a single label will 
be taken from the same script as determined by the Unicode Standard Annex #24: Script 
Names at http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr24. Exception to this is permissible for languages 
with established orthographies and conventions that require the commingled use of multiple 
scripts. In such cases, visually confusable characters from different scripts will not be 
allowed to co-exist in a single set of permissible codepoints unless a corresponding policy 
and character table is clearly defined. (d) All registry policies based on these considerations 
will be documented and publicly available, including a character table for each permissible 
set of code points, before the registration of any IDN associated with such an aggregate may 
be accepted. 
4. Permissible code points will not include: (a) line symbol-drawing characters (as those in 
the Unicode Box Drawing block), (b) symbols and icons that are neither alphanumeric nor 
ideographic language characters, such as typographic and pictographic dingbats, (c) 
characters with well-established functions as protocol elements, (d) punctuation marks used 
solely to indicate the structure of sentences. (e) Punctuation marks that are used within words 
may only be permitted if they are not excluded by any of the preceding points, are essential to 
the language of the IDN registration, and are associated with explicit prescriptive rules about 
the context in which they may be used. (f) Under corresponding conditions, a single specified 
character may be used as a separator within a label, either by allowing the hyphen-minus to 
appear together with non-Latin scripts, or by designating a functionally equivalent 
punctuation mark from within the script. 
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When a pre-existing registered name requires a registry to make transitional exception to any 
of these rules, the terms of that action will be made readily available online. A registry may 
not even by exception permit code points that are prohibited by the IDN standards. 
5. A registry will define an IDN registration in terms of both its Unicode and ASCII-encoded 
representations. The availability of a given Unicode sequence is currently determined by its 
encodability into the scheme defined in RFC 3491, and changes to that component of the IDN 
standard can have disruptive consequences for the operability of a Unicode name. Since the 
appearance of hyphens in the third and fourth positions of a label indicates an encoding 
scheme, the registration of any label containing hyphens in these positions must not be 
permitted unless the hyphens follow a two-letter designator for a sanctioned scheme and the 
label conforms to the corresponding specifications. 
6. Top-level domain registries will work collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to develop 
IDN-specific registration policies, with the objective of achieving consistent approaches to 
IDN implementation for the benefit of DNS users worldwide. Top-level domain registries 
will work collaboratively with each other to address common issues, for example by forming 
or appointing a consortium to coordinate contact with external communities, elicit the 
assistance of support groups, and establish global fora. 
7. Top-level domain registries will make definitions of what constitutes an IDN registration 
and associated registration rules available to the IANA Registry for IDN Tables. If material 
fundamental to the understanding of a registry’s IDN policies is not published by the IANA, 
it will otherwise be made readily available online by the registry, which should also ensure 
that its registrars call the attention of prospective holders of IDN names to it. 
8. The top-level domain registries should provide resources containing information about the 
sources and references that were used in the formation of the corresponding IDN registration 
policies for all languages and scripts in which they offer IDN registrations. 
9. The UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag described in RFC 3490 must be set when performing 
ToASCII conversions to produce ACE names.  
Additional remarks 
The deceptive use of visually confusable characters from different scripts is discussed in 
detail in the Unicode Technical Report #36 on ‘Unicode Security Conditions’ at 
http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr36/ and in a draft Unicode Technical Report #39 at 
http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/. Limitations to the character repertoire available for 
IDNs are suggested in UTR#36 in tables presented under the heading “Data files”. 
The current restriction of top-level labels to the 26-letter basic Latin alphabet makes it 
necessary to determine the language attributes of an IDN without consideration of the top-
level label. The discussion that is in progress about permitting a more extensive character 
repertoire in top-level labels may change this, as well as raise need for guidelines specific to 
the new condition.  
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Appendix 5.2.E Finalised IDN Guidelines version 2.2 (26 April 2007) 
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/idn-guidelines-26apr07.pdf  
1. Domain registries that implement internationalized domain name capabilities at any level, 
including their own top-level designations, will do so in strict compliance with the technical 
requirements described in RFCs 3454, 3490, 3491, and 3492 (collectively, the "IDN 
standards"). 
 
2. In implementing the IDN standards, domain registries will employ an "inclusion-based" 
approach (meaning that code points which are not explicitly permitted by the registry are 
prohibited) for identifying permissible sets of code points from among the full Unicode 
repertoire, as described below. A registry may not even by exception permit code points that 
are prohibited by the IDN standards. 
 
3. In implementing the IDN standards, domain registries will associate each label in a 
registered internationalized domain name, as it appears in their registry, with a single script as 
defined by the block division of the Unicode code chart. A more specific association may be 
made by combining descriptors for both language and script. Alternatively, a label may be 
associated with a set of languages, or with more than one designator under the conditions 
described below. 
3.1 A domain registry will publish the aggregate set of code points that it makes 
available in clearly identified IDN-specific character tables, and will define equivalent 
character variants if registration policies are established on their basis. Any such table 
will be designated in a manner that indicates the script(s) and/or language(s) it is 
intended to support. 
 
3.2 All code points in a single label will be taken from the same script as determined 
by the Unicode Standard Annex #24: Script Names 
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr24>. Exceptions to this guideline are permissible 
for languages with established orthographies and conventions that require the 
commingled use of multiple scripts. Even in the case of this exception, visually 
confusable characters from different scripts will not be allowed to co-exist in a single 
set of permissible codepoints unless a corresponding policy and character table is 
clearly defined. 
 
4. All registry policies based on these considerations will be documented and publicly 
available, including a character table for each permissible set of code points, before the 
registration of any IDN associated with such an aggregate may be accepted. 
 
5. Permissible code points will not include: 
5.1 geometrical and line-drawing symbols such as those in the Unicode Box Drawing 
and Box Elements blocks, 
5.2 symbols and icons that are neither alphanumeric nor ideographic language 
characters, such as typographic and pictographic dingbats,  
5.3 characters with well-established functions as protocol elements, 
5.4 punctuation marks used solely to indicate the structure of sentences, 
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5.5 punctuation marks that are used within words, with possible exception of those 
that are not excluded by any of the preceding points, are essential to the language 
represented by the IDN, and are associated with explicit prescriptive rules about the 
context in which they may be used. 
 
6. A domain registry will define an IDN registration in terms of both its Unicode and ASCII-
encoded representations (also termed U-label and A-label). The availability of a given 
Unicode sequence is currently determined by its encodability into the scheme defined in RFC 
3491. 
 
6.1 Changes to that component of the IDN standard can have disruptive consequences 
for the operability of a Unicode name. Characters that are marginally acceptable in the 
terms noted in the preceding section should therefore only be made available where 
there is compelling and clearly documented reason. 
 
6.2 The appearance of hyphens in the third and fourth positions of a label indicates an 
encoding scheme. The registration of any label containing hyphens in these positions 
must not be permitted unless the hyphens follow a two-letter designator for a 
sanctioned scheme and the label conforms to the corresponding specifications. 
 
7. Domain registries will work collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to develop IDN-
specific registration policies, with the objective of achieving consistent approaches to IDN 
implementation for the benefit of DNS users worldwide. Domain registries will work 
collaboratively with each other to address common issues, for example by forming or 
appointing a consortium to coordinate contact with external communities, elicit the assistance 
of support groups, and establish global fora. 
 
8. Domain registries will make definitions of what constitutes an IDN registration and 
associated registration rules available to the IANA Repository for TLD IDN Practices 
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/idn/>. If material fundamental to the understanding of a 
registry’s IDN policies does not appear in the IANA Repository, it will otherwise be made 
readily available online by the registry. The registry should also ensure that its registrars call 
the attention of prospective holders of IDN names to this documentation. 
 
9. Domain registries should provide resources containing information about the sources and 
references that were used in the formation of the corresponding IDN registration policies for 
all languages and scripts in which they offer IDN registrations. 
 
Additional remarks. 
 
The deceptive use of visually confusable characters from different scripts is discussed in 
detail in the Unicode Technical Standard #39 on Unicode Security Mechanisms 
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/>. 
A revision to the IDN standards that is currently under consideration may result in increased 
constraint on the availability of punctuation marks as discussed in Guideline 5.5. The RFCs 
cited in Guideline 1 will be provided with forward references to any replacement documents 
that may be adopted. 
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Appendix 5.2F: IDN Guidelines version 3.0 (2 September 2011) 
Source: http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/idn-guidelines-02sep11-en.htm  
IDN Guidelines 
1. Top-level domain ("TLD") registries supporting Internationalized Domain Names 
("IDNs") will do so in strict compliance with the requirements of the IETF protocol for 
Internationalized Domain Names in Applications. The initial version of this protocol was 
defined in RFCs 3454, 3490, 3491, and 3492. A revised version is defined in RFCs 5890, 
5891, 5892, 5893, and 5894. Both will be in parallel use in applications for an indeterminate 
transitional period but registries will conform fully with IDNA2008 in the shortest practicable 
order. 
2. No code point permitted in IDNA2003 but disallowed in IDNA2008 will be accepted for 
registration regardless of the extent to which such code points appear in names registered 
prior to the protocol revision. The registrant of a domain that is no longer supported by 
IDNA2008 should be notified that there may be unanticipated consequences for a user 
attempting to reach it, and such names should be replaced, held, or deleted at registry 
initiative. 
3. A registry will publish one or several lists of Unicode code points that are permitted for 
registration and will not accept the registration of any name containing an unlisted code 
point. Each such list will indicate the script or language(s) it is intended to support. If registry 
policy treats any code point in a list as a variant of any other code point, the nature of that 
variance and the policies attached to it will be clearly articulated. 
4. All such code point listings will be placed in the IANA Repository for IDN TLD Practices 
in tabular format together with any rules applied to the registration of names containing those 
code points, before any such registration may be accepted. 
5. All code points in a single label will be taken from the same script as determined by the 
Unicode Standard Annex #24: Script Names <http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr24>. 
Exceptions to this guideline are permissible for languages with established orthographies and 
conventions that require the commingled use of multiple scripts. Even in the case of this 
exception, visually confusable characters from different scripts will not be allowed to co-exist 
in a single set of permissible code points unless a corresponding policy and character table is 
clearly defined. 
6. Any information fundamental to the understanding of a registry's IDN policies that is not 
published by the IANA will be made directly available online by the registry. The registry 
should also encourage its registrars to call attention to these policies for all prospective IDN 
registrants. This documentation will include references to the linguistic and orthographic 
sources used in establishing policies and code point repertoires. If material is provided both 
via the IANA and other channels the registry must ensure that its substance is concordant 
across all platforms. 
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7. When a preexisting name requires a registry to make transitional exception to any of these 
Guidelines, the terms of that action will also be made readily available online, including the 
timeline for the resolution of such transitional matters. The excepted registrations themselves 
are, however, not part of this documentation. At the end of the transitional period, code points 
that are prohibited by IDNA2008 will not be permitted even by exception. 
8. No label containing hyphens in the third and fourth positions will be registered unless it is 
a valid A-label, with reservation for transitional action in accordance with the preceding 
Guideline. Hyphens in these positions are explicitly reserved to indicate encoding schemes, 
of which IDNA is only one instantiation. These guidelines are not intended to assist with any 
other instantiations. 
9. TLD registries should collaborate on issues of shared interest, for example, by forming a 
consortium to coordinate contact with external communities, elicit the assistance of support 
groups, and establish global fora. 
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Appendix 5.3: Summary of points raised at IDN Workshops  
Workshop Summary of major points / questions  
from the audience 
 
Shanghai, China, 30 October 2002 No transcript available 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 26 March 2003 No transcript available   
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 21 July 2004 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/kualalumpur/
captioning-idn-workshop-21jul04.htm  
Amr Hashem (Nile Ventures IT 
Consulting) questioned whether IDNs were 
as big a necessity as was being assumed, or 
whether native users of non-Latin scripts 
had nonetheless ‘got used’ to ASCII labels. 
Naser Sulaiman (UAEnic) raised issues of 
defining a language, e.g. Arabic, and 
whether attempts to do so might be seen as 
‘diluting’ the original language.  
Vittorio Bertola (ALAC) expressed 
concern about lack of co-ordination 
between various groups working on 
aspects of IDN policy and technology.  
Several questions on technical and 
operational matters were also raised.  
Cape Town, South Africa, 1 December 2004 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/capetown/cap
tioning-idn-workshop-01dec04.htm  
Victor Wilson (ISOC-ZA) asked a 
question related to African languages, 
which he believed should / would be 
represented using the standard Latin 
character set. 
Sébastien Bachollet (Speednames Pte Ltd) 
favoured localisation in creating character 
sets.  
Roozbeh Pournader (Persian Domain Naes 
Project) questioned whether mixed scripts 
would be allowed.  
Ed Lewis (Neulevel) spoke of the 
difficulties of creating a single set of 
requirements for all IDNs and thus 
difficulties experienced by the IETF in 
creating a single specification.  
Michel Suignard (Microsoft) raised a 
technical issue. 
 
Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, 13 July 
2005 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/luxembourg/c
aptioning-idn-workshop-13jul05.htm  
Ram Mohan (panel member) expressed a 
view that it was ‘time to stop pussy footing 
around’ and get on with developing a best 
current practice. This was met with 
applause from the audience.  
Bruce Tonkin, speaking as an audience 
member / representative of Melbourne IT, 
supported Mohan’s statement and also 
warned of the dangers of mixing scripts. 
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Milton Mueller (academic) advocated 
separation of IDN TLD policy from ASCII 
TLD policy.   
Walter Wu (CNIC) advocated giving 
priority to IDN ccTLDs.  
Amadeu Abril I Abril (.org) asked whether 
it would be possible to establish a 
‘hierachy’ of authoritative sources for 
language definition.  
Andrzej Bartosiewicz (.pl registry) asked a 
technical question related to browsers. 
 
Workshop, Vancouver, Canada, 30 
November 2005 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/vancouver/ca
ptioning-idn-workshop-30nov05.htm  
Mark Davis (IBM) advocated allowing 
only transliterations of existing ccTLDs in 
the first instance to avoid opening up a 
‘pandora’s box’ of political issues. Also 
questioned whether IDNs may lead to 
‘balkanisation’ of the namespace.  
Oav Keren (Domain.net registrar), 
suggested parallel IDN TLDs for each 
ASCII gTLD/ 
Gervase Markham (Mozilla Foundation) 
spoke of the usefulness of expanding the 
namespace to allow similarly named 
entities to coexist.  
A few questions were also asked on 
technical issues.  
 
 
 
Public Forum, Wellington, New Zealand, 30 
March 2006  
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/wellington/ca
ptioning-icann-pub-forum-ii-30mar06.htm 
 
No questions on IDNs from the floor 
Marrakesh, Morocco, 25 June 2006 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/marrakech/ca
ptioning-idn-25jun06.htm  
Michael Everson (linguist) questioned 
whether a new protocol could be 
developed rather than basing IDNs 
ultimately on ASCII.  
Sabine Dolderer (DENIC) defended the 
ASCII-based approach.  
Further discussion followed on this. 
John Klensin (IETF) raised danger of 
losing the principle of universal 
connectivity. Ram Mohan (AFILIAS) 
made a similar point. 
Several technical questions / comments 
made around this poinrt. 
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Mouhamet Diop (AfriNIC) argued that 
ICANN should focus on language 
communities rather than countries.  
Kelly Kang (GAC, S. Korea) spoke of the 
need to co-ordinate between ccNSO, 
GNSO and GAC.  
Jae Chul (Korea Internet & Security 
Agency ) cited Korean ‘key word’ system. 
Marrakesh, Morocco, 27 June 2006 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/meetings/marrakech/ca
ptioning-idn-ws-26jun06.htm  
Highly technical session.  
Sabine Dolderer (DENIC) made a 
technical point.  
Sébastien Bachollet (Speednames Pte Ltd) 
suggested a new class of ‘linguistical’ 
TLDs alongside gTLDs and ccTLDs 
Hiro Hotta (JPRS) asked technical 
question related to IE7 
William Tan (NeuStar) asked about 
potential for accessing different scripts 
with a keyboard lacking those characters. 
Sao Paolo, Brazil, December 2006  
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/saopaulo/c
aptioning-idnworkshop-06dec06.htm  
 
Amadeu Abril I Abril (.org) suggested 
basing sets of scripts upon 'scientific' 
classification of language groups. 
Werner Staub (CORE) asked whether the 
new gTLDs programme would be delayed 
until IDN testing was complete.  
Sophia Bekele (GNSO Council / 
NomCom) asked whether an alternative 
solution might be feasible based around 
making the DNS capable of handling 
Unicode characters directly rather than 
converting to and from ASCII. 
Subramanian Subbiah: (i-dns.net) argued 
that spoofing was much less of a problem 
if mixed scripts were not permitted. Also 
spoke of the need for ICANN to coordinate 
with local language communities.   
Werner Staub spoke of the need for 
registries to have registration policies to 
deal with issues such as spoofing. 
 
Cairo, Egypt, November 2008 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://cai.icann.org/files/meetings/cairo2008/
Cairo-IDNsAnOverview2Nov08.txt 
Britt Lysaa (Nokia) asked a question about 
timetable for IDNA revision.  
Christopher Crowther (Internetmedia.net) 
asked whether an IDN TLD would 
represent a new extension or a conversion 
of an existing extension. 
Matt Mansell (Mesh UK) asked whether 
application fees for IDN ccTLDs would be 
the same as for IDN gTLDs.  
Dr. Govind (GAC, India) asked whether 
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formal contracts would be required for 
IDN ccTLD operators.  
 
 
Mexico city, Mexico 
At-Large Summit: Working Group 3: New 
gTLDs including IDN gTLDs  Sunday, 01 
March 2009 
No transcript available 
Sydney, Australia, 2009 
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://syd.icann.org/files/meetings/sydney200
9/transcript-idn-cctld-fast-track-22jun09-
en.txt  
Eric Brunner-Williams (CORE) asked 
whether cost recovery could be made to 
reflect the time and value of work done on 
IDNs by entities other than ICANN. He 
also asked whether ICANN could take a 
role in developing variant tables.  
Werner Staub (CORE) commented that it 
was unfair to ask users of non-ASCII 
scripts to pay for the 'patch' that would 
allow them to use DNS. He also argued 
that 'variants' of TLDs are in fact separate 
TLDs.  
Edmon Chung (GNSO) asked whether the 
IDN guidelines need to address variants at 
the second level.  
Sivasubramanian Muthusamy (ALAC) 
asked whether the cost recovery model 
could be modified to reduce the cost to the 
end user.  
Andrey Kolesnikov (GAC, Russian 
Federation) believed the proposed cost 
model was fair. He also commented that 
contracts should be signed on paper and 
not just electronically. He further felt that 
unproblematic IDN ccTLDs should go 
ahead ASAP and not be delayed because of 
problems with certain scripts. 
Izumi Aizu (At-Large Japan) asked 
whether costs would be scaled or a flat rate 
for each applicant.  
Avri Doria (GNSO) asked what the 
process would be for making the decision 
whether to go live with the older or revised 
version of IDNA.  
Ravi Shanker (GAC, India) commented 
that high cost recovery fees could 
undermine the aim of overcoming the 
digital divide.  
Janis Karklins (GAC, Finland) commented 
that the entry fee may be prohibitive for 
some TLDs or for some applicants, and 
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asked whether it could be subsidised or 
made voluntary. 
Steve DelBianco (Netchoice) suggested 
allowing a few large gTLD operators to 
join the Fast Track programme in order 
that they pay for cost recovery.   
Yalin Tang (CNNIC) commented that 
while ICANN had invested resources into 
the issue, so had the 'IDN community', and 
ICANN had a responsibility to get IDNs 
deployed as soon as possible. He also 
suggested delegating just simplified and 
traditional Chinese  rather than all the 
many variants.  
for our Chinese speakers.    
Jonathan Shea (.hk registry) expressed 
surprise that ICANN was concerned about 
stability re variants, given that registries 
such as .hk had been handling these for 
years at the second level with no problems. 
He also urged ICANN, in implementing a 
cost recovery strategy, to take into account 
that many ccTLD operators were non-
profit and some operating at a loss already.  
Manail Ismail (GAC, Egypt) also 
commented that the proposed cost recovery 
model could prove a barrier to applicants 
from developing countries.  
Seoul, South Korea, 26 October 2009  
 
Transcript retrieved 25 August 2011, from 
http://sel.icann.org/meetings/seoul2009/transc
ript-idn-cctld-fast-track-26oct09-en.txt  
 
Imran Ahmed Shah (Urdu Internet 
Community Pakistan) asked about 
procedures for assigning a ccTLD 
manager, ascertaining community support, 
dispute resolution and fee waiver. 
Andrey Kolesnikov (GNSO) asked what 
would be considered community support.  
Werner Staub (CORE) asked a question 
about variants.  
Izumi Aizu (Japan Internet Domain Name 
Council) asked a question about fees. 
Naomasa Maruyama (GAC, Japan) asked 
whether there would be a time limit for 
applications.  
Rahman Khanjohn (affiliation not 
established) asked if the ccTLD authority 
and the IDN ccTLD authority must be the 
same or if it could be two different 
organisations. 
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Appendix 5.4: Issues regarding IDN ccTLDs identified in ccNSO – GAC Issues Report 
on selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two letter codes.
100
 
1. General issues regarding IDN ccTLDs 
Which ‘territories’ are eligible for an IDN ccTLD? 
The existence of IDNs as ccTLDs assumes a direct relationship between an IDN TLD string 
and a ‘territory’ as in ASCII ccTLDs. 
a) Should this relationship be maintained? 
b) If so, should the ‘territories’ which are potentially eligible for IDN ccTLDs be exactly the 
same as the ‘territories’ that are listed in the ISO-3166-1 list? 
c) If not, should another list be used or should another mechanism be developed? 
d) Should anything be done about ccTLDs already being used as gTLDs? 
Should an IDN ccTLD string be “meaningful”? 
An ASCII ccTLD string ‘represents’ the name of a ‘territory’ based on its entry into the ISO 
3166-1 list. 
a) Is there an obligation to make the IDN ccTLD string 'meaningful' in its representation of 
the name of a ‘territory’? For example, whereas .uk is 'meaningful' because it is a commonly 
used abbreviation for United Kingdom, .au is not 'meaningful' because the commonly used 
abbreviations for Australia are Oz or Aus. 
b) If so, how is “meaningful” determined and by whom? 
How many IDN ccTLDs per script per ‘territory’? 
Apart from some exceptions, there is one single ASCII ccTLD per listed ‘territory’. 
a) Should there similarly be only a single IDN ccTLD for a given script for each ‘territory’ or 
can there be multiple IDN ccTLD strings? For example, should there be only one equivalent 
of .cn in Chinese script for China or .ru in Cyrillic for Russia? 
b) Could there be several IDN strings for a ‘territory’ in a script? If so, who would determine 
the number and what are the criteria? 
c) If an IDN ccTLD string is not applied for, for whatever reason, should an IDN ccTLD 
string that could be associated with a particular ‘territory’ be reserved or protected in some 
way? 
                                                          
100 ICANN (2007). ccNSO-GAC Issues Paper: Selection of IDN ccTLDs associated with the ISO 3166-1 two 
letter codes. 9 July 2007. Retrieved 31 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/ccnso-gac-issues-
report-on-idn-09jul07.pdf 
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How many scripts per ‘territory’? 
a) Can a ‘territory’ apply for more than one IDN ccTLD string in different scripts if more 
than one script is used to represent languages spoken in that location? For example in Japan 
more than one script is used to represent the Japanese language. In other words, should there 
be a limit on the number of scripts eachterritory can apply for? 
b) In what circumstances would it be appropriate to seek to introduce a limit on the number 
of scripts a ‘territory’ may choose to introduce for a ccTLD or any TLD with a national 
connection? 
c) Can a ‘territory’ apply for an IDN ccTLD string even if the script is not used in a language 
with any ‘official status’ in that ‘territory’? For example, if the Kanji script is accepted under 
the IDNA protocol, can Australia apply for a representation of Australia in that script even 
though neither the script nor any language deriving from it has any 'official' status in 
Australia? 
d) If ‘official status’ is required who will define it and who will determine it ineach  case? 
Number of characters in the string? 
Currently, ccTLD strings are limited to 2 US-ASCII characters and gTLDs to 3 or more. It is 
understood that abbreviations can be problematic for internationalized TLDs as abbreviations 
used in US-ASCII are not used on a global basis in all scripts. The underlying nature of IDN 
makes the actual string inserted in the DNS always longer than two characters when 
expressed in Unicode (due to the IDNA requirement to prefix internationalized labels with 
‘xn—‘). However, it is how the string appears in its non US-ASCII character set that is 
important. In this context: 
 
a) Should all IDN ccTLD strings be of a fixed length, for example by retaining the two-
character limitation that applies to ASCII ccTLD labels, or can they be of variable length? If 
a variable string length is introduced for IDN ccTLDs, should it also be introduced for ASCII 
ccTLDs? 
b) Does moving outside the current 2 symbol limitation create any security, stability or 
integrity issues? 
c) Who determines the appropriate label used to represent a new IDN ccTLD string, and how 
are the set of characters used to represent this label selected? 
 
Are there any ‘rights’ attached to a given script? 
In purely technical terms, a script is a collection of symbols. However, each of those 
collections of symbols when put together in particular ways produce the ‘languages’ of 
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groups of people sometimes defined by borders, although very often not. These groups are 
often referred to as language communities. 
a) Should such groups (or their governments) have special rights regarding those scripts? For 
example, should the Korean language community be entitled to restrict the use of the Hangul 
script? If special rights exist what is the procedure to exert these rights and resolve conflicts? 
b) Can anyone get acceptance of a script under the IDNA protocol or are there restrictions? 
For example, can a gTLD registry get the Kanji script accepted under the IDNA protocol? 
Should that use be vetted/approved by Japan? If yes, would the same requirement apply if a 
script is used in more then one ‘territory’  
c) Should it be possible to adopt two or more ‘versions’ of a script with only minor 
differences for use under the IDNA protocol and are there issues or concerns should this 
occur? 
2. Introduction of IDN ccTLDs 
Should a list of IDN ccTLD strings be mandated? 
In the US-ASCII case, ccTLD strings are currently primarily based on the ISO 3166-1 Alpha 
2 list. If a similar mechanism were adopted for IDN ccTLDs, this could mean that every ISO 
3166 entry would have an equivalent IDN ccTLD string(s) to represent it. 
a) Is such a list necessary? 
b) Who would develop such a list? 
c) Should such a list be mandated? 
d) If yes, by whom? 
e) Who would develop the criteria and relevant policies for identifying IDN ccTLDs? 
f) Under what policy or authority would the list be created? 
g) If additional criteria and or policies are required, who is responsible for formulating that 
policy? 
 
What precedence should be given to ccTLDs in the IDN implementation process? 
Who selects the IDN ccTLD string in the absence of a mandated list? 
If IDN ccTLD strings are not going to come from a mandated list then, how does an IDN 
ccTLD string become designated as the string for a particular ‘territory’? 
a) What are the criteria and policies to determine who can submit a request for the 
designation of an IDN ccTLD? 
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b) Who will develop the criteria and policies for determining the designation of an IDN 
ccTLD? 
c) How will such issues as competing requests (both domestic and international) be dealt 
with? 
d) What will happen if 2 ‘territories’ are eligible for the same or confusingly similar strings 
for IDN ccTLD? 
What coordination should exist between the different actors? The deployment of IDN 
ccTLDs will require coordination among various actors, within territories and ICANN 
constituencies. Irrespective of the methodology employed, some coordination questions must 
be addressed, such as: 
a) Who are the appropriate actors? 
b) What are their roles? 
c) Do the GAC ccTLD principles need to be revised in the light of the introduction of IDN 
ccTLDs? 
 
3. Delegation of IDN ccTLDs 
Do existing ccTLD delegation policies apply to the delegation of IDN ccTLDs?  
If not: 
a) Who can apply to have the IDN ccTLD delegated or to be the delegate for that 
ccTLD? 
b) Who decides on the delegation and in particular: 
• Are there specific reasons for deviating from the standard practice/guidelines that a 
zone should only be delegated with the support of the local internet community, 
which includes the government? 
• Is consent/involvement/knowledge of government required? 
• Is consent/involvement/knowledge of incumbent ccTLD manager required? 
• Is there any presumptive right of the ASCII ccTLD manager over a corresponding 
IDN ccTLD? 
c) Who will formulate the policy for these processes? 
d) Do existing US-ASCII ccTLD delegation policies for dealing with multiple applications, 
objections to applications or disputes apply to the same issues in the delegation of IDN 
ccTLDs? If not who will formulate the policies for these issues? 
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e) Taking into account all experiences ICANN has acquired - should there be an agreement 
between ICANN and the IDN ccTLD operator on the operation of the IDN ccTLD string? 
4. Operation of IDN ccTLDs 
Is the operation and management of an IDN ccTLD different to that of an existing US-ASCII 
ccTLD such that there are specific global technical requirements, in addition to the general 
IDN standards, needed for the operation of an IDN ccTLD? If so, how are those requirements 
developed and who would develop them? 
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Appendix 5.5: Overview of Application Process for IDN ccTLD Fast Track 
Source: ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 
November 2009. PP27-31. Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-16nov09-en.pdf.  
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Appendix 5.6: Areas for discussion regarding IDN ccTLDs as identified in IDN ccPDP 
Final Issues Report (2 April 2009) 
101
 
 
A. General issues regarding IDN ccTLDs 
 
• Definition of IDN ccTLD 
• String selection methodology 
• Need for/possibility of creating an authoritative list of IDN ccTLD strings 
• Criteria for IDN ccTLD string selection methodology 
• Should an IDN ccTLD string be “meaningful”? 
• How many IDN ccTLDs per ‘territory’? 
• How many scripts per ‘territory’? 
• Number of characters in the string? 
• Are there any ‘rights’ attached to a given script? 
 
B. Introduction of IDN ccTLDs 
 
• Should a list of IDN ccTLD strings be mandated? 
• What precedence should be given to ccTLDs in the IDN implementation process? 
• Who selects the IDN ccTLD string in the absence of a mandated list? 
• What coordination should exist between the different actors? 
 
C. Delegation of IDN ccTLDs 
 
D. Operation of IDN ccTLDs 
 
E. Additional issues relating to Article IX of the ICANN bylaws 
 
                                                          
101ICANN (2009). Final Issues Report on IDN ccPDP. 2 April 2009. Retrieved 29 July 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/final-issues-report-idn-ccpdp-02apr09.pdf PP5-6 
 263 
Appendix 5.7A: Topics and Issues relating to the introduction and delegation of IDN 
ccTLDs 
 
(As set out in Draft Topic Paper: Internationalised Domain Names country code supporting 
organisation policy development process working group on Selection and Delegation of IDN 
ccTLDs. 16 October 2009. For full details see original document 102) 
 
1. Which ‘territories’ are eligible for an IDN ccTLD? 
 
2. Should an IDN ccTLD string be “meaningful”? 
 
3. How many IDN ccTLDs per ‘territory’? 
 
4. Number of characters in the string? 
 
5. Are technical requirements for the IDN ccTLD string needed? 
 
6. Should a list of IDN ccTLD strings be mandated? 
 
7. Who selects the IDN ccTLD string in the absence of a list? 
 
8. Are there any ‘rights’ attached to a given script? 
 
9. Delegation, Redelegation and retirement of IDN ccTLDs 
 
10. Should precedence be given to ccTLDs under the overall policy? 
 
11. What coordination should exist between the different actors?  
 
12. Operation of IDN ccTLDs 
 
13 Should there be a formal and financial relationship between ICANN and the IDN ccTLD 
under the policy? 
 
                                                          
102 ICANN (2009). Draft Topic Paper: Internationalised Domain Names country code supporting organisation 
policy development process working group on Selection and Delegation of IDN ccTLDs (IDNccPDP WG 1)16 
October 2009.  Retrieved 14 August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idn-topic-paper-16oct09-
en.pdf 
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Appendix 5.7B Topics and Issues relating to the introduction and delegation of IDN 
ccTLDs 
 
(As set out in Draft Final topic paper WG 1 of the IDN ccPDP. 26 February 2010. For full 
details, see original document.103) 
 
Topics and Issues relating to the introduction and delegation of IDN ccTLD 
 
1. Which ‘territories’ are eligible for an IDN ccTLD? 
 
2. Should an IDN ccTLD string be limited to non Latin characters? 
 
3. Should an IDN ccTLD string be “meaningful”? 
 
4. How many IDN ccTLDs per ‘territory’? 
 
5. Number of characters in the string? 
 
6. Are technical requirements for the IDN ccTLD string needed? 
 
7. Should a list of IDN ccTLD strings be mandated? 
 
8.Who selects the IDN ccTLD string in the absence of a mandated list? 
 
9. Should a list be created over time? 
 
10. Are there any ‘rights’ attached to a given script? 
 
11. General Technical requirements 
 
12. Delegation, Redelegation and retirement of IDN ccTLDs 
 
13. What coordination should exist between the different actors?  
 
14. Operation of IDN ccTLDs 
 
15. Should there be a formal and financial relationship between ICANN and the IDN ccTLD 
under the policy? 
 
16. Should the overall policy be reviewed at regular intervals? 
                                                          
103 ICANN (2010). Draft Final topic paper WG 1 of the IDN ccPDP. 26 February 2010. Retrieved 14 August 
2011, from  http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/draft-final-topic-paper-wg1-26feb10-en.pdf  
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Appendix 5.7C: Areas of agreement reached by IDN ccPDP Working Group 1 as of 29 
November 2010. 
(As set out in IDN ccPDP Working Group 1 Progress Report: IDN ccTLD String Selection 
Criteria and Requirements. 29 November 2010.104) 
Section 2. Overarching Principles 
• Association of the [IDN] country code Top Level Domain with a territory.  
• [ASCII] ccTLD and IDN ccTLDs are all country code Top Level Domains. 
• Preserve security, stability and interoperability of the DNS.  
• The IDN ccTLD string should be non-contentious within the territory.  
• Requests for the delegation of IDN ccTLDs should be an ongoing process and thus 
open to enter when ready. Currently the delegation of a ccTLD can be requested at 
any time, once all the criteria are met. 
• The criteria to select the IDN ccTLD string should determine the number of eligible 
IDN ccTLDs per Territory, not an arbitrarily set number. 
 
Section 3. Agreed Criteria for the selection of an IDN ccTLD. 
A. An IDN country code Top Level Domain must contain at least one non-ASCII character. 
B. Eligibility only if name of territory listed on ISO 3 166. 
C. The IDN ccTLD string must be a meaningful Representation of the name of aTerritory. 
D. The meaningful Representation ofthe name of the Territory must be in a Designated 
Language of the Territory  
E. If the string applied for is not the long or short form of the name of a Territory then 
evidence of meaningfulness is required. 
F. Only one (1) IDN ccTLD string per Designated Language. 
G. The selected IDN ccTLD string must abide to all Technical Criteria for IDN ccTLD string. 
H. The IDN ccTLD string can not be confused with any combination of two ASCII letters 
[letters a-z] as or to be used by ISO 3166/MA (section 5.2 of ISO 3166-1:2006). 
                                                          
104 ICANN (2010). 29 November 2010. IDN ccPDP Working Group 1 Progress Report: IDN ccTLD String 
Selection Criteria and Requirements. Retrieved 16 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/final-progress-report-idn-ccpdp-wg1-29nov10-en.pdf  
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Decision l. String Confusion with other TLD. String confusion issues can involve two or 
more strings that are identical or are so confusingly similar that they cannot coexist in the 
DNS, such as If a string resembles another visually then it is likely to cause deception or 
confusion.For the likelihood of deception or confusion to exist, it must be probable, not 
merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind ofthe average, reasonable Internet user. 
Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to 
find a likelihood of confusion. 
: 
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Appendix 5.8: GAC Interim Principles on IDN ccTLDs  
 
(As set out in GAC Communique XXXVII – Nairobi, 10 March 2010.105) 
 
 
General Principles  
1. The main provisions of the GAC ccTLDs principles: "Principles and Guidelines for the 
Delegation and Administration of Country Code Top Level Domains" apply also for IDN 
ccTLDs. The current principles are intended to supplement the aforementioned principles 
insofar as non-ASCII ccTLDs are concerned.  
2. The introduction and operation of IDN ccTLDs should not undermine the security and 
stability of the DNS. To this end, all actors, including TLD operators, ICANN and the 
relevant government should work together to ensure that the highest standards of TLD 
operation are achieved, taking account of best practices and internationally accepted technical 
standards where they exist.  
3. All countries and distinct economies, listed in the International Standard ISO 3166-11 have 
equal rights to creating IDN ccTLDs that reflect their languages and scripts.  
4. Ultimate public policy authority over the IDN ccTLD(s) of a country or distinct economy 
rests with the government or relevant public authority. How this authority is exercised, is 
determined by applicable law.  
5. On receipt of an IDN ccTLD application, ICANN should ensure that either the proposal 
has the support of the Government or relevant public authority or that the Government or 
relevant public authority raises no objections to the application. In the event that such 
confirmation is not obtainable, ICANN should desist from the introduction of the proposed 
IDN ccTLD until such confirmation is obtained.  
6. The number of IDN strings per territory should reflect the cultural and linguistic 
characteristics of the community concerned. A limit on the number of IDN strings per 
territory may only be considered if there are reasons to believe that some form of limitation 
on the overall size of the root zone file is necessary to preserve the stability of the DNS. If a 
limit is to be introduced, this should be done in agreement with the government or relevant 
public authority of the territory concerned, and adequate justification for such a limit should 
be made clear beforehand in order for territories to establish their priorities properly.  
7. It is anticipated in most cases that the Government or relevant public authority will decide 
that one IDN ccTLD per script will be sufficient, but it should also be borne in mind that 
within some countries and distinct economies different scripts are in use and, in some cases, 
the same script is used in a number of widely used languages. In these cases the Government 
or relevant public authority may determine that more than one IDN ccTLD is necessary.  
 
1 Codes for the representation of names and countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: 
Country Codes. The exception to this requirement is the additional eligibility of the European 
                                                          
105 ICANN (2010). GAC Communique XXXVII – Nairobi, 10 March 2010. Retrieved 12 August 2011, from 
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540146/GAC_37_Nairobi_Communique.pdf?version=1&mod
ificationDate=1312226773000  
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Union, which has an exceptionally reserved code designated by the ISO 3166 Maintenance 
Agency  
 
IDN ccTLDs Strings  
8. It is anticipated that an IDN ccTLD string will normally:  
o be shortest meaningful representation of the name of the territory  
GAC Communiqué—Nairobi 5  
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o not be restricted to a fixed length, its maximum length being set by the prevailing technical 
standards with stability, security, integrity and usability in mind  
9. Given the different form that IDN ccTLDs will take and the absence of an equivalent of the 
ISO 3166-1 list used for ASCII ccTLDs, the experience of relevant international 
organizations2 should be taken into account.  
10. Only the Government or the relevant public authority of the country or distinct economy 
concerned, representing all relevant stakeholders within its jurisdiction, can provide 
authoritative advice to ICANN on the legitimacy of any application for an IDN ccTLD.  
11. An IDN ccTLD string that refers to a specific country or distinct economy, even if 
unapplied for, should be reserved for it.  
 
2 Example, UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographic Names, UNESCO and ITU  
 
IDN ccTLDs Scripts  
12. Nobody has property rights over a script. Some scripts are commonly used to write more 
than one language and should be available to be used for IDN ccTLD purposes in each of 
those languages.  
13. It is recommended that each language community develop one language table for its 
script. Language tables, after elaboration, should be deposited with IANA and posted for 
public use by any registry with no restriction in any sense.  
14. The latest available version of Unicode in use should be complete, including all scripts, 
and constantly upgraded with newer versions to help include maximum character sets of any 
language and ensure a strong and dynamic variant table to handle security issues.  
 
Stakeholders  
15. Relevant actors for international coordination include:  
o Concerned governments  
o Relevant international organizations within their respective mandates  
o Standardization bodies  
o Language experts  
o Language communities and local users  
o ICANN SOs/ACs  
o ISOC (chapters)  
o IETF  
o Unicode consortium  
 
16. All relevant actors should participate in a public and inclusive consultation process, at the 
international level, and work towards evolving a consensus for IDN ccTLDs formulation 
from the point of view of technical and operational stability, security as well as addressing 
public-policy issues.  
GAC Communiqué—Nairobi 6  
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Introduction and Delegation of IDN ccTLDs  
17. Procedure for delegation of an IDN ccTLD should follow GAC ccTLDs principles: 
"Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration of Country Code Top Level 
Domains".  
18. A mandated list / reference table of strings representing the IDN ccTLDs of countries and 
distinct economies, as listed in the ISO 3166-13, would facilitate management and would 
ensure predictability of the IDN ccTLD system.  
19. Competing or confusingly similar requests should be dealt with on a case by case basis 
and resolved in consultation with all concerned stakeholders.  
20. Policies for dealing with multiple applications, objections to applications or disputes that 
are currently applied for ASCII ccTLDs should be equally applied to IDN ccTLDs.  
21. The decision regarding whether an existing ASCII ccTLD manager should also be the 
operator of a corresponding IDN ccTLD is a matter to be decided by the national/local 
Internet community, including the government or relevant public authority, subject to 
applicable legislation. In cases of dispute, ICANN should seek authoritative advice from the 
government or relevant public authority.  
22. There should be some form of transparent communication as appropriate between 
ICANN and any IDN ccTLD registry to define their respective roles and responsibilities.  
 
3 Codes for the representation of names and countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: 
Country Codes. The exception to this requirement is the additional eligibility of the European 
Union, which has an exceptionally reserved code designated by the ISO 3166 Maintenance 
Agency GAC Communiqué—Nairobi 7 
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Appendix 5.9A: Summary of Public Comments Periods on IDNs 
Initial Public Comments Period (February 28th - March 14th 2001) 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/idn1/ Accessed 11 July 2011)  
76 comments were submitted during this period by 31 individual posters.  One of these 
(‘cats’) appeared to be a spammer and did not post anything on-topic.  
16 of the 31 posters were identified only by a screen name and did not state their full name, 
background or affiliation, making it difficult to break the comments down by interest group 
(See Appendix 5.9B). Of the 15 that could be identified, 9 represented private companies of 
one sort or another, one of which was a gTLD registry and two registrars. There were also 
two comments from academics.   
Only three posters opposed the introduction of IDNs. Marc Persuy (a network engineer) cited 
trademark and malicious use concerns. ‘Flo’ and ‘Integrator’ cited concerns about  
incompatibility with the existing ASCII-based namespace.  
Considerable discussion in this PCP revolved around the Verisign testbed, particularly the 
issue of whether the ‘testbed’ was actually the de facto commercial launch of a live system 
under another guise. Seven respondents expressed concern that VeriSign was attempting to 
prematurely launch a live system and capture the market before the IETF had produced a 
standard.  
‘Interdomain’ (a registrar) and ‘webpit’ favoured deletion of the ‘test’ registrations on 
conclusion of the test, however this was opposed by ‘journalism’ and ‘tomsey’. 
Alexander Svensson (private individual), Friedrich Kisters (Human Bios GmbH) ‘fncohen’  
and ‘KMalorny’  were heavily critical of Verisign’s initiative, which they saw as an attempt 
to stake a premature claim to the IDN market without regard for the proper standardisation 
process. However, a few posters (such as ‘tomsey’) defended the Verisign testbeds.  Marc 
Schneiders (NCUC) suggested that ICANN was not showing enough leadership on the issue.  
Other than the Verisign testbed, various  other issues relating to IDNs were also raised in the 
PCP. The potential for new cybersquatting opportunities presented by IDNs was raised by 
Marc Persuy, ‘journalism’, ‘interdomain’, ‘webpit’and Young-Eum Lee (an academic, Korea 
National Open University). 
‘Interdomain’ and ‘webpit’ proposed that the testbed registrations should be deleted at the 
conclusion of the test and an intellectual property preregistering or sunrise process (as the 
new gTLDs) held for subsequent IDN registrations. ‘Journalism’ (identity unknown) argued 
that the UDRP should be sufficient protection, and while agreeing that a sunrise period 
‘would have made sense’, he disagreed with the proposal to delete ‘testbed’ registrations. 
Young-Eum Lee (an academic, Korea National Open University) likewise criticised the way 
the process had been handled, but did not think deletion of the registration database was 
practical. James Seng (i-DNS) argued that the UDRP was not capable of handling IDNs yet.  
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Many of these issues raised in this initial PCP went on become significant points of debate 
during the policy development process, particularly issues relating to cybersquatting and 
spoofing. In that sense the PCP can be said to have either anticipated or informed the 
subsequent debate.  
 
PCP on draft IDN policy (13-24 March 2003) 
 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/riodejaneiro/idn-comments/general/index.html Accessed 
11 July 2011)  
5 posts were submitted by 5 individual posters (plus two further posts by two additional 
posters shortly after the official PCP closing date). Six of the posters represented private 
companies, of which three were ccTLD registries or associations of ccTLD registries, one 
was a gTLD registry and one was a registrar.  
Neil Edwards, commenting on behalf of Verisign, was highly critical of the draft Guidelines, 
arguing that the policy should not be mandatory for registry operators and that ICANN was 
proposing to supplement the IETF standard with ‘new conditions that significantly exceed the 
scope of that standard’. Edwards also criticised ICANN for lack of transparency in producing 
the recommendations. These comments by Edwards may be as reflective of the ongoing 
struggle between Verisign and ICANN that was occurring at this time, with Verisign 
continuing to resist ICANN centralisation of policy. However, Edwards was to some degree 
supported by the representative of JPNIC, the Japanese ccTLD registry (‘Marayuma’), who 
argued that all guidelines apart from point 1 should be recommendations, not mandatory. By 
contrast, ‘Masilva’, representing Interdomain, a Spanish registrar, argued that in order to 
avoid confusion between registrants and end users, make ICANN role credible, and tackle 
cybersquatting, it was essential that these mandatory requirements exist. Hiro Hotta (Japan 
Registry Services) also approved of the draft guidelines. 
  
‘Masilva’ and Peter Gustav Olson (a lawyer, Plesner Svane Gr�nborg) strongly favoured 
sunrise provisions for IDN registrations. Masilva and AM (amitdotbiz) also addressed the 
issue of whether testbed registrations would be retained, with AM recommending that they 
should be.  
 
The IDN Guidelines version 1.0, as endorsed by the Board on 27 March106 and finalised on 
20th June107, showed no major changes from the draft IDN policy108 discussed in this PCP. No 
sunrise period was implemented. The Board resolution seems to suggest that the Guidelines 
would be mandatory for registries offering IDNs. The issue of testbed registrations was not 
tackled at this time. Thus, it would be fair to say that the comments submitted in this PCP had 
no significant discernable effect on policy outcomes. 
                                                          
106ICANN (2003). Minutes  of regular meeting of the Board, 27 March 2003. Retrieved 4 August 2011, from 
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-27mar03.htm  
107 ICANN (2003). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Version 1.0. 20 June 
2003. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-20jun03.htm  
108ICANN (2003). 'ICANN Rio de Janeiro Meeting Topic: Internationalized Domain Names.' 13 March 2003. 
Retrieved 6 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/riodejaneiro/idn-topic.htm  
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PCP on draft IDN Guidelines version 2.0 (20 September-20 October 2005) 
(Archived at  http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-guidelines Accessed 11 July 2011) 
There were ten posts by ten individual posters during the official comments period. Of these, 
5 could not be identified. Three comments were received from private companies, including 
one from a ccTLD registry. There were also comments from the Internet Architecture Board 
(IAB) and the International Trademarks Association (INTA).  
Michael Heltzer of INTA made the case for stronger trademark protection mechanisms for 
IDNs particularly strengthened WHOIS. Danny Younger (background / affiliation not 
disclosed)  favoured making an exception to the rule against mixing two distinct scripts in 
IDN labels, arguing that this should not be applied to verified trademark owners, who may 
wish to run a multilingual promotion campaign with local phrases mixed with trademarks in 
English. Paul Hoffman (background / affiliation not disclosed) and ‘showker’ (Spam 
Trackers) argued that stronger enforcement of the Guidelines plus the establishment of clear 
penalties for breaches must be established. Michael Heltzer, Paul Hoffman, ‘showker’, Neil 
Harris (Media channel Limited) and Gervase Markham (background / affiliation not 
disclosed) felt that stronger measures to tackle spoofing using IDN labels were required.  
Abdulaziz Al-Zoman raised the issue of IDN TLDs, arguing that IDN TLD policy should 
concentrate on ccTLDs first. Comments from ‘r&d afrac’ (background / affiliation not 
disclosed)  and Leslie Daigle (IAB) addressed technical / script encoding issues. 
Apart from some changes in wording, the finalised version 2.0 of the Guidelines109 was 
substantially the same as the draft110 discussed in this PCP. There were no changes to 
trademark protections or enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the comments submitted in this 
PCP do not appear to have had any significant effect upon policy outcomes.  
 
PCP on IDN Guidelines version  2.1 (27 February 2006 – open) 
(Archived at http://www.icann.org/topics/idn/fora.htm Accessed 11 July 2011) 
In the Public Comments period on version 2.1, no comments appear to have been posted on 
the indicated board, suggesting that the amendment was not controversial.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 ICANN (2005). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Version 2.0. 8 
November 2005. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-14nov05.htm  
110ICANN (2005). Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names.Draft Version 2.0. 20 
September 2005. Retrieved 6 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/general/idn-guidelines-20sep05.htm  
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PCP on Autonomica test plan (5 - 19 December 2006) 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-tests-comments/ Accessed 11 July 2011) 
Only two people commented. Stephane Bortzmeyer (privately employed network engineer) 
questioned why the test was necessary, reasoning that since IDN labels are stored in the DNS 
as ASCII labels like any others, and IDN processing is done only by client-side applications, 
not at the nameserver level, there seemed to be nothing to test. Jaeyoun Kim (National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea) stated that the test plan was “very well designed”, 
but, like Bortzmeyer, noted that since the test was simply insertion of ASCII punycode 
strings into a simulated root zone, there was unlikely to be an adverse effect on the root 
server. He advised that ICANN should also test the performance of IDN-aware client-side 
applications, such as web browsers and e-mail clients. 
 
PCP on IDN Guidelines version 2.2 (11 May 2007 – open – ended ) 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-guidelines/ Accessed 12 July 2011) 
A Public Comments Period on the new guidelines was announced from 11 May 2007. 
However, no comments appear to have been submitted on the indicated board after 11 May.  
 
 
PCP on IDNC Working Group Draft Final Report of Recommendations for IDN ccTLD Fast 
Track Mechanism111 (13 - 23 June 2008) 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-fast-track/ Accessed 12 July 2011) 
Five responses were received in this period, from four distinct individuals. These included a 
member of ICANN staff, an advisor to the Urdu Internet Council, a private individual, and an 
unidentified individual. There were no major objections to the principle of ‘Fast Track’.  
 
Imran Ahmed Shah (Urdu Internet Council) raised the issue of fees, arguing that the ‘Fast 
Track’ approach may result in disproportionately high fees for early applicants, as ICANN 
sought to recover costs from the first round of applicants (such as policy development costs, 
the costs of all relevant meetings and the configuration of the root servers). He recommended 
developing a mechanism to spread cost recovery over a longer period of time so that the full 
costs were not borne by the earliest applicants. Shah also recommended that IDN ccTLDs 
should not be restricted to two characters as with ASCII ccTLDs; and that IDN ccTLD 
registries should be required to be local organisations based in the relevant country or 
territory.   
 
Paul Hoffman (identity not disclosed) recommended that Guiding Principle D (Fast Track 
only for non-Latin scripts) could be dropped, arguing that it was inherently unfair to many 
countries whose country names in their native languages, for example Norway, could 
                                                          
111 http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idn-cctld-fast-track-draft-final-report-recommendations-13jun08.pdf  
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otherwise meet all the other guiding principles. Hoffman also opposed the ‘no mixed scripts’ 
rule. Robert Hoggarth (ICANN staff) posted a summary of some input received from various 
groups and fora, including the RyC, the Arabic team for domain names, and various ICANN 
public meetings. This input suggested general support for the principles of Fast Track, though 
with ongoing discussion around various points of policy, particularly technical issues and 
language / script definitions. Michael D. Palage (private individual) questioned why the 
public comment period had been restricted to ten days on this occasion.  
    
None of the proposals made in this PCP appear to have been incorporated into the finalised 
version of the Final Report.112  
 
 
PCP on the Final Report of IDNC Working Group on ccTLD "Fast Track" Mechanisms113 
(15 July - 15 August 2008. 
 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-cctld-fast-track/  Accessed 12 July 2011) 
 
8 posts were submitted by 8 individual posters. Three of these represented private companies, 
including a ccTLD registry. There were also comments from the Jordanian National 
Information Technology Center, the Asia-Pacific Top-Level Domains Association (APTLD, 
an organisation mainly of ccTLD registries), the GNSO Council and one private individual, 
as well as one unidentified poster.   
 
There were no major objections to the principle of fast track, however both Jaser Elmorsy 
(bluebridge.net) and Andrew Mack (AMGlobal Consulting) advocated that certain gTLDs 
included in the fast track as well. Mack argued that limiting fast track to ccTLDs would give 
governments too much power in the near term. Jonathan Shea (APTLD) advised that the 
delegation process for new IDN ccTLDs should not be used to ‘force’ ccTLD registries to 
enter into contractual agreements with ICANN. This was supported in this by Abdulaziz Al-
Zoman (SaudiNIC). Shea argued that a ccTLD “represents sovereignty or a 
territorial/national right and cannot be subjected to a contract with a corporation under the 
laws of another country”.  
 
Ghazwa Malhas (National Information Technology Center / Jordan) and Abdulaziz Al-
Zoman (SaudiNIC)  raised the issue of contracts between ICANN and IDN ccTLD registries, 
arguing that these should not be a mandatory requirement for the delegation of the ccTLD 
(note that this would mirror existing policy for ASCII TLDs; for  existing ccTLDs, unlike 
gTLDs, formal Registry Agreements between ICANN and the registry are voluntary).   
                                                          
112 ICANN (2008). Discussion Draft of Interim Report of IDNC WG for Public Comments. 13 June 2008. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idn-cctld-fast-track-draft-final-report-
recommendations-24jun08.pdf  
113 ICANN (2008). Discussion Draft of Interim Report of IDNC WG for Public Comments. 13 June 2008. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/idn-cctld-fast-track-draft-final-report-
recommendations-24jun08.pdf  
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Public Comments Period on the ccTLD Fast Track Draft Implementation Plan (23 October 
2008 - 7 January 2009. 
(Archived at http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-implementation/  Accessed 12 July 2011) 
There were 15 comments posted by 14 individual posters.  These included 3 private 
companies of which two were ccTLD registries and one a registrar. There were also 
comments from the GNSO Council, the Registrars Constituency, three national governments 
or their agencies, the APTLD and one private individual. The other four posters could not be 
identified.   
A significant point of contention in this PCP concerned the question of application fees for 
prospective IDN ccTLD registries. Manal Ismail (Egyptian GAC Representative), 
Mohammed El-Bashir (State of Qatar, Supreme Council of Information and Communication 
Technology).Abdulaziz Al-Zoman (SaudiNIC), El Maayati Afaf (identity not disclosed) and 
Ibaa Oueichek (Arab Team for Domain Names and Internet Issues) argued that registry 
contributions to ICANN’s costs should be voluntary, while Avri Doria (GNSO Council) and 
Clarke D. Walton (Registrars Constituency) favoured mandatory charges. The final policy 
outcome on this point was that financial contributions were deemed ‘expected’ but not 
mandatory. 114  
Manal Ismail, Erin Chen (Taiwan Network Information Centre)Abdulaziz Al-Zoman and 
Ibaa Oueichek recommended that national governments should be given the final word on 
whether a given IDN ccTLD should go ahead and that this should be made explicit in the 
policy. This became the case in the final policy. 115 
Clarke D Walton advocated that ‘Fast Track’ should be extended to certain IDN gTLDs. This 
did not occur in the final policy.  
Manal Ismail and Ibaa Oueichek argued against mandatory formal registry contracts for IDN 
ccTLDs. Mohammed El-Bashir favoured a light weight' contractural relationship, while 
Jonathan Shea  (APTLD) and Abdulaziz Al-Zoman felt that for those operators who do not 
want to exchange formal contracts documents with ICANN, a commitment to the stability 
and security of the Internet, including compliance with the IDNA Guidelines and Protocols, 
should be sufficient. Avri Doria (GNSO Council) and Clarke D. Walton (Registrar 
Constituency) likewise argued that registries must commit to IDNA standards and the IDN 
                                                          
114 ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-
16nov09-en.pdf P43 
115 ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-
16nov09-en.pdf  
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Guidelines. The final policy mandated a minimum commitment to follow the IDNA 
standards and IDN Guidelines, but did not mandate a formal registry agreement. 116  
PCP on revision to the Draft Implementation plan for the Fast track process 18 February-6 
April 2009 
(Archived at  http://forum.icann.org/lists/ft-implementation/ Accessed 12 July 2011) 
A total of 7 responses were received from 7 individual posters. These included one private 
company (a ccTLD registry), the International Trademark Association (INTA), the Arabic 
Script IDN Working Group (ASIWG),  two national governments / governmental agencies, 
one GNSO Council member and one poster who could not be identified.  
Ken Stubbs (GNSO Council) pointed to the financial costs of the process, which he claimed 
were “well into seven figures”, and argued that this should be shifted as much as possible 
onto the main beneficiaries, the ccTLD registries. Eric Brunner-Williams (identity not 
disclosed) made some technically related suggestions for changes in the text. Naveed-ul-Haq 
(Pakistan Telecommunication Authority) requested a clear timetable and statement of likely 
costs to the ccTLD registries. A cost analysis was ultimately provided in Module 8 of the 
final Implementation Plan.117 An exact timetable for the process was not given.  
 
Paul Szyndler (.au Domain Administration) argued that ICANN staff ‘should endeavour to 
finalise outstanding details, including information on “meaningfulness”requirements, and the 
finalised structure and role of the DNS Stability Technical Panel.’ This was ultimately dealt 
with in Module 4 of the final Implementation Plan. 118 Szyndler was otherwise 
complimentary of the process. Manal Ismail (Egyptian GAC Representative) recommended 
‘that there be collaboration among communities sharing scripts, or where particular 
confusability exists between characters across the used languages, to develop IDN tables and 
associated policies’ and recommended that ICANN establish a clear process for submission 
of language/script tables developed by language communities sharing the same 
language/script. Similarly, Ram Mohan (Afilias / ASIWG) made some recommendations for 
a procedure for drawing up language / script tables through collaboration with language 
communities and references to ‘authoritative’ locally based expert groups, and argued that no 
IDN TLD should be launched prior to the creation of an authoritative and complete table for 
that language / script. This issue was dealt with by Module 3 of the final Implementation 
Plan, which encouraged co-operation between such communities in developing such tables. 
119 Claudio DiGangi (International Trademark Association) asserted that ICANN should 
recommend the use of a Dispute Resolution Provider (DRP) to resolve disputes arising from 
                                                          
116 ICANN (2009). Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 16 November 2009. 
Retrieved 12 August 2011, from  http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-
16nov09-en.pdf P12 
117 ICANN (2009). Proposed Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 30 September 
2009. Retrieved 22 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-
plan-30sep09-en.pdf PP53-56 
118 ICANN (2009). Proposed Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 30 September 
2009. Retrieved 22 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-
plan-30sep09-en.pdf PP15-16 
119 ICANN (2009). Proposed Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process. 30 September 
2009. Retrieved 22 August 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-
plan-30sep09-en.pdf P7-12 
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the registration of domain names within the IDN ccTLD registry. No such recommendation 
was made in the final Implementation Plan. Paul Szyndler (.au Domain Administration) 
raised the contracts issue, arguing that contracts should be voluntary only. As discussed, this 
was the eventual outcome on this issue. 
 
PCP on additional update to the Fast Track Process Implementation Plan (3rd revision): 31 
May-15 July 2009 
 
(Archived at  http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-31may09-en.htm. 
Accessed 12 July 2011) 
There were 10 posts by 10 individual posters.120 These were comprised of representatives of 
four private companies, including two ccTLD registries, two national governments / 
governmental agencies, the Chinese Domain Name Users Alliance, the Arab Team for 
Domain Names and Internet Issues, and two individuals who could not be identified.  
The question of application fees was again raised, with  Abdulaziz Al-Zoman (SaudiNIC), 
Ibaa Oueichek (Arab Team for Domain Names and Internet Issues) and Manal Ismail  
(Egyptian GAC Representative)advocating that contributions should be voluntary and Tan 
Yaling (China Internet Network Information Center) favouring mandatory fees. As discussed, 
the final policy on this issue was that fees were deemed ‘expected’ but not mandatory. 
The contracts issue was also raised again, with Abdulaziz Al-Zoman, Manal Ismail, Ibaa 
Oueichek and Ramesh Kumar Nadarajah (APTLD) arguing against mandatory contracts. 
Ismail however agreed that applicants must indicate an intention to adherence to standards. 
Mohammed El-Bashir (Qatar Supreme Council of Information and Communication 
Technology) favoured a ‘lightweight’ agreement. As discussed, the final policy on this issue 
was an avoidance of mandatory contracts but acceptance of certain minimum requirements, 
including the IDN Guidelines and IDNA standard, was mandated.  
 
PCP on proposed Final Implementation Plan for the IDN ccTLD Fast-Track Process (30th 
September – 30th October 2009) 
(Archived at http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/public-comment-200907.html#fast-
track Accessed 12 July 2011) 
No comments appear to have been received during the specified period.  
 
 
                                                          
120 ICANN. (2009). "Public Comment: Fast Track Implementation (3rd Revision): 31 May 2009."   Retrieved 18 
June, 2009, from http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-31may09-en.htm. 
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PCPs on work of ccNSO IDN ccPDP Working Group  
A Public Comments Period was announced on the draft topic paper between 20th October 
and 3rd November 2009.121   However, no relevant comments appear to have been made on 
the specified board (http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-ccpdp/) during that time period.   
A further PCP was announced on the progress report between 29th November 2010 and 14th 
January 2011.122  However, once again no comments were submitted to the specified board 
(http://forum.icann.org/lists/idnpdpwg1-progressreport/).  
 
PCP on Draft IDN Guidelines version 3.0 (27 July – 26 August  2011) 
(Archived at  http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-guidelines-v3-revision/ Accessed 12 July 2011) 
Only two people commented in the specified period. 
Simon Josefsson  (network security consultant) raised some technical points.  Hugo Salgado (NIC 
Chile) advised inclusion of a recommendation for registries/registrars to warn registrants about 
lack of global support in IDN client software, to avoid possible litigation by dissatisfied 
registrants.  
  
 
                                                          
121 ICANN (2009). Announcement:  ‘Public Comments Requested on Draft Topic Paper for Policy on the 
Introduction of IDN ccTLDs’. 20 October 2009. Retrieved 9 August 2011, from 
http://ccnso.icann.org/announcements/announcement-20oct09.htm  
122 ICANN (2010). Announcement:  ‘IDN PDP Working Group 1 Publishes its First Progress Report.’ Retrieved 
9 August 2011, from http://ccnso.icann.org/announcements/announcement-29nov10-en.htm  
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Appendix 5.9B: Statistical breakdown of public comments on IDNs 
Breakdown of public comments on IDNs by background / affiliation of poster 
(Note that some posters fall into more than one category; for example a registrar is also a private 
company; therefore totals will exceed number of actual posts)  
 PCP 
28/2/01  
- 
14/3/01 
 
PCP 
13/3/03 
- 
24/3/03   
PCP  
20/9/05 
 – 
20/10/05 
PCP 
5/12/06 
 – 
19/12/06 
PCP 
13/6/08 
- 
23/6/08 
PCP 
15/7/08  
- 
15/8/08 
PCP 
23/10/08 
 –  
7/1/09 
PCP 
18/2/09 –  
6/4/09 
PCP 
31/5/09 -
15/7/09 
PCP 
27/7/11 
- 
26/8/11 
TOTAL 
 
Academics 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Intellectual 
property 
interests 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2 
Private 
companies 
15 6 3 0 0 3 3 1 4 0 
35 
gTLD registries 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
ccTLD registries 
/ registry 
associations 
0 3 1 0 0 2 3 1 3 1 
14 
Registrars / 
registrars 
associations 
5 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 
ICANN staff 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Technical NGOs 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Other NGOs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Regional IGOs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Internet 
governance 
bodies e.g. 
IETF, IAB 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
National 
governments / 
governmental 
agencies  
0 0 0 2 0 1 4 2 2 0 
11 
GNSO Council 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
GNSO 
constituencies 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2 
Private 
individuals 
4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
8 
Unidentified / 
affiliation not 
stated 
51 1 5 0 1 1 4 2 2 0 
67 
ALAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 81 12 11 3 5 9 18 8 14 2 163 
 
Number of 
actual 
comments 
76 7 10 3 5 8 15 7 10 2 143 
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IDNs: Breakdown of individual public commenters by background / affiliation  
(Note that some posters fall into more than one category; for example a registrar is also a 
private company; therefore totals will exceed number of actual individual commentators)  
 PCP 
28/2/01  
- 
14/3/01 
 
PCP 
13/3/03 
- 
24/3/03   
PCP  
20/9/05 
 – 
20/10/05 
PCP 
5/12/06 
 – 
19/12/06 
PCP 
13/6/08 
- 
23/6/08 
PCP 
15/7/08  
- 
15/8/08 
PCP 
23/10/08 
 –  
7/1/09 
PCP 
18/2/09 
 –  
6/4/09 
PCP 
31/5/09 
 - 
15/7/09 
PCP 
27/7/11 
- 
26/8/11 
TOTAL 
Academics 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Intellectual 
property 
interests 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2 
Private 
companies 
10 6 2 0 0 3 3 1 4 0 
29 
gTLD registries 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
ccTLD registries 
/ registry 
associations 
0 3 1 0 0 2 3 1 3 1 
14 
Registrars / 
registrars 
associations 
2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4 
ICANN staff 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Technical NGOs 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Other NGOs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Regional IGOs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Internet 
governance 
bodies e.g. 
IETF, IAB 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
National 
governments / 
governmental 
agencies  
0 0 0 1 0 1 3 2 2 0 
9 
GNSO Council 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
GNSO 
constituencies 
1 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 
2 
Private 
individuals 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
5 
Unidentified / 
affiliation not 
stated 
16 1 5 0 1 1 4 2 2 0 
32 
ALAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 34 12 10 0 4 9 17 8 14 0 112 
 
Number of 
actual posters 
31 7 10 2 4 8 14 7 10 2 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 282 
Appendix to Chapter 6 
 283 
Appendix 6.1 Working Group A membership 
• Jonathan Cohen (IPC) 
• Mark Partridge (IPC) 
• Susan Anthony (IPC) 
• Michael Heltzer (IPC) 
• Ted Shapiro (IPC) 
• Peter Dengate Thrush (IPC) 
• Randy Bush (NCC) 
• Kathy Kleiman (NCC) 
• David Maher (NCC) 
• Amadeu Abril i Abril (RC) 
• Ken Stubbs (RC) 
• Jon Englund (BCC) 
• Luis H. de Larramendi (BCC) 
• Hirofumi Hotta (ISPC) 
• Dr. Willie Black (ccTLDC) 
Source: ICANN (1999). Results of DNSO Names Council Teleconference on June 11th, 
1999. Retrieved 18 September 2011, from 
http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/19990612.NCtelecon.html   
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Appendix 6.2: Positions of the GNSO Constituencies on UDRP Review (August 2003). 
As set out in Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review, 1 August 2003. 
Non-Commercial Users – Place great emphasis on procedural safeguards and substantive 
protections for registrants making legitimate noncommercial or fair use of domain 
registrations. 
Commercial Users – Want a economical, streamlined, and reliable remedy against domain 
registrations made in bad faith to misleadingly divert customers. 
Intellectual Property Interests – Stress the importance of protections against cybersquatting 
and bad-faith registrations intended to tarnish trademarks. 
ISPs – Not directly interested, except in their general status as commercial enterprises. 
Registrars – Appreciate a standardized dispute-resolution policy that is fair to their customers 
and that keeps registrars out of the role of party or arbiter in domain disputes. 
gTLD Registries – Registry operators are rarely (but increasingly) drawn directly into 
disputes over domain registrations, and thus share registrars' interests in a standard and fair 
policy. 
 
Source: ICANN (1999). Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review. 1 August 2003. 
Retrieved 14 September 2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/gnso/issue-reports/udrp-review-
report-01aug03.htm 
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Appendix 6.3: List of speakers at Webinar on the Current State of the UDRP (10 May 
2011).  
Source: Webinar on the Current State of the UDRP - Agenda and additional information. 
Retrieved 22 September 2011, from 
https://community.icann.org/display/gnsoudrpdt/Webinar+on+the+Current+State+of+the+U
DRP 
Moderator –             Margie Milam, ICANN Staff  
 
UDRP Providers                                                               
Erik Wilbers, World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO)                                                            
Kristine Dorrain, National Arbitration Forum 
(NAF)                                                                              
Dennis Cai, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center (ADNDRC)                               
Tereza Bartoskova, Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes 
(CAC)                    
 
ICANN Compliance Staff                                                    
Khalil Rasheed 
 
Registrar Stakeholder Group 
Statton Hammock,Network Solutions 
 
Panelists                                                                
Czech Arbitration Court Panelist - Mathew Harris 
ADNDRC Panelist- Neil Brown                                                                                           
NAF Panelist- James Carmody                                                                                    
WIPO Panelist-David Bernstein                                                                                     
WIPO Panelist-Tony Willoughby 
 
Complainants/Counsel                                 
Aimee Gessner,  BMW 
Paul McGrady                                                                                                                     
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Respondents/Counsel  
John Berryhill 
Ari Goldberger 
 
Academic Speakers     
Konstantinos Komaitis, University of Strathclyde  
 
Cédric Manara, EDHEC                                                                                                    
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Appendix 6.4: Summary details of sample of 250 UDRP case histories 
Chosen at random from online case history databases provided by WIPO (100 cases), NAF 
(100 cases) and ANDRC (50 cases).  
WIPO cases 
CASE 
NUMBER DOMAIN 
 
PARTIES 
 
WINNER 
NOTES 
Case No. D2000-
0020 
 
saint-gobain.net  
Compagnie de Saint 
Gobain v. Com-
Union Corp 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
0381 
 
sydkraft.com 
 
 
Sydkraft AB v. 
Control Alt Delete 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2000-
0621 wrightandlato.com 
Wright & Lato, Inc. 
v. Michael L. Epstein 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
0521 
hifog.com 
 
Marioff Corporation 
Oy v. Ultra Fog AB 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
0995 
komatsuparts.com 
komatsu-parts.com 
Komatsu Ltd. And 
Komatsu America 
International 
Company v. RKWeb 
Ltd. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1088 
 
 
 
Quote-smith.com 
 
 
 
 
Quotesmith.com Inc. 
v. James Noble 
(Domain For 
Sale.com) 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
 
 
    Single member panel 
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Case No. D2000-
1244 
 
 
vestel.com 
 
 
 
Vestel Elektronik 
Sanayi ve Ticaret AS 
v. Mehmet Kahveci 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1575 
 
 
 
collegesummit.com 
collegenetsummit.com 
 
 
 
College Summit, Inc. 
v. Yarmouth 
Educational 
Consultants, Inc. 
 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1687 
 
 
reinfolink.com 
 
 
 
RE Infolink v. 
Nathan Frey d/b/a 
123 Mail 
 
R 
Respondent wins despite 
complainant having trademark 
– though trademark registered 
after domain name 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1814 
 
 
 
 
harina-pan.com 
mazeite.com procria.com 
arrozprimor.com 
mazorca.com 
harinapromasa.com 
ricarepa.com 
Refinadora de Maíz 
Venezolana, C.A. 
("REMAVENCA") 
and C.A. Promesa 
("PROMESA") v. 
Jaime Rentería 
 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
 
 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
0300 
 
systima.com 
 
 
Systima Limited v. 
Willie Byrne 
 
C Complainant (unregistered 
servce mark owner) wins 
Single member panel 
 
  
  Interesting case because 
complainant had no registered 
trademark, however 
unregistered service mark 
treated as equivalent 
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Case No. D2001-
0605 rewe.com 
REWE-Zentral AG v. 
Fahmi Banafa 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
0894 milbanktweed.com. 
Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy 
LLP v. John Zissu 
 
C 
Complainant (unregistered 
service mark owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
1177 bauhaus.com 
Bauhaus AG, 
Zweigniederlassung 
Mannheim v. Robert 
Desideri 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2003-
1178 aracruz.com  
Aracruz Celulose S/A 
v. CM Banco de 
Servicos SC Ltda 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2001-
1400 panasonic.net.  
Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd., 
v. O Eunjung 
 
C 
Interesting because it infers 
bad faith from non-response 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
1475 cellexc.com  
Caleel+Hayden 
L.L.C. v. Jaye 
Pharmacy 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2001-
1484 
jcb-equipment.com, 
jcbplant.com, jcb-
plant.com, jcb-sales.com, 
jcbspares.com, jcb-
J C Bamford 
Excavators Limited 
v. MSD (Darlington) 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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spares.com, 
jcbequipment.uk.com, 
jcb-equipment.uk.com, 
jcbfinance.uk.com, jcb-
parts.uk.com, 
jcbplant.uk.com, jcb-
plant.uk.com, 
jcbs.uk.com, 
jcbsales.uk.com, jcb-
sales.uk.com, 
jcbspares.uk.com, jcb-
spares.uk.com; 
Limited 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0001 Nokiaheaven-uk.com 
Nokia Corporation v. 
Nick Holmes t/a 
EType Media 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2002-
0027 186k.org 
186K.Net, Co v. 
Christopher Rinaldi 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0207 
 bingogala.com 
bingogala.net 
galaslots.com 
galagold.com 
Gala Holdings 
Limited v. Richard 
Chambers 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    3 member panel 
Case No: D2002-
0329 providencejournal.com   
Belo Corp. v. George 
Latimer 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0448 
www.freemandecorating.c
om  
Freeman Capital 
Company v. 
ONScreen Business 
Communications 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0741 
attvideophone.biz, 
attphone.biz, 
attvideophone.info, 
attphone.info, 
attcredit.biz, 
attmobile.biz, 
attcredit.info and 
attmobile.info  
AT&T Corp v All 
Time Talk Cellular 
and All Over Land 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0856 
potsdam.com, 
potsdam.net, potsdam.org, 
potsdam.info  
City of Potsdam v. 
Transglobal Networx 
Inc. 
 
C 
Trademark owner wins – on 
the basis  of trademark ONLY 
– DOES NOT SET A 
PRECEDENT for place names 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0950 samclubcredit.com 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v John Zuccarini 
d/b/a RaveClub 
Berlin 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
1134 juanvaldez.org 
National Federation 
of Coffee Growers of 
Colombia v. Daniel 
Harrison 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0280 rbcentura.com  
Royal Bank of 
Canada v. Party 
Night Inc. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0336 bellsotuh.net 
BellSouth Intellectual 
Property Corporation 
v. Phayze Inc. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0463 terrellowens.com 
Terrell Eldorado 
Owens v. Aran Smith 
d/b/a 
Sportsphenoms.com 
and/or 
Sportsphenoms 
 
C 
Interesting because a well-
known person’s name is 
treated as a trademark 
  
  Seems  straightforward since 
registrant had no interests and 
defaulted anyway 
    Complainant wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0473 wzbhrocks.com 
Great Scott 
Broadcasting v. FIFC 
sa aka Netfisher aka 
Erik Simmons 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2003-
0695 betandwincasino.com 
BET and WIN 
Interactive 
Entertainment AG v. 
Jonas Lindstedt 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0800 
wwwbet 
straightforward.com.  
The Sporting 
Exchange Limited v. 
Grand Slam Co. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0908 bayaspirina.com   
Bayer AG v. Daniel 
H. Davies, 
Interplanetarium 
Corp. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
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Case No. D2003-
1007 amazoy.com 
The Shelburne 
Company d/b/a 
Zoysia Farm 
Nurseries v. Smith 
Turf Farms 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
1013 wwwredeglobo.com  
TV Globo Ltda. v. 
Alvaro Collazo 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
1041 
wwwichotelsgroup.com  
wwwintercontinental.com 
Inter-Continental 
Hotels Corporation v. 
Cheap-Hotel-Room, 
Inc. 
 
R (split 
decision) 
 Split decision  
    Respondent wins 
  
  Service mark not deemed to be 
equivalent to trademark in this 
case  
    Single member panel  
Case No. D2003-
1049 yallapepsi.com 
PepsiCo, Inc., v. 
Samtech 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
    Single member panel   
Case No. D2004-
0091 achannel.com 
Craig Media, Inc. v. 
Kim Hyungho 
 
R 
Case dismissed / respondent 
retains name 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
0138 unisysconsulting.com 
Unisys Corporation 
v. Unisys Consulting, 
LLC 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
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Case No. D2004-
0855 imvamune.com  
Bavarian Nordic A/S 
v. Henrik Olsen, The 
Vamune Family 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
0908 wwwikea.com  
InterIKEA Systems 
B.V. v. Michael 
Huang 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
1009 hamburgerhabit.com  
Habit Holding Co., 
L.L.C. v. None / 
Michael Pimentel 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
1025 wedgewoodchina.com 
Wedgwood Ltd. 
Corp. v. JIT Limited 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
1049 moncler.com 
Moncler S.p.A. v. 
Bestinfo 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
1081 
nativestyles.net 
nativestyles.org    
Rudy Rojas v. Gary 
Davis 
 
R Panel clearly did not want to 
get involved in what is clearly 
a very complex broader 
business dispute. 
    Case dismissed  
    3 member panel  
Case No. D2004-
1105 cambolero.com 
Campero 
International, Corp. 
v. Jordan Data 
Communication 
Services Company 
 
C 
 
   C 
Complainant (trademark 
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owner) wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0084 lcia.org   
LCIA (London Court 
of International 
Arbitration) v. 
Wellsbuck 
Corporation 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0134 waterfordchina.com   
Waterford 
Wedgwood plc. v. 
Namia Limited 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0211 generic-cialis.com    
Lilly Icos LLC v. 
Silagra World 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0282 alsa.com 
Automóviles de 
Luarca, S.A. v. 
NUCOM, Domain 
Name Brokers 
 
R 
This effectively sanctions 
domain name speculation 
under certain circumstances  
    Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0459 meridienwedding.com. 
Société des Hôtels 
Méridien v. 
Mr. Richard 
Kaminskas 
 
R 
Respondent wins despite not 
submitting a response 
  
  ‘meridien’ is a generic word 
and meridianwedding is not 
trademarked 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel   
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Case No. D2005-
0697 
stephenfossler.com and 
stephenfosslercompany.co
m  
Stephen Fossler 
Company v. LaPorte 
Holdings 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0934 prudentialbankplc.com  
The Prudential 
Assurance Company 
Limited v. Osaro 
Godwin 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
1047 laserenisima.com 
Mastellone HNOS. 
S.A. v. Link 
Comercial Corp. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2005-
1322 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
arizonarepublicdelivery.c
om 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media West-DMR, 
Inc., Media West-
GSI, Inc., Media 
West-INI, Inc., 
Media West-
PNI, Inc., Des 
Moines Register and 
Tribune Co., Gannett 
Satellite Information 
Network, Inc., 
Indiana Newspapers, 
Inc., Phoenix 
Newspapers, Inc., 
Gannett Co. Inc. 
v. Phil Nagy 
 
C 
 Straightforward case apart 
from the multiple complainant 
aspect + the number of names 
involved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
arizonarepublicsubscriptio
  
Complainant(s) (trademark 
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n.com  owners) win 
Single member panel 
 
cincinnatienquirerdelivery
.com 
  
 
 
cincinnatienquirersubscrip
tion.com 
  
 
 
desmoinesregisterdelivery
.com 
  
 
 
desmoinesregistersubscrip
tion.com 
  
 
 
indianapolisstarnewsdeliv
ery.com 
  
 
 
indianapolisstarnewssubsc
ription.com 
  
 
 
myusatodaysubscription.c
om 
  
 
 orderarizonarepublic.com    
 
ordercincinnatienquirer.co
m 
  
 
 
orderdesmoinesregister.co
m 
  
 
 
orderindianapolisstarnews
.com 
  
 
 ordertennessean.com    
 
orderthearizonarepublic.c
om 
  
 
 
orderthecincinnatienquirer
.com 
  
 
 
orderthedesmoinesregister
.com 
  
 
 
ordertheindianapolisstarne
ws.com 
  
 
 orderthetennessean.com    
 ordertheusatoday.com    
 orderusatoday.com    
 
theusatodaysubscription.c
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om 
 usatodaydelivery.com    
 usatodaysubscription.net    
 
usatodaysubscriptiononlin
e.com 
  
 
Case No. D2006-
0026 cloer.com  
Cloer Elektrogeräte 
GmbH v. Motohisa 
Ohno 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0126 delongsportswear.com   
DeLong Sportswear, 
Inc. v. LaPorte 
Holdings 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0320 funtomas.com  
Tomas Sziranyi v. 
RegisterFly.com 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0370 lotrfanclub.com  
The Saul Zaentz 
Company v. Siarhei 
Chyzhevich 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0680 checksunimited.com 
Paper Payment 
Services, LLC v. 
Web Domain Names 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0912 porscheci.com 
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. 
Porsche AG v. ANC 
Online Avrasya 
Bilisim Tekn San ve 
Dis Tic A S 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
1238 uwindsor.com 
The University of 
Windsor v. Modern 
Empire Internet 
Limited 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
1492 
nationwideinsurancequote
.com 
Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company 
v. Henry Adams 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
1618 
pamperedchef.mobi and 
thepamperedchef.mobi 
Columbia Insurance 
Company v. Fred 
Sacco 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
0032 adidas.mobi  
Adidas AG v. 
Zhifang Wu 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
0039   atlascopco24.com   
Atlas Copco 
Aktiebolag v. 
Andreas Clara 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
0400 bangbusters.com 
Ox Ideas, Inc. v. 
Wan-Fu China, Ltd. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 ibangbus.com   Single member panel 
 www-bangbros.com    
 xxxbangbus.com    
Case No. D2007-
0688 
mastercard-
applications.com 
MasterCard 
International 
Incorporated v. 
Unicorn Multi-
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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Media, Inc. 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
1000 superbowlxliv.com 
National Football 
League v. Exotic 
Design Group 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
1321 pga2012.com 
The Professional 
Golfers Association 
of America v. RW 
Smith 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
1558 honda-jp.org   
American Honda 
Motor Co., Inc. v. 
Honda Automobile 
Company 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2007-
1726 linak-israel.com 
Linak A/S v. Elsar 
Ltd. 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
1924 tatarealty.com 
Tata Sons Limited v. 
Imtiaz Kalwar 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
0626 
royalbankofscotlandteneri
fe.com.   
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc 
and The Royal Bank 
of Scotland plc v. 
"Christopher 
Graham" or "John 
Graham" dba GRA 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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Marketing CL 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
0643 iittala.com.  
Designor OY AB v 
Bamse Enterprises  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
  
  False registration details used 
as evidence of bad faith 
Case No. D2003-
0802 
swatchnews.com and 
swatchresearch.com are 
registered with Tucows, 
Inc.  
The disputed domain 
names 
swatchdiscovery.com, 
swatchdiscovery.net and 
swatchdiscovery.org are 
registered with Innerwise, 
Inc. d/b/a 
ItsYourDomain.com.  
The disputed domain 
names swatchnews.net, 
swatchnews.org, 
swatchresearch.net and 
swatchresearch.org are 
registered with @com 
Technology LLC. 
SWATCH AG v. 
Stefano Manfroi  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
77    3 member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0877 greentyre.com 
Green Tyre Company 
Plc. v. Shannon 
Group 
 
R 
Respondent wins despite not 
submitting a response 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel  
Case No. D2006-
0802 harrodsoflasvegas.com 
Harrods Limited v. 
New ForSale 
(HARRODSOFLAS
VEGAS-COM-
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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DOM) 
 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
1360 hibbettsportinggoods.com 
Sports Holdings, Inc. 
v. WhoisGuard 
Protection 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2007-
0008 
berlitzlanguagecourse.inf
o   
Berlitz Investment 
Corporation v. 
Katelin Adkins 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1012 geocities-yahoo.com 
Yahoo! Inc. and 
GeoCities v. Roger 
Campanera Renom 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2001-
1041 jonesapparelgroup.com   
Jones Apparel Group 
Inc .v. Jones Apparel 
Group.com 
 
C 
 Complainant got a second 
attempt having failed in a 
previous case 
  
 C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2000-
1010 babyrus.com 
Geoffrey, Inc., v. 
Russian Baby 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2000-
1015 
lockheedsucks.com 
lockheedmartinsucks.com 
Lockheed Martin 
Corporation v. Dan 
Parisi 
 
R 
 Interesting that there was a 
dissenting opinion, but verdict 
is consistent with the other 
'sucks' cases 
 303 
    Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses   
  
  Multi-member panel with 
dissenting opinion  
Case No: D2002-
0201 janus.info 
Janus Interantional 
Holding Co. v. Scott 
Rademacher 
 
C 
 Interesting case as janus is the 
name of a greek god - seems 
quite generic 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
     
Case No. D2002-
0301 
ingrammmicro.org and 
ingrammmicro.net 
Ingram Micro, Inc. v. 
Ingredients Among 
Modern Microwaves 
 
R Interesting that trademark 
owner lost – because other 
cases seem to suggest that 
illegitimate registration in 
itself is grounds for bad faith 
finding. 
     
  
  Respondent wins despite 
failure to submit a response 
  
  Trademark owner loses 
Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0217 gayselfpic.com  
Bret Kelly v. Web 
Ventures 
 
C 
 Contradictory outcome to the 
previous case 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2003-
0255 1verio.com  
Verio Inc. v 
Sunshinehh 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
d-online.com Deutsche Telekom R Respondent wins 
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0102 AG v. foxQ 
 
     
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel  
Case No. D2003-
0362 ritzcasinoclub.com   
Ellerman Investments 
Limited and The Ritz 
Hotel Casino Limited 
v. Al Cleary 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Trademark owner wins   
     
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0523 rymanauditorium.c 
Gaylord 
Entertainment 
Company v. Nevis 
Domains LLC 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2006-
0300 assetloanco.net 
Asset Loan Co. Pty 
Ltd v. Gregory 
Rogers 
 
 
Interesting take on the 
criticism site as legitimate use 
of name 
  
  Also interesting that it admits 
there is lack of consensus view 
on this issue 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    3 member panel 
Case No. D2007-
1427 
edmudns.com, 
edmunods.com, 
edmunsds.com and 
emdunds.com  
Edmunds.com, Inc. v. 
Keyword Marketing 
Inc. a/k/a Marketing 
Total S.A. a/k/a 
Domain Drop S.A. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
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Case No. D2000-
0243 cbs.org, 
CBS Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. Gaddoor Saidi 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2001-
0903 okidataparts.com 
Oki Data Americas, 
Inc. v. ASD, Inc. 
 
R  Raises the difficult question 
of whether an authorised sales 
or service agent of 
trademarked goods can use the 
trademark at issue in its 
domain name, and goes to a 
lot of trouble to define when 
and under what circumstances 
this is permissible 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Respondent wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0095 
experiancredit.com, 
experiancredit.net and 
experiancredit.org  
Experian Information 
Solutions, Inc. v. 
Credit Research, Inc. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2002-
0484 complexionrx.com. 
Complexions Rx, Inc. 
v. Julie Hogan 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
Case No. D2004-
0481 
porsche-buy.com and 
porschebuy.com 
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. 
Porsche AG v. Del 
Fabbro Laurent 
 
R 
  
    Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single Member panel 
Case No. D2005-
0130 walmartfacts.biz   
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Jeff Milchen 
 
C 
‘Protest’ name transferred – 
but respondent wasn’t actually 
using it 
    
Complainant (trademark 
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owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
D2008-1025 sonyholland.com 
Sony Corporation 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    3 member panel  
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NAF cases 
CASE 
NUMBER DOMAIN 
 
PARTIES 
 
WINNER 
NOTES 
FA94659  
 
eshow.com 
 
C = 3Z Productions 
LLC 
R 
Service mark ‘owner’ loses, 
no trademark 
  R - GlobalDomain  Respondent wins 
    Single member panel  
FA00300009423
7 
 
sahajmarj.org 
 
 
 
C = Shri Ram 
Chandra Mission 
(California) 
R Respondent wins 
Single member panel 
 
 
  
R= Shri Ram 
Chandra Mission 
(India)  
 Respondent had been using 
the mark in India since 1945 + 
could document this 
  
  Complainant held US 
trademark  
FA00080000954
75 
chefsdepot.net 
 
C = M&T quality 
Restaurant Supply 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R = UPI Inc. 
Commerce 
 
Single member panel 
FA00090000955
75 
 
alravista.com 
altaviasta.com 
altaviosta.com 
C = AltaVista 
Company 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Orbyt Web 
Solutions d/b/a Net 
Meter  
 
 
Single member panel 
FA00070000951
59 
 
labportal.com 
 lab-portal.com 
 
C=American Medical 
Laboratories, Inc 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=David A. 
Colondres  
 
Single member panel 
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FA00020000935
48 
zaploan.com 
 
C=Americor 
Mortgage, Inc. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Robert D Bowman  Single member panel 
FA00060000950
68 knowwhatyouown.com 
C=Calvert Group, 
Ltd. 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Joseph Pagano, Jr.  Single member panel 
FA00050000948
91 
cumberlandswan.com 
 
C=Cumberland Swan 
Holdings, Inc. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Jeff Sizemore 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA00030000943
33  
 
bassets.com 
 
 
C=Steven H. 
Schimpff 
 
C 
Interesting case in that it spells 
out some trademarks are more 
entitled to protection than 
others 
  
R=Jerry Sumpton 
 
 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner closes 
    3 member panel  
FA00040000943
87 
penthouse.net 
 
C=General Media 
Communications, Inc 
 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
  
R=JMR Creations 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA#92532 golferswarehouse.com 
C=Golfers’ 
Warehouise Inc. 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Dan Lynch  Single member panel 
FA00050000949
32 sandalsvactations.com  
C=Gorstew Limited, 
Jamaica, and Unique 
Vacations, Miami,. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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R= 
Florida Vacations 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA00080000954
15 800BEACHES.COM 
C=Gorstew 
Limited,Jamaica,, 
and Unique 
Vacations, Miami 
 
 
R 
 
  
R= 
Broker4domains.com
, 
 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel  
FA00050000947
33  casinohollywood.com 
C=Hollywood Casino 
Corporation 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=B.F. LLC  Single member panel 
FA00080000953
46 ITH.COM 
C=ITH GmbH 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= First American  Single member panel 
FA00070000952
42 JEWELERY.COM  
C=Jewelry.com 
 
R 
Fell down on 'service mark' – 
too generic 
  
R= Idealab! 
 
 
Respondent wins 
    Single member panel 
FA00030009437
9 
MILKYWAYMIDNIGH
T.COM 
C=Mars Inc.  C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= 
J.C. Candy Store  
 
 
Single member panel 
FA00020000936
77 
MCKENNAANDCUNE
O.com 
C= McKenna & 
Cuneo, L.L.P. 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=NameIsForSale.co  Single member panel 
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m 
FA00060000950
14 LITTLEFOLKART.COM 
C=Mitchell D. 
Salzman   
 
R 
Very interesting case – even 
anomalous? 
  
R= Sam Nassab  
 
 Finds respondent has 
legitimate interests – even 
though he isn’t using the 
name?  
  
  Does not find bad faith – even 
though he offered to sell it for 
$150,000? 
    Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel  
FA00040000944
49 
msdwprivateequity.com 
msdwipe.com 
C= MORGAN 
STANLEY DEAN 
WITTER & CO. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= SYED HUSSAIN 
CPIC Net 
 
3 member panel 
FA00020000943
11  blueridgeknife.com 
C=Phillip S. Martin, 
dba Blue Ridge 
Knives 
 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Deon Carpenter  3 member panel 
       
     
FA 
0006000094963 
quirkmazda.com  
quirkvolkswagen.com 
C= Quirk Works, Inc. C Interesting case – protest site 
that was ruled against 
  
R=Michael J. 
Maccini 
 Compare to cases where 
protest site was upheld 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA00070000953
14 thecaravanclub.com 
C= The Caravan 
Club, England 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= MRG Sale  Single member panel 
FA00080000955 prudentialamerica.com 
The Prudential 
Insurance Company 
C Straightforward case 
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09 prudentialbrazil.com of America 
  R= J.J. Corp  Single member panel 
FA000 
2000094204 sidchrome.com 
C=UNC-TV C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Gary Tilton  Single member panel 
FA01030000968
41 
panamericanlife.com 
panamlife.com  
C= Pan-American 
Life Insurance 
Company 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Hampton New 
Media 
 
Single member panel 
FA01030000969
34 
cytodine.com cytodyne-
technologies.com 
C=Cytodyne 
Technologies, 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= INetSources  Single member panel 
FA01040000970
31 dykemagossett.com  
C=Dykema Gossett 
PLLC 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= DefaultData.com 
and Brian Wick 
 
Single member panel 
FA01040000970
78 mindazzle.com 
C=MindDazzle 
InterActive v 
R 
Service mark' holder loses 
  R=Mindfire  Respondent wins 
    Single member panel 
FA01040000970
90 egeorgeharrison.com 
C=George Harrison  C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=1WebAddress.co
m 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA01050000971
62 aircanda.com 
C=Air Canada C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= John Zuccarini  Single member panel 
FA01050000973
09 ezloanmart.com 
C=Dollar Financial 
Grouo Inc. 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=EZLoanmart  Single member panel 
FA01050000973
29 pleasantonautomall.com 
C=The Hendrick 
Automotive Group 
(d/b/a Pleasanton 
R 
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Automall)  
  R=Orbit Productions  Respondent wins 
    Single member panel 
FA01060000973
77 bioxide.com  
C= United States 
Filter Corporation  
R 
Trademark owner loses 
  
R= Purlzer 
Corporation 
 
Respondent wins  
    Single member panel 
FA01060000977
22 digitalagent.com 
C= Digital Agent, 
Inc.  
R 
Respondent wins 
  
R= DTA Digital 
Talent Agent 
 
No trademark  
    Single member panel 
FA01070000980
56 thegalluppoll.com 
C= Gallup Inc. C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Eric Keller  3 member panel 
FA01080000996
02  cityofdearborn.com 
C= City of Dearborn  R 
 
  
R= Dan Mekled d/b/a 
ID Solutions 
 Again geographical place not 
acceptable as a mark 
    Respondent wins 
    3 member panel 
FA01090001001
45 kvuu.com and wgir.com  
C=Clear Channel 
Communications, Inc  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Russx Casting 
Company aka 
ForSale 
 
Single member panel 
FA01100001002
48 
mountainmud.com 
mountain-mudd.net 
mountain-mudd.org 
mountain-
manufacturing.net,mounta
inmanufacturing.org  
mountainmud.org 
C= Mountain Mudd 
LLC  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Roy Snowden dba 
World Media 
International Inc dba 
Emerald Coast 
 
Single member panel 
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Manufacturing Inc 
FA01120001027
26 
amerisourcebergen.com 
amerisource-bergen.com 
C=Amerisourceberge
n Corporation 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Yongseok Kwon  Single member panel 
FA01120001031
27 idlj.com  
C=DLJ Long Term 
Investment 
Corporation 
 
R 
Trademark owner loses 
  
R=Nucom Domain 
Name Brokers 
 
 
Respondent wins 
    Single member panel 
FA02010001035
76 albertsonsrx.com  
C=Albertson's Inc.  C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= RXFILLS.NET  Single member panel 
FA02010001039
85 
212postcard.com, and 
212postcards.com  
C=Next Printing and 
Design, Inc. dba 
212Postcards  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Craig Singer  Single member panel 
FA02010001041
87 tweetsierailroad.com 
Tweetsie Railroad, 
Inc. v. Amer-Con 
Industries 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA02020001051
82 patrickjaguar.com 
C= Patrick Jaguar, 
LLC d/b/a Patrick 
Jaguar  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Alex Bruzas  Single member panel 
FA02030001057
63 
Aolmalls.com 
aolmalls.net 
aolmarketplace.com 
aolmarketplace.net 
aolbingo.net  
C=America Online, 
Inc..  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= USACOOP.COM  Single member panel 
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a/k/a Bingo Giant 
FA02030001058
91 ankofamerica.com 
C=Bank of America 
Corporation .  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= 
ANKOFAMERICA.
COM 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA02030001059
78 wwwaa.com 
C= American 
Airlines, Inc., Dallas  
 
C Interesting because AA mark 
is used not just by American 
airlines but by automobile 
association, alcoholics 
anonymous, etc.  
  
R= Registrate Co., 
Seoul 
 Nonetheless the respondent 
had no rights in it  
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA02040001090
30 
northshoretowers.com, 
northshoretowers.net, 
northshoretowers.biz, and 
northshoretowersinfo.com 
C=North Shore 
Towers Apartments, 
Inc. 
 
C 
The claim to a trademark 
seems tenuous 
  
R= Erik Kroll 
 
 However little doubt 
respondent was using name to 
mislead 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA02040001093
71 bankofaerica.com 
C=Bank of America 
Corporation    
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= ThadZeus  Single member panel 
FA07100010889
89 egpedia.com 
C= Expedia, Inc.  C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Ashraf Sello c/o 
EgyptShop Trade 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA05110005974
96 everythingcooking.com 
C=Cooking.com, Inc  
 
C 
Seems dubious – 'cooking' is a 
generic word 
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R= 
EverythingForSaleOn
line c/o Domain 
Registration 
 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA08010011397
98 citifoundation.com 
C=Citigroup Inc and 
Citigroup Foundation  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Western Data 
Exchange c/o P K 
Montgomery 
 
Single member panel 
FA08010011306
80 robedikappa.us 
C=Basic Trademark 
S.A. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Antares S.p.A c/o 
Germano Armani 
 
Single member panel 
FA08010011282
45 hustlertube.com 
C=LFP IP, LLC and 
L.F.P., Inc.  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Gallery Traffic 
Service c/o Mark 
Hurson 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA08010011263
41 
caesarstower.com, 
caesarstowers.com, 
caesarspalacetower.com, 
caesarspalacetowers.com, 
and  
caesarspalacetowerslasve
gas.com 
C=Caesars World, 
Inc.   
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Marcel July Ra 
Christian Kaldenhoff 
c/o mar-motorcycle 
replacement 
airshields GmbH 
 
Single member panel 
FA07120011250
92 aquentfinancial.net 
C=Aquent LLC   C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Maison Tropicale 
S.A 
 
 
Single member panel 
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FA07100010939
13 imageshack.com 
C=ImageShack Corp.  
R= Steven Baxt 
R (Split 
decision) 
1 dissenting panellist 
  
  Both respondent + 
complainant have a trademark 
both of which registered after 
the domain name 
    Respondent wins 
  
  3 member panel with 
dissenting opinion 
FA07100010880
44 
phoenixlifeinsurancecomp
any.com 
C=Phoenix Life 
Insurance Company  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Belize Domain 
WHOIS Service Lt 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA07090010821
60 rockresort.com  
C=RockResorts 
International LLC & 
The Vail Corporation   
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= HempWorld, Inc. 
c/o Matthijs Huijgen 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA07090010806
47 chervontexacocards.com 
C=Chevron 
Intellectual Property 
LLC  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Domain Admin 
c/o Match Domains 
LLC 
 
Single member panel 
FA07080010658
37 bostonlimos.com 
C=Manny Pasha Dismissed Panel didn't want to get 
involved in what is clearly a 
wider business dispute 
  
R= John Koveos c/o 
bostonlimos 
 
 
Case dismissed 
FA07080010609
92 
googledatadrive.com, 
googlenetstorage.com, 
googlewebdrive.com, 
googlewebstorage.com, 
mygoogledrive.com, and 
mygooglestorage.com  
C=Google Inc.   
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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  R= Patrick Babaian  Single member panel 
FA07080010587
67 
dransfieldandross.com, 
dransfieldross.com, and 
dransfield-ross.com 
 
C=Dransfield and 
Ross Ltd.  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= N.S. Wolf & 
Assoc. c/o Nathan 
Wolf 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA07070010458
52 
morganstanleyclientserver
.com, 
morganstanleyclientservic
es.com, and 
mydeskmorganstanley.co
m 
C=Morgan Stanley 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Domain Park 
Limited 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA07070010451
28 1800sendftds.com  
C=Florists' 
Transworld Delivery, 
Inc. 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Mike Lopez  Single member panel 
FA06120008688
25 medhelp.com 
C=Med Help 
International, Inc.  
 
R 
Respondent wins 
  
R=[Unknown 
Registrant] 
 
‘Service mark’ holder loses 
    Single member panel  
FA06120008640
72 deltasigmatheta.com 
C=Delta Sigma Theta 
Sorority, Inc.  
C Interesting illustration of what 
is and is not considered bona 
fide use 
  
R= Minerva 
Computer Services 
 
 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06120008615
boycottplanetfitness.com C-PFIP, LLC  C ‘Protest’ site ruled against – 
justified on the grounds that it 
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94  is not merely a protest site but 
has commercial motivations  
 
  
R= Vendetta 
Marketing 
 Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06110008536
98 worldofproducts.com 
C=Specialty 
Merchandise Corp.  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Roswell, Jo-Ann 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06110008467
59 popular-mortgage.info  
C=Popular, Inc.  C Seems a bit dubious – 
‘popular’ is a generic term 
  
R= Terence Tan c/o 
Success Junction 
Group 
 
 
However the respondent had 
voluntarily agreed to transfer 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06110008323
76 netzerodsl.com 
C=NetZero, Inc.   C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Digi Real Estate 
Foundation 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06110008310
79 wwwlcitigroup.com  
C=Citigroup, Inc.   
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=50.com 
domain/web 
design/web 
 
Single member panel 
FA06100008276
83 myfinalfour.com 
C=The National 
Collegiate Athletic 
Association  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Allen Terjesen  Single member panel 
FA06100008232
63 growerflower.com 
C=Buy Easy Ltd.   
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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R= TTY c/o Sunny 
Adal 
 
Single member panel 
FA06100008197
88 
epxedia.com, 
expedial.com and 
expeida.com  
C=Expedia, Inc.  
(Chicago) 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Expedia Inc. 
(Washington) 
 
Single member panel 
FA06090007914
33 
bayloraids.com, 
baylorfan.com, 
baylorgrapevinehospital.c
om, 
baylorhospitaldallas.com, 
baylormedicalcenter.com, 
and 
baylormedicalschool.com 
C=Baylor University, 
Austin, Texas 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Baylor University, 
Waco, Texas 
 
Single member panel 
FA06080007851
36 yaffa.com  
C=Basic Line, Inc. v. 
Isaac Shepher 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06080007829
12 liquidsplenda.com 
R=McNeil 
Nutritionals, LLC v. 
Steven Odinetz 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06070007589
81 lifestylelounge-travel.com 
C=Summit Group, 
LLC. v. LSO, Ltd 
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06070007653
07 basketball-goals.com 
R=Bryan Kilpatrick 
v. Jeff McDonald 
 
R 
Respondent wins 
  
  No real trademark or service 
mark involved 
    Single member panel  
FA06070007550 inphonictruth.com C=InPhonic Inc..  C 
Complainant (trademark 
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owner) wins 
  
R= Rick Rahim and 
BusinessVentures.co
m 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06070007446
13 campuscircle.com 
C=Campus Circle, 
Incorporated.  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= MustNeed.com  Single member panel 
FA06060007418
52 goldmansex.com 
C=Goldman, Sachs & 
Co.  
 
C 
This seems somewhat dubious 
decision 
  
R= NA  Goldmansex hardly 
confusingly similar to 
goldmansachs – average 
internet user unlikely to 
mistake one for the other 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06060007403
29 enterprisecar-rental.com 
C=Enterprise Rent-
A-Car Company  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Craig 
Chamberlain 
 
Single member panel 
FA06060007366
47 Prudentialappraisals.com 
C=The Prudential 
Insurance Company 
of America  . 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Stephen Keohane  Single member panel 
FA06060007330
16 herbalifestore.com 
C=Herbalife 
International of 
America, Inc.,  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Ratio 
WebServices c/o 
Daniel Reimann 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06060007285
nike-cancer-bracelets.com C=Nike, Inc.  C 
Complainant (trademark 
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56 owner) wins 
  
R= SEM Hosting Inc 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06060007245
09 greenpc.com 
C=GREENPC INC.  C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Lee Joohee 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA06050007150
52 quickerloans.net 
C=Quicken Loans 
Inc. 
 
C  Seems like typosquatting, on 
the other hand ‘quickerloans’ 
seems like a fairly obvious 
name for a loans service 
  
R= Keith Davies  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA05110006014
55 myxbox.com 
C=Microsoft 
Corporation  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Woo Seungchul 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA05110005931
14 sportbeans.com 
C=Jelly Belly Candy 
Company, Inc.  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Rich Schallmo 
 
 
Single member panel 
FA05100005895
01 beatthebookstore.com 
C=Beat the 
Bookstore, LLC   
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= May Enterprise  Single member panel 
FA05090005670
39 teensmart.com 
C=Advanced Drivers 
Education Products 
and Training, Inc.  
R Interesting that it finds a portal 
/ links to be legitimate use – 
some cases have not 
  
R= Michelle L. 
Samonek, of 
McDonough Holland 
& Allen 
 
Respondent wins 
    3 Member panel   
FA05080005503
homedepotsucks.com C=Homer TLC, Inc.   R 
Protest site upheld – ‘sucks’ 
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45 added to domain name 
  
R=GreenPeople  Respondent was actively using 
the name for protest site 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Respondent wins 
    Single member panel  
FA06040006713
04 
mymorganstanleyplatinu
m.com 
C=Morgan Stanley   
 
C Strange case - raised issue of 
whether a cat can hold a 
domain name 
  
R= Meow  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
FA06040006724
31 safeguard-storage.com 
C=Safeguard 
Operations, LLC   
R=Safeguard Storage 
R 
Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single Member panel  
FA05030004367
35 indb.com 
C=IMDb, Inc.  R 
 
  
R= Seventh Summit 
Ventures 
 
 
Illustrates how trademarks 
registered after the domain 
name are not accepted 
  
  Surprising though that indb is 
not considered confusingly 
similar to imdb 
    Respondent wins 
    Trademark owner loses 
    3 Member panel   
FA02040001093
86 
whirlpoolparts.com and 
kitchenaidparts.com 
C=Whirlpool 
Properties, Inc. & 
Whirlpool 
Corporation  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R= Ace Appliance 
Parts and Service 
 
 
Single member panel 
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FA11020013742
40 
golddustwest.org 
 
C= Gold Dust West 
Casino 
C Straightforward 
cybersquatting case – meets 
all criteria 
  R= Michael Barnett  Complainant wins 
    Single member panel 
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ANDRC CASES   
CASE 
NUMBER 
DOMAIN 
 
PARTIES WINNER NOTES 
 
CN-0800209 
 
ruyanstore.com 
 
C =Beijing SBT 
RUYAN Technology 
& Development Co.   
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Marios 
Papanikolaou  
 
 Single member panel 
CN-0800208 
 
chinauniopay.com 
 
C=CHINA 
UNIONPAY CO., 
LTD.  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins, but respondent 
had already agreed to transfer 
  
R=DEMAND 
DOMAINS, INC.  
 
Single member panel  
CN-0700147 
 
airchina.org 
 C=Air China Limited  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Interxis 
Technologies BVBA 
(Kurt Briers)  
 
Single member panel 
CN-0700137 
 
carlylechina.com 
 
C=T.C.Group, L.L.C  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Chen Derong   Ample evidence of bad faith 
    Multimember panel 
CN-0800195 
 
 
 
biamp.net 
 
 
 
C=Biamp Systems 
Corporation, 
Rauland-Borg 
Corporation  
 
C 
Interesting defence, but 
ultimately shown to be false 
since the complainant did have 
a foothold in the Chinese 
market long before 2004 
  
R=Shanghai Bipai 
Dianzi  
 Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
CN-0800198 redoffice.com C=Beijing Redflag 
CH2000 Software 
C At first finding of no 
legitimate interests seems 
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Co., Ltd. 
R=Li Li 
 
suspect since the name was 
apparently being used for a 
nonprofit site 
   
 However, is justified in the 
following grounds: The 
evidence submitted by the 
Complainant shows that the 
disputed domain name, since 
its registration in 2004, has 
not been used at least until 
April 2008. This led the 
panel to infer that the 
website for non-profit 
purpose was developed only 
after the dispute was 
brought. 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
CN-0800193 boschhk.com 
C=Robert Bosch 
GmbH   
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=GUANG ZHOU 
BOSCHHID AUTO 
SUPPL  
 
Single member panel 
CN-0700153 epson-paper.com 
C=精工爱普生株式
会社  
C 
Straightforward case 
  
R=Wuxi Tenw 
Information Tec Co. 
Ltd.  
 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
CN-0600102 .inachina.com 
C=Schaeffler KG 
INA  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=warren   3 Member panel 
CN-0700134 cqtv.com 
C=Chongqing 
Broadcasting Group  
R Takes Chinese law 
interpretation that if a 
trademark is not registered, it 
is not valid 
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  R=Qi Zhong Yan    
     
  
  Respondent wins Complainant 
loses, no trademark 
  
  Complaint fell down on 
criterion 1 
    3 member panel 
CN-0700131 kraus-naimer.net 
C= Kraus & Naimer 
Gesellschaft m.b.H  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Xu Peng Cheng   Single member panel 
CN-0800187 592.com C=Zhai Zuolian  R Failed on lack of trademark 
  R= Chenmin  
 Respondent wins 
Single member panel 
CN-0600114 asics-3c.com C=Asics Corporation  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Asics Chen   Single member panel 
CN-0700156 myteaforte.com C=Xinmin Cui 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R= Lulin Gao    Single member panel  
HK-0800183 
 
 
likashing.org 
 
 
C= (1)Li Ka Shing ; 
(2) Li Ka Shing 
Foundation  
C Straightforward case – but 
respondent had in any case 
already agreed to the transfer 
 
  
R=Chui Siu Cheung 
of Bookmarkking 
Info.  
 Common law trademark is 
recognised here. Reason - 
panel abiding by Hong Kong 
law, which does recognise 
common law trademarks.  
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
Single member panel 
HK-0800164 duoleshi.net.net 
C=Imperial Chemical 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
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Industries Plc  owner) wins 
  
R=YingGuo 
DuoLeShi Paint Co., 
Ltd.  
 
Single member panel  
HK-0800159 
 
chinaiveco.com 
 
C= Iveco S.p.A.  
 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Nanjing Guoyuan 
Tech Ltd.  
 
Single member panel  
HK-0800155 
 
shrue.com 
 
C=Shure 
Incorporated  
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Zhang Jia Bin   Single member panel  
HK-0700150 
 
 
 
 
 
desciclopedia.org 
 
 
 
 
 
C=Carl Austin 
Bennett  
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Seems a somewhat 
questionable decision – in that 
the trademark seems to have 
been filed after the domain 
name. Moreover panel does 
not explain why the trademark 
rights still stand under this 
circumstance. 
  
R=Domain Park 
Limited  
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that 
it wasn’t used / offered to the 
public for sale, a convincing 
case doesn’t seem to have 
been made on point 1. 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel  
HK-0700147 
 
 
welovehongkong.com 
 
 
C=Excellent 
Management Limited  
 
R 
Interesting, but ultimately 
straightforward enough – the 
complainant failed to prove 
criterion 1 
  R=Vich Marco  Interesting also that the panel 
stated it regretted the decision 
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since it believes that the 
complainant has a better claim 
to the name, but this isn’t what 
matters – under the rules the 
case must fail 
  
  Therefore respondent wins, 
complainant loses 
    No trademark involved 
    3 member panel 
HK-0700141 baiweiwine.com 
C=Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Mr Zhao Tianhu  Single member panel  
HK-0700135 
 
saia-borgess.com 
 
C=Saia-Burgess 
Electronics Holding 
AG 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Yueqingshi 
Kaidaliyibiao Co., 
Ltd 
 
Single member panel 
HK-0700134 nvidia.mobi 
C=Nvidia 
Corporation 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=施?? Shi 
ShuaiDong 
 
Single member panel 
HK-0700119 
 
hkjcmarksix.com 
 
 C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
HK-0700116 
 
 
theta-world.com 
 
 
C=Thetaworld 
Corporation 
R 
Trademark registered 5 years 
after the domain name – so 
hard to find bad faith 
  
R=Daniel Albrecht  Respondent wins DESPITE 
not submitting a response  
    Trademark owner loses 
    Single member panel 
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HK-0400044 citysuper.com 
C=City Super 
Limited 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=C.K. Li  3 Member panel 
HK-0400047 plan-in.com 
C=Plan In Interior & 
Contracting Co Ltd 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 qds-net.com R=Ashura Lee C Single member panel  
HK-0400050 
 
51botox.com 
 
C=Allergan, Inc  
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Shanghai Ilongen 
Bio Technology,Co., 
Ltd 
 
Single member panel  
HK-0400051 
 
 
 
woerma.com 
 
 
 
C=WAL-MART 
Stores,Inc. 
C 
Demonstrates that Chinese 
language equivalents of 
English-language trademarks 
are protected under the UDRP 
  
R=Weiqiu Zhong  Interesting also because the 
‘trademark’ was in fact 
unregistered at the time of the 
domain name registration –  
yet protected – unlike some 
other cases – though was a 
well-known mark in China 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel  
HK-0400054 cathaypacificairline.com 
C=Cathay Pacific 
Airways Limited 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Tang Nguyen  Single member panel 
HK-0400055 page.com 
C=Sung Ok Cho R Interesting case, but 
predictably it fell down 
straightaway on criterion 1. 
  
R=Korean Online 
Web Agency 
 Not the kind of thing the 
UDRP was intended to deal 
with. 
 330 
    Complaint dismissed 
    Complainant loses 
    No trademark involved 
    Single member panel 
HK-0600084 
 
 
 
asiabase.com 
 
 
 
C=Asia Base A/S C 
Correctly states that paragraph 
4 a.(i) of the Rules does not 
require that rights need to be 
registered 
 
  
R=Wah Ching Kwok  (So why did earlier cases 
apparently require it?) 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel  
HK-0600083 chipmos.com 
C=ChipMOS 
Technologies Inc.  
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Charles Yeh  Single member panel 
HK-0600080 hennessy-cn.com 
C=Societe Jas 
Hennessy & Co 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=汕头市潮南区嘉
柔化妆品有限公司 
 
Single member panel  
HK-0600079 randyhanger.com 
C=Randy Hangers, 
LLC 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Chunshui Co. Ltd.  Single member panel 
HK-0600078 tvbclub.com 
C=Television 
Broadcasts Limited 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Chen Hua Zhong  Single member panel 
HK-0600077 
 
santonprene .com 
 
C= Clifford Chance 
Advanced Elastomer 
Systems L.P 
C Straightforward case – apart 
from no confirmed ID on 
registrant  
  R= Li Ming  
Complainant (trademark 
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owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
CN-1000395 
 
 
fuanna.com 
 
 
C= Shenzhen Fuanna 
Bedding and 
Furnishing Co.,Ltd 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
  
R= CDN Properties 
Incorporated 
 
Single member panel 
HK-0500061 
 
 
smartone-vodafone.com 
 
 
C=SmarTone Mobile 
Communications Ltd. 
and Vodafone Group 
plc 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
 
 
  R=Ho S  Single member panel 
HK-0500064 cathypacific.com 
C=Cathay Pacific 
Airways Limited 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Cathypacific Web 
Master 
 
3 member panel 
HK-0500066 ascotsports.com 
C=Pintas Consulting 
Group Sdn Bhd 
R Failed on criterion 1 – DID 
NOT prove a service mark 
  R=hong ong  Single member panel 
HK-1100362 americaneagleboot.com    
C=Retail Royalty 
Company & AEO 
Management Co. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=zhang han  Single member panel 
HK-0600090 winghangbank.com 
C=Wing Hang Bank 
Limited 
C False registration details as 
one reason for bad faith 
  R=Richard Feldman  Otherwise straightforward 
  
  Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
    Single member panel 
HK-0600092 macaus10t.com 
C=Sociedade de 
Lotarias e Aposta 
C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
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  R=Xu Ming  Single member panel 
CN-1000375 inlacoste.com  
C=LACOSTE S.A C Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=Eyu Lang  Single member panel  
HK-0600107 marrybrown.com 
C=Marrybrown Fried 
Chicken 
 Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Rare Domain 
DotCom 
 
Single member panel 
HK-0700113 
 
manthiri.com 
 
C=Sea N See Private 
Ltd. 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  R=iPlanet Network  Single member panel 
HK-0700115 
 
 
sydus.com 
 
 
C=Sydus Pte 
Ltd.;Saumil Nanavati 
R=Jeonggon Seo 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
Single member panel 
HK-0700112 
 
palmrite.com 
 
C=Dipped Products 
Limited 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
  
R=Mr. Eddy 
Tsai/Palmrite Corp 
 Single member panel 
 
HK-1100367 
 
 
 
 
olayclub.net 
 
 
 
 
C= The Procter & 
Gamble Company 
R= olayclu 
C 
Complainant (trademark 
owner) wins 
Single member panel 
Name not being used + this 
used as evidence of bad faith 
based on precedent. 
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Appendix 6.5: WG-A recommendations and the Names Council vote on each 
 
Working Group-A Recommendation Names Council Vote 
1. Generally, the recommendations of Chapter 3 of the 
WIPO Report relating to Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Procedures (UDRP) should be put into place as soon 
as possible after the ICANN Board meeting in 
Santiago, Chile, subject to recommendation 2 [sic, 4]) 
below, and all Registrars should be required to adopt a 
UDRP, namely, that recommended by WIPO, until 
such time as ICANN decides that it should be 
replaced. 
Unqualified yes: 11  
Yes with dissent: 3 (gTLD reps.)  
No: 1 (ccTLD rep.)  
Not voting: 2 (ccTLD reps.) 
One late vote: Yes 
 
 
2. The DNSO recommends the adoption and 
implementation of a uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy. Such DRP should be uniform across current 
gTLDs, approved by ICANN and implemented on a 
gTLD wide level in a uniform way. 
 
Unqualified yes: 11  
Yes with dissent/comment: 4 (3-gTLD 
reps., 1-ccTLD rep.)  
No: 0  
Not voting: 2 (ccTLD reps.) 
One late vote: Yes 
3. Uniformity should affect both material or 
substantive rules as well as procedural rules with an 
effect on substantive rights of the parties. Some minor, 
administrative, differences could be implemented in 
procedures followed by different UDRP Service 
Providers. In this regard we recommend that ICANN 
establishes an accreditation process for DRP Service 
providers based on objective criteria, and that all 
accredited DRP Service Providers should be 
incorporated by the Registration Authorities in their 
Domain Name Registration Agreements with 
registrants. 
Unqualified yes: 12  
Yes with dissent: 3 (gTLD reps.)  
No: 0  
Not voting: 2 (ccTLD reps.) 
One late vote: Yes 
 
 
 
4. For at least the balance of 1999, this UDRP should 
apply only to bad faith / abusive domain name 
registrations (cybersquatting) on a mandatory basis, 
but without precluding the parties' ability to litigate 
the dispute. Further, once proof of litigation is 
submitted to the WIPO panel, it should immediately 
cease its decisionmaking process pending the outcome 
of the litigation. 
Unqualified yes: 10  
Yes with dissent/comment: 5 (3-gTLD 
reps.; 1-ccTLD; 1- IPC)  
No: 0  
Not voting: 2 (ccTLD reps.) 
One late vote: Yes 
However, in light of the procedural and substantive 
concerns enumerated below that have been expressed 
by Respondents to the WGA RFC process, it is 
recommended these concerns should be referred back 
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to WIPO for its reconsideration for a short, thirty day 
period. WIPO should be asked to call for an expert 
group of arbitrators and IP practitioners to work with 
it on an urgent basis to clarify the procedural 
implications of these concerns. WIPO's 
recommendations and conclusions in relation to these 
issues should then be put back before ICANN for 
evaluation by way of this, or another WG established 
for this purpose, for a two week period, before being 
implemented. However, this should not delay 
implementation of the WIPO UDRP. 
[These concerns may be summarized: 
a. Need for a "user's guide" describing the process 
b. Need to accord SLD holder with a reciprocal right 
to appeal, using a legally adequate mechanism 
c. Need for future refinement of process timetable, 
including mechanism extensions 
d. Consideration of future development of substantive 
rules of decision independent of law of any particular 
nation 
e. Need for a more clearly articulated standard of 
proof to be used in deciding whether a registration was 
abusive.] 
  
5. It is recommended that early in 2000, WIPO should 
be asked to provide a timetable in which it can make 
available its UDRP with an adequate number of 
arbitrators from a number of different countries who 
speak a cross section of languages, trainfored in 
online arbitration, making it possible to offer these 
dispute resolution services on a voluntary basis to 
disputants having trademark / domain name disputes. 
It is recommended that such voluntary dispute 
resolution shall not preclude access to courts unless 
both parties to the dispute contract out of such access, 
in which case the results of the online dispute 
resolution process will be final and binding. 
Unqualified yes: 13  
Yes with dissent: 0  
No: 2  
Not voting: 2 (ccTLD reps.) 
One late vote: Yes 
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Appendix 6.6: Summary of key points from public comments on establishment of a 
UDRP (August-September 1999) 
Source: ICANN public comments forum on UDRP establisment. Retrieved 19 September 
2011, from http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/maillist.html  
Position  Poster / affiliation 
Outright opposition to principle of 
UDRP 
David Schutt 
(Speco, Inc.);  
Shari Steele (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation); 
Carl Oppedahl (Background not 
disclosed);  
Judith Oppenheimer (Consumer rights 
campaigner); 
biker (Background not disclosed);  
Michael Walker (Background not 
disclosed);  
L & P Nelson ((Background not 
disclosed);  
Mikki Barry (Domain Name Rights 
Coalition);  
Mark Duane (‘online entrepreneur’);  
Terry Seale (Background not 
disclosed);  
Theresa Amato (Consumer Project on 
Technology);   
Maren S. Leizaola (Background not 
disclosed);  
Matt Hooker 
Webmaster@Net-Speed.com; 
Celeste Brunson (Background not 
disclosed);  
Dennis Schaefer (Background not 
disclosed);  
Dan Parisi 
WhiteHouse.com 
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No opposition to principle, but 
opposition to / proposed amendments to 
specific proposals  
 
 
KathrynKL@aol.com (NCUC); 
Barbara Simons (Association for 
Computing Machinery); 
Mark Perkins (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community Library); 
A. Michael Froomkin(Professor of 
Law, University of Miami); 
Russ Smith 
http://consumer.net; 
Steve Hoss; 
 
(hoss.com) 
Sandra Murray (Background not 
disclosed); 
Alan Smith 
(supermarketpromotions.com); 
Steven A. Jackson (Background not 
disclosed); 
Tony Klinkert (Background not 
disclosed);  
John Gilmore (Background not 
disclosed); 
Mheltzer (INTA); 
Douglas W. Kim 
dwk@techattorney.com; 
Mark Babiarz (Background not 
disclosed); 
David Post -- Temple Univ. School of 
Law; 
Mark Leventhal (Background not 
disclosed); 
Charles Peterson (Background not 
disclosed); 
Atsuo Torii(Hitachi, Ltd.); 
Tepper, Maury (Glaxo Wellcome 
Inc.); 
Curt Krechevsky 
(Reebok International Ltd).; 
John M. Jacobs (background not 
disclosed); 
Toshi Tsubo (JPNIC);  
Philip Davison (Gateway, Inc.); 
Fred Carl III 
(Bayer Corporation); 
Kathryn Barrett Park, (NBA 
Properties, Inc); 
Milton Mueller (Associate Professor, 
Syracuse University, School of 
Information Studies); 
Sarah Deutsch (Bell Atlantic); 
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Fausett (Fausett, Gaeta & Lund, LLP); 
Anne Lucey (Viacom Inc).; 
 Scott B. Schwartz (Intel Corporation); 
Caroline G. Chicoine (Blackwell 
Sanders Peper Martin Lawyers); 
David Lizmi (background not 
disclosed);  
Jonathan Weinberg 
(Professor of Law, Wayne State 
University); 
Tsuyoshi ONODERA (Japanese 
Patent Office); 
Lee Schroeder (AIPLA); 
Susan Anthony (MCI WorldCom); 
Rita Rodin (AOL); 
Tomohiro Nakamura (The Japan 
Intellectual Property Association); 
Christopher Zaborsky (Background 
not disclosed)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No opposition to principle, but specific 
proposals of are seen as favouring 
trademark interests to an excessive 
degree 
KathrynKL@aol.com (NCUC); 
Barbara Simons (Association for 
Computing Machinery); 
Mark Perkins (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community Library); 
Steve Hoss 
(hoss.com); 
John Gilmore (Background not 
disclosed); 
Tony Mackay (Background not 
disclosed); 
Mark Babiarz (Background not 
disclosed); 
Jonathan Weinberg 
Professor of Law, Wayne State 
University; 
A. Michael Froomkin(Professor of 
Law, University of Miami); 
 
 
Unqualified support for proposals J. Scott Evans (INTA)  
Jeffrey R. Kuester (Kuester Law)  
B. Clark (Background not disclosed) 
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Supporting stronger trademark 
protections than those currently 
proposed 
Mheltzer (INTA) 
Douglas W. Kim 
dwk@techattorney.com 
Tepper, Maury (Glaxo Wellcome Inc.) 
Curt Krechevsky 
(Reebok International Ltd). 
John M. Jacobs (background not 
disclosed) 
Philip Davison Gateway, Inc. 
Fred Carl III 
Bayer Corporation 
Kathryn Barrett Park 
 NBA Properties, Inc 
Sarah Deutsch 
Bell Atlantic 
Anne Lucey 
Viacom Inc 
Scott B. Schwartz 
Intel Corporation 
Caroline G. Chicoine Blackwell 
Sanders Peper Martin Lawyers 
Lee Schroeder AIPLA 
Criticising policy development process 
for not being sufficiently representative 
KathrynKL@aol.com (NCUC) 
Association for Computing 
Machinery; 
Mark Perkins (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community Library); 
Joop Teernstra (Cyberspace 
Association); 
Frederick W. Weingarten 
(American Library Association); 
Raul Echeberria 
(Foro Latinoamericano de Redes); 
Jim Fleming (Background 
undisclosed); 
Alejandro Pisanty; 
Russ Smith (http://consumer.net); 
David Post -- Temple Univ. School of 
Law; 
Jeff Williams (INEGroup); 
Matt Hooker; 
Webmaster@Net-Speed.com; 
A. Michael Froomkin 
Professor of Law 
University of Miami School of Law; 
Jonathan Weinberg 
Professor of Law, Wayne State 
University 
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NCUC should have been involved in 
drafting the policy 
KathrynKL@aol.com (NCUC); 
Association for Computing 
Machinery; 
Mark Perkins (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community Library); 
Joop Teernstra (Cyberspace 
Association); 
Frederick W. Weingarten 
(American Library Association); 
Raul Echeberria 
(Foro Latinoamericano de Redes); 
Jim Fleming (Background 
undisclosed); 
Jeffrey Graber (Association of Internet 
Professionals); 
Ellen Rony (Author);  
A. Michael Froomkin 
(Professor of Law 
University of Miami School of Law); 
Jonathan Weinberg 
(Professor of Law, Wayne State 
University) 
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Appendix 6.7: Summary of major points raised in Public Comments Period on eUDRP 
proposals (12 July-12 August 2009). 
Source: ICANN Public Comments forum on eUDRP Proposals. Opened 12 July 2009. 
Accessed 17 September 2011, at  http://forum.icann.org/lists/eudrp/  
Position  Taken by (posters) 
Support for eUDRP Kristine Dorrain (NAF);  
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial 
Services Inc); 
Marco Rinaudo (Internet.bs Corp. - ICANN 
Accredited Registrar); 
Nick Wenban-Smith (Nominet UK) ; 
Steve Metalitz (IPC); 
Patrick M. Flaherty (Verizon); 
Zbynek Loebl (Czech Arbitration Court); 
Jérôme Rhein (F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG); 
Claudio DiGangi (International Trademark 
Association); 
Douglas M. Isenberg (GigaLaw); 
Philip S. Corwin (Internet Commerce 
Association); 
Yvette Wojciechowski (Fairwinds Partners 
LLC); 
James M. Bladel (GoDaddy); 
Sandrine Gerber (Droit & Affaires 
internationales) 
Opposition to eUDRP   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not clearly for or against the principle Vijaya Sree Nidadhavolu (background not 
disclosed); 
Alexandre FOUCHER (Cecurity.com); 
Steve BILLON (ChamberSign France); 
Mr Michele Neylon (Blacknight 
Solutions)<not support it as it is>; 
Frank Michlick (DomainCocoon Inc) 
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Safeguards must be taken to ensure 
respondents have actual notice of a 
proceeding 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial 
Services Inc) 
Vijaya Sree Nidadhavolu  
Mr Michele Neylon (Blacknight Solutions) 
Frank Michlick (DomainCocoon Inc.) 
Sandrine Gerber 
Institut Fédéral de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
Sandrine Gerber (Droit & Affaires 
internationales) 
 
Philip S. Corwin (Internet Commerce 
Association) 
James M. Bladel (GoDaddy) 
Hard copy of complaint must be issued to 
respondents 
Vijaya Sree Nidadhavolu 
Frank Michlick (DomainCocoon Inc.) 
Sandrine Gerber 
Institut Fédéral de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
Douglas M. Isenberg (Gigalaw) 
Philip S. Corwin (Internet Commerce 
Association) 
James M. Bladel (GoDaddy)    
Sandrine Gerber (Droit & Affaires 
internationales) 
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Appendix 6.8: Summary of key points raised in Public Comments Period on 
Preliminary Report on the State of the UDRP. 15 May – 22 July 2011.  
Source: ICANN Public Comments Forum on Preliminary Report on the State of the UDRP. 
Opened 24 July 2011. Accessed 18 September 2011, at http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim-
report-udrp/  
Position Taken by 
Support for immediate UDRP review RySG;  
Danny Younger (Online journalist / former 
DNSO member); 
NCUC; 
Konstantinos Komaitis (Academic, 
University of Strathcylde); 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial 
Services Inc.);   
Philip S. Corwin (Virtualaw LLP, acting on 
behalf of Internet Commerce Association); 
David Simon (Teaching Fellow, Harvard 
Law School) 
Opposition to immediate UDRP review Sarah B. Deutsch (Verizon);  
Fritz E. Attaway 
(Motion Picture Association of America, 
Inc.);   
Rebecca Sandland (on behalf of International 
Federation of Intellectual Property 
Attorneys); 
Claudio Digangi (INTA); 
Elizabeth Cummings (Coalition Against 
Domain Name Abuse); 
Steve DelBianco (Business Constituency); 
Russell Pangborn (Microsoft); 
Kristine Dorrain (NAF); 
Brian Beckham (WIPO); 
Luca Barbero (MARQUES); 
David Taylor (Hogan Lovells LLP); 
Steven J. Metalitz (Coalition for Online 
Accountability); 
J Scott Evans (IPC);  
Frederick Felman (Markmonitor); 
Adam Scoville (RE/MAX, LLC);   
Susan Kawaguchi (Facebook Inc.); 
ICANN At-Large Staff 
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Support for (or states not in opposition to) a 
UDRP review at some future time 
Russell Pangborn (Microsoft); 
Luca Barbero (MARQUES); 
J Scott Evans (IPC);  
David Taylor (Hogan Lovells LLP); 
Rebecca Sandland (on behalf of International 
Federation of Intellectual Property 
Attorneys); 
Frederick Felman (Markmonitor) 
 
Advocating substantive change to UDRP Konstantinos Komaitis (Academic, 
University of Strathcylde); 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial 
Services Inc.);   
David Simon (Teaching Fellow,Harvard Law 
School) 
Advocating procedural change to UDRP Sarah B. Deutsch (Verizon); 
Elizabeth Cummings (Coalition Against 
Domain Name Abuse); 
Steven J. Metalitz (Coalition for Online 
Accountability); 
Philip S. Corwin (Virtualaw LLP, acting on 
behalf of Internet Commerce Association);   
Susan Kawaguchi (Facebook Inc.); 
Cruquenaire Alexandre (Professor,) 
University of Namur, Belgium; 
ICANN At-Large Staff; 
Konstantinos Komaitis (Academic, 
University of Strathcylde); 
George Kirikos (Leap of Faith Financial 
Services Inc.);   
David Simon (Teaching Fellow,Harvard Law 
School); 
Rebecca Sandland, on behalf of International 
Federation of Intellectual Property Attorneys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
